FKIE_CVE-2022-50675

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2025-12-09 16:17 - Updated: 2025-12-09 18:37
Severity ?
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: arm64: mte: Avoid setting PG_mte_tagged if no tags cleared or restored Prior to commit 69e3b846d8a7 ("arm64: mte: Sync tags for pages where PTE is untagged"), mte_sync_tags() was only called for pte_tagged() entries (those mapped with PROT_MTE). Therefore mte_sync_tags() could safely use test_and_set_bit(PG_mte_tagged, &page->flags) without inadvertently setting PG_mte_tagged on an untagged page. The above commit was required as guests may enable MTE without any control at the stage 2 mapping, nor a PROT_MTE mapping in the VMM. However, the side-effect was that any page with a PTE that looked like swap (or migration) was getting PG_mte_tagged set automatically. A subsequent page copy (e.g. migration) copied the tags to the destination page even if the tags were owned by KASAN. This issue was masked by the page_kasan_tag_reset() call introduced in commit e5b8d9218951 ("arm64: mte: reset the page tag in page->flags"). When this commit was reverted (20794545c146), KASAN started reporting access faults because the overriding tags in a page did not match the original page->flags (with CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS=y): BUG: KASAN: invalid-access in copy_page+0x10/0xd0 arch/arm64/lib/copy_page.S:26 Read at addr f5ff000017f2e000 by task syz-executor.1/2218 Pointer tag: [f5], memory tag: [f2] Move the PG_mte_tagged bit setting from mte_sync_tags() to the actual place where tags are cleared (mte_sync_page_tags()) or restored (mte_restore_tags()).
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version

{
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\narm64: mte: Avoid setting PG_mte_tagged if no tags cleared or restored\n\nPrior to commit 69e3b846d8a7 (\"arm64: mte: Sync tags for pages where PTE\nis untagged\"), mte_sync_tags() was only called for pte_tagged() entries\n(those mapped with PROT_MTE). Therefore mte_sync_tags() could safely use\ntest_and_set_bit(PG_mte_tagged, \u0026page-\u003eflags) without inadvertently\nsetting PG_mte_tagged on an untagged page.\n\nThe above commit was required as guests may enable MTE without any\ncontrol at the stage 2 mapping, nor a PROT_MTE mapping in the VMM.\nHowever, the side-effect was that any page with a PTE that looked like\nswap (or migration) was getting PG_mte_tagged set automatically. A\nsubsequent page copy (e.g. migration) copied the tags to the destination\npage even if the tags were owned by KASAN.\n\nThis issue was masked by the page_kasan_tag_reset() call introduced in\ncommit e5b8d9218951 (\"arm64: mte: reset the page tag in page-\u003eflags\").\nWhen this commit was reverted (20794545c146), KASAN started reporting\naccess faults because the overriding tags in a page did not match the\noriginal page-\u003eflags (with CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS=y):\n\n  BUG: KASAN: invalid-access in copy_page+0x10/0xd0 arch/arm64/lib/copy_page.S:26\n  Read at addr f5ff000017f2e000 by task syz-executor.1/2218\n  Pointer tag: [f5], memory tag: [f2]\n\nMove the PG_mte_tagged bit setting from mte_sync_tags() to the actual\nplace where tags are cleared (mte_sync_page_tags()) or restored\n(mte_restore_tags())."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2022-50675",
  "lastModified": "2025-12-09T18:37:13.640",
  "metrics": {},
  "published": "2025-12-09T16:17:19.730",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/749e9fc18b1e1a3f93a9512e91bd7f93002d2821"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/918002bdbe4328c8c0164a22e8ebf2384b80dc23"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a8e5e5146ad08d794c58252bab00b261045ef16d"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
  "vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis"
}


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