ghsa-826h-69x5-63pc
Vulnerability from github
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf, arm64: Fixed a BTI error on returning to patched function
When BPF_TRAMP_F_CALL_ORIG is set, BPF trampoline uses BLR to jump back to the instruction next to call site to call the patched function. For BTI-enabled kernel, the instruction next to call site is usually PACIASP, in this case, it's safe to jump back with BLR. But when the call site is not followed by a PACIASP or bti, a BTI exception is triggered.
Here is a fault log:
Unhandled 64-bit el1h sync exception on CPU0, ESR 0x0000000034000002 -- BTI CPU: 0 PID: 263 Comm: test_progs Tainted: GF Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) pstate: 40400805 (nZcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=-c) pc : bpf_fentry_test1+0xc/0x30 lr : bpf_trampoline_6442573892_0+0x48/0x1000 sp : ffff80000c0c3a50 x29: ffff80000c0c3a90 x28: ffff0000c2e6c080 x27: 0000000000000000 x26: 0000000000000000 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: 0000000000000050 x23: 0000000000000000 x22: 0000ffffcfd2a7f0 x21: 000000000000000a x20: 0000ffffcfd2a7f0 x19: 0000000000000000 x18: 0000000000000000 x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 0000ffffcfd2a7f0 x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000 x11: 0000000000000000 x10: ffff80000914f5e4 x9 : ffff8000082a1528 x8 : 0000000000000000 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0101010101010101 x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 00000000fffffff2 x3 : 0000000000000001 x2 : ffff8001f4b82000 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : 0000000000000001 Kernel panic - not syncing: Unhandled exception CPU: 0 PID: 263 Comm: test_progs Tainted: GF Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) Call trace: dump_backtrace+0xec/0x144 show_stack+0x24/0x7c dump_stack_lvl+0x8c/0xb8 dump_stack+0x18/0x34 panic+0x1cc/0x3ec __el0_error_handler_common+0x0/0x130 el1h_64_sync_handler+0x60/0xd0 el1h_64_sync+0x78/0x7c bpf_fentry_test1+0xc/0x30 bpf_fentry_test1+0xc/0x30 bpf_prog_test_run_tracing+0xdc/0x2a0 __sys_bpf+0x438/0x22a0 __arm64_sys_bpf+0x30/0x54 invoke_syscall+0x78/0x110 el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x6c/0x1d0 do_el0_svc+0x38/0xe0 el0_svc+0x30/0xd0 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x1ac/0x1b0 el0t_64_sync+0x1a0/0x1a4 Kernel Offset: disabled CPU features: 0x0000,00034c24,f994fdab Memory Limit: none
And the instruction next to call site of bpf_fentry_test1 is ADD, not PACIASP:
: bti c nop nop add w0, w0, #0x1 paciasp
For BPF prog, JIT always puts a PACIASP after call site for BTI-enabled kernel, so there is no problem. To fix it, replace BLR with RET to bypass the branch target check.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-53634"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-10-07T16:15:46Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbpf, arm64: Fixed a BTI error on returning to patched function\n\nWhen BPF_TRAMP_F_CALL_ORIG is set, BPF trampoline uses BLR to jump\nback to the instruction next to call site to call the patched function.\nFor BTI-enabled kernel, the instruction next to call site is usually\nPACIASP, in this case, it\u0027s safe to jump back with BLR. But when\nthe call site is not followed by a PACIASP or bti, a BTI exception\nis triggered.\n\nHere is a fault log:\n\n Unhandled 64-bit el1h sync exception on CPU0, ESR 0x0000000034000002 -- BTI\n CPU: 0 PID: 263 Comm: test_progs Tainted: GF\n Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)\n pstate: 40400805 (nZcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=-c)\n pc : bpf_fentry_test1+0xc/0x30\n lr : bpf_trampoline_6442573892_0+0x48/0x1000\n sp : ffff80000c0c3a50\n x29: ffff80000c0c3a90 x28: ffff0000c2e6c080 x27: 0000000000000000\n x26: 0000000000000000 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: 0000000000000050\n x23: 0000000000000000 x22: 0000ffffcfd2a7f0 x21: 000000000000000a\n x20: 0000ffffcfd2a7f0 x19: 0000000000000000 x18: 0000000000000000\n x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 0000ffffcfd2a7f0\n x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000\n x11: 0000000000000000 x10: ffff80000914f5e4 x9 : ffff8000082a1528\n x8 : 0000000000000000 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0101010101010101\n x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 00000000fffffff2 x3 : 0000000000000001\n x2 : ffff8001f4b82000 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : 0000000000000001\n Kernel panic - not syncing: Unhandled exception\n CPU: 0 PID: 263 Comm: test_progs Tainted: GF\n Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)\n Call trace:\n dump_backtrace+0xec/0x144\n show_stack+0x24/0x7c\n dump_stack_lvl+0x8c/0xb8\n dump_stack+0x18/0x34\n panic+0x1cc/0x3ec\n __el0_error_handler_common+0x0/0x130\n el1h_64_sync_handler+0x60/0xd0\n el1h_64_sync+0x78/0x7c\n bpf_fentry_test1+0xc/0x30\n bpf_fentry_test1+0xc/0x30\n bpf_prog_test_run_tracing+0xdc/0x2a0\n __sys_bpf+0x438/0x22a0\n __arm64_sys_bpf+0x30/0x54\n invoke_syscall+0x78/0x110\n el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x6c/0x1d0\n do_el0_svc+0x38/0xe0\n el0_svc+0x30/0xd0\n el0t_64_sync_handler+0x1ac/0x1b0\n el0t_64_sync+0x1a0/0x1a4\n Kernel Offset: disabled\n CPU features: 0x0000,00034c24,f994fdab\n Memory Limit: none\n\nAnd the instruction next to call site of bpf_fentry_test1 is ADD,\nnot PACIASP:\n\n\u003cbpf_fentry_test1\u003e:\n\tbti c\n\tnop\n\tnop\n\tadd w0, w0, #0x1\n\tpaciasp\n\nFor BPF prog, JIT always puts a PACIASP after call site for BTI-enabled\nkernel, so there is no problem. To fix it, replace BLR with RET to bypass\nthe branch target check.",
"id": "GHSA-826h-69x5-63pc",
"modified": "2025-10-07T18:31:09Z",
"published": "2025-10-07T18:31:09Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-53634"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/738a96c4a8c36950803fdd27e7c30aca92dccefd"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8b9c64942ada229f52fe6f1b537a50f88b3c2673"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/eabc166919d169e105263974991f52b0351e431a"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
Sightings
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