fkie_cve-2025-39958
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd
Published
2025-10-09 10:15
Modified
2025-10-09 15:50
Severity ?
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iommu/s390: Make attach succeed when the device was surprise removed When a PCI device is removed with surprise hotplug, there may still be attempts to attach the device to the default domain as part of tear down via (__iommu_release_dma_ownership()), or because the removal happens during probe (__iommu_probe_device()). In both cases zpci_register_ioat() fails with a cc value indicating that the device handle is invalid. This is because the device is no longer part of the instance as far as the hypervisor is concerned. Currently this leads to an error return and s390_iommu_attach_device() fails. This triggers the WARN_ON() in __iommu_group_set_domain_nofail() because attaching to the default domain must never fail. With the device fenced by the hypervisor no DMAs to or from memory are possible and the IOMMU translations have no effect. Proceed as if the registration was successful and let the hotplug event handling clean up the device. This is similar to how devices in the error state are handled since commit 59bbf596791b ("iommu/s390: Make attach succeed even if the device is in error state") except that for removal the domain will not be registered later. This approach was also previously discussed at the link. Handle both cases, error state and removal, in a helper which checks if the error needs to be propagated or ignored. Avoid magic number condition codes by using the pre-existing, but never used, defines for PCI load/store condition codes and rename them to reflect that they apply to all PCI instructions.
References
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/359613f2fa009587154511e4842e8ab9532edd15
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9ffaf5229055fcfbb3b3d6f1c7e58d63715c3f73
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version


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{
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\niommu/s390: Make attach succeed when the device was surprise removed\n\nWhen a PCI device is removed with surprise hotplug, there may still be\nattempts to attach the device to the default domain as part of tear down\nvia (__iommu_release_dma_ownership()), or because the removal happens\nduring probe (__iommu_probe_device()). In both cases zpci_register_ioat()\nfails with a cc value indicating that the device handle is invalid. This\nis because the device is no longer part of the instance as far as the\nhypervisor is concerned.\n\nCurrently this leads to an error return and s390_iommu_attach_device()\nfails. This triggers the WARN_ON() in __iommu_group_set_domain_nofail()\nbecause attaching to the default domain must never fail.\n\nWith the device fenced by the hypervisor no DMAs to or from memory are\npossible and the IOMMU translations have no effect. Proceed as if the\nregistration was successful and let the hotplug event handling clean up\nthe device.\n\nThis is similar to how devices in the error state are handled since\ncommit 59bbf596791b (\"iommu/s390: Make attach succeed even if the device\nis in error state\") except that for removal the domain will not be\nregistered later. This approach was also previously discussed at the\nlink.\n\nHandle both cases, error state and removal, in a helper which checks if\nthe error needs to be propagated or ignored. Avoid magic number\ncondition codes by using the pre-existing, but never used, defines for\nPCI load/store condition codes and rename them to reflect that they\napply to all PCI instructions."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2025-39958",
  "lastModified": "2025-10-09T15:50:04.013",
  "metrics": {},
  "published": "2025-10-09T10:15:37.867",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/359613f2fa009587154511e4842e8ab9532edd15"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9ffaf5229055fcfbb3b3d6f1c7e58d63715c3f73"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
  "vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis"
}


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