fkie_cve-2023-53431
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd
Published
2025-09-18 16:15
Modified
2025-10-01 08:15
Severity ?
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: ses: Handle enclosure with just a primary component gracefully
This reverts commit 3fe97ff3d949 ("scsi: ses: Don't attach if enclosure
has no components") and introduces proper handling of case where there are
no detected secondary components, but primary component (enumerated in
num_enclosures) does exist. That fix was originally proposed by Ding Hui
<dinghui@sangfor.com.cn>.
Completely ignoring devices that have one primary enclosure and no
secondary one results in ses_intf_add() bailing completely
scsi 2:0:0:254: enclosure has no enumerated components
scsi 2:0:0:254: Failed to bind enclosure -12ven in valid configurations such
even on valid configurations with 1 primary and 0 secondary enclosures as
below:
# sg_ses /dev/sg0
3PARdata SES 3321
Supported diagnostic pages:
Supported Diagnostic Pages [sdp] [0x0]
Configuration (SES) [cf] [0x1]
Short Enclosure Status (SES) [ses] [0x8]
# sg_ses -p cf /dev/sg0
3PARdata SES 3321
Configuration diagnostic page:
number of secondary subenclosures: 0
generation code: 0x0
enclosure descriptor list
Subenclosure identifier: 0 [primary]
relative ES process id: 0, number of ES processes: 1
number of type descriptor headers: 1
enclosure logical identifier (hex): 20000002ac02068d
enclosure vendor: 3PARdata product: VV rev: 3321
type descriptor header and text list
Element type: Unspecified, subenclosure id: 0
number of possible elements: 1
The changelog for the original fix follows
=====
We can get a crash when disconnecting the iSCSI session,
the call trace like this:
[ffff00002a00fb70] kfree at ffff00000830e224
[ffff00002a00fba0] ses_intf_remove at ffff000001f200e4
[ffff00002a00fbd0] device_del at ffff0000086b6a98
[ffff00002a00fc50] device_unregister at ffff0000086b6d58
[ffff00002a00fc70] __scsi_remove_device at ffff00000870608c
[ffff00002a00fca0] scsi_remove_device at ffff000008706134
[ffff00002a00fcc0] __scsi_remove_target at ffff0000087062e4
[ffff00002a00fd10] scsi_remove_target at ffff0000087064c0
[ffff00002a00fd70] __iscsi_unbind_session at ffff000001c872c4
[ffff00002a00fdb0] process_one_work at ffff00000810f35c
[ffff00002a00fe00] worker_thread at ffff00000810f648
[ffff00002a00fe70] kthread at ffff000008116e98
In ses_intf_add, components count could be 0, and kcalloc 0 size scomp,
but not saved in edev->component[i].scratch
In this situation, edev->component[0].scratch is an invalid pointer,
when kfree it in ses_intf_remove_enclosure, a crash like above would happen
The call trace also could be other random cases when kfree cannot catch
the invalid pointer
We should not use edev->component[] array when the components count is 0
We also need check index when use edev->component[] array in
ses_enclosure_data_process
=====
References
Impacted products
Vendor | Product | Version |
---|
{ "cveTags": [], "descriptions": [ { "lang": "en", "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nscsi: ses: Handle enclosure with just a primary component gracefully\n\nThis reverts commit 3fe97ff3d949 (\"scsi: ses: Don\u0027t attach if enclosure\nhas no components\") and introduces proper handling of case where there are\nno detected secondary components, but primary component (enumerated in\nnum_enclosures) does exist. That fix was originally proposed by Ding Hui\n\u003cdinghui@sangfor.com.cn\u003e.\n\nCompletely ignoring devices that have one primary enclosure and no\nsecondary one results in ses_intf_add() bailing completely\n\n\tscsi 2:0:0:254: enclosure has no enumerated components\n scsi 2:0:0:254: Failed to bind enclosure -12ven in valid configurations such\n\neven on valid configurations with 1 primary and 0 secondary enclosures as\nbelow:\n\n\t# sg_ses /dev/sg0\n\t 3PARdata SES 3321\n\tSupported diagnostic pages:\n\t Supported Diagnostic Pages [sdp] [0x0]\n\t Configuration (SES) [cf] [0x1]\n\t Short Enclosure Status (SES) [ses] [0x8]\n\t# sg_ses -p cf /dev/sg0\n\t 3PARdata SES 3321\n\tConfiguration diagnostic page:\n\t number of secondary subenclosures: 0\n\t generation code: 0x0\n\t enclosure descriptor list\n\t Subenclosure identifier: 0 [primary]\n\t relative ES process id: 0, number of ES processes: 1\n\t number of type descriptor headers: 1\n\t enclosure logical identifier (hex): 20000002ac02068d\n\t enclosure vendor: 3PARdata product: VV rev: 3321\n\t type descriptor header and text list\n\t Element type: Unspecified, subenclosure id: 0\n\t number of possible elements: 1\n\nThe changelog for the original fix follows\n\n=====\nWe can get a crash when disconnecting the iSCSI session,\nthe call trace like this:\n\n [ffff00002a00fb70] kfree at ffff00000830e224\n [ffff00002a00fba0] ses_intf_remove at ffff000001f200e4\n [ffff00002a00fbd0] device_del at ffff0000086b6a98\n [ffff00002a00fc50] device_unregister at ffff0000086b6d58\n [ffff00002a00fc70] __scsi_remove_device at ffff00000870608c\n [ffff00002a00fca0] scsi_remove_device at ffff000008706134\n [ffff00002a00fcc0] __scsi_remove_target at ffff0000087062e4\n [ffff00002a00fd10] scsi_remove_target at ffff0000087064c0\n [ffff00002a00fd70] __iscsi_unbind_session at ffff000001c872c4\n [ffff00002a00fdb0] process_one_work at ffff00000810f35c\n [ffff00002a00fe00] worker_thread at ffff00000810f648\n [ffff00002a00fe70] kthread at ffff000008116e98\n\nIn ses_intf_add, components count could be 0, and kcalloc 0 size scomp,\nbut not saved in edev-\u003ecomponent[i].scratch\n\nIn this situation, edev-\u003ecomponent[0].scratch is an invalid pointer,\nwhen kfree it in ses_intf_remove_enclosure, a crash like above would happen\nThe call trace also could be other random cases when kfree cannot catch\nthe invalid pointer\n\nWe should not use edev-\u003ecomponent[] array when the components count is 0\nWe also need check index when use edev-\u003ecomponent[] array in\nses_enclosure_data_process\n=====" } ], "id": "CVE-2023-53431", "lastModified": "2025-10-01T08:15:30.747", "metrics": {}, "published": "2025-09-18T16:15:47.070", "references": [ { "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67", "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/05143d90ac90b7abc6692285895a1ef460e008ee" }, { "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67", "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/110d425cdfb15006f3c4fde5264e786a247b6b36" }, { "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67", "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/176d7345b89ced72020a313bfa4e7f345d1c3aed" }, { "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67", "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4e7c498c3713b09bef20c76c7319555637e8bbd5" }, { "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67", "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c8e22b7a1694bb8d025ea636816472739d859145" }, { "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67", "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/eabc4872f172ecb8dd8536bc366a51868154a450" }, { "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67", "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f8e702c54413eee2d8f94f61d18adadac7c87e87" } ], "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67", "vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis" }
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Sightings
Author | Source | Type | Date |
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Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability is confirmed from an analyst perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: This vulnerability was exploited and seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Patched: This vulnerability was successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not exploited: This vulnerability was not exploited or seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expresses doubt about the veracity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
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