fkie_cve-2022-49955
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd
Published
2025-06-18 11:15
Modified
2025-11-14 18:59
Severity ?
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
powerpc/rtas: Fix RTAS MSR[HV] handling for Cell
The semi-recent changes to MSR handling when entering RTAS (firmware)
cause crashes on IBM Cell machines. An example trace:
kernel tried to execute user page (2fff01a8) - exploit attempt? (uid: 0)
BUG: Unable to handle kernel instruction fetch
Faulting instruction address: 0x2fff01a8
Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1]
BE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Hash SMP NR_CPUS=4 NUMA Cell
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G W 6.0.0-rc2-00433-gede0a8d3307a #207
NIP: 000000002fff01a8 LR: 0000000000032608 CTR: 0000000000000000
REGS: c0000000015236b0 TRAP: 0400 Tainted: G W (6.0.0-rc2-00433-gede0a8d3307a)
MSR: 0000000008001002 <ME,RI> CR: 00000000 XER: 20000000
...
NIP 0x2fff01a8
LR 0x32608
Call Trace:
0xc00000000143c5f8 (unreliable)
.rtas_call+0x224/0x320
.rtas_get_boot_time+0x70/0x150
.read_persistent_clock64+0x114/0x140
.read_persistent_wall_and_boot_offset+0x24/0x80
.timekeeping_init+0x40/0x29c
.start_kernel+0x674/0x8f0
start_here_common+0x1c/0x50
Unlike PAPR platforms where RTAS is only used in guests, on the IBM Cell
machines Linux runs with MSR[HV] set but also uses RTAS, provided by
SLOF.
Fix it by copying the MSR[HV] bit from the MSR value we've just read
using mfmsr into the value used for RTAS.
It seems like we could also fix it using an #ifdef CELL to set MSR[HV],
but that doesn't work because it's possible to build a single kernel
image that runs on both Cell native and pseries.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| linux | linux_kernel | * | |
| linux | linux_kernel | * | |
| linux | linux_kernel | * | |
| linux | linux_kernel | 6.0 | |
| linux | linux_kernel | 6.0 | |
| linux | linux_kernel | 6.0 |
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"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\npowerpc/rtas: Fix RTAS MSR[HV] handling for Cell\n\nThe semi-recent changes to MSR handling when entering RTAS (firmware)\ncause crashes on IBM Cell machines. An example trace:\n\n kernel tried to execute user page (2fff01a8) - exploit attempt? (uid: 0)\n BUG: Unable to handle kernel instruction fetch\n Faulting instruction address: 0x2fff01a8\n Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1]\n BE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Hash SMP NR_CPUS=4 NUMA Cell\n Modules linked in:\n CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G W 6.0.0-rc2-00433-gede0a8d3307a #207\n NIP: 000000002fff01a8 LR: 0000000000032608 CTR: 0000000000000000\n REGS: c0000000015236b0 TRAP: 0400 Tainted: G W (6.0.0-rc2-00433-gede0a8d3307a)\n MSR: 0000000008001002 \u003cME,RI\u003e CR: 00000000 XER: 20000000\n ...\n NIP 0x2fff01a8\n LR 0x32608\n Call Trace:\n 0xc00000000143c5f8 (unreliable)\n .rtas_call+0x224/0x320\n .rtas_get_boot_time+0x70/0x150\n .read_persistent_clock64+0x114/0x140\n .read_persistent_wall_and_boot_offset+0x24/0x80\n .timekeeping_init+0x40/0x29c\n .start_kernel+0x674/0x8f0\n start_here_common+0x1c/0x50\n\nUnlike PAPR platforms where RTAS is only used in guests, on the IBM Cell\nmachines Linux runs with MSR[HV] set but also uses RTAS, provided by\nSLOF.\n\nFix it by copying the MSR[HV] bit from the MSR value we\u0027ve just read\nusing mfmsr into the value used for RTAS.\n\nIt seems like we could also fix it using an #ifdef CELL to set MSR[HV],\nbut that doesn\u0027t work because it\u0027s possible to build a single kernel\nimage that runs on both Cell native and pseries."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "En el kernel de Linux, se ha resuelto la siguiente vulnerabilidad: powerpc/rtas: Correcci\u00f3n del manejo de MSR[HV] de RTAS para Cell. Los cambios recientes en el manejo de MSR al ingresar RTAS (firmware) provocan bloqueos en las m\u00e1quinas IBM Cell. Ejemplo de rastreo: el kernel intent\u00f3 ejecutar la p\u00e1gina de usuario (2fff01a8): \u00bfintento de explotaci\u00f3n? (uid: 0) ERROR: No se puede controlar la obtenci\u00f3n de instrucciones del n\u00facleo Direcci\u00f3n de instrucci\u00f3n err\u00f3nea: 0x2fff01a8 Oops: Acceso del n\u00facleo al \u00e1rea defectuosa, firma: 11 [#1] BE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Hash SMP NR_CPUS=4 M\u00f3dulos de celda NUMA vinculados: CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Contaminado: GW 6.0.0-rc2-00433-gede0a8d3307a #207 NIP: 000000002fff01a8 LR: 0000000000032608 CTR: 000000000000000 REGS: c0000000015236b0 TRAP: 0400 Contaminado: GW (6.0.0-rc2-00433-gede0a8d3307a) MSR: 0000000008001002 CR: 00000000 XER: 20000000 ... NIP 0x2fff01a8 LR 0x32608 Rastreo de llamadas: 0xc00000000143c5f8 (no confiable) .rtas_call+0x224/0x320 .rtas_get_boot_time+0x70/0x150 .read_persistent_clock64+0x114/0x140 .read_persistent_wall_and_boot_offset+0x24/0x80 .timekeeping_init+0x40/0x29c A diferencia de las plataformas PAPR, donde RTAS solo se usa en hu\u00e9spedes, en las m\u00e1quinas IBM Cell, Linux se ejecuta con MSR[HV] activado, pero tambi\u00e9n usa RTAS, proporcionado por SLOF. Para solucionarlo, copie el bit MSR[HV] del valor MSR que acabamos de leer con mfmsr al valor usado para RTAS. Parece que tambi\u00e9n podr\u00edamos solucionarlo usando un #ifdef CELL para activar MSR[HV], pero esto no funciona, ya que es posible crear una \u00fanica imagen de kernel que funcione tanto en Cell nativo como en pseries."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2022-49955",
"lastModified": "2025-11-14T18:59:35.720",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "LOCAL",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 5.5,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"integrityImpact": "NONE",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 1.8,
"impactScore": 3.6,
"source": "nvd@nist.gov",
"type": "Primary"
}
]
},
"published": "2025-06-18T11:15:22.630",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"tags": [
"Patch"
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"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8b08d4f97233d8e58fff2fd9d5f86397a49733c5"
},
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"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
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"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
"weaknesses": [
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"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-476"
}
],
"source": "nvd@nist.gov",
"type": "Primary"
}
]
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability is confirmed from an analyst perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: This vulnerability was exploited and seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Patched: This vulnerability was successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not exploited: This vulnerability was not exploited or seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expresses doubt about the veracity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
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