GHSA-CV7M-C9JX-VG7Q
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-18 00:46 – Updated: 2026-02-18 00:46Summary
Authenticated attackers can read arbitrary files from the Gateway host by supplying absolute paths or path traversal sequences to the browser tool's upload action. The server passed these paths to Playwright's setInputFiles() APIs without restricting them to a safe root.
Severity remains High due to the impact (arbitrary local file read on the Gateway host), even though exploitation requires authenticated access.
Exploitability / Preconditions
This is not a "drive-by" issue.
An attacker must:
- Reach the Gateway HTTP surface (or otherwise invoke the same browser control hook endpoints).
- Present valid Gateway auth (bearer token / password), as required by the Gateway configuration.
- In common default setups, the Gateway binds to loopback and the onboarding wizard generates a gateway token even for loopback.
- Have the
browsertool permitted by tool policy for the target session/context (and have browser support enabled).
If an operator exposes the Gateway beyond loopback (LAN/tailnet/custom bind, reverse proxy, tunnels, etc.), the impact increases accordingly.
Affected Packages / Versions
- Package:
openclaw(npm) - Vulnerable:
< 2026.2.14(includes latest published2026.2.13) - Patched:
>= 2026.2.14(planned next release)
Details
Entry points:
POST /tools/invokewith{"tool":"browser","action":"upload",...}POST /hooks/file-chooser(browser control hook)
When the upload paths are not validated, Playwright reads the referenced files from the local filesystem and attaches them to a page-level <input type="file">. Contents can then be exfiltrated by page JavaScript (e.g. via FileReader) or via agent/browser snapshots.
Impact: arbitrary local file read on the Gateway host (confidentiality impact).
Fix
Upload paths are now confined to OpenClaw's temp uploads root (DEFAULT_UPLOAD_DIR) and traversal/escape paths are rejected.
This fix was implemented internally; the reporter provided a clear reproduction and impact analysis.
Fix commit(s):
- 3aa94afcfd12104c683c9cad81faf434d0dadf87
Thanks @p80n-sec for reporting.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "openclaw"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2026.2.14"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-26329"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-18T00:46:49Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nAuthenticated attackers can read arbitrary files from the Gateway host by supplying absolute paths or path traversal sequences to the browser tool\u0027s `upload` action. The server passed these paths to Playwright\u0027s `setInputFiles()` APIs without restricting them to a safe root.\n\nSeverity remains **High** due to the impact (arbitrary local file read on the Gateway host), even though exploitation requires authenticated access.\n\n## Exploitability / Preconditions\n\nThis is not a \"drive-by\" issue.\n\nAn attacker must:\n\n- Reach the Gateway HTTP surface (or otherwise invoke the same browser control hook endpoints).\n- Present valid Gateway auth (bearer token / password), as required by the Gateway configuration.\n - In common default setups, the Gateway binds to loopback and the onboarding wizard generates a gateway token even for loopback.\n- Have the `browser` tool permitted by tool policy for the target session/context (and have browser support enabled).\n\nIf an operator exposes the Gateway beyond loopback (LAN/tailnet/custom bind, reverse proxy, tunnels, etc.), the impact increases accordingly.\n\n## Affected Packages / Versions\n\n- Package: `openclaw` (npm)\n- Vulnerable: `\u003c 2026.2.14` (includes latest published `2026.2.13`)\n- Patched: `\u003e= 2026.2.14` (planned next release)\n\n## Details\n\n**Entry points**:\n\n- `POST /tools/invoke` with `{\"tool\":\"browser\",\"action\":\"upload\",...}`\n- `POST /hooks/file-chooser` (browser control hook)\n\nWhen the upload paths are not validated, Playwright reads the referenced files from the local filesystem and attaches them to a page-level `\u003cinput type=\"file\"\u003e`. Contents can then be exfiltrated by page JavaScript (e.g. via `FileReader`) or via agent/browser snapshots.\n\nImpact: arbitrary local file read on the Gateway host (confidentiality impact).\n\n## Fix\n\nUpload paths are now confined to OpenClaw\u0027s temp uploads root (`DEFAULT_UPLOAD_DIR`) and traversal/escape paths are rejected.\n\nThis fix was implemented internally; the reporter provided a clear reproduction and impact analysis.\n\nFix commit(s):\n\n- 3aa94afcfd12104c683c9cad81faf434d0dadf87\n\nThanks @p80n-sec for reporting.",
"id": "GHSA-cv7m-c9jx-vg7q",
"modified": "2026-02-18T00:46:49Z",
"published": "2026-02-18T00:46:49Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-cv7m-c9jx-vg7q"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/3aa94afcfd12104c683c9cad81faf434d0dadf87"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/releases/tag/v2026.2.14"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "OpenClaw has a path traversal in browser upload allows local file read"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.