fkie_cve-2022-48815
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd
Published
2024-07-16 12:15
Modified
2025-10-06 17:05
Severity ?
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: dsa: bcm_sf2: don't use devres for mdiobus
As explained in commits:
74b6d7d13307 ("net: dsa: realtek: register the MDIO bus under devres")
5135e96a3dd2 ("net: dsa: don't allocate the slave_mii_bus using devres")
mdiobus_free() will panic when called from devm_mdiobus_free() <-
devres_release_all() <- __device_release_driver(), and that mdiobus was
not previously unregistered.
The Starfighter 2 is a platform device, so the initial set of
constraints that I thought would cause this (I2C or SPI buses which call
->remove on ->shutdown) do not apply. But there is one more which
applies here.
If the DSA master itself is on a bus that calls ->remove from ->shutdown
(like dpaa2-eth, which is on the fsl-mc bus), there is a device link
between the switch and the DSA master, and device_links_unbind_consumers()
will unbind the bcm_sf2 switch driver on shutdown.
So the same treatment must be applied to all DSA switch drivers, which
is: either use devres for both the mdiobus allocation and registration,
or don't use devres at all.
The bcm_sf2 driver has the code structure in place for orderly mdiobus
removal, so just replace devm_mdiobus_alloc() with the non-devres
variant, and add manual free where necessary, to ensure that we don't
let devres free a still-registered bus.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| linux | linux_kernel | * | |
| linux | linux_kernel | * | |
| linux | linux_kernel | * | |
| linux | linux_kernel | 5.17 | |
| linux | linux_kernel | 5.17 | |
| linux | linux_kernel | 5.17 |
{
"configurations": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "B68BDC6A-C47C-43F1-B39E-31269028B46E",
"versionEndExcluding": "5.10.101",
"versionStartIncluding": "5.9",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "866451F0-299E-416C-B0B8-AE6B33E62CCA",
"versionEndExcluding": "5.15.24",
"versionStartIncluding": "5.11",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "679523BA-1392-404B-AB85-F5A5408B1ECC",
"versionEndExcluding": "5.16.10",
"versionStartIncluding": "5.16",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:5.17:rc1:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "7BD5F8D9-54FA-4CB0-B4F0-CB0471FDDB2D",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:5.17:rc2:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "E6E34B23-78B4-4516-9BD8-61B33F4AC49A",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:5.17:rc3:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "C030FA3D-03F4-4FB9-9DBF-D08E5CAC51AA",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
]
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet: dsa: bcm_sf2: don\u0027t use devres for mdiobus\n\nAs explained in commits:\n74b6d7d13307 (\"net: dsa: realtek: register the MDIO bus under devres\")\n5135e96a3dd2 (\"net: dsa: don\u0027t allocate the slave_mii_bus using devres\")\n\nmdiobus_free() will panic when called from devm_mdiobus_free() \u003c-\ndevres_release_all() \u003c- __device_release_driver(), and that mdiobus was\nnot previously unregistered.\n\nThe Starfighter 2 is a platform device, so the initial set of\nconstraints that I thought would cause this (I2C or SPI buses which call\n-\u003eremove on -\u003eshutdown) do not apply. But there is one more which\napplies here.\n\nIf the DSA master itself is on a bus that calls -\u003eremove from -\u003eshutdown\n(like dpaa2-eth, which is on the fsl-mc bus), there is a device link\nbetween the switch and the DSA master, and device_links_unbind_consumers()\nwill unbind the bcm_sf2 switch driver on shutdown.\n\nSo the same treatment must be applied to all DSA switch drivers, which\nis: either use devres for both the mdiobus allocation and registration,\nor don\u0027t use devres at all.\n\nThe bcm_sf2 driver has the code structure in place for orderly mdiobus\nremoval, so just replace devm_mdiobus_alloc() with the non-devres\nvariant, and add manual free where necessary, to ensure that we don\u0027t\nlet devres free a still-registered bus."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "En el kernel de Linux, se ha resuelto la siguiente vulnerabilidad: net: dsa: bcm_sf2: no use devres para mdiobus Como se explica en los commits: 74b6d7d13307 (\"net: dsa: realtek: registre el bus MDIO en devres\") 5135e96a3dd2 (\" net: dsa: no asigne el esclavo_mii_bus usando devres\") mdiobus_free() entrar\u00e1 en p\u00e1nico cuando se llame desde devm_mdiobus_free() \u0026lt;- devres_release_all() \u0026lt;- __device_release_driver(), y ese mdiobus no fue anulado previamente. El Starfighter 2 es un dispositivo de plataforma, por lo que el conjunto inicial de restricciones que pens\u00e9 que causar\u00edan esto (buses I2C o SPI que llaman -\u0026gt;eliminar activado -\u0026gt;apagar) no se aplican. Pero hay algo m\u00e1s que se aplica aqu\u00ed. Si el maestro DSA est\u00e1 en un bus que llama -\u0026gt;remove from -\u0026gt;shutdown (como dpaa2-eth, que est\u00e1 en el bus fsl-mc), hay un enlace de dispositivo entre el conmutador y el maestro DSA, y device_links_unbind_consumers( ) desvincular\u00e1 el controlador del conmutador bcm_sf2 al apagar. Por lo tanto, se debe aplicar el mismo tratamiento a todos los controladores de conmutador DSA, que es: usar devres tanto para la asignaci\u00f3n como para el registro de mdiobus, o no usar devres en absoluto. El controlador bcm_sf2 tiene la estructura de c\u00f3digo implementada para la eliminaci\u00f3n ordenada de mdiobus, as\u00ed que simplemente reemplace devm_mdiobus_alloc() con la variante que no es devres y agregue manual free cuando sea necesario, para garantizar que no permitamos que devres libere un bus a\u00fan registrado."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2022-48815",
"lastModified": "2025-10-06T17:05:29.747",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "LOCAL",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 5.5,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"integrityImpact": "NONE",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 1.8,
"impactScore": 3.6,
"source": "nvd@nist.gov",
"type": "Primary"
}
]
},
"published": "2024-07-16T12:15:05.623",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"tags": [
"Patch"
],
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/08e1a3554e99a1a5bd2835907381e2383ee85cae"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"tags": [
"Patch"
],
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/08f1a20822349004bb9cc1b153ecb516e9f2889d"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"tags": [
"Patch"
],
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2770b795294ed312375c11ef1d0b810499c66b83"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"tags": [
"Patch"
],
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/caabb5f64f5c32fceed93356bb688ef1ec6c5783"
},
{
"source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
"tags": [
"Patch"
],
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/08e1a3554e99a1a5bd2835907381e2383ee85cae"
},
{
"source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
"tags": [
"Patch"
],
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/08f1a20822349004bb9cc1b153ecb516e9f2889d"
},
{
"source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
"tags": [
"Patch"
],
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2770b795294ed312375c11ef1d0b810499c66b83"
},
{
"source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
"tags": [
"Patch"
],
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/caabb5f64f5c32fceed93356bb688ef1ec6c5783"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "NVD-CWE-noinfo"
}
],
"source": "nvd@nist.gov",
"type": "Primary"
}
]
}
Loading…
Loading…
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability is confirmed from an analyst perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: This vulnerability was exploited and seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Patched: This vulnerability was successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not exploited: This vulnerability was not exploited or seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expresses doubt about the veracity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
Loading…
Loading…