fkie_cve-2023-53070
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd
Published
2025-05-02 16:15
Modified
2025-05-05 20:54
Severity ?
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ACPI: PPTT: Fix to avoid sleep in the atomic context when PPTT is absent Commit 0c80f9e165f8 ("ACPI: PPTT: Leave the table mapped for the runtime usage") enabled to map PPTT once on the first invocation of acpi_get_pptt() and never unmapped the same allowing it to be used at runtime with out the hassle of mapping and unmapping the table. This was needed to fetch LLC information from the PPTT in the cpuhotplug path which is executed in the atomic context as the acpi_get_table() might sleep waiting for a mutex. However it missed to handle the case when there is no PPTT on the system which results in acpi_get_pptt() being called from all the secondary CPUs attempting to fetch the LLC information in the atomic context without knowing the absence of PPTT resulting in the splat like below: | BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/semaphore.c:164 | in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 1, non_block: 0, pid: 0, name: swapper/1 | preempt_count: 1, expected: 0 | RCU nest depth: 0, expected: 0 | no locks held by swapper/1/0. | irq event stamp: 0 | hardirqs last enabled at (0): 0x0 | hardirqs last disabled at (0): copy_process+0x61c/0x1b40 | softirqs last enabled at (0): copy_process+0x61c/0x1b40 | softirqs last disabled at (0): 0x0 | CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Not tainted 6.3.0-rc1 #1 | Call trace: | dump_backtrace+0xac/0x138 | show_stack+0x30/0x48 | dump_stack_lvl+0x60/0xb0 | dump_stack+0x18/0x28 | __might_resched+0x160/0x270 | __might_sleep+0x58/0xb0 | down_timeout+0x34/0x98 | acpi_os_wait_semaphore+0x7c/0xc0 | acpi_ut_acquire_mutex+0x58/0x108 | acpi_get_table+0x40/0xe8 | acpi_get_pptt+0x48/0xa0 | acpi_get_cache_info+0x38/0x140 | init_cache_level+0xf4/0x118 | detect_cache_attributes+0x2e4/0x640 | update_siblings_masks+0x3c/0x330 | store_cpu_topology+0x88/0xf0 | secondary_start_kernel+0xd0/0x168 | __secondary_switched+0xb8/0xc0 Update acpi_get_pptt() to consider the fact that PPTT is once checked and is not available on the system and return NULL avoiding any attempts to fetch PPTT and thereby avoiding any possible sleep waiting for a mutex in the atomic context.
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version



{
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nACPI: PPTT: Fix to avoid sleep in the atomic context when PPTT is absent\n\nCommit 0c80f9e165f8 (\"ACPI: PPTT: Leave the table mapped for the runtime usage\")\nenabled to map PPTT once on the first invocation of acpi_get_pptt() and\nnever unmapped the same allowing it to be used at runtime with out the\nhassle of mapping and unmapping the table. This was needed to fetch LLC\ninformation from the PPTT in the cpuhotplug path which is executed in\nthe atomic context as the acpi_get_table() might sleep waiting for a\nmutex.\n\nHowever it missed to handle the case when there is no PPTT on the system\nwhich results in acpi_get_pptt() being called from all the secondary\nCPUs attempting to fetch the LLC information in the atomic context\nwithout knowing the absence of PPTT resulting in the splat like below:\n\n | BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/semaphore.c:164\n | in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 1, non_block: 0, pid: 0, name: swapper/1\n | preempt_count: 1, expected: 0\n | RCU nest depth: 0, expected: 0\n | no locks held by swapper/1/0.\n | irq event stamp: 0\n | hardirqs last  enabled at (0): 0x0\n | hardirqs last disabled at (0): copy_process+0x61c/0x1b40\n | softirqs last  enabled at (0): copy_process+0x61c/0x1b40\n | softirqs last disabled at (0): 0x0\n | CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Not tainted 6.3.0-rc1 #1\n | Call trace:\n |  dump_backtrace+0xac/0x138\n |  show_stack+0x30/0x48\n |  dump_stack_lvl+0x60/0xb0\n |  dump_stack+0x18/0x28\n |  __might_resched+0x160/0x270\n |  __might_sleep+0x58/0xb0\n |  down_timeout+0x34/0x98\n |  acpi_os_wait_semaphore+0x7c/0xc0\n |  acpi_ut_acquire_mutex+0x58/0x108\n |  acpi_get_table+0x40/0xe8\n |  acpi_get_pptt+0x48/0xa0\n |  acpi_get_cache_info+0x38/0x140\n |  init_cache_level+0xf4/0x118\n |  detect_cache_attributes+0x2e4/0x640\n |  update_siblings_masks+0x3c/0x330\n |  store_cpu_topology+0x88/0xf0\n |  secondary_start_kernel+0xd0/0x168\n |  __secondary_switched+0xb8/0xc0\n\nUpdate acpi_get_pptt() to consider the fact that PPTT is once checked and\nis not available on the system and return NULL avoiding any attempts to\nfetch PPTT and thereby avoiding any possible sleep waiting for a mutex\nin the atomic context."
    },
    {
      "lang": "es",
      "value": "En el kernel de Linux, se ha resuelto la siguiente vulnerabilidad: ACPI: PPTT: Correcci\u00f3n para evitar la suspensi\u00f3n en el contexto at\u00f3mico cuando PPTT est\u00e1 ausente. el commit 0c80f9e165f8 (\"ACPI: PPTT: Dejar la tabla asignada para el uso en tiempo de ejecuci\u00f3n\") habilit\u00f3 la asignaci\u00f3n de PPTT una vez en la primera invocaci\u00f3n de acpi_get_pptt() y nunca la desasign\u00f3, lo que permite su uso en tiempo de ejecuci\u00f3n sin la molestia de asignar y desasignar la tabla. Esto era necesario para obtener informaci\u00f3n de LLC del PPTT en la ruta cpuhotplug, que se ejecuta en el contexto at\u00f3mico, ya que acpi_get_table() podr\u00eda estar en suspensi\u00f3n esperando un mutex. Sin embargo, no logr\u00f3 gestionar el caso en que no hay PPTT en el sistema, lo que provoca que acpi_get_pptt() se llame desde todas las CPU secundarias que intentan obtener la informaci\u00f3n de LLC en el contexto at\u00f3mico sin conocer la ausencia de PPTT, lo que resulta en un error como el siguiente: | ERROR: funci\u00f3n inactiva llamada desde contexto no v\u00e1lido en kernel/locking/semaphore.c:164 | in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 1, non_block: 0, pid: 0, name: swapper/1 | preempt_count: 1, expected: 0 | Profundidad de anidamiento de RCU: 0, expected: 0 | swapper/1/0 no tiene bloqueos. | marca de evento irq: 0 | hardirqs habilitado por \u00faltima vez en (0): 0x0 | hardirqs deshabilitado por \u00faltima vez en (0): copy_process+0x61c/0x1b40 | softirqs habilitado por \u00faltima vez en (0): copy_process+0x61c/0x1b40 | softirqs deshabilitado por \u00faltima vez en (0): 0x0 | CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 No contaminado 6.3.0-rc1 #1 | Rastreo de llamadas: | dump_backtrace+0xac/0x138 | show_stack+0x30/0x48 | dump_stack_lvl+0x60/0xb0 | dump_stack+0x18/0x28 | __might_resched+0x160/0x270 | __might_sleep+0x58/0xb0 | down_timeout+0x34/0x98 | acpi_os_wait_semaphore+0x7c/0xc0 | acpi_ut_acquire_mutex+0x58/0x108 | acpi_get_table+0x40/0xe8 | acpi_get_pptt+0x48/0xa0 | acpi_get_cache_info+0x38/0x140 | init_cache_level+0xf4/0x118 | detect_cache_attributes+0x2e4/0x640 | update_siblings_masks+0x3c/0x330 | store_cpu_topology+0x88/0xf0 | secondary_start_kernel+0xd0/0x168 | __secondary_switched+0xb8/0xc0 Actualice acpi_get_pptt() para considerar el hecho de que PPTT se verifica una vez y no est\u00e1 disponible en el sistema y devuelve NULL evitando cualquier intento de obtener PPTT y, por lo tanto, evitando cualquier posible suspensi\u00f3n esperando un mutex en el contexto at\u00f3mico."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2023-53070",
  "lastModified": "2025-05-05T20:54:45.973",
  "metrics": {},
  "published": "2025-05-02T16:15:26.050",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1318a07706bb2f8c65f88f39a16c2b5260bcdcd4"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/91d7b60a65d9f71230ea09b86d2058a884a3c2af"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e0c1106d51b9abc8eae03c5522b20649b6a55f6e"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
  "vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis"
}


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