fkie_cve-2025-38593
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd
Published
2025-08-19 17:15
Modified
2025-08-20 14:40
Severity ?
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: hci_sync: fix double free in 'hci_discovery_filter_clear()' Function 'hci_discovery_filter_clear()' frees 'uuids' array and then sets it to NULL. There is a tiny chance of the following race: 'hci_cmd_sync_work()' 'update_passive_scan_sync()' 'hci_update_passive_scan_sync()' 'hci_discovery_filter_clear()' kfree(uuids); <-------------------------preempted--------------------------------> 'start_service_discovery()' 'hci_discovery_filter_clear()' kfree(uuids); // DOUBLE FREE <-------------------------preempted--------------------------------> uuids = NULL; To fix it let's add locking around 'kfree()' call and NULL pointer assignment. Otherwise the following backtrace fires: [ ] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ ] kernel BUG at mm/slub.c:547! [ ] Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [ ] CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 246 Comm: bluetoothd Tainted: G O 6.12.19-kernel #1 [ ] Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE [ ] pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [ ] pc : __slab_free+0xf8/0x348 [ ] lr : __slab_free+0x48/0x348 ... [ ] Call trace: [ ] __slab_free+0xf8/0x348 [ ] kfree+0x164/0x27c [ ] start_service_discovery+0x1d0/0x2c0 [ ] hci_sock_sendmsg+0x518/0x924 [ ] __sock_sendmsg+0x54/0x60 [ ] sock_write_iter+0x98/0xf8 [ ] do_iter_readv_writev+0xe4/0x1c8 [ ] vfs_writev+0x128/0x2b0 [ ] do_writev+0xfc/0x118 [ ] __arm64_sys_writev+0x20/0x2c [ ] invoke_syscall+0x68/0xf0 [ ] el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x40/0xe0 [ ] do_el0_svc+0x1c/0x28 [ ] el0_svc+0x30/0xd0 [ ] el0t_64_sync_handler+0x100/0x12c [ ] el0t_64_sync+0x194/0x198 [ ] Code: 8b0002e6 eb17031f 54fffbe1 d503201f (d4210000) [ ] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version



{
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nBluetooth: hci_sync: fix double free in \u0027hci_discovery_filter_clear()\u0027\n\nFunction \u0027hci_discovery_filter_clear()\u0027 frees \u0027uuids\u0027 array and then\nsets it to NULL. There is a tiny chance of the following race:\n\n\u0027hci_cmd_sync_work()\u0027\n\n \u0027update_passive_scan_sync()\u0027\n\n   \u0027hci_update_passive_scan_sync()\u0027\n\n     \u0027hci_discovery_filter_clear()\u0027\n       kfree(uuids);\n\n       \u003c-------------------------preempted--------------------------------\u003e\n                                           \u0027start_service_discovery()\u0027\n\n                                             \u0027hci_discovery_filter_clear()\u0027\n                                               kfree(uuids); // DOUBLE FREE\n\n       \u003c-------------------------preempted--------------------------------\u003e\n\n      uuids = NULL;\n\nTo fix it let\u0027s add locking around \u0027kfree()\u0027 call and NULL pointer\nassignment. Otherwise the following backtrace fires:\n\n[ ] ------------[ cut here ]------------\n[ ] kernel BUG at mm/slub.c:547!\n[ ] Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1] PREEMPT SMP\n[ ] CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 246 Comm: bluetoothd Tainted: G O 6.12.19-kernel #1\n[ ] Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE\n[ ] pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)\n[ ] pc : __slab_free+0xf8/0x348\n[ ] lr : __slab_free+0x48/0x348\n...\n[ ] Call trace:\n[ ]  __slab_free+0xf8/0x348\n[ ]  kfree+0x164/0x27c\n[ ]  start_service_discovery+0x1d0/0x2c0\n[ ]  hci_sock_sendmsg+0x518/0x924\n[ ]  __sock_sendmsg+0x54/0x60\n[ ]  sock_write_iter+0x98/0xf8\n[ ]  do_iter_readv_writev+0xe4/0x1c8\n[ ]  vfs_writev+0x128/0x2b0\n[ ]  do_writev+0xfc/0x118\n[ ]  __arm64_sys_writev+0x20/0x2c\n[ ]  invoke_syscall+0x68/0xf0\n[ ]  el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x40/0xe0\n[ ]  do_el0_svc+0x1c/0x28\n[ ]  el0_svc+0x30/0xd0\n[ ]  el0t_64_sync_handler+0x100/0x12c\n[ ]  el0t_64_sync+0x194/0x198\n[ ] Code: 8b0002e6 eb17031f 54fffbe1 d503201f (d4210000)\n[ ] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---"
    },
    {
      "lang": "es",
      "value": "En el kernel de Linux, se ha resuelto la siguiente vulnerabilidad: Bluetooth: hci_sync: corrige la doble liberaci\u00f3n en \u0027hci_discovery_filter_clear()\u0027 La funci\u00f3n \u0027hci_discovery_filter_clear()\u0027 libera la matriz \u0027uuids\u0027 y luego la establece en NULL. Hay una peque\u00f1a posibilidad de la siguiente ejecuci\u00f3n: \u0027hci_cmd_sync_work()\u0027 \u0027update_passive_scan_sync()\u0027 \u0027hci_update_passive_scan_sync()\u0027 \u0027hci_discovery_filter_clear()\u0027 kfree(uuids); \u0026lt;-------------------------preempted--------------------------------\u0026gt; \u0027start_service_discovery()\u0027 \u0027hci_discovery_filter_clear()\u0027 kfree(uuids); // DOBLE LIBERACI\u00d3N \u0026lt;-------------------------preempted--------------------------------\u0026gt; uuids = NULL; Para solucionarlo, agreguemos un bloqueo alrededor de la llamada \u0027kfree()\u0027 y la asignaci\u00f3n del puntero NULL. De lo contrario, se activa el siguiente backtrace: [ ] ------------[ cortar aqu\u00ed ]------------ [ ] \u00a1ERROR del kernel en mm/slub.c:547! [ ] Error interno: Ups - ERROR: 00000000f2000800 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [ ] CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 246 Comm: bluetoothd Tainted: G O 6.12.19-kernel #1 [ ] Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE [ ] pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [ ] pc : __slab_free+0xf8/0x348 [ ] lr : __slab_free+0x48/0x348 ... [ ] Call trace: [ ] __slab_free+0xf8/0x348 [ ] kfree+0x164/0x27c [ ] start_service_discovery+0x1d0/0x2c0 [ ] hci_sock_sendmsg+0x518/0x924 [ ] __sock_sendmsg+0x54/0x60 [ ] sock_write_iter+0x98/0xf8 [ ] do_iter_readv_writev+0xe4/0x1c8 [ ] vfs_writev+0x128/0x2b0 [ ] do_writev+0xfc/0x118 [ ] __arm64_sys_writev+0x20/0x2c [ ] invoke_syscall+0x68/0xf0 [ ] el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x40/0xe0 [ ] do_el0_svc+0x1c/0x28 [ ] el0_svc+0x30/0xd0 [ ] el0t_64_sync_handler+0x100/0x12c [ ] el0t_64_sync+0x194/0x198 [ ] Code: 8b0002e6 eb17031f 54fffbe1 d503201f (d4210000) [ ] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]-]---"
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2025-38593",
  "lastModified": "2025-08-20T14:40:17.713",
  "metrics": {},
  "published": "2025-08-19T17:15:37.067",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/16852eccbdfaf41a666705e3f8be55cf2864c5ca"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2935e556850e9c94d7a00adf14d3cd7fe406ac03"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a351ff6b8ecca4229afaa0d98042bead8de64799"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f8069f34c4c976786ded97498012225af87435d7"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
  "vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis"
}


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