GHSA-7H24-C332-P48C

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-07-30 16:33 – Updated: 2025-07-31 11:18
VLAI
Summary
vproxy Divide by Zero DoS Vulnerability
Details

Summary

Untrusted, user-controlled data from the HTTP Proxy-Authorization header can induce a denial of service state.

Details

Untrusted data is extracted from the user-controlled HTTP Proxy-Authorization header and passed to Extension::try_from and flows into parse_ttl_extension where it is parsed as a TTL value. If an attacker supplies a TTL of zero (e.g. by using a username such as 'configuredUser-ttl-0'), the modulo operation 'timestamp % ttl' will cause a division by zero panic, causing the server to crash causing a denial-of-service.

The code assumed to be responsible for this can be found here: https://github.com/0x676e67/vproxy/blob/ab304c3854bf8480be577039ada0228907ba0923/src/extension.rs#L173-L183

PoC

  1. Download and run the latest version of vproxy
  2. Send a cUrl request like the following, adjusting address and port as necessary: curl -x "http://test-ttl-0:test@127.0.0.1:8101" https://google.com
  3. Wait for a cUrl error indicating "Proxy CONNECT aborted"
  4. View logs from the vproxy server
  5. Observe that the vproxy server crashed due to a divide-by-zero panic

Impact

The resulting crash renders the proxy server unusable until it is reset.

Finally, one last note: I'm reporting this on behalf of another researcher at Black Duck. Credit for discovery should be attributed to David Bohannon (dbohannon)

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.3.3"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "vproxy"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.4.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-54581"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-369"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2025-07-30T16:33:41Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-07-30T20:15:37Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nUntrusted, user-controlled data from the HTTP Proxy-Authorization header can induce a denial of service state.\n\n### Details\nUntrusted data is extracted from the user-controlled HTTP Proxy-Authorization header and passed to Extension::try_from and flows into parse_ttl_extension where it is parsed as a TTL value. If an attacker supplies a TTL of zero (e.g. by using a username such as \u0027configuredUser-ttl-0\u0027), the modulo operation \u0027timestamp % ttl\u0027 will cause a division by zero panic, causing the server to crash causing a denial-of-service.\n\nThe code assumed to be responsible for this can be found here: https://github.com/0x676e67/vproxy/blob/ab304c3854bf8480be577039ada0228907ba0923/src/extension.rs#L173-L183\n\n### PoC\n1. Download and run the latest version of vproxy\n2. Send a cUrl request like the following, adjusting address and port as necessary: ```curl -x \"http://test-ttl-0:test@127.0.0.1:8101\" https://google.com```\n3. Wait for a cUrl error indicating \"Proxy CONNECT aborted\"\n4. View logs from the vproxy server\n5. Observe that the vproxy server crashed due to a divide-by-zero panic\n\n### Impact\nThe resulting crash renders the proxy server unusable until it is reset.\n\nFinally, one last note: I\u0027m reporting this on behalf of another researcher at Black Duck. Credit for discovery should be attributed to David Bohannon ([dbohannon](https://github.com/dbohannon))",
  "id": "GHSA-7h24-c332-p48c",
  "modified": "2025-07-31T11:18:29Z",
  "published": "2025-07-30T16:33:41Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/0x676e67/vproxy/security/advisories/GHSA-7h24-c332-p48c"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-54581"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/0x676e67/vproxy/commit/aa1bf64c5e7f1c471395f9f29175ffc1b16a1079"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/0x676e67/vproxy"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/0x676e67/vproxy/releases/tag/v2.4.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "vproxy Divide by Zero DoS Vulnerability"
}



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