fkie_cve-2024-47679
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd
Published
2024-10-21 12:15
Modified
2025-11-03 23:16
Severity ?
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vfs: fix race between evice_inodes() and find_inode()&iput()
Hi, all
Recently I noticed a bug[1] in btrfs, after digged it into
and I believe it'a race in vfs.
Let's assume there's a inode (ie ino 261) with i_count 1 is
called by iput(), and there's a concurrent thread calling
generic_shutdown_super().
cpu0: cpu1:
iput() // i_count is 1
->spin_lock(inode)
->dec i_count to 0
->iput_final() generic_shutdown_super()
->__inode_add_lru() ->evict_inodes()
// cause some reason[2] ->if (atomic_read(inode->i_count)) continue;
// return before // inode 261 passed the above check
// list_lru_add_obj() // and then schedule out
->spin_unlock()
// note here: the inode 261
// was still at sb list and hash list,
// and I_FREEING|I_WILL_FREE was not been set
btrfs_iget()
// after some function calls
->find_inode()
// found the above inode 261
->spin_lock(inode)
// check I_FREEING|I_WILL_FREE
// and passed
->__iget()
->spin_unlock(inode) // schedule back
->spin_lock(inode)
// check (I_NEW|I_FREEING|I_WILL_FREE) flags,
// passed and set I_FREEING
iput() ->spin_unlock(inode)
->spin_lock(inode) ->evict()
// dec i_count to 0
->iput_final()
->spin_unlock()
->evict()
Now, we have two threads simultaneously evicting
the same inode, which may trigger the BUG(inode->i_state & I_CLEAR)
statement both within clear_inode() and iput().
To fix the bug, recheck the inode->i_count after holding i_lock.
Because in the most scenarios, the first check is valid, and
the overhead of spin_lock() can be reduced.
If there is any misunderstanding, please let me know, thanks.
[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/000000000000eabe1d0619c48986@google.com/
[2]: The reason might be 1. SB_ACTIVE was removed or 2. mapping_shrinkable()
return false when I reproduced the bug.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| linux | linux_kernel | * | |
| linux | linux_kernel | * | |
| linux | linux_kernel | * | |
| linux | linux_kernel | * | |
| linux | linux_kernel | * | |
| linux | linux_kernel | * |
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{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nvfs: fix race between evice_inodes() and find_inode()\u0026iput()\n\nHi, all\n\nRecently I noticed a bug[1] in btrfs, after digged it into\nand I believe it\u0027a race in vfs.\n\nLet\u0027s assume there\u0027s a inode (ie ino 261) with i_count 1 is\ncalled by iput(), and there\u0027s a concurrent thread calling\ngeneric_shutdown_super().\n\ncpu0: cpu1:\niput() // i_count is 1\n -\u003espin_lock(inode)\n -\u003edec i_count to 0\n -\u003eiput_final() generic_shutdown_super()\n -\u003e__inode_add_lru() -\u003eevict_inodes()\n // cause some reason[2] -\u003eif (atomic_read(inode-\u003ei_count)) continue;\n // return before // inode 261 passed the above check\n // list_lru_add_obj() // and then schedule out\n -\u003espin_unlock()\n// note here: the inode 261\n// was still at sb list and hash list,\n// and I_FREEING|I_WILL_FREE was not been set\n\nbtrfs_iget()\n // after some function calls\n -\u003efind_inode()\n // found the above inode 261\n -\u003espin_lock(inode)\n // check I_FREEING|I_WILL_FREE\n // and passed\n -\u003e__iget()\n -\u003espin_unlock(inode) // schedule back\n -\u003espin_lock(inode)\n // check (I_NEW|I_FREEING|I_WILL_FREE) flags,\n // passed and set I_FREEING\niput() -\u003espin_unlock(inode)\n -\u003espin_lock(inode)\t\t\t -\u003eevict()\n // dec i_count to 0\n -\u003eiput_final()\n -\u003espin_unlock()\n -\u003eevict()\n\nNow, we have two threads simultaneously evicting\nthe same inode, which may trigger the BUG(inode-\u003ei_state \u0026 I_CLEAR)\nstatement both within clear_inode() and iput().\n\nTo fix the bug, recheck the inode-\u003ei_count after holding i_lock.\nBecause in the most scenarios, the first check is valid, and\nthe overhead of spin_lock() can be reduced.\n\nIf there is any misunderstanding, please let me know, thanks.\n\n[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/000000000000eabe1d0619c48986@google.com/\n[2]: The reason might be 1. SB_ACTIVE was removed or 2. mapping_shrinkable()\nreturn false when I reproduced the bug."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "En el kernel de Linux, se ha resuelto la siguiente vulnerabilidad: vfs: arregla la ejecuci\u00f3n entre evice_inodes() y find_inode()\u0026amp;iput() Hola a todos Recientemente not\u00e9 un error[1] en btrfs, despu\u00e9s de investigarlo y creo que es una ejecuci\u00f3n en vfs. Supongamos que hay un inodo (es decir, ino 261) con i_count 1 que es llamado por iput(), y hay un hilo concurrente que llama a generic_shutdown_super(). cpu0: cpu1: iput() // i_count es 1 -\u0026gt;spin_lock(inode) -\u0026gt;dec i_count a 0 -\u0026gt;iput_final() generic_shutdown_super() -\u0026gt;__inode_add_lru() -\u0026gt;evict_inodes() // por alguna raz\u00f3n[2] -\u0026gt;if (atomic_read(inode-\u0026gt;i_count)) continue; // regresar antes // el inodo 261 pas\u00f3 la verificaci\u00f3n anterior // list_lru_add_obj() // y luego programar la salida -\u0026gt;spin_unlock() // nota aqu\u00ed: el inodo 261 // todav\u00eda estaba en la lista sb y la lista hash, // y I_FREEING|I_WILL_FREE no se hab\u00eda establecido btrfs_iget() // despu\u00e9s de algunas llamadas de funci\u00f3n -\u0026gt;find_inode() // encontr\u00f3 el inodo 261 anterior -\u0026gt;spin_lock(inode) // verific\u00f3 I_FREEING|I_WILL_FREE // y pas\u00f3 -\u0026gt;__iget() -\u0026gt;spin_unlock(inode) // program\u00f3 de regreso -\u0026gt;spin_lock(inode) // verific\u00f3 los indicadores (I_NEW|I_FREEING|I_WILL_FREE), // pas\u00f3 y estableci\u00f3 I_FREEING iput() -\u0026gt;spin_unlock(inode) -\u0026gt;spin_lock(inode) -\u0026gt;evict() // dec i_count a 0 -\u0026gt;iput_final() -\u0026gt;spin_unlock() -\u0026gt;evict() Ahora, tenemos dos subprocesos expulsando simult\u00e1neamente el mismo inodo, lo que puede activar la declaraci\u00f3n BUG(inode-\u0026gt;i_state \u0026amp; I_CLEAR) tanto dentro de clear_inode() como de iput(). Para corregir el error, vuelva a verificar inode-\u0026gt;i_count despu\u00e9s de mantener i_lock. Porque en la mayor\u00eda de los escenarios, la primera verificaci\u00f3n es v\u00e1lida y se puede reducir la sobrecarga de spin_lock(). Si hay alg\u00fan malentendido, h\u00e1gamelo saber, gracias. [1]: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/000000000000eabe1d0619c48986@google.com/ [2]: La raz\u00f3n podr\u00eda ser 1. SB_ACTIVE fue eliminado o 2. mapping_shrinkable() devolvi\u00f3 falso cuando reproduje el error."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2024-47679",
"lastModified": "2025-11-03T23:16:15.737",
"metrics": {
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"confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"integrityImpact": "NONE",
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"scope": "UNCHANGED",
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"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
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"published": "2024-10-21T12:15:04.920",
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability is confirmed from an analyst perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: This vulnerability was exploited and seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Patched: This vulnerability was successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not exploited: This vulnerability was not exploited or seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expresses doubt about the veracity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
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