ghsa-4hc4-pgfx-3mrx
Vulnerability from github
Published
2023-03-17 18:20
Modified
2023-03-17 21:38
Severity ?
4.4 (Medium) - CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Summary
cilium-agent container can access the host via `hostPath` mount
Details

Impact

An attacker with access to a Cilium agent pod can write to /opt/cni/bin due to a hostPath mount of that directory in the agent pod. By replacing the CNI binary with their own malicious binary and waiting for the creation of a new pod on the node, the attacker can gain access to the underlying node.

Patches

The issue has been fixed and is available on versions >=1.11.15, >=1.12.8, >=1.13.1.

Workarounds

Kubernetes RBAC should be used to deny users and service accounts exec access to Cilium agent pods.

In cases where a user requires exec access to Cilium agent pods, but should not have access to the underlying node, no workaround is possible.

References

Acknowledgements

The Cilium community has worked together with members of Isovalent and Form3 to prepare these mitigations. Special thanks to Anastasios Koutlis, Daniel Teixeira, and Magdalena Oczadly for their cooperation.

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please reach out on Slack.

As usual, if you think you found a related vulnerability, we strongly encourage you to report security vulnerabilities to our private security mailing list: security@cilium.io - first, before disclosing them in any public forums. This is a private mailing list where only members of the Cilium internal security team are subscribed to, and is treated as top priority.

Show details on source website

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/cilium/cilium"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.11.15"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/cilium/cilium"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.12.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.12.8"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/cilium/cilium"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.13.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.13.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-27593"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-276"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2023-03-17T18:20:46Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-03-17T20:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n\nAn attacker with access to a Cilium agent pod can write to `/opt/cni/bin` due to a `hostPath` mount of that directory in the agent pod. By replacing the CNI binary with their own malicious binary and waiting for the creation of a new pod on the node, the attacker can gain access to the underlying node. \n\n### Patches\n\nThe issue has been fixed and is available on versions \u003e=1.11.15, \u003e=1.12.8, \u003e=1.13.1.\n\n### Workarounds\n\n[Kubernetes RBAC](https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/access-authn-authz/rbac/) should be used to deny users and service accounts `exec` access to Cilium agent pods.\n\nIn cases where a user requires `exec` access to Cilium agent pods, but should not have access to the underlying node, no workaround is possible.\n\n### References\n\n* [PR containing resolution](https://github.com/cilium/cilium/pull/24075)\n\n### Acknowledgements\n\nThe Cilium community has worked together with members of Isovalent and Form3 to prepare these mitigations. Special thanks to Anastasios Koutlis, Daniel Teixeira, and Magdalena Oczadly for their cooperation. \n\n### For more information\n\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please reach out on [Slack](https://docs.cilium.io/en/latest/community/community/#slack).\n\nAs usual, if you think you found a related vulnerability, we strongly encourage you to report security vulnerabilities to our private security mailing list: security@cilium.io - first, before disclosing them in any public forums. This is a private mailing list where only members of the Cilium internal security team are subscribed to, and is treated as top priority. ",
  "id": "GHSA-4hc4-pgfx-3mrx",
  "modified": "2023-03-17T21:38:36Z",
  "published": "2023-03-17T18:20:46Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/cilium/cilium/security/advisories/GHSA-4hc4-pgfx-3mrx"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-27593"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/cilium/cilium/pull/24075"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/cilium/cilium"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/cilium/cilium/releases/tag/v1.11.15"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/cilium/cilium/releases/tag/v1.12.8"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/cilium/cilium/releases/tag/v1.13.1"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/access-authn-authz/rbac"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "cilium-agent container can access the host via `hostPath` mount"
}


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