ghsa-fhwm-pc6r-4h2f
Vulnerability from github
Published
2025-10-13 17:43
Modified
2025-10-15 19:14
Severity ?
6.1 (Medium) - CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N
Summary
CommandKit has incorrect command name exposure in context object for message command aliases
Details

Impact

A logic flaw exists in the message command handler of CommandKit that affects how the commandName property is exposed to both middleware functions and command execution contexts when handling command aliases. When a message command is invoked using an alias, the ctx.commandName value reflects the alias rather than the canonical command name. This occurs in both middleware functions and within the command’s own run function.

Although not explicitly documented, CommandKit’s examples and guidance around middleware usage implicitly convey that ctx.commandName represents the canonical command identifier. Middleware examples in the documentation consistently use ctx.commandName to reference the command being executed, and the documentation describes middleware as suitable for “logging, authentication, permission checks, or any other cross-cutting concerns.” As a result, developers reasonably expect ctx.commandName to return the canonical command name and may rely on it for security-sensitive logic.

Developers who assume ctx.commandName is canonical may introduce unintended behavior when relying on it for logic such as permission checks, rate limiting, or audit logging. This could allow unauthorized command execution or inaccurate access control decisions. Slash commands and context menu commands are not affected.

Patches

Fixed in v1.2.0-rc.12. ctx.commandName now consistently returns the actual canonical command name, regardless of the alias used to invoke it.

Workaround

If upgrading isn't immediately possible:

  • Use ctx.command.data.command.name for permission validations, or
  • Include all command aliases in your permission logic.

References

Show details on source website

To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.2.0-rc.11"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "commandkit"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.2.0-rc.1"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.2.0-rc.12"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-62378"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-706"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2025-10-13T17:43:51Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-10-15T17:16:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n\nA logic flaw exists in the message command handler of CommandKit that affects how the `commandName` property is exposed to both middleware functions and command execution contexts when handling command aliases. When a message command is invoked using an alias, the `ctx.commandName` value reflects the alias rather than the canonical command name. This occurs in both middleware functions and within the command\u2019s own run function.\n\nAlthough not explicitly documented, CommandKit\u2019s examples and guidance around middleware usage implicitly convey that `ctx.commandName` represents the canonical command identifier. Middleware examples in the documentation consistently use `ctx.commandName` to reference the command being executed, and the documentation describes middleware as suitable for \u201clogging, authentication, permission checks, or any other cross-cutting concerns.\u201d As a result, developers reasonably expect `ctx.commandName` to return the canonical command name and may rely on it for security-sensitive logic.\n\nDevelopers who assume `ctx.commandName` is canonical may introduce unintended behavior when relying on it for logic such as permission checks, rate limiting, or audit logging. This could allow unauthorized command execution or inaccurate access control decisions. Slash commands and context menu commands are not affected.\n\n### Patches\n\nFixed in v1.2.0-rc.12.\n`ctx.commandName` now consistently returns the actual canonical command name, regardless of the alias used to invoke it.\n\n### Workaround\n\nIf upgrading isn\u0027t immediately possible:\n\n* Use `ctx.command.data.command.name` for permission validations, or\n* Include all command aliases in your permission logic.\n\n### References\n\n* [CommandKit repository](https://github.com/underctrl-io/commandkit)\n* [Middleware documentation](https://commandkit.dev/docs/guide/commands/middlewares)",
  "id": "GHSA-fhwm-pc6r-4h2f",
  "modified": "2025-10-15T19:14:41Z",
  "published": "2025-10-13T17:43:51Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/underctrl-io/commandkit/security/advisories/GHSA-fhwm-pc6r-4h2f"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-62378"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/underctrl-io/commandkit/commit/440385a3e5de3fa3d2a76d23a807995cb29602fd"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/underctrl-io/commandkit"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "CommandKit has incorrect command name exposure in context object for message command aliases"
}


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