ghsa-cq4p-vp5q-4522
Vulnerability from github
Impact
This issue affects Rancher versions from 2.5.0 up to and including 2.5.16, from 2.6.0 up to and including 2.6.9 and 2.7.0. It was discovered that the security advisory CVE-2021-36782 (GHSA-g7j7-h4q8-8w2f), previously released by Rancher, missed addressing some sensitive fields, secret tokens, encryption keys, and SSH keys that were still being stored in plaintext directly on Kubernetes objects like Clusters
.
The exposed credentials are visible in Rancher to authenticated Cluster Owners
, Cluster Members
, Project Owners
and Project Members
of that cluster on the endpoints:
/v1/management.cattle.io.cluster
/v1/management.cattle.io.clustertemplaterevisions
The remaining sensitive fields are now stripped from Clusters
and other objects and moved to a Secret
before the object is stored. The Secret
is retrieved when the credential is needed. For objects that existed before this security fix, a one-time migration happens on startup.
The fields that have been addressed by this security fix are:
Cluster.Spec.RancherKubernetesEngineConfig.Services.KubeAPI.SecretsEncryptionConfig.CustomConfig.Providers[].AESGCM.Keys[].Secret
Cluster.Spec.RancherKubernetesEngineConfig.Services.KubeAPI.SecretsEncryptionConfig.CustomConfig.Providers[].AESCBC.Keys[].Secret
Cluster.Spec.RancherKubernetesEngineConfig.Services.KubeAPI.SecretsEncryptionConfig.CustomConfig.Providers[].SecretboxConfiguration.Keys[].Secret
Cluster.Spec.RancherKubernetesEngineConfig.Services.Kubelet.ExtraEnv
when containing theAWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY
environment variableCluster.Spec.RancherKubernetesEngineConfig.BastionHost.SSHKey
Cluster.Spec.RancherKubernetesEngineConfig.PrivateRegistries[].ECRCredentialPlugin.AwsSecretAccessKey
Cluster.Spec.RancherKubernetesEngineConfig.PrivateRegistries[].ECRCredentialPlugin.AwsSessionToken
Cluster.Spec.RancherKubernetesEngineConfig.Network.AciNetworkProvider.ApicUserKey
Cluster.Spec.RancherKubernetesEngineConfig.Network.AciNetworkProvider.KafkaClientKey
Cluster.Spec.RancherKubernetesEngineConfig.Network.AciNetworkProvider.Token
Important:
-
For the exposure of credentials not related to Rancher, the final impact severity for confidentiality, integrity and availability is dependent on the permissions the leaked credentials have on their services.
-
It is recommended to review for potentially leaked credentials in this scenario and to change them if deemed necessary.
Workarounds
There is no direct mitigation besides updating Rancher to a patched version.
Patches
Patched versions include releases 2.5.17, 2.6.10, 2.7.1 and later versions.
After upgrading to a patched version, it is important to check for the ACISecretsMigrated
and RKESecretsMigrated
conditions on Clusters
and ClusterTemplateRevisions
to confirm when secrets have been fully migrated off of those objects, and the objects scoped within them.
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:
- Reach out to SUSE Rancher Security team for security related inquiries.
- Open an issue in Rancher repository.
- Verify our support matrix and product support lifecycle.
{ "affected": [ { "package": { "ecosystem": "Go", "name": "github.com/rancher/rancher" }, "ranges": [ { "events": [ { "introduced": "2.5.0" }, { "fixed": "2.5.17" } ], "type": "ECOSYSTEM" } ] }, { "package": { "ecosystem": "Go", "name": "github.com/rancher/rancher" }, "ranges": [ { "events": [ { "introduced": "2.6.0" }, { "fixed": "2.6.10" } ], "type": "ECOSYSTEM" } ] }, { "package": { "ecosystem": "Go", "name": "github.com/rancher/rancher" }, "ranges": [ { "events": [ { "introduced": "2.7.0" }, { "fixed": "2.7.1" } ], "type": "ECOSYSTEM" } ] } ], "aliases": [ "CVE-2022-43757" ], "database_specific": { "cwe_ids": [ "CWE-200", "CWE-256", "CWE-312" ], "github_reviewed": true, "github_reviewed_at": "2023-01-25T19:36:57Z", "nvd_published_at": "2023-02-07T13:15:00Z", "severity": "HIGH" }, "details": "### Impact\n\nThis issue affects Rancher versions from 2.5.0 up to and including 2.5.16, from 2.6.0 up to and including 2.6.9 and 2.7.0. It was discovered that the security advisory CVE-2021-36782 (GHSA-g7j7-h4q8-8w2f), previously released by Rancher, missed addressing some sensitive fields, secret tokens, encryption keys, and SSH keys that were still being stored in plaintext directly on Kubernetes objects like `Clusters`.\n\nThe exposed credentials are visible in Rancher to authenticated `Cluster Owners`, `Cluster Members`, `Project Owners` and `Project Members` of that cluster on the endpoints:\n\n- `/v1/management.cattle.io.cluster`\n- `/v1/management.cattle.io.clustertemplaterevisions`\n\nThe remaining sensitive fields are now stripped from `Clusters` and other objects and moved to a `Secret` before the object is stored. The `Secret` is retrieved when the credential is needed. For objects that existed before this security fix, a one-time migration happens on startup.\n\nThe fields that have been addressed by this security fix are:\n\n- `Cluster.Spec.RancherKubernetesEngineConfig.Services.KubeAPI.SecretsEncryptionConfig.CustomConfig.Providers[].AESGCM.Keys[].Secret`\n- `Cluster.Spec.RancherKubernetesEngineConfig.Services.KubeAPI.SecretsEncryptionConfig.CustomConfig.Providers[].AESCBC.Keys[].Secret`\n- `Cluster.Spec.RancherKubernetesEngineConfig.Services.KubeAPI.SecretsEncryptionConfig.CustomConfig.Providers[].SecretboxConfiguration.Keys[].Secret`\n- `Cluster.Spec.RancherKubernetesEngineConfig.Services.Kubelet.ExtraEnv` when containing the `AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY` environment variable\n- `Cluster.Spec.RancherKubernetesEngineConfig.BastionHost.SSHKey`\n- `Cluster.Spec.RancherKubernetesEngineConfig.PrivateRegistries[].ECRCredentialPlugin.AwsSecretAccessKey`\n- `Cluster.Spec.RancherKubernetesEngineConfig.PrivateRegistries[].ECRCredentialPlugin.AwsSessionToken`\n- `Cluster.Spec.RancherKubernetesEngineConfig.Network.AciNetworkProvider.ApicUserKey`\n- `Cluster.Spec.RancherKubernetesEngineConfig.Network.AciNetworkProvider.KafkaClientKey`\n- `Cluster.Spec.RancherKubernetesEngineConfig.Network.AciNetworkProvider.Token`\n\n**Important:**\n\n- For the exposure of credentials not related to Rancher, the final impact severity for confidentiality, integrity and availability is dependent on the permissions the leaked credentials have on their services.\n\n- It is recommended to review for potentially leaked credentials in this scenario and to change them if deemed necessary.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nThere is no direct mitigation besides updating Rancher to a patched version.\n\n### Patches\n\nPatched versions include releases 2.5.17, 2.6.10, 2.7.1 and later versions.\n\nAfter upgrading to a patched version, it is important to check for the `ACISecretsMigrated` and `RKESecretsMigrated` conditions on `Clusters` and `ClusterTemplateRevisions` to confirm when secrets have been fully migrated off of those objects, and the objects scoped within them.\n\n### For more information\n\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory:\n\n* Reach out to [SUSE Rancher Security team](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/security/policy) for security related inquiries.\n* Open an issue in [Rancher](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/issues/new/choose) repository.\n* Verify our [support matrix](https://www.suse.com/suse-rancher/support-matrix/all-supported-versions/) and [product support lifecycle](https://www.suse.com/lifecycle/).", "id": "GHSA-cq4p-vp5q-4522", "modified": "2023-02-15T18:40:09Z", "published": "2023-01-25T19:36:57Z", "references": [ { "type": "WEB", "url": "https://github.com/rancher/rancher/security/advisories/GHSA-cq4p-vp5q-4522" }, { "type": "ADVISORY", "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-43757" }, { "type": "WEB", "url": "https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1205295" }, { "type": "PACKAGE", "url": "https://github.com/rancher/rancher" } ], "schema_version": "1.4.0", "severity": [ { "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "type": "CVSS_V3" } ], "summary": "Plaintext storage of sensitive data in Rancher API and cluster.management.cattle.io objects" }
Sightings
Author | Source | Type | Date |
---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability is confirmed from an analyst perspective.
- Exploited: This vulnerability was exploited and seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Patched: This vulnerability was successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not exploited: This vulnerability was not exploited or seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expresses doubt about the veracity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.