ghsa-3m86-c9x3-vwm9
Vulnerability from github
Impact
Graylog users can gain elevated privileges by creating and using API tokens for the local Administrator or any other user for whom the malicious user knows the ID.
For the attack to succeed, the attacker needs a user account in Graylog. They can then proceed to issue hand-crafted requests to the Graylog REST API and exploit a weak permission check for token creation.
Workarounds
In Graylog version 6.2.0 and above, regular users can be restricted from creating API tokens. The respective configuration can be found in System > Configuration > Users > "Allow users to create personal access tokens". This option should be Disabled, so that only administrators are allowed to create tokens.
Recommended Actions
After upgrading Graylog from a vulnerable version to a patched version, administrators are advised to perform the following steps to ensure the integrity of their system:
Review API tokens
An overview of all existing API tokens is available at System > Users and Teams > Token Management. Please review this list carefully and ensure each token is there for a reason.
Check Audit Log (Graylog Enterprise only)
Graylog Enterprise provides an audit log that can be used to review which API tokens were created when the system was vulnerable. Please search the Audit Log for action:create token and match the Actor with the user for whom the token was created. In most cases this should be the same user, but there might be legitimate reasons for users to be allowed to create tokens for other users. If in doubt, please review the user's actual permissions.
Review API token creation requests
Graylog Open does not provide audit logging, but many setups contain infrastructure components, like reverse proxies, in front of the Graylog REST API. These components often provide HTTP access logs. Please check the access logs to detect malicious token creations by reviewing all API token requests to the /api/users/{user_id}/tokens/{token_name} endpoint ({user_id} and {token_name} may be arbitrary strings).
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.graylog2:graylog2-server"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "6.2.0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.2.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.graylog2:graylog2-server"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "6.3.0-alpha.1"
},
{
"fixed": "6.3.0-rc.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-53106"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-285"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-06-30T19:35:38Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-07-02T14:15:26Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nGraylog users can gain elevated privileges by creating and using API tokens for the local Administrator or any other user for whom the malicious user knows the ID.\n\nFor the attack to succeed, the attacker needs a user account in Graylog. They can then proceed to issue hand-crafted requests to the Graylog REST API and exploit a weak permission check for token creation.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nIn Graylog version `6.2.0` and above, regular users can be restricted from creating API tokens. The respective configuration can be found in `System \u003e Configuration \u003e Users \u003e \"Allow users to create personal access tokens\"`. This option should be *Disabled*, so that only administrators are allowed to create tokens.\n\n### Recommended Actions\n\nAfter upgrading Graylog from a vulnerable version to a patched version, administrators are advised to perform the following steps to ensure the integrity of their system:\n\n#### Review API tokens \nAn overview of all existing API tokens is available at `System \u003e Users and Teams \u003e Token Management`. Please review this list carefully and ensure each token is there for a reason. \n\n#### Check Audit Log (Graylog Enterprise only)\nGraylog Enterprise provides an audit log that can be used to review which API tokens were created when the system was vulnerable. Please search the Audit Log for `action:create token` and match the *Actor* with the user for whom the token was created. In most cases this should be the same user, but there might be legitimate reasons for users to be allowed to create tokens for other users. If in doubt, please review the user\u0027s actual permissions.\n\n#### Review API token creation requests\nGraylog Open does not provide audit logging, but many setups contain infrastructure components, like reverse proxies, in front of the Graylog REST API. These components often provide HTTP access logs. Please check the access logs to detect malicious token creations by reviewing all API token requests to the `/api/users/{user_id}/tokens/{token_name}` endpoint (`{user_id}` and `{token_name}` may be arbitrary strings).",
"id": "GHSA-3m86-c9x3-vwm9",
"modified": "2025-07-02T18:55:45Z",
"published": "2025-06-30T19:35:38Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Graylog2/graylog2-server/security/advisories/GHSA-3m86-c9x3-vwm9"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-53106"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Graylog2/graylog2-server/commit/6936bd16a783c2944a3d2f1e83902062520f90e3"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Graylog2/graylog2-server/commit/9215b8f1fd32566c31e6f7447ed864df3590c157"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/Graylog2/graylog2-server"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Graylog vulnerable to privilege escalation through API tokens"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability is confirmed from an analyst perspective.
- Exploited: This vulnerability was exploited and seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Patched: This vulnerability was successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not exploited: This vulnerability was not exploited or seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expresses doubt about the veracity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.