fkie_cve-2025-68282
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd
Published
2025-12-16 16:16
Modified
2025-12-18 15:08
Severity ?
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: gadget: udc: fix use-after-free in usb_gadget_state_work A race condition during gadget teardown can lead to a use-after-free in usb_gadget_state_work(), as reported by KASAN: BUG: KASAN: invalid-access in sysfs_notify+0x2c/0xd0 Workqueue: events usb_gadget_state_work The fundamental race occurs because a concurrent event (e.g., an interrupt) can call usb_gadget_set_state() and schedule gadget->work at any time during the cleanup process in usb_del_gadget(). Commit 399a45e5237c ("usb: gadget: core: flush gadget workqueue after device removal") attempted to fix this by moving flush_work() to after device_del(). However, this does not fully solve the race, as a new work item can still be scheduled *after* flush_work() completes but before the gadget's memory is freed, leading to the same use-after-free. This patch fixes the race condition robustly by introducing a 'teardown' flag and a 'state_lock' spinlock to the usb_gadget struct. The flag is set during cleanup in usb_del_gadget() *before* calling flush_work() to prevent any new work from being scheduled once cleanup has commenced. The scheduling site, usb_gadget_set_state(), now checks this flag under the lock before queueing the work, thus safely closing the race window.
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version



{
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nusb: gadget: udc: fix use-after-free in usb_gadget_state_work\n\nA race condition during gadget teardown can lead to a use-after-free\nin usb_gadget_state_work(), as reported by KASAN:\n\n  BUG: KASAN: invalid-access in sysfs_notify+0x2c/0xd0\n  Workqueue: events usb_gadget_state_work\n\nThe fundamental race occurs because a concurrent event (e.g., an\ninterrupt) can call usb_gadget_set_state() and schedule gadget-\u003ework\nat any time during the cleanup process in usb_del_gadget().\n\nCommit 399a45e5237c (\"usb: gadget: core: flush gadget workqueue after\ndevice removal\") attempted to fix this by moving flush_work() to after\ndevice_del(). However, this does not fully solve the race, as a new\nwork item can still be scheduled *after* flush_work() completes but\nbefore the gadget\u0027s memory is freed, leading to the same use-after-free.\n\nThis patch fixes the race condition robustly by introducing a \u0027teardown\u0027\nflag and a \u0027state_lock\u0027 spinlock to the usb_gadget struct. The flag is\nset during cleanup in usb_del_gadget() *before* calling flush_work() to\nprevent any new work from being scheduled once cleanup has commenced.\nThe scheduling site, usb_gadget_set_state(), now checks this flag under\nthe lock before queueing the work, thus safely closing the race window."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2025-68282",
  "lastModified": "2025-12-18T15:08:06.237",
  "metrics": {},
  "published": "2025-12-16T16:16:06.970",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/10014310193cf6736c1aeb4105c5f4a0818d0c65"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3b32caa73d135eea8fb9cabb45e9fc64c5a3ecb9"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/baeb66fbd4201d1c4325074e78b1f557dff89b5b"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c12a0c3ef815ddd67e47f9c819f9fe822fed5467"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f02a412c0a18f02f0f91b0a3d9788315a721b7fd"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
  "vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis"
}


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