fkie_cve-2025-40002
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd
Published
2025-10-18 08:15
Modified
2025-10-21 19:31
Severity ?
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
thunderbolt: Fix use-after-free in tb_dp_dprx_work
The original code relies on cancel_delayed_work() in tb_dp_dprx_stop(),
which does not ensure that the delayed work item tunnel->dprx_work has
fully completed if it was already running. This leads to use-after-free
scenarios where tb_tunnel is deallocated by tb_tunnel_put(), while
tunnel->dprx_work remains active and attempts to dereference tb_tunnel
in tb_dp_dprx_work().
A typical race condition is illustrated below:
CPU 0 | CPU 1
tb_dp_tunnel_active() |
tb_deactivate_and_free_tunnel()| tb_dp_dprx_start()
tb_tunnel_deactivate() | queue_delayed_work()
tb_dp_activate() |
tb_dp_dprx_stop() | tb_dp_dprx_work() //delayed worker
cancel_delayed_work() |
tb_tunnel_put(tunnel); |
| tunnel = container_of(...); //UAF
| tunnel-> //UAF
Replacing cancel_delayed_work() with cancel_delayed_work_sync() is
not feasible as it would introduce a deadlock: both tb_dp_dprx_work()
and the cleanup path acquire tb->lock, and cancel_delayed_work_sync()
would wait indefinitely for the work item that cannot proceed.
Instead, implement proper reference counting:
- If cancel_delayed_work() returns true (work is pending), we release
the reference in the stop function.
- If it returns false (work is executing or already completed), the
reference is released in delayed work function itself.
This ensures the tb_tunnel remains valid during work item execution
while preventing memory leaks.
This bug was found by static analysis.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nthunderbolt: Fix use-after-free in tb_dp_dprx_work\n\nThe original code relies on cancel_delayed_work() in tb_dp_dprx_stop(),\nwhich does not ensure that the delayed work item tunnel-\u003edprx_work has\nfully completed if it was already running. This leads to use-after-free\nscenarios where tb_tunnel is deallocated by tb_tunnel_put(), while\ntunnel-\u003edprx_work remains active and attempts to dereference tb_tunnel\nin tb_dp_dprx_work().\n\nA typical race condition is illustrated below:\n\nCPU 0 | CPU 1\ntb_dp_tunnel_active() |\n tb_deactivate_and_free_tunnel()| tb_dp_dprx_start()\n tb_tunnel_deactivate() | queue_delayed_work()\n tb_dp_activate() |\n tb_dp_dprx_stop() | tb_dp_dprx_work() //delayed worker\n cancel_delayed_work() |\n tb_tunnel_put(tunnel); |\n | tunnel = container_of(...); //UAF\n | tunnel-\u003e //UAF\n\nReplacing cancel_delayed_work() with cancel_delayed_work_sync() is\nnot feasible as it would introduce a deadlock: both tb_dp_dprx_work()\nand the cleanup path acquire tb-\u003elock, and cancel_delayed_work_sync()\nwould wait indefinitely for the work item that cannot proceed.\n\nInstead, implement proper reference counting:\n- If cancel_delayed_work() returns true (work is pending), we release\n the reference in the stop function.\n- If it returns false (work is executing or already completed), the\n reference is released in delayed work function itself.\n\nThis ensures the tb_tunnel remains valid during work item execution\nwhile preventing memory leaks.\n\nThis bug was found by static analysis."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2025-40002",
"lastModified": "2025-10-21T19:31:25.450",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2025-10-18T08:15:34.243",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/67600ccfc4f38ebd331b9332ac94717bfbc87ea7"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c07923f6a8729fc27ee652221a51702ff6654097"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis"
}
Loading…
Loading…
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability is confirmed from an analyst perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: This vulnerability was exploited and seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Patched: This vulnerability was successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not exploited: This vulnerability was not exploited or seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expresses doubt about the veracity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
Loading…
Loading…