GHSA-CVQ8-GHFQ-J2CG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-09 18:30 – Updated: 2025-12-09 18:30In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
arm64: mte: Avoid setting PG_mte_tagged if no tags cleared or restored
Prior to commit 69e3b846d8a7 ("arm64: mte: Sync tags for pages where PTE is untagged"), mte_sync_tags() was only called for pte_tagged() entries (those mapped with PROT_MTE). Therefore mte_sync_tags() could safely use test_and_set_bit(PG_mte_tagged, &page->flags) without inadvertently setting PG_mte_tagged on an untagged page.
The above commit was required as guests may enable MTE without any control at the stage 2 mapping, nor a PROT_MTE mapping in the VMM. However, the side-effect was that any page with a PTE that looked like swap (or migration) was getting PG_mte_tagged set automatically. A subsequent page copy (e.g. migration) copied the tags to the destination page even if the tags were owned by KASAN.
This issue was masked by the page_kasan_tag_reset() call introduced in commit e5b8d9218951 ("arm64: mte: reset the page tag in page->flags"). When this commit was reverted (20794545c146), KASAN started reporting access faults because the overriding tags in a page did not match the original page->flags (with CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS=y):
BUG: KASAN: invalid-access in copy_page+0x10/0xd0 arch/arm64/lib/copy_page.S:26 Read at addr f5ff000017f2e000 by task syz-executor.1/2218 Pointer tag: [f5], memory tag: [f2]
Move the PG_mte_tagged bit setting from mte_sync_tags() to the actual place where tags are cleared (mte_sync_page_tags()) or restored (mte_restore_tags()).
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-50675"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-12-09T16:17:19Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\narm64: mte: Avoid setting PG_mte_tagged if no tags cleared or restored\n\nPrior to commit 69e3b846d8a7 (\"arm64: mte: Sync tags for pages where PTE\nis untagged\"), mte_sync_tags() was only called for pte_tagged() entries\n(those mapped with PROT_MTE). Therefore mte_sync_tags() could safely use\ntest_and_set_bit(PG_mte_tagged, \u0026page-\u003eflags) without inadvertently\nsetting PG_mte_tagged on an untagged page.\n\nThe above commit was required as guests may enable MTE without any\ncontrol at the stage 2 mapping, nor a PROT_MTE mapping in the VMM.\nHowever, the side-effect was that any page with a PTE that looked like\nswap (or migration) was getting PG_mte_tagged set automatically. A\nsubsequent page copy (e.g. migration) copied the tags to the destination\npage even if the tags were owned by KASAN.\n\nThis issue was masked by the page_kasan_tag_reset() call introduced in\ncommit e5b8d9218951 (\"arm64: mte: reset the page tag in page-\u003eflags\").\nWhen this commit was reverted (20794545c146), KASAN started reporting\naccess faults because the overriding tags in a page did not match the\noriginal page-\u003eflags (with CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS=y):\n\n BUG: KASAN: invalid-access in copy_page+0x10/0xd0 arch/arm64/lib/copy_page.S:26\n Read at addr f5ff000017f2e000 by task syz-executor.1/2218\n Pointer tag: [f5], memory tag: [f2]\n\nMove the PG_mte_tagged bit setting from mte_sync_tags() to the actual\nplace where tags are cleared (mte_sync_page_tags()) or restored\n(mte_restore_tags()).",
"id": "GHSA-cvq8-ghfq-j2cg",
"modified": "2025-12-09T18:30:32Z",
"published": "2025-12-09T18:30:32Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-50675"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/749e9fc18b1e1a3f93a9512e91bd7f93002d2821"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/918002bdbe4328c8c0164a22e8ebf2384b80dc23"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a8e5e5146ad08d794c58252bab00b261045ef16d"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
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