fkie_cve-2025-39879
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd
Published
2025-09-23 06:15
Modified
2025-09-23 06:15
Severity ?
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ceph: always call ceph_shift_unused_folios_left() The function ceph_process_folio_batch() sets folio_batch entries to NULL, which is an illegal state. Before folio_batch_release() crashes due to this API violation, the function ceph_shift_unused_folios_left() is supposed to remove those NULLs from the array. However, since commit ce80b76dd327 ("ceph: introduce ceph_process_folio_batch() method"), this shifting doesn't happen anymore because the "for" loop got moved to ceph_process_folio_batch(), and now the `i` variable that remains in ceph_writepages_start() doesn't get incremented anymore, making the shifting effectively unreachable much of the time. Later, commit 1551ec61dc55 ("ceph: introduce ceph_submit_write() method") added more preconditions for doing the shift, replacing the `i` check (with something that is still just as broken): - if ceph_process_folio_batch() fails, shifting never happens - if ceph_move_dirty_page_in_page_array() was never called (because ceph_process_folio_batch() has returned early for some of various reasons), shifting never happens - if `processed_in_fbatch` is zero (because ceph_process_folio_batch() has returned early for some of the reasons mentioned above or because ceph_move_dirty_page_in_page_array() has failed), shifting never happens Since those two commits, any problem in ceph_process_folio_batch() could crash the kernel, e.g. this way: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000034 #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP NOPTI CPU: 172 UID: 0 PID: 2342707 Comm: kworker/u778:8 Not tainted 6.15.10-cm4all1-es #714 NONE Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R7615/0G9DHV, BIOS 1.6.10 12/08/2023 Workqueue: writeback wb_workfn (flush-ceph-1) RIP: 0010:folios_put_refs+0x85/0x140 Code: 83 c5 01 39 e8 7e 76 48 63 c5 49 8b 5c c4 08 b8 01 00 00 00 4d 85 ed 74 05 41 8b 44 ad 00 48 8b 15 b0 > RSP: 0018:ffffb880af8db778 EFLAGS: 00010207 RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000003 RDX: ffffe377cc3b0000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffffb880af8db8c0 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 000000000000007d R09: 000000000102b86f R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 00000000000000ac R12: ffffb880af8db8c0 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff9bd262c97000 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9c8efc303000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000034 CR3: 0000000160958004 CR4: 0000000000770ef0 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> ceph_writepages_start+0xeb9/0x1410 The crash can be reproduced easily by changing the ceph_check_page_before_write() return value to `-E2BIG`. (Interestingly, the crash happens only if `huge_zero_folio` has already been allocated; without `huge_zero_folio`, is_huge_zero_folio(NULL) returns true and folios_put_refs() skips NULL entries instead of dereferencing them. That makes reproducing the bug somewhat unreliable. See https://lore.kernel.org/20250826231626.218675-1-max.kellermann@ionos.com for a discussion of this detail.) My suggestion is to move the ceph_shift_unused_folios_left() to right after ceph_process_folio_batch() to ensure it always gets called to fix up the illegal folio_batch state.
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version



{
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nceph: always call ceph_shift_unused_folios_left()\n\nThe function ceph_process_folio_batch() sets folio_batch entries to\nNULL, which is an illegal state.  Before folio_batch_release() crashes\ndue to this API violation, the function ceph_shift_unused_folios_left()\nis supposed to remove those NULLs from the array.\n\nHowever, since commit ce80b76dd327 (\"ceph: introduce\nceph_process_folio_batch() method\"), this shifting doesn\u0027t happen\nanymore because the \"for\" loop got moved to ceph_process_folio_batch(),\nand now the `i` variable that remains in ceph_writepages_start()\ndoesn\u0027t get incremented anymore, making the shifting effectively\nunreachable much of the time.\n\nLater, commit 1551ec61dc55 (\"ceph: introduce ceph_submit_write()\nmethod\") added more preconditions for doing the shift, replacing the\n`i` check (with something that is still just as broken):\n\n- if ceph_process_folio_batch() fails, shifting never happens\n\n- if ceph_move_dirty_page_in_page_array() was never called (because\n  ceph_process_folio_batch() has returned early for some of various\n  reasons), shifting never happens\n\n- if `processed_in_fbatch` is zero (because ceph_process_folio_batch()\n  has returned early for some of the reasons mentioned above or\n  because ceph_move_dirty_page_in_page_array() has failed), shifting\n  never happens\n\nSince those two commits, any problem in ceph_process_folio_batch()\ncould crash the kernel, e.g. this way:\n\n BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000034\n #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode\n #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page\n PGD 0 P4D 0\n Oops: Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP NOPTI\n CPU: 172 UID: 0 PID: 2342707 Comm: kworker/u778:8 Not tainted 6.15.10-cm4all1-es #714 NONE\n Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R7615/0G9DHV, BIOS 1.6.10 12/08/2023\n Workqueue: writeback wb_workfn (flush-ceph-1)\n RIP: 0010:folios_put_refs+0x85/0x140\n Code: 83 c5 01 39 e8 7e 76 48 63 c5 49 8b 5c c4 08 b8 01 00 00 00 4d 85 ed 74 05 41 8b 44 ad 00 48 8b 15 b0 \u003e\n RSP: 0018:ffffb880af8db778 EFLAGS: 00010207\n RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000003\n RDX: ffffe377cc3b0000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffffb880af8db8c0\n RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 000000000000007d R09: 000000000102b86f\n R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 00000000000000ac R12: ffffb880af8db8c0\n R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff9bd262c97000\n FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9c8efc303000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000\n CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033\n CR2: 0000000000000034 CR3: 0000000160958004 CR4: 0000000000770ef0\n PKRU: 55555554\n Call Trace:\n  \u003cTASK\u003e\n  ceph_writepages_start+0xeb9/0x1410\n\nThe crash can be reproduced easily by changing the\nceph_check_page_before_write() return value to `-E2BIG`.\n\n(Interestingly, the crash happens only if `huge_zero_folio` has\nalready been allocated; without `huge_zero_folio`,\nis_huge_zero_folio(NULL) returns true and folios_put_refs() skips NULL\nentries instead of dereferencing them.  That makes reproducing the bug\nsomewhat unreliable.  See\nhttps://lore.kernel.org/20250826231626.218675-1-max.kellermann@ionos.com\nfor a discussion of this detail.)\n\nMy suggestion is to move the ceph_shift_unused_folios_left() to right\nafter ceph_process_folio_batch() to ensure it always gets called to\nfix up the illegal folio_batch state."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2025-39879",
  "lastModified": "2025-09-23T06:15:47.523",
  "metrics": {},
  "published": "2025-09-23T06:15:47.523",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/289b6615cf553d98509a9b273195d9936da1cfb2"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cce7c15faaac79b532a07ed6ab8332280ad83762"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
  "vulnStatus": "Received"
}


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