ghsa-f8mr-jv2c-v8mg
Vulnerability from github
6.3 (Medium) - CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:P/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N
Impact
The Python TUF reference implementation tuf<0.12 will incorrectly trust a previously downloaded root metadata file which failed verification at download time. This allows an attacker who is able to serve multiple new versions of root metadata (i.e. by a man-in-the-middle attack) culminating in a version which has not been correctly signed to control the trust chain for future updates.
While investigating the reported vulnerability, we discovered that the detailed client workflow was not fully implemented. Specifically, for step 1.3 the newly downloaded root metadata was not being verified with a threshold of keys specified in the new root metadata file. This missing step of the client workflow has been implemented in PR #1101, which is included in v0.14.0 of tuf.
Patches
A fix, is available in version 0.12 and newer.
Workarounds
No workarounds are known for this issue.
References
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "tuf"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.12.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-15163"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345",
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2020-09-09T17:27:31Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2020-09-09T18:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Impact\nThe Python TUF reference implementation `tuf\u003c0.12` will incorrectly trust a previously downloaded root metadata file which failed verification at download time. This allows an attacker who is able to serve multiple new versions of root metadata (i.e. by a man-in-the-middle attack) culminating in a version which has not been correctly signed to control the trust chain for future updates.\n\nWhile investigating the reported vulnerability, we discovered that the detailed client workflow was not fully implemented. Specifically, for step 1.3 the newly downloaded root metadata was not being verified with a threshold of keys specified in the new root metadata file.\nThis missing step of the client workflow has been implemented in [PR #1101](https://github.com/theupdateframework/tuf/pull/1101), which is included in [v0.14.0](https://github.com/theupdateframework/tuf/releases/tag/v0.14.0) of tuf.\n\n### Patches\nA [fix](https://github.com/theupdateframework/tuf/pull/885), is available in version [0.12](https://github.com/theupdateframework/tuf/releases/tag/v0.12.0) and newer.\n\n### Workarounds\nNo workarounds are known for this issue.\n\n### References\n* Pull request resolving the invalid root becoming trusted issue [PR 885](https://github.com/theupdateframework/tuf/pull/885)\n* Pull request implementing self verification of newly downloaded root metadata [PR 1101](https://github.com/theupdateframework/tuf/pull/1101)",
"id": "GHSA-f8mr-jv2c-v8mg",
"modified": "2024-11-18T22:41:33Z",
"published": "2020-09-09T17:29:27Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/theupdateframework/tuf/security/advisories/GHSA-f8mr-jv2c-v8mg"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-15163"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/theupdateframework/tuf/pull/885"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/theupdateframework/tuf/commit/3d342e648fbacdf43a13d7ba8886aaaf07334af7"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/tuf/PYSEC-2020-145.yaml"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/theupdateframework/tuf"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/theupdateframework/tuf/releases/tag/v0.12.0"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://pypi.org/project/tuf"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:P/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Invalid root may become trusted root in The Update Framework (TUF)"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability is confirmed from an analyst perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: This vulnerability was exploited and seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Patched: This vulnerability was successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not exploited: This vulnerability was not exploited or seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expresses doubt about the veracity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.