ghsa-fv86-c5hh-rvpj
Vulnerability from github
Published
2025-10-24 18:30
Modified
2025-10-24 18:30
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

zonefs: fix zonefs_iomap_begin() for reads

If a readahead is issued to a sequential zone file with an offset exactly equal to the current file size, the iomap type is set to IOMAP_UNWRITTEN, which will prevent an IO, but the iomap length is calculated as 0. This causes a WARN_ON() in iomap_iter():

[17309.548939] WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 2137 at fs/iomap/iter.c:34 iomap_iter+0x9cf/0xe80 [...] [17309.650907] RIP: 0010:iomap_iter+0x9cf/0xe80 [...] [17309.754560] Call Trace: [17309.757078] [17309.759240] ? lock_is_held_type+0xd8/0x130 [17309.763531] iomap_readahead+0x1a8/0x870 [17309.767550] ? iomap_read_folio+0x4c0/0x4c0 [17309.771817] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x400/0x400 [17309.778848] ? lock_release+0x370/0x750 [17309.784462] ? folio_add_lru+0x217/0x3f0 [17309.790220] ? reacquire_held_locks+0x4e0/0x4e0 [17309.796543] read_pages+0x17d/0xb60 [17309.801854] ? folio_add_lru+0x238/0x3f0 [17309.807573] ? readahead_expand+0x5f0/0x5f0 [17309.813554] ? policy_node+0xb5/0x140 [17309.819018] page_cache_ra_unbounded+0x27d/0x450 [17309.825439] filemap_get_pages+0x500/0x1450 [17309.831444] ? filemap_add_folio+0x140/0x140 [17309.837519] ? lock_is_held_type+0xd8/0x130 [17309.843509] filemap_read+0x28c/0x9f0 [17309.848953] ? zonefs_file_read_iter+0x1ea/0x4d0 [zonefs] [17309.856162] ? trace_contention_end+0xd6/0x130 [17309.862416] ? __mutex_lock+0x221/0x1480 [17309.868151] ? zonefs_file_read_iter+0x166/0x4d0 [zonefs] [17309.875364] ? filemap_get_pages+0x1450/0x1450 [17309.881647] ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x15e/0x620 [17309.888248] ? wait_for_completion_io_timeout+0x20/0x20 [17309.895231] ? lock_is_held_type+0xd8/0x130 [17309.901115] ? lock_is_held_type+0xd8/0x130 [17309.906934] zonefs_file_read_iter+0x356/0x4d0 [zonefs] [17309.913750] new_sync_read+0x2d8/0x520 [17309.919035] ? __x64_sys_lseek+0x1d0/0x1d0

Furthermore, this causes iomap_readahead() to loop forever as iomap_readahead_iter() always returns 0, making no progress.

Fix this by treating reads after the file size as access to holes, setting the iomap type to IOMAP_HOLE, the iomap addr to IOMAP_NULL_ADDR and using the length argument as is for the iomap length. To simplify the code with this change, zonefs_iomap_begin() is split into the read variant, zonefs_read_iomap_begin() and zonefs_read_iomap_ops, and the write variant, zonefs_write_iomap_begin() and zonefs_write_iomap_ops.

Show details on source website


{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-49706"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-125"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-02-26T07:01:46Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nzonefs: fix zonefs_iomap_begin() for reads\n\nIf a readahead is issued to a sequential zone file with an offset\nexactly equal to the current file size, the iomap type is set to\nIOMAP_UNWRITTEN, which will prevent an IO, but the iomap length is\ncalculated as 0. This causes a WARN_ON() in iomap_iter():\n\n[17309.548939] WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 2137 at fs/iomap/iter.c:34 iomap_iter+0x9cf/0xe80\n[...]\n[17309.650907] RIP: 0010:iomap_iter+0x9cf/0xe80\n[...]\n[17309.754560] Call Trace:\n[17309.757078]  \u003cTASK\u003e\n[17309.759240]  ? lock_is_held_type+0xd8/0x130\n[17309.763531]  iomap_readahead+0x1a8/0x870\n[17309.767550]  ? iomap_read_folio+0x4c0/0x4c0\n[17309.771817]  ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x400/0x400\n[17309.778848]  ? lock_release+0x370/0x750\n[17309.784462]  ? folio_add_lru+0x217/0x3f0\n[17309.790220]  ? reacquire_held_locks+0x4e0/0x4e0\n[17309.796543]  read_pages+0x17d/0xb60\n[17309.801854]  ? folio_add_lru+0x238/0x3f0\n[17309.807573]  ? readahead_expand+0x5f0/0x5f0\n[17309.813554]  ? policy_node+0xb5/0x140\n[17309.819018]  page_cache_ra_unbounded+0x27d/0x450\n[17309.825439]  filemap_get_pages+0x500/0x1450\n[17309.831444]  ? filemap_add_folio+0x140/0x140\n[17309.837519]  ? lock_is_held_type+0xd8/0x130\n[17309.843509]  filemap_read+0x28c/0x9f0\n[17309.848953]  ? zonefs_file_read_iter+0x1ea/0x4d0 [zonefs]\n[17309.856162]  ? trace_contention_end+0xd6/0x130\n[17309.862416]  ? __mutex_lock+0x221/0x1480\n[17309.868151]  ? zonefs_file_read_iter+0x166/0x4d0 [zonefs]\n[17309.875364]  ? filemap_get_pages+0x1450/0x1450\n[17309.881647]  ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x15e/0x620\n[17309.888248]  ? wait_for_completion_io_timeout+0x20/0x20\n[17309.895231]  ? lock_is_held_type+0xd8/0x130\n[17309.901115]  ? lock_is_held_type+0xd8/0x130\n[17309.906934]  zonefs_file_read_iter+0x356/0x4d0 [zonefs]\n[17309.913750]  new_sync_read+0x2d8/0x520\n[17309.919035]  ? __x64_sys_lseek+0x1d0/0x1d0\n\nFurthermore, this causes iomap_readahead() to loop forever as\niomap_readahead_iter() always returns 0, making no progress.\n\nFix this by treating reads after the file size as access to holes,\nsetting the iomap type to IOMAP_HOLE, the iomap addr to IOMAP_NULL_ADDR\nand using the length argument as is for the iomap length. To simplify\nthe code with this change, zonefs_iomap_begin() is split into the read\nvariant, zonefs_read_iomap_begin() and zonefs_read_iomap_ops, and the\nwrite variant, zonefs_write_iomap_begin() and zonefs_write_iomap_ops.",
  "id": "GHSA-fv86-c5hh-rvpj",
  "modified": "2025-10-24T18:30:57Z",
  "published": "2025-10-24T18:30:57Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-49706"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/355be6131164c5bacf2e810763835aecb6e01fcb"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3a7f05f104347b407e865c10be2675cd833a4e48"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c1c1204c0d0c1dccc1310b9277fb2bd8b663d8fe"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c2f71b9bb398e2e573bdc2574149f42b45efe410"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}


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