CVE-2025-40362 (GCVE-0-2025-40362)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5
Published
2025-12-16 13:40
Modified
2025-12-16 13:40
Severity ?
VLAI Severity ?
EPSS score ?
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ceph: fix multifs mds auth caps issue
The mds auth caps check should also validate the
fsname along with the associated caps. Not doing
so would result in applying the mds auth caps of
one fs on to the other fs in a multifs ceph cluster.
The bug causes multiple issues w.r.t user
authentication, following is one such example.
Steps to Reproduce (on vstart cluster):
1. Create two file systems in a cluster, say 'fsname1' and 'fsname2'
2. Authorize read only permission to the user 'client.usr' on fs 'fsname1'
$ceph fs authorize fsname1 client.usr / r
3. Authorize read and write permission to the same user 'client.usr' on fs 'fsname2'
$ceph fs authorize fsname2 client.usr / rw
4. Update the keyring
$ceph auth get client.usr >> ./keyring
With above permssions for the user 'client.usr', following is the
expectation.
a. The 'client.usr' should be able to only read the contents
and not allowed to create or delete files on file system 'fsname1'.
b. The 'client.usr' should be able to read/write on file system 'fsname2'.
But, with this bug, the 'client.usr' is allowed to read/write on file
system 'fsname1'. See below.
5. Mount the file system 'fsname1' with the user 'client.usr'
$sudo bin/mount.ceph usr@.fsname1=/ /kmnt_fsname1_usr/
6. Try creating a file on file system 'fsname1' with user 'client.usr'. This
should fail but passes with this bug.
$touch /kmnt_fsname1_usr/file1
7. Mount the file system 'fsname1' with the user 'client.admin' and create a
file.
$sudo bin/mount.ceph admin@.fsname1=/ /kmnt_fsname1_admin
$echo "data" > /kmnt_fsname1_admin/admin_file1
8. Try removing an existing file on file system 'fsname1' with the user
'client.usr'. This shoudn't succeed but succeeds with the bug.
$rm -f /kmnt_fsname1_usr/admin_file1
For more information, please take a look at the corresponding mds/fuse patch
and tests added by looking into the tracker mentioned below.
v2: Fix a possible null dereference in doutc
v3: Don't store fsname from mdsmap, validate against
ceph_mount_options's fsname and use it
v4: Code refactor, better warning message and
fix possible compiler warning
[ Slava.Dubeyko: "fsname check failed" -> "fsname mismatch" ]
References
Impacted products
{
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"descriptions": [
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"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nceph: fix multifs mds auth caps issue\n\nThe mds auth caps check should also validate the\nfsname along with the associated caps. Not doing\nso would result in applying the mds auth caps of\none fs on to the other fs in a multifs ceph cluster.\nThe bug causes multiple issues w.r.t user\nauthentication, following is one such example.\n\nSteps to Reproduce (on vstart cluster):\n1. Create two file systems in a cluster, say \u0027fsname1\u0027 and \u0027fsname2\u0027\n2. Authorize read only permission to the user \u0027client.usr\u0027 on fs \u0027fsname1\u0027\n $ceph fs authorize fsname1 client.usr / r\n3. Authorize read and write permission to the same user \u0027client.usr\u0027 on fs \u0027fsname2\u0027\n $ceph fs authorize fsname2 client.usr / rw\n4. Update the keyring\n $ceph auth get client.usr \u003e\u003e ./keyring\n\nWith above permssions for the user \u0027client.usr\u0027, following is the\nexpectation.\n a. The \u0027client.usr\u0027 should be able to only read the contents\n and not allowed to create or delete files on file system \u0027fsname1\u0027.\n b. The \u0027client.usr\u0027 should be able to read/write on file system \u0027fsname2\u0027.\n\nBut, with this bug, the \u0027client.usr\u0027 is allowed to read/write on file\nsystem \u0027fsname1\u0027. See below.\n\n5. Mount the file system \u0027fsname1\u0027 with the user \u0027client.usr\u0027\n $sudo bin/mount.ceph usr@.fsname1=/ /kmnt_fsname1_usr/\n6. Try creating a file on file system \u0027fsname1\u0027 with user \u0027client.usr\u0027. This\n should fail but passes with this bug.\n $touch /kmnt_fsname1_usr/file1\n7. Mount the file system \u0027fsname1\u0027 with the user \u0027client.admin\u0027 and create a\n file.\n $sudo bin/mount.ceph admin@.fsname1=/ /kmnt_fsname1_admin\n $echo \"data\" \u003e /kmnt_fsname1_admin/admin_file1\n8. Try removing an existing file on file system \u0027fsname1\u0027 with the user\n \u0027client.usr\u0027. This shoudn\u0027t succeed but succeeds with the bug.\n $rm -f /kmnt_fsname1_usr/admin_file1\n\nFor more information, please take a look at the corresponding mds/fuse patch\nand tests added by looking into the tracker mentioned below.\n\nv2: Fix a possible null dereference in doutc\nv3: Don\u0027t store fsname from mdsmap, validate against\n ceph_mount_options\u0027s fsname and use it\nv4: Code refactor, better warning message and\n fix possible compiler warning\n\n[ Slava.Dubeyko: \"fsname check failed\" -\u003e \"fsname mismatch\" ]"
}
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"dateUpdated": "2025-12-16T13:40:02.467Z",
"orgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
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"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/07640d34a781bb2e39020a39137073c03c4aa932"
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{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ca3da8b27ab9a0923ad477447cfb8fc7f4b4c523"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/22c73d52a6d05c5a2053385c0d6cd9984732799d"
}
],
"title": "ceph: fix multifs mds auth caps issue",
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"cveId": "CVE-2025-40362",
"datePublished": "2025-12-16T13:40:02.467Z",
"dateReserved": "2025-04-16T07:20:57.187Z",
"dateUpdated": "2025-12-16T13:40:02.467Z",
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}
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability is confirmed from an analyst perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: This vulnerability was exploited and seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Patched: This vulnerability was successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not exploited: This vulnerability was not exploited or seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expresses doubt about the veracity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
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