ghsa-2rf6-4xf4-32wc
Vulnerability from github
Published
2025-12-16 15:30
Modified
2025-12-16 15:30
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

nvme: fix admin request_queue lifetime

The namespaces can access the controller's admin request_queue, and stale references on the namespaces may exist after tearing down the controller. Ensure the admin request_queue is active by moving the controller's 'put' to after all controller references have been released to ensure no one is can access the request_queue. This fixes a reported use-after-free bug:

BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in blk_queue_enter+0x41c/0x4a0 Read of size 8 at addr ffff88c0a53819f8 by task nvme/3287 CPU: 67 UID: 0 PID: 3287 Comm: nvme Tainted: G E 6.13.2-ga1582f1a031e #15 Tainted: [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE Hardware name: Jabil /EGS 2S MB1, BIOS 1.00 06/18/2025 Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x4f/0x60 print_report+0xc4/0x620 ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x70/0xb0 ? _raw_read_unlock_irqrestore+0x30/0x30 ? blk_queue_enter+0x41c/0x4a0 kasan_report+0xab/0xe0 ? blk_queue_enter+0x41c/0x4a0 blk_queue_enter+0x41c/0x4a0 ? __irq_work_queue_local+0x75/0x1d0 ? blk_queue_start_drain+0x70/0x70 ? irq_work_queue+0x18/0x20 ? vprintk_emit.part.0+0x1cc/0x350 ? wake_up_klogd_work_func+0x60/0x60 blk_mq_alloc_request+0x2b7/0x6b0 ? __blk_mq_alloc_requests+0x1060/0x1060 ? __switch_to+0x5b7/0x1060 nvme_submit_user_cmd+0xa9/0x330 nvme_user_cmd.isra.0+0x240/0x3f0 ? force_sigsegv+0xe0/0xe0 ? nvme_user_cmd64+0x400/0x400 ? vfs_fileattr_set+0x9b0/0x9b0 ? cgroup_update_frozen_flag+0x24/0x1c0 ? cgroup_leave_frozen+0x204/0x330 ? nvme_ioctl+0x7c/0x2c0 blkdev_ioctl+0x1a8/0x4d0 ? blkdev_common_ioctl+0x1930/0x1930 ? fdget+0x54/0x380 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x129/0x190 do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x160 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 RIP: 0033:0x7f765f703b0b Code: ff ff ff 85 c0 79 9b 49 c7 c4 ff ff ff ff 5b 5d 4c 89 e0 41 5c c3 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa b8 10 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d dd 52 0f 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007ffe2cefe808 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffe2cefe860 RCX: 00007f765f703b0b RDX: 00007ffe2cefe860 RSI: 00000000c0484e41 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000003 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 00007f765f611d50 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000000003 R13: 00000000c0484e41 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 00007ffe2cefea60

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-68265"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-12-16T15:15:56Z",
    "severity": null
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnvme: fix admin request_queue lifetime\n\nThe namespaces can access the controller\u0027s admin request_queue, and\nstale references on the namespaces may exist after tearing down the\ncontroller. Ensure the admin request_queue is active by moving the\ncontroller\u0027s \u0027put\u0027 to after all controller references have been released\nto ensure no one is can access the request_queue. This fixes a reported\nuse-after-free bug:\n\n  BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in blk_queue_enter+0x41c/0x4a0\n  Read of size 8 at addr ffff88c0a53819f8 by task nvme/3287\n  CPU: 67 UID: 0 PID: 3287 Comm: nvme Tainted: G            E       6.13.2-ga1582f1a031e #15\n  Tainted: [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE\n  Hardware name: Jabil /EGS 2S MB1, BIOS 1.00 06/18/2025\n  Call Trace:\n   \u003cTASK\u003e\n   dump_stack_lvl+0x4f/0x60\n   print_report+0xc4/0x620\n   ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x70/0xb0\n   ? _raw_read_unlock_irqrestore+0x30/0x30\n   ? blk_queue_enter+0x41c/0x4a0\n   kasan_report+0xab/0xe0\n   ? blk_queue_enter+0x41c/0x4a0\n   blk_queue_enter+0x41c/0x4a0\n   ? __irq_work_queue_local+0x75/0x1d0\n   ? blk_queue_start_drain+0x70/0x70\n   ? irq_work_queue+0x18/0x20\n   ? vprintk_emit.part.0+0x1cc/0x350\n   ? wake_up_klogd_work_func+0x60/0x60\n   blk_mq_alloc_request+0x2b7/0x6b0\n   ? __blk_mq_alloc_requests+0x1060/0x1060\n   ? __switch_to+0x5b7/0x1060\n   nvme_submit_user_cmd+0xa9/0x330\n   nvme_user_cmd.isra.0+0x240/0x3f0\n   ? force_sigsegv+0xe0/0xe0\n   ? nvme_user_cmd64+0x400/0x400\n   ? vfs_fileattr_set+0x9b0/0x9b0\n   ? cgroup_update_frozen_flag+0x24/0x1c0\n   ? cgroup_leave_frozen+0x204/0x330\n   ? nvme_ioctl+0x7c/0x2c0\n   blkdev_ioctl+0x1a8/0x4d0\n   ? blkdev_common_ioctl+0x1930/0x1930\n   ? fdget+0x54/0x380\n   __x64_sys_ioctl+0x129/0x190\n   do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x160\n   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53\n  RIP: 0033:0x7f765f703b0b\n  Code: ff ff ff 85 c0 79 9b 49 c7 c4 ff ff ff ff 5b 5d 4c 89 e0 41 5c c3 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa b8 10 00 00 00 0f 05 \u003c48\u003e 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d dd 52 0f 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48\n  RSP: 002b:00007ffe2cefe808 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010\n  RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffe2cefe860 RCX: 00007f765f703b0b\n  RDX: 00007ffe2cefe860 RSI: 00000000c0484e41 RDI: 0000000000000003\n  RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000003 R09: 0000000000000000\n  R10: 00007f765f611d50 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000000003\n  R13: 00000000c0484e41 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 00007ffe2cefea60\n   \u003c/TASK\u003e",
  "id": "GHSA-2rf6-4xf4-32wc",
  "modified": "2025-12-16T15:30:47Z",
  "published": "2025-12-16T15:30:47Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-68265"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/03b3bcd319b3ab5182bc9aaa0421351572c78ac0"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e7dac681790556c131854b97551337aa8042215b"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e8061d02b49c5c901980f58d91e96580e9a14acf"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}


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