fkie_cve-2025-68263
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd
Published
2025-12-16 15:15
Modified
2025-12-18 15:08
Severity ?
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: ipc: fix use-after-free in ipc_msg_send_request
ipc_msg_send_request() waits for a generic netlink reply using an
ipc_msg_table_entry on the stack. The generic netlink handler
(handle_generic_event()/handle_response()) fills entry->response under
ipc_msg_table_lock, but ipc_msg_send_request() used to validate and free
entry->response without holding the same lock.
Under high concurrency this allows a race where handle_response() is
copying data into entry->response while ipc_msg_send_request() has just
freed it, leading to a slab-use-after-free reported by KASAN in
handle_generic_event():
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in handle_generic_event+0x3c4/0x5f0 [ksmbd]
Write of size 12 at addr ffff888198ee6e20 by task pool/109349
...
Freed by task:
kvfree
ipc_msg_send_request [ksmbd]
ksmbd_rpc_open -> ksmbd_session_rpc_open [ksmbd]
Fix by:
- Taking ipc_msg_table_lock in ipc_msg_send_request() while validating
entry->response, freeing it when invalid, and removing the entry from
ipc_msg_table.
- Returning the final entry->response pointer to the caller only after
the hash entry is removed under the lock.
- Returning NULL in the error path, preserving the original API
semantics.
This makes all accesses to entry->response consistent with
handle_response(), which already updates and fills the response buffer
under ipc_msg_table_lock, and closes the race that allowed the UAF.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nksmbd: ipc: fix use-after-free in ipc_msg_send_request\n\nipc_msg_send_request() waits for a generic netlink reply using an\nipc_msg_table_entry on the stack. The generic netlink handler\n(handle_generic_event()/handle_response()) fills entry-\u003eresponse under\nipc_msg_table_lock, but ipc_msg_send_request() used to validate and free\nentry-\u003eresponse without holding the same lock.\n\nUnder high concurrency this allows a race where handle_response() is\ncopying data into entry-\u003eresponse while ipc_msg_send_request() has just\nfreed it, leading to a slab-use-after-free reported by KASAN in\nhandle_generic_event():\n\n BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in handle_generic_event+0x3c4/0x5f0 [ksmbd]\n Write of size 12 at addr ffff888198ee6e20 by task pool/109349\n ...\n Freed by task:\n kvfree\n ipc_msg_send_request [ksmbd]\n ksmbd_rpc_open -\u003e ksmbd_session_rpc_open [ksmbd]\n\nFix by:\n- Taking ipc_msg_table_lock in ipc_msg_send_request() while validating\n entry-\u003eresponse, freeing it when invalid, and removing the entry from\n ipc_msg_table.\n- Returning the final entry-\u003eresponse pointer to the caller only after\n the hash entry is removed under the lock.\n- Returning NULL in the error path, preserving the original API\n semantics.\n\nThis makes all accesses to entry-\u003eresponse consistent with\nhandle_response(), which already updates and fills the response buffer\nunder ipc_msg_table_lock, and closes the race that allowed the UAF."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2025-68263",
"lastModified": "2025-12-18T15:08:06.237",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2025-12-16T15:15:55.813",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1fab1fa091f5aa97265648b53ea031deedd26235"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5ac763713a1ef8f9a8bda1dbd81f0318d67baa4e"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/759c8c30cfa8706c518e56f67971b1f0932f4b9b"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8229c6ca50cea701e25a7ee25f48441b582ec5fa"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability is confirmed from an analyst perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: This vulnerability was exploited and seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Patched: This vulnerability was successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not exploited: This vulnerability was not exploited or seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expresses doubt about the veracity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
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