fkie_cve-2023-53599
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd
Published
2025-10-04 16:15
Modified
2025-10-06 14:56
Severity ?
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: crypto: af_alg - Fix missing initialisation affecting gcm-aes-s390 Fix af_alg_alloc_areq() to initialise areq->first_rsgl.sgl.sgt.sgl to point to the scatterlist array in areq->first_rsgl.sgl.sgl. Without this, the gcm-aes-s390 driver will oops when it tries to do gcm_walk_start() on req->dst because req->dst is set to the value of areq->first_rsgl.sgl.sgl by _aead_recvmsg() calling aead_request_set_crypt(). The problem comes if an empty ciphertext is passed: the loop in af_alg_get_rsgl() just passes straight out and doesn't set areq->first_rsgl up. This isn't a problem on x86_64 using gcmaes_crypt_by_sg() because, as far as I can tell, that ignores req->dst and only uses req->src[*]. [*] Is this a bug in aesni-intel_glue.c? The s390x oops looks something like: Unable to handle kernel pointer dereference in virtual kernel address space Failing address: 0000000a00000000 TEID: 0000000a00000803 Fault in home space mode while using kernel ASCE. AS:00000000a43a0007 R3:0000000000000024 Oops: 003b ilc:2 [#1] SMP ... Call Trace: [<000003ff7fc3d47e>] gcm_walk_start+0x16/0x28 [aes_s390] [<00000000a2a342f2>] crypto_aead_decrypt+0x9a/0xb8 [<00000000a2a60888>] aead_recvmsg+0x478/0x698 [<00000000a2e519a0>] sock_recvmsg+0x70/0xb0 [<00000000a2e51a56>] sock_read_iter+0x76/0xa0 [<00000000a273e066>] vfs_read+0x26e/0x2a8 [<00000000a273e8c4>] ksys_read+0xbc/0x100 [<00000000a311d808>] __do_syscall+0x1d0/0x1f8 [<00000000a312ff30>] system_call+0x70/0x98 Last Breaking-Event-Address: [<000003ff7fc3e6b4>] gcm_aes_crypt+0x104/0xa68 [aes_s390]
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version



{
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ncrypto: af_alg - Fix missing initialisation affecting gcm-aes-s390\n\nFix af_alg_alloc_areq() to initialise areq-\u003efirst_rsgl.sgl.sgt.sgl to point\nto the scatterlist array in areq-\u003efirst_rsgl.sgl.sgl.\n\nWithout this, the gcm-aes-s390 driver will oops when it tries to do\ngcm_walk_start() on req-\u003edst because req-\u003edst is set to the value of\nareq-\u003efirst_rsgl.sgl.sgl by _aead_recvmsg() calling\naead_request_set_crypt().\n\nThe problem comes if an empty ciphertext is passed: the loop in\naf_alg_get_rsgl() just passes straight out and doesn\u0027t set areq-\u003efirst_rsgl\nup.\n\nThis isn\u0027t a problem on x86_64 using gcmaes_crypt_by_sg() because, as far\nas I can tell, that ignores req-\u003edst and only uses req-\u003esrc[*].\n\n[*] Is this a bug in aesni-intel_glue.c?\n\nThe s390x oops looks something like:\n\n Unable to handle kernel pointer dereference in virtual kernel address space\n Failing address: 0000000a00000000 TEID: 0000000a00000803\n Fault in home space mode while using kernel ASCE.\n AS:00000000a43a0007 R3:0000000000000024\n Oops: 003b ilc:2 [#1] SMP\n ...\n Call Trace:\n  [\u003c000003ff7fc3d47e\u003e] gcm_walk_start+0x16/0x28 [aes_s390]\n  [\u003c00000000a2a342f2\u003e] crypto_aead_decrypt+0x9a/0xb8\n  [\u003c00000000a2a60888\u003e] aead_recvmsg+0x478/0x698\n  [\u003c00000000a2e519a0\u003e] sock_recvmsg+0x70/0xb0\n  [\u003c00000000a2e51a56\u003e] sock_read_iter+0x76/0xa0\n  [\u003c00000000a273e066\u003e] vfs_read+0x26e/0x2a8\n  [\u003c00000000a273e8c4\u003e] ksys_read+0xbc/0x100\n  [\u003c00000000a311d808\u003e] __do_syscall+0x1d0/0x1f8\n  [\u003c00000000a312ff30\u003e] system_call+0x70/0x98\n Last Breaking-Event-Address:\n  [\u003c000003ff7fc3e6b4\u003e] gcm_aes_crypt+0x104/0xa68 [aes_s390]"
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2023-53599",
  "lastModified": "2025-10-06T14:56:21.733",
  "metrics": {},
  "published": "2025-10-04T16:15:56.497",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2c9d205040d7c0eaccc473917f9b0bb0a923e440"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6a4b8aa0a916b39a39175584c07222434fa6c6ef"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
  "vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis"
}


Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.


Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Sightings

Author Source Type Date

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability is confirmed from an analyst perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: This vulnerability was exploited and seen by the user reporting the sighting.
  • Patched: This vulnerability was successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
  • Not exploited: This vulnerability was not exploited or seen by the user reporting the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expresses doubt about the veracity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.


Loading…

Loading…