GHSA-68RR-P4FP-J59V

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-09 15:28 – Updated: 2026-02-09 18:49
VLAI?
Summary
Fiber has an insecure fallback in utils.UUIDv4() / utils.UUID() — predictable / zero‑UUID on crypto/rand failure
Details

Fiber v2 contains an internal vendored copy of gofiber/utils, and its functions UUIDv4() and UUID() inherit the same critical weakness described in the upstream advisory. On Go versions prior to 1.24, the underlying crypto/rand implementation can return an error if secure randomness cannot be obtained. In such cases, these Fiber v2 UUID functions silently fall back to generating predictable values — the all-zero UUID 00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000.

On Go 1.24+, the language guarantees that crypto/rand no longer returns an error (it will block or panic instead), so this vulnerability primarily affects Fiber v2 users running Go 1.23 or earlier, which Fiber v2 officially supports.

Because no error is returned by the Fiber v2 UUID functions, application code may unknowingly rely on predictable, repeated, or low-entropy identifiers in security-critical pathways. This is especially impactful because many Fiber v2 middleware components (session middleware, CSRF, rate limiting, request-ID generation, etc.) default to using utils.UUIDv4().

Impact includes, but is not limited to:

  • Session fixation or hijacking (predictable session IDs)
  • CSRF token forgery or bypass
  • Authentication replay / token prediction
  • Potential denial-of-service (DoS): if the zero UUID is generated, key-based structures (sessions, rate-limits, caches, CSRF stores) may collapse into a single shared key, causing overwrites, lock contention, or state corruption
  • Request-ID collisions, undermining logging and trace integrity
  • General compromise of confidentiality, integrity, and authorization logic relying on UUIDs for uniqueness or secrecy

All Fiber v2 versions containing the internal utils.UUIDv4() / utils.UUID() implementation are affected when running on Go <1.24. No patched Fiber v2 release currently exists.


Suggested Mitigations / Workarounds

Update to the latest version of Fiber v2.


Likelihood / Environmental Factors

It’s important to note that entropy exhaustion on modern Linux systems is extremely rare, as the kernel’s CSPRNG is resilient and non-blocking. However, entropy-source failures — where crypto/rand cannot read from its underlying provider — are significantly more likely in certain environments.

This includes containerized deployments, restricted sandboxes, misconfigured systems lacking read access to /dev/urandom or platform-equivalent sources, chrooted or jailed environments, embedded devices, or systems with non-standard or degraded randomness providers. On Go <1.24, such failures cause crypto/rand to return an error, which the Fiber v2 UUID functions currently treat as a signal to silently generate predictable UUIDs, including the zero UUID. This silent fallback is the root cause of the vulnerability.


References

  • Upstream advisory for gofiber/utils: GHSA-m98w-cqp3-qcqr
  • Source repositories:

  • github.com/gofiber/fiber

  • github.com/gofiber/utils

Credits / Reporter

Reported by @sixcolors (Fiber Maintainer / Security Team)

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/gofiber/fiber/v2"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.52.11"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-66630"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-338"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-09T15:28:37Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-02-09T18:16:04Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "Fiber v2 contains an internal vendored copy of `gofiber/utils`, and its functions `UUIDv4()` and `UUID()` inherit the same critical weakness described in the upstream advisory. On **Go versions prior to 1.24**, the underlying `crypto/rand` implementation **can return an error** if secure randomness cannot be obtained. In such cases, these Fiber v2 UUID functions silently fall back to generating predictable values \u2014 the all-zero UUID `00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000`.\n\nOn Go **1.24+**, the language guarantees that `crypto/rand` no longer returns an error (it will block or panic instead), so this vulnerability primarily affects **Fiber v2 users running Go 1.23 or earlier**, which Fiber v2 officially supports.\n\nBecause no error is returned by the Fiber v2 UUID functions, application code may unknowingly rely on *predictable, repeated, or low-entropy identifiers* in security-critical pathways. This is especially impactful because many Fiber v2 middleware components (session middleware, CSRF, rate limiting, request-ID generation, etc.) **default to using `utils.UUIDv4()`**.\n\nImpact includes, but is not limited to:\n\n* **Session fixation or hijacking** (predictable session IDs)\n* **CSRF token forgery** or bypass\n* **Authentication replay / token prediction**\n* **Potential denial-of-service (DoS):** if the zero UUID is generated, key-based structures (sessions, rate-limits, caches, CSRF stores) may collapse into a single shared key, causing overwrites, lock contention, or state corruption\n* **Request-ID collisions**, undermining logging and trace integrity\n* **General compromise** of confidentiality, integrity, and authorization logic relying on UUIDs for uniqueness or secrecy\n\nAll Fiber v2 versions containing the internal `utils.UUIDv4()` / `utils.UUID()` implementation are affected when running on **Go \u003c1.24**. **No patched Fiber v2 release currently exists.**\n\n---\n\n## Suggested Mitigations / Workarounds\n\nUpdate to the latest version of Fiber v2.\n\n---\n\n### Likelihood / Environmental Factors\n\nIt\u2019s important to note that **entropy exhaustion on modern Linux systems is extremely rare**, as the kernel\u2019s CSPRNG is resilient and non-blocking. However, **entropy-source failures** \u2014 where `crypto/rand` cannot read from its underlying provider \u2014 are significantly more likely in certain environments.\n\nThis includes containerized deployments, restricted sandboxes, misconfigured systems lacking read access to `/dev/urandom` or platform-equivalent sources, chrooted or jailed environments, embedded devices, or systems with non-standard or degraded randomness providers. On **Go \u003c1.24**, such failures cause `crypto/rand` to return an error, which the Fiber v2 UUID functions currently treat as a signal to silently generate predictable UUIDs, including the zero UUID. This silent fallback is the root cause of the vulnerability.\n\n---\n\n## References\n\n* Upstream advisory for `gofiber/utils`: **GHSA-m98w-cqp3-qcqr**\n* Source repositories:\n\n  * `github.com/gofiber/fiber`\n  * `github.com/gofiber/utils`\n\n---\n\n## Credits / Reporter\n\nReported by **@sixcolors** (Fiber Maintainer / Security Team)",
  "id": "GHSA-68rr-p4fp-j59v",
  "modified": "2026-02-09T18:49:19Z",
  "published": "2026-02-09T15:28:37Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/gofiber/fiber/security/advisories/GHSA-68rr-p4fp-j59v"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-66630"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/gofiber/fiber/commit/eb874b6f6c5896b968d9b0ab2b56ac7052cb0ee1"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/gofiber/fiber"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/gofiber/fiber/releases/tag/v2.52.11"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Fiber has an insecure fallback in utils.UUIDv4() / utils.UUID() \u2014 predictable / zero\u2011UUID on crypto/rand failure"
}


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