fkie_cve-2023-53351
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd
Published
2025-09-17 15:15
Modified
2025-09-18 13:43
Severity ?
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/sched: Check scheduler work queue before calling timeout handling During an IGT GPU reset test we see again oops despite of commit 0c8c901aaaebc9 (drm/sched: Check scheduler ready before calling timeout handling). It uses ready condition whether to call drm_sched_fault which unwind the TDR leads to GPU reset. However it looks the ready condition is overloaded with other meanings, for example, for the following stack is related GPU reset : 0 gfx_v9_0_cp_gfx_start 1 gfx_v9_0_cp_gfx_resume 2 gfx_v9_0_cp_resume 3 gfx_v9_0_hw_init 4 gfx_v9_0_resume 5 amdgpu_device_ip_resume_phase2 does the following: /* start the ring */ gfx_v9_0_cp_gfx_start(adev); ring->sched.ready = true; The same approach is for other ASICs as well : gfx_v8_0_cp_gfx_resume gfx_v10_0_kiq_resume, etc... As a result, our GPU reset test causes GPU fault which calls unconditionally gfx_v9_0_fault and then drm_sched_fault. However now it depends on whether the interrupt service routine drm_sched_fault is executed after gfx_v9_0_cp_gfx_start is completed which sets the ready field of the scheduler to true even for uninitialized schedulers and causes oops vs no fault or when ISR drm_sched_fault is completed prior gfx_v9_0_cp_gfx_start and NULL pointer dereference does not occur. Use the field timeout_wq to prevent oops for uninitialized schedulers. The field could be initialized by the work queue of resetting the domain. v1: Corrections to commit message (Luben)
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version



{
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ndrm/sched: Check scheduler work queue before calling timeout handling\n\nDuring an IGT GPU reset test we see again oops despite of\ncommit 0c8c901aaaebc9 (drm/sched: Check scheduler ready before calling\ntimeout handling).\n\nIt uses ready condition whether to call drm_sched_fault which unwind\nthe TDR leads to GPU reset.\nHowever it looks the ready condition is overloaded with other meanings,\nfor example, for the following stack is related GPU reset :\n\n0  gfx_v9_0_cp_gfx_start\n1  gfx_v9_0_cp_gfx_resume\n2  gfx_v9_0_cp_resume\n3  gfx_v9_0_hw_init\n4  gfx_v9_0_resume\n5  amdgpu_device_ip_resume_phase2\n\ndoes the following:\n\t/* start the ring */\n\tgfx_v9_0_cp_gfx_start(adev);\n\tring-\u003esched.ready = true;\n\nThe same approach is for other ASICs as well :\ngfx_v8_0_cp_gfx_resume\ngfx_v10_0_kiq_resume, etc...\n\nAs a result, our GPU reset test causes GPU fault which calls unconditionally gfx_v9_0_fault\nand then drm_sched_fault. However now it depends on whether the interrupt service routine\ndrm_sched_fault is executed after gfx_v9_0_cp_gfx_start is completed which sets the ready\nfield of the scheduler to true even  for uninitialized schedulers and causes oops vs\nno fault or when ISR  drm_sched_fault is completed prior  gfx_v9_0_cp_gfx_start and\nNULL pointer dereference does not occur.\n\nUse the field timeout_wq  to prevent oops for uninitialized schedulers.\nThe field could be initialized by the work queue of resetting the domain.\n\nv1: Corrections to commit message (Luben)"
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2023-53351",
  "lastModified": "2025-09-18T13:43:34.310",
  "metrics": {},
  "published": "2025-09-17T15:15:39.057",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2da5bffe9eaa5819a868e8eaaa11b3fd0f16a691"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c43a96fc00b662cef1ef0eb22d40441ce2abae8f"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
  "vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis"
}


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