ghsa-232p-vwff-86mp
Vulnerability from github
Published
2023-04-04 21:13
Modified
2023-04-05 23:16
Severity ?
7.5 (High) - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:L
Summary
Docker Swarm encrypted overlay network may be unauthenticated
Details

Moby is an open source container framework developed by Docker Inc. that is distributed as Docker, Mirantis Container Runtime, and various other downstream projects/products. The Moby daemon component (dockerd), which is developed as moby/moby is commonly referred to as Docker.

Swarm Mode, which is compiled in and delivered by default in dockerd and is thus present in most major Moby downstreams, is a simple, built-in container orchestrator that is implemented through a combination of SwarmKit and supporting network code.

The overlay network driver is a core feature of Swarm Mode, providing isolated virtual LANs that allow communication between containers and services across the cluster. This driver is an implementation/user of VXLAN, which encapsulates link-layer (Ethernet) frames in UDP datagrams that tag the frame with a VXLAN Network ID (VNI) that identifies the originating overlay network. In addition, the overlay network driver supports an optional, off-by-default encrypted mode, which is especially useful when VXLAN packets traverses an untrusted network between nodes.

Encrypted overlay networks function by encapsulating the VXLAN datagrams through the use of the IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload protocol in Transport mode. By deploying IPSec encapsulation, encrypted overlay networks gain the additional properties of source authentication through cryptographic proof, data integrity through check-summing, and confidentiality through encryption.

When setting an endpoint up on an encrypted overlay network, Moby installs three iptables (Linux kernel firewall) rules that enforce both incoming and outgoing IPSec. These rules rely on the u32 iptables extension provided by the xt_u32 kernel module to directly filter on a VXLAN packet's VNI field, so that IPSec guarantees can be enforced on encrypted overlay networks without interfering with other overlay networks or other users of VXLAN.

Two iptables rules serve to filter incoming VXLAN datagrams with a VNI that corresponds to an encrypted network and discards unencrypted datagrams. The rules are appended to the end of the INPUT filter chain, following any rules that have been previously set by the system administrator. Administrator-set rules take precedence over the rules Moby sets to discard unencrypted VXLAN datagrams, which can potentially admit unencrypted datagrams that should have been discarded.

On Red Hat Enterprise Linux and derivatives such as CentOS and Rocky, the xt_u32 module has been: * moved to the kernel-modules-extra package and no longer installed by default in RHEL 8.3 * officially deprecated in RHEL 8.6 * removed completely in RHEL 9

These rules are not created when xt_u32 is unavailable, even though the container is still attached to the network.

Impact

Encrypted overlay networks on affected configurations silently accept cleartext VXLAN datagrams that are tagged with the VNI of an encrypted overlay network. As a result, it is possible to inject arbitrary Ethernet frames into the encrypted overlay network by encapsulating them in VXLAN datagrams.

The injection of arbitrary Ethernet frames can enable a Denial of Service attack. A sophisticated attacker may be able to establish a UDP or TCP connection by way of the container’s outbound gateway that would otherwise be blocked by a stateful firewall, or carry out other escalations beyond simple injection by smuggling packets into the overlay network.

Patches

Patches are available in Moby releases 23.0.3, and 20.10.24. As Mirantis Container Runtime's 20.10 releases are numbered differently, users of that platform should update to 20.10.16.

Workarounds

  • Close the VXLAN port (by default, UDP port 4789) to incoming traffic at the Internet boundary (see GHSA-vwm3-crmr-xfxw) to prevent all VXLAN packet injection.
  • Ensure that the xt_u32 kernel module is available on all nodes of the Swarm cluster.

Background

  • #43382 partially discussed this concern, but did not consider the security implications.
  • Mirantis FIELD-5788 essentially duplicates #43382, and was created six months earlier; it similarly overlooked the security implications.
  • #45118 is the ancestor of the final patches, and was where the security implications were discovered.

Related

Show details on source website

To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/docker/docker"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.12.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "20.10.24"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/docker/docker"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "23.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "23.0.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-28840"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-420",
      "CWE-636"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2023-04-04T21:13:06Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-04-04T22:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "[Moby](https://mobyproject.org/) is an open source container framework developed by Docker Inc. that is distributed as Docker, Mirantis Container Runtime, and various other downstream projects/products. The Moby daemon component (`dockerd`), which is developed as [moby/moby](https://github.com/moby/moby) is commonly referred to as *Docker*.\n\nSwarm Mode, which is compiled in and delivered by default in `dockerd` and is thus present in most major Moby downstreams, is a simple, built-in container orchestrator that is implemented through a combination of [SwarmKit](https://github.com/moby/swarmkit) and supporting network code.\n\nThe `overlay` network driver is a core feature of Swarm Mode, providing isolated virtual LANs that allow communication between containers and services across the cluster. This driver is an implementation/user of [VXLAN](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Virtual_Extensible_LAN), which encapsulates link-layer (Ethernet) frames in UDP datagrams that tag the frame with a VXLAN Network ID (VNI) that identifies the originating overlay network. In addition, the overlay network driver supports an optional, off-by-default encrypted mode, which is especially useful when VXLAN packets traverses an untrusted network between nodes.\n\nEncrypted overlay networks function by encapsulating the VXLAN datagrams through the use of the [IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IPsec#Encapsulating_Security_Payload) protocol in [Transport mode](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IPsec#Transport_mode). By deploying IPSec encapsulation, encrypted overlay networks gain the additional properties of source authentication through cryptographic proof, data integrity through check-summing, and confidentiality through encryption.\n\nWhen setting an endpoint up on an encrypted overlay network, Moby installs three [iptables](https://www.netfilter.org/projects/iptables/index.html) (Linux kernel firewall) rules that enforce both incoming and outgoing IPSec. These rules rely on the `u32` iptables extension provided by the `xt_u32` kernel module to directly filter on a VXLAN packet\u0027s VNI field, so that IPSec guarantees can be enforced on encrypted overlay networks without interfering with other overlay networks or other users of VXLAN.\n\n[Two iptables rules](https://github.com/moby/libnetwork/blob/d9fae4c73daf76c3b0f77e14b45b8bf612ba764d/drivers/overlay/encryption.go#L230-L234) serve to filter incoming VXLAN datagrams with a VNI that corresponds to an encrypted network and discards unencrypted datagrams. The rules are appended to the end of the `INPUT` filter chain, following any rules that have been previously set by the system administrator. Administrator-set rules take precedence over the rules Moby sets to discard unencrypted VXLAN datagrams, which can potentially admit unencrypted datagrams that should have been discarded.\n\nOn Red Hat Enterprise Linux and derivatives such as CentOS and Rocky, the `xt_u32` module has been:\n* [moved to the kernel-modules-extra package and no longer installed by default in RHEL 8.3](https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_enterprise_linux/8/html/8.3_release_notes/rhel-8-3-0-release#technology-preview_networking)\n* [officially deprecated in RHEL 8.6](https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_enterprise_linux/8/html/8.6_release_notes/deprecated_functionality#deprecated-functionality_networking)\n* [removed completely in RHEL 9](https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_enterprise_linux/9/html/considerations_in_adopting_rhel_9/assembly_networking_considerations-in-adopting-rhel-9#ref_firewall-networking_assembly_networking)\n\nThese rules are not created when `xt_u32` is unavailable, even though the container is still attached to the network.\n\n## Impact\nEncrypted overlay networks on affected configurations silently accept cleartext VXLAN datagrams that are tagged with the VNI of an encrypted overlay network. As a result, it is possible to inject arbitrary Ethernet frames into the encrypted overlay network by encapsulating them in VXLAN datagrams.\n\nThe injection of arbitrary Ethernet frames can enable a Denial of Service attack. A sophisticated attacker may be able to establish a UDP or TCP connection by way of the container\u2019s outbound gateway that would otherwise be blocked by a stateful firewall, or carry out other escalations beyond simple injection by smuggling packets into the overlay network.\n\n## Patches\nPatches are available in Moby releases 23.0.3, and 20.10.24. As Mirantis Container Runtime\u0027s 20.10 releases are numbered differently, users of that platform should update to 20.10.16.\n\n## Workarounds\n* Close the VXLAN port (by default, UDP port 4789) to incoming traffic at the Internet boundary (see [GHSA-vwm3-crmr-xfxw](https://github.com/moby/moby/security/advisories/GHSA-vwm3-crmr-xfxw)) to prevent all VXLAN packet injection.\n* Ensure that the `xt_u32` kernel module is available on all nodes of the Swarm cluster.\n\n## Background\n* [#43382](https://github.com/moby/moby/issues/43382) partially discussed this concern, but did not consider the security implications.\n* Mirantis FIELD-5788 essentially duplicates [#43382](https://github.com/moby/moby/issues/43382), and was created six months earlier; it similarly overlooked the security implications.\n* [#45118](https://github.com/moby/moby/pull/45118) is the ancestor of the final patches, and was where the security implications were discovered.\n\n## Related\n* [CVE-2023-28841: Encrypted overlay network traffic may be unencrypted](https://github.com/moby/moby/security/advisories/GHSA-33pg-m6jh-5237)\n* [CVE-2023-28842: Encrypted overlay network with a single endpoint is unauthenticated](https://github.com/moby/moby/security/advisories/GHSA-6wrf-mxfj-pf5p)\n* [GHSA-vwm3-crmr-xfxw: The Swarm VXLAN port may be exposed to attack due to ambiguous documentation](https://github.com/moby/moby/security/advisories/GHSA-vwm3-crmr-xfxw)\n* [GHSA-gvm4-2qqg-m333: Security issues in encrypted overlay networks](https://github.com/moby/libnetwork/security/advisories/GHSA-gvm4-2qqg-m333) (libnetwork)",
  "id": "GHSA-232p-vwff-86mp",
  "modified": "2023-04-05T23:16:22Z",
  "published": "2023-04-04T21:13:06Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/moby/libnetwork/security/advisories/GHSA-gvm4-2qqg-m333"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/moby/moby/security/advisories/GHSA-232p-vwff-86mp"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/moby/moby/security/advisories/GHSA-33pg-m6jh-5237"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/moby/moby/security/advisories/GHSA-6wrf-mxfj-pf5p"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/moby/moby/security/advisories/GHSA-vwm3-crmr-xfxw"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-28840"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/moby/moby/issues/43382"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/moby/moby/pull/45118"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/moby/moby"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Docker Swarm encrypted overlay network may be unauthenticated"
}


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