fkie_cve-2025-40002
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd
Published
2025-10-18 08:15
Modified
2025-10-21 19:31
Severity ?
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: thunderbolt: Fix use-after-free in tb_dp_dprx_work The original code relies on cancel_delayed_work() in tb_dp_dprx_stop(), which does not ensure that the delayed work item tunnel->dprx_work has fully completed if it was already running. This leads to use-after-free scenarios where tb_tunnel is deallocated by tb_tunnel_put(), while tunnel->dprx_work remains active and attempts to dereference tb_tunnel in tb_dp_dprx_work(). A typical race condition is illustrated below: CPU 0 | CPU 1 tb_dp_tunnel_active() | tb_deactivate_and_free_tunnel()| tb_dp_dprx_start() tb_tunnel_deactivate() | queue_delayed_work() tb_dp_activate() | tb_dp_dprx_stop() | tb_dp_dprx_work() //delayed worker cancel_delayed_work() | tb_tunnel_put(tunnel); | | tunnel = container_of(...); //UAF | tunnel-> //UAF Replacing cancel_delayed_work() with cancel_delayed_work_sync() is not feasible as it would introduce a deadlock: both tb_dp_dprx_work() and the cleanup path acquire tb->lock, and cancel_delayed_work_sync() would wait indefinitely for the work item that cannot proceed. Instead, implement proper reference counting: - If cancel_delayed_work() returns true (work is pending), we release the reference in the stop function. - If it returns false (work is executing or already completed), the reference is released in delayed work function itself. This ensures the tb_tunnel remains valid during work item execution while preventing memory leaks. This bug was found by static analysis.
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version



{
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nthunderbolt: Fix use-after-free in tb_dp_dprx_work\n\nThe original code relies on cancel_delayed_work() in tb_dp_dprx_stop(),\nwhich does not ensure that the delayed work item tunnel-\u003edprx_work has\nfully completed if it was already running. This leads to use-after-free\nscenarios where tb_tunnel is deallocated by tb_tunnel_put(), while\ntunnel-\u003edprx_work remains active and attempts to dereference tb_tunnel\nin tb_dp_dprx_work().\n\nA typical race condition is illustrated below:\n\nCPU 0                            | CPU 1\ntb_dp_tunnel_active()            |\n  tb_deactivate_and_free_tunnel()| tb_dp_dprx_start()\n    tb_tunnel_deactivate()       |   queue_delayed_work()\n      tb_dp_activate()           |\n        tb_dp_dprx_stop()        | tb_dp_dprx_work() //delayed worker\n          cancel_delayed_work()  |\n    tb_tunnel_put(tunnel);       |\n                                 |   tunnel = container_of(...); //UAF\n                                 |   tunnel-\u003e //UAF\n\nReplacing cancel_delayed_work() with cancel_delayed_work_sync() is\nnot feasible as it would introduce a deadlock: both tb_dp_dprx_work()\nand the cleanup path acquire tb-\u003elock, and cancel_delayed_work_sync()\nwould wait indefinitely for the work item that cannot proceed.\n\nInstead, implement proper reference counting:\n- If cancel_delayed_work() returns true (work is pending), we release\n  the reference in the stop function.\n- If it returns false (work is executing or already completed), the\n  reference is released in delayed work function itself.\n\nThis ensures the tb_tunnel remains valid during work item execution\nwhile preventing memory leaks.\n\nThis bug was found by static analysis."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2025-40002",
  "lastModified": "2025-10-21T19:31:25.450",
  "metrics": {},
  "published": "2025-10-18T08:15:34.243",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/67600ccfc4f38ebd331b9332ac94717bfbc87ea7"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c07923f6a8729fc27ee652221a51702ff6654097"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
  "vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis"
}


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