GHSA-9F29-V6MM-PW6W
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-18 15:25 – Updated: 2026-02-19 21:56A security vulnerability has been discovered in how the input.parsed_path field is constructed. HTTP request paths are treated as full URIs when parsed; interpreting leading path segments prefixed with double slashes (//) as authority components, and therefore dropping them from the parsed path. This creates a path interpretation mismatch between authorization policies and backend servers, enabling attackers to bypass access controls by crafting requests where the authorization filter evaluates a different path than the one ultimately served.
Attack example
HTTP request:
GET //admin/users HTTP/1.1
Host: example.com
Policy sees:
The leading //admin path segment is interpreted as an authority component, and dropped from input.parsed_path field:
{
"parsed_path": ["users"]
}
Backend receives:
//admin/users path, normalized to /admin/users.
Affected Request Pattern Examples
| Request path | input.parsed_path |
input.attributes.request.http.path |
Discrepancy |
|---|---|---|---|
| / | [""] | / | ✅ None |
| //foo | [""] | //foo | ❌ Mismatch |
| /admin | ["admin"] | /admin | ✅ None |
| /admin/users | ["admin", "users"] | /admin/users | ✅ None |
| //admin/users | ["users"] | //admin/users | ❌ Mismatch |
Impact
Users are impacted if all the following conditions apply:
- Protected resources are path-hierarchical (e.g.,
/admin/usersvs/users) - Authorization policies use
input.parsed_pathfor path-based decisions - Backend servers apply lenient path normalization
Patches
Go: v1.13.2-envoy-2
Docker: 1.13.2-envoy-2, 1.13.2-envoy-2-static
Workarounds
Users who cannot immediately upgrade opa-envoy-plugin are recommended to apply one, or more, of the workarrounds described below.
1. Enable the merge_slashes Envoy configuration option
As per Envoy best practices, enabling the merge_slashes configuration option in Envoy will remove redundant slashes from the request path before filtering is applied, effectively mitigating the input.parsed_path issue described in this advisory.
2. Use input.attributes.request.http.path instead of input.parsed_path in policies
The input.attributes.request.http.path field contains the unprocessed, raw request path. Users are recommended to update any policy using input.parsed_path to instead use the input.attributes.request.http.path field.
Example
package example
# Use instead of input.parsed_path
parsed_path := split( # tokenize into array
trim_left( # drop leading slashes
urlquery.decode(input.attributes.request.http.path), # url-decode the path
"/",
),
"/",
)
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.13.1-envoy"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/open-policy-agent/opa-envoy-plugin"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.13.2-envoy-2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-26205"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-18T15:25:04Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-02-19T20:25:43Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A security vulnerability has been discovered in how the `input.parsed_path` field is constructed. HTTP request paths are treated as full URIs when parsed; interpreting leading path segments prefixed with double slashes (`//`) as [authority](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc3986#section-3.2) components, and therefore dropping them from the parsed path. This creates a path interpretation mismatch between authorization policies and backend servers, enabling attackers to bypass access controls by crafting requests where the authorization filter evaluates a different path than the one ultimately served.\n\n#### Attack example\n\n**HTTP request:**\n\n```\nGET //admin/users HTTP/1.1\nHost: example.com\n```\n\n**Policy sees:**\n\nThe leading `//admin` path segment is interpreted as an authority component, and dropped from `input.parsed_path` field:\n\n\n```json\n{\n \"parsed_path\": [\"users\"]\n}\n```\n\n**Backend receives:**\n\n`//admin/users` path, normalized to `/admin/users`.\n\n#### Affected Request Pattern Examples\n\n| Request path | `input.parsed_path` | `input.attributes.request.http.path` | Discrepancy |\n| - | - | - | - |\n| / | [\"\"] | / | \u2705 None |\n| //foo | [\"\"] | //foo| \u274c Mismatch |\n| /admin | [\"admin\"] | /admin | \u2705 None |\n| /admin/users | [\"admin\", \"users\"] | /admin/users | \u2705 None |\n| //admin/users | [\"users\"] | //admin/users | \u274c Mismatch |\n\n### Impact\n\nUsers are impacted if all the following conditions apply:\n\n1. Protected resources are path-hierarchical (e.g., `/admin/users` vs `/users`)\n2. Authorization policies use `input.parsed_path` for path-based decisions\n3. Backend servers apply lenient path normalization\n\n### Patches\n\nGo: `v1.13.2-envoy-2`\nDocker: `1.13.2-envoy-2`, `1.13.2-envoy-2-static`\n\n### Workarounds\n\nUsers who cannot immediately upgrade opa-envoy-plugin are recommended to apply one, or more, of the workarrounds described below.\n\n#### 1. Enable the `merge_slashes` Envoy configuration option\n\nAs per [Envoy best practices](https://www.envoyproxy.io/docs/envoy/v1.37.0/configuration/best_practices/edge.html), enabling the [merge_slashes](https://www.envoyproxy.io/docs/envoy/latest/api-v3/extensions/filters/network/http_connection_manager/v3/http_connection_manager.proto#envoy-v3-api-field-extensions-filters-network-http-connection-manager-v3-httpconnectionmanager-merge-slashes) configuration option in Envoy will remove redundant slashes from the request path before filtering is applied, effectively mitigating the `input.parsed_path` issue described in this advisory.\n\n\n#### 2. Use `input.attributes.request.http.path` instead of `input.parsed_path` in policies\n\nThe `input.attributes.request.http.path` field contains the unprocessed, raw request path. Users are recommended to update any policy using `input.parsed_path` to instead use the `input.attributes.request.http.path` field.\n\n##### Example ####\n\n```rego\npackage example\n\n# Use instead of input.parsed_path\nparsed_path := split( # tokenize into array\n\ttrim_left( # drop leading slashes\n\t\turlquery.decode(input.attributes.request.http.path), # url-decode the path\n\t\t\"/\",\n\t),\n\t\"/\",\n)\n```",
"id": "GHSA-9f29-v6mm-pw6w",
"modified": "2026-02-19T21:56:34Z",
"published": "2026-02-18T15:25:04Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/open-policy-agent/opa-envoy-plugin/security/advisories/GHSA-9f29-v6mm-pw6w"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-26205"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/open-policy-agent/opa-envoy-plugin/commit/58c44d4ec408d5852d1d0287599e7d5c5e2bc5c3"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/open-policy-agent/opa-envoy-plugin"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/open-policy-agent/opa-envoy-plugin/releases/tag/v1.13.2-envoy-2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "opa-envoy-plugin has an Authorization Bypass via Double-Slash Path Misinterpretation in input.parsed_path"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.