ghsa-7h24-c332-p48c
Vulnerability from github
Summary
Untrusted, user-controlled data from the HTTP Proxy-Authorization header can induce a denial of service state.
Details
Untrusted data is extracted from the user-controlled HTTP Proxy-Authorization header and passed to Extension::try_from and flows into parse_ttl_extension where it is parsed as a TTL value. If an attacker supplies a TTL of zero (e.g. by using a username such as 'configuredUser-ttl-0'), the modulo operation 'timestamp % ttl' will cause a division by zero panic, causing the server to crash causing a denial-of-service.
The code assumed to be responsible for this can be found here: https://github.com/0x676e67/vproxy/blob/ab304c3854bf8480be577039ada0228907ba0923/src/extension.rs#L173-L183
PoC
- Download and run the latest version of vproxy
- Send a cUrl request like the following, adjusting address and port as necessary:
curl -x "http://test-ttl-0:test@127.0.0.1:8101" https://google.com
- Wait for a cUrl error indicating "Proxy CONNECT aborted"
- View logs from the vproxy server
- Observe that the vproxy server crashed due to a divide-by-zero panic
Impact
The resulting crash renders the proxy server unusable until it is reset.
Finally, one last note: I'm reporting this on behalf of another researcher at Black Duck. Credit for discovery should be attributed to David Bohannon (dbohannon)
{ "affected": [ { "database_specific": { "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.3.3" }, "package": { "ecosystem": "crates.io", "name": "vproxy" }, "ranges": [ { "events": [ { "introduced": "0" }, { "fixed": "2.4.0" } ], "type": "ECOSYSTEM" } ] } ], "aliases": [ "CVE-2025-54581" ], "database_specific": { "cwe_ids": [ "CWE-369" ], "github_reviewed": true, "github_reviewed_at": "2025-07-30T16:33:41Z", "nvd_published_at": "2025-07-30T20:15:37Z", "severity": "HIGH" }, "details": "### Summary\nUntrusted, user-controlled data from the HTTP Proxy-Authorization header can induce a denial of service state.\n\n### Details\nUntrusted data is extracted from the user-controlled HTTP Proxy-Authorization header and passed to Extension::try_from and flows into parse_ttl_extension where it is parsed as a TTL value. If an attacker supplies a TTL of zero (e.g. by using a username such as \u0027configuredUser-ttl-0\u0027), the modulo operation \u0027timestamp % ttl\u0027 will cause a division by zero panic, causing the server to crash causing a denial-of-service.\n\nThe code assumed to be responsible for this can be found here: https://github.com/0x676e67/vproxy/blob/ab304c3854bf8480be577039ada0228907ba0923/src/extension.rs#L173-L183\n\n### PoC\n1. Download and run the latest version of vproxy\n2. Send a cUrl request like the following, adjusting address and port as necessary: ```curl -x \"http://test-ttl-0:test@127.0.0.1:8101\" https://google.com```\n3. Wait for a cUrl error indicating \"Proxy CONNECT aborted\"\n4. View logs from the vproxy server\n5. Observe that the vproxy server crashed due to a divide-by-zero panic\n\n### Impact\nThe resulting crash renders the proxy server unusable until it is reset.\n\nFinally, one last note: I\u0027m reporting this on behalf of another researcher at Black Duck. Credit for discovery should be attributed to David Bohannon ([dbohannon](https://github.com/dbohannon))", "id": "GHSA-7h24-c332-p48c", "modified": "2025-07-31T11:18:29Z", "published": "2025-07-30T16:33:41Z", "references": [ { "type": "WEB", "url": "https://github.com/0x676e67/vproxy/security/advisories/GHSA-7h24-c332-p48c" }, { "type": "ADVISORY", "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-54581" }, { "type": "WEB", "url": "https://github.com/0x676e67/vproxy/commit/aa1bf64c5e7f1c471395f9f29175ffc1b16a1079" }, { "type": "PACKAGE", "url": "https://github.com/0x676e67/vproxy" }, { "type": "WEB", "url": "https://github.com/0x676e67/vproxy/releases/tag/v2.4.0" } ], "schema_version": "1.4.0", "severity": [ { "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H", "type": "CVSS_V3" } ], "summary": "vproxy Divide by Zero DoS Vulnerability" }
Sightings
Author | Source | Type | Date |
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Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability is confirmed from an analyst perspective.
- Exploited: This vulnerability was exploited and seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Patched: This vulnerability was successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not exploited: This vulnerability was not exploited or seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expresses doubt about the veracity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.