cve-2024-46734
Vulnerability from cvelistv5
Published
2024-09-18 07:11
Modified
2024-12-19 09:22
Severity ?
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: btrfs: fix race between direct IO write and fsync when using same fd If we have 2 threads that are using the same file descriptor and one of them is doing direct IO writes while the other is doing fsync, we have a race where we can end up either: 1) Attempt a fsync without holding the inode's lock, triggering an assertion failures when assertions are enabled; 2) Do an invalid memory access from the fsync task because the file private points to memory allocated on stack by the direct IO task and it may be used by the fsync task after the stack was destroyed. The race happens like this: 1) A user space program opens a file descriptor with O_DIRECT; 2) The program spawns 2 threads using libpthread for example; 3) One of the threads uses the file descriptor to do direct IO writes, while the other calls fsync using the same file descriptor. 4) Call task A the thread doing direct IO writes and task B the thread doing fsyncs; 5) Task A does a direct IO write, and at btrfs_direct_write() sets the file's private to an on stack allocated private with the member 'fsync_skip_inode_lock' set to true; 6) Task B enters btrfs_sync_file() and sees that there's a private structure associated to the file which has 'fsync_skip_inode_lock' set to true, so it skips locking the inode's VFS lock; 7) Task A completes the direct IO write, and resets the file's private to NULL since it had no prior private and our private was stack allocated. Then it unlocks the inode's VFS lock; 8) Task B enters btrfs_get_ordered_extents_for_logging(), then the assertion that checks the inode's VFS lock is held fails, since task B never locked it and task A has already unlocked it. The stack trace produced is the following: assertion failed: inode_is_locked(&inode->vfs_inode), in fs/btrfs/ordered-data.c:983 ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/ordered-data.c:983! Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI CPU: 9 PID: 5072 Comm: worker Tainted: G U OE 6.10.5-1-default #1 openSUSE Tumbleweed 69f48d427608e1c09e60ea24c6c55e2ca1b049e8 Hardware name: Acer Predator PH315-52/Covini_CFS, BIOS V1.12 07/28/2020 RIP: 0010:btrfs_get_ordered_extents_for_logging.cold+0x1f/0x42 [btrfs] Code: 50 d6 86 c0 e8 (...) RSP: 0018:ffff9e4a03dcfc78 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000054 RBX: ffff9078a9868e98 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff907dce4a7800 RDI: ffff907dce4a7800 RBP: ffff907805518800 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff9e4a03dcfb38 R10: ffff9e4a03dcfb30 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: ffff907684ae7800 R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffff90774646b600 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007f04b96006c0(0000) GS:ffff907dce480000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f32acbfc000 CR3: 00000001fd4fa005 CR4: 00000000003726f0 Call Trace: <TASK> ? __die_body.cold+0x14/0x24 ? die+0x2e/0x50 ? do_trap+0xca/0x110 ? do_error_trap+0x6a/0x90 ? btrfs_get_ordered_extents_for_logging.cold+0x1f/0x42 [btrfs bb26272d49b4cdc847cf3f7faadd459b62caee9a] ? exc_invalid_op+0x50/0x70 ? btrfs_get_ordered_extents_for_logging.cold+0x1f/0x42 [btrfs bb26272d49b4cdc847cf3f7faadd459b62caee9a] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20 ? btrfs_get_ordered_extents_for_logging.cold+0x1f/0x42 [btrfs bb26272d49b4cdc847cf3f7faadd459b62caee9a] ? btrfs_get_ordered_extents_for_logging.cold+0x1f/0x42 [btrfs bb26272d49b4cdc847cf3f7faadd459b62caee9a] btrfs_sync_file+0x21a/0x4d0 [btrfs bb26272d49b4cdc847cf3f7faadd459b62caee9a] ? __seccomp_filter+0x31d/0x4f0 __x64_sys_fdatasync+0x4f/0x90 do_syscall_64+0x82/0x160 ? do_futex+0xcb/0x190 ? __x64_sys_futex+0x10e/0x1d0 ? switch_fpu_return+0x4f/0xd0 ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x72/0x220 ? do_syscall_64+0x8e/0x160 ? syscall_exit_to_user_mod ---truncated---
References
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/01681aa609b5f110502f56c4e3b2938efcf4a5bc
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7b5595f33c3c273613b590892a578d78186bb400
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cd3087582e4fa36e89be4e6f859e75a4400292b4
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cd9253c23aedd61eb5ff11f37a36247cd46faf86
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d116a0b0e02f395cedfb8c725bd67480aa7c428c
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
Linux Linux Version: 5.15.165   ≤
Version: 6.1.105   ≤
Version: 6.6.46   ≤
Version: 6.10.5   ≤
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{
  "containers": {
    "adp": [
      {
        "metrics": [
          {
            "other": {
              "content": {
                "id": "CVE-2024-46734",
                "options": [
                  {
                    "Exploitation": "none"
                  },
                  {
                    "Automatable": "no"
                  },
                  {
                    "Technical Impact": "partial"
                  }
                ],
                "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                "timestamp": "2024-09-29T14:53:19.995108Z",
                "version": "2.0.3"
              },
              "type": "ssvc"
            }
          }
        ],
        "providerMetadata": {
          "dateUpdated": "2024-09-29T14:53:34.279Z",
          "orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
          "shortName": "CISA-ADP"
        },
        "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
      }
    ],
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "fs/btrfs/ctree.h",
            "fs/btrfs/direct-io.c",
            "fs/btrfs/file.c",
            "fs/btrfs/transaction.h"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "d116a0b0e02f395cedfb8c725bd67480aa7c428c",
              "status": "affected",
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              "versionType": "git"
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              "lessThan": "cd3087582e4fa36e89be4e6f859e75a4400292b4",
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            {
              "lessThan": "7b5595f33c3c273613b590892a578d78186bb400",
              "status": "affected",
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              "versionType": "git"
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            {
              "lessThan": "01681aa609b5f110502f56c4e3b2938efcf4a5bc",
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              "versionType": "git"
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        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "fs/btrfs/ctree.h",
            "fs/btrfs/direct-io.c",
            "fs/btrfs/file.c",
            "fs/btrfs/transaction.h"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "5.15.167",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "5.15.165",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "6.1.110",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "6.1.105",
              "versionType": "semver"
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            {
              "lessThan": "6.6.51",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "6.6.46",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "6.10.10",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "6.10.5",
              "versionType": "semver"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbtrfs: fix race between direct IO write and fsync when using same fd\n\nIf we have 2 threads that are using the same file descriptor and one of\nthem is doing direct IO writes while the other is doing fsync, we have a\nrace where we can end up either:\n\n1) Attempt a fsync without holding the inode\u0027s lock, triggering an\n   assertion failures when assertions are enabled;\n\n2) Do an invalid memory access from the fsync task because the file private\n   points to memory allocated on stack by the direct IO task and it may be\n   used by the fsync task after the stack was destroyed.\n\nThe race happens like this:\n\n1) A user space program opens a file descriptor with O_DIRECT;\n\n2) The program spawns 2 threads using libpthread for example;\n\n3) One of the threads uses the file descriptor to do direct IO writes,\n   while the other calls fsync using the same file descriptor.\n\n4) Call task A the thread doing direct IO writes and task B the thread\n   doing fsyncs;\n\n5) Task A does a direct IO write, and at btrfs_direct_write() sets the\n   file\u0027s private to an on stack allocated private with the member\n   \u0027fsync_skip_inode_lock\u0027 set to true;\n\n6) Task B enters btrfs_sync_file() and sees that there\u0027s a private\n   structure associated to the file which has \u0027fsync_skip_inode_lock\u0027 set\n   to true, so it skips locking the inode\u0027s VFS lock;\n\n7) Task A completes the direct IO write, and resets the file\u0027s private to\n   NULL since it had no prior private and our private was stack allocated.\n   Then it unlocks the inode\u0027s VFS lock;\n\n8) Task B enters btrfs_get_ordered_extents_for_logging(), then the\n   assertion that checks the inode\u0027s VFS lock is held fails, since task B\n   never locked it and task A has already unlocked it.\n\nThe stack trace produced is the following:\n\n   assertion failed: inode_is_locked(\u0026inode-\u003evfs_inode), in fs/btrfs/ordered-data.c:983\n   ------------[ cut here ]------------\n   kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/ordered-data.c:983!\n   Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI\n   CPU: 9 PID: 5072 Comm: worker Tainted: G     U     OE      6.10.5-1-default #1 openSUSE Tumbleweed 69f48d427608e1c09e60ea24c6c55e2ca1b049e8\n   Hardware name: Acer Predator PH315-52/Covini_CFS, BIOS V1.12 07/28/2020\n   RIP: 0010:btrfs_get_ordered_extents_for_logging.cold+0x1f/0x42 [btrfs]\n   Code: 50 d6 86 c0 e8 (...)\n   RSP: 0018:ffff9e4a03dcfc78 EFLAGS: 00010246\n   RAX: 0000000000000054 RBX: ffff9078a9868e98 RCX: 0000000000000000\n   RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff907dce4a7800 RDI: ffff907dce4a7800\n   RBP: ffff907805518800 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff9e4a03dcfb38\n   R10: ffff9e4a03dcfb30 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: ffff907684ae7800\n   R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffff90774646b600 R15: 0000000000000000\n   FS:  00007f04b96006c0(0000) GS:ffff907dce480000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000\n   CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033\n   CR2: 00007f32acbfc000 CR3: 00000001fd4fa005 CR4: 00000000003726f0\n   Call Trace:\n    \u003cTASK\u003e\n    ? __die_body.cold+0x14/0x24\n    ? die+0x2e/0x50\n    ? do_trap+0xca/0x110\n    ? do_error_trap+0x6a/0x90\n    ? btrfs_get_ordered_extents_for_logging.cold+0x1f/0x42 [btrfs bb26272d49b4cdc847cf3f7faadd459b62caee9a]\n    ? exc_invalid_op+0x50/0x70\n    ? btrfs_get_ordered_extents_for_logging.cold+0x1f/0x42 [btrfs bb26272d49b4cdc847cf3f7faadd459b62caee9a]\n    ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20\n    ? btrfs_get_ordered_extents_for_logging.cold+0x1f/0x42 [btrfs bb26272d49b4cdc847cf3f7faadd459b62caee9a]\n    ? btrfs_get_ordered_extents_for_logging.cold+0x1f/0x42 [btrfs bb26272d49b4cdc847cf3f7faadd459b62caee9a]\n    btrfs_sync_file+0x21a/0x4d0 [btrfs bb26272d49b4cdc847cf3f7faadd459b62caee9a]\n    ? __seccomp_filter+0x31d/0x4f0\n    __x64_sys_fdatasync+0x4f/0x90\n    do_syscall_64+0x82/0x160\n    ? do_futex+0xcb/0x190\n    ? __x64_sys_futex+0x10e/0x1d0\n    ? switch_fpu_return+0x4f/0xd0\n    ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x72/0x220\n    ? do_syscall_64+0x8e/0x160\n    ? syscall_exit_to_user_mod\n---truncated---"
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2024-12-19T09:22:03.698Z",
        "orgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
        "shortName": "Linux"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d116a0b0e02f395cedfb8c725bd67480aa7c428c"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cd3087582e4fa36e89be4e6f859e75a4400292b4"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7b5595f33c3c273613b590892a578d78186bb400"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/01681aa609b5f110502f56c4e3b2938efcf4a5bc"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cd9253c23aedd61eb5ff11f37a36247cd46faf86"
        }
      ],
      "title": "btrfs: fix race between direct IO write and fsync when using same fd",
      "x_generator": {
        "engine": "bippy-5f407fcff5a0"
      }
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
    "assignerShortName": "Linux",
    "cveId": "CVE-2024-46734",
    "datePublished": "2024-09-18T07:11:56.361Z",
    "dateReserved": "2024-09-11T15:12:18.257Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2024-12-19T09:22:03.698Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.1",
  "vulnerability-lookup:meta": {
    "nvd": "{\"cve\":{\"id\":\"CVE-2024-46734\",\"sourceIdentifier\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\",\"published\":\"2024-09-18T08:15:02.980\",\"lastModified\":\"2024-09-20T12:30:51.220\",\"vulnStatus\":\"Awaiting Analysis\",\"cveTags\":[],\"descriptions\":[{\"lang\":\"en\",\"value\":\"In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\\n\\nbtrfs: fix race between direct IO write and fsync when using same fd\\n\\nIf we have 2 threads that are using the same file descriptor and one of\\nthem is doing direct IO writes while the other is doing fsync, we have a\\nrace where we can end up either:\\n\\n1) Attempt a fsync without holding the inode\u0027s lock, triggering an\\n   assertion failures when assertions are enabled;\\n\\n2) Do an invalid memory access from the fsync task because the file private\\n   points to memory allocated on stack by the direct IO task and it may be\\n   used by the fsync task after the stack was destroyed.\\n\\nThe race happens like this:\\n\\n1) A user space program opens a file descriptor with O_DIRECT;\\n\\n2) The program spawns 2 threads using libpthread for example;\\n\\n3) One of the threads uses the file descriptor to do direct IO writes,\\n   while the other calls fsync using the same file descriptor.\\n\\n4) Call task A the thread doing direct IO writes and task B the thread\\n   doing fsyncs;\\n\\n5) Task A does a direct IO write, and at btrfs_direct_write() sets the\\n   file\u0027s private to an on stack allocated private with the member\\n   \u0027fsync_skip_inode_lock\u0027 set to true;\\n\\n6) Task B enters btrfs_sync_file() and sees that there\u0027s a private\\n   structure associated to the file which has \u0027fsync_skip_inode_lock\u0027 set\\n   to true, so it skips locking the inode\u0027s VFS lock;\\n\\n7) Task A completes the direct IO write, and resets the file\u0027s private to\\n   NULL since it had no prior private and our private was stack allocated.\\n   Then it unlocks the inode\u0027s VFS lock;\\n\\n8) Task B enters btrfs_get_ordered_extents_for_logging(), then the\\n   assertion that checks the inode\u0027s VFS lock is held fails, since task B\\n   never locked it and task A has already unlocked it.\\n\\nThe stack trace produced is the following:\\n\\n   assertion failed: inode_is_locked(\u0026inode-\u003evfs_inode), in fs/btrfs/ordered-data.c:983\\n   ------------[ cut here ]------------\\n   kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/ordered-data.c:983!\\n   Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI\\n   CPU: 9 PID: 5072 Comm: worker Tainted: G     U     OE      6.10.5-1-default #1 openSUSE Tumbleweed 69f48d427608e1c09e60ea24c6c55e2ca1b049e8\\n   Hardware name: Acer Predator PH315-52/Covini_CFS, BIOS V1.12 07/28/2020\\n   RIP: 0010:btrfs_get_ordered_extents_for_logging.cold+0x1f/0x42 [btrfs]\\n   Code: 50 d6 86 c0 e8 (...)\\n   RSP: 0018:ffff9e4a03dcfc78 EFLAGS: 00010246\\n   RAX: 0000000000000054 RBX: ffff9078a9868e98 RCX: 0000000000000000\\n   RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff907dce4a7800 RDI: ffff907dce4a7800\\n   RBP: ffff907805518800 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff9e4a03dcfb38\\n   R10: ffff9e4a03dcfb30 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: ffff907684ae7800\\n   R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffff90774646b600 R15: 0000000000000000\\n   FS:  00007f04b96006c0(0000) GS:ffff907dce480000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000\\n   CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033\\n   CR2: 00007f32acbfc000 CR3: 00000001fd4fa005 CR4: 00000000003726f0\\n   Call Trace:\\n    \u003cTASK\u003e\\n    ? __die_body.cold+0x14/0x24\\n    ? die+0x2e/0x50\\n    ? do_trap+0xca/0x110\\n    ? do_error_trap+0x6a/0x90\\n    ? btrfs_get_ordered_extents_for_logging.cold+0x1f/0x42 [btrfs bb26272d49b4cdc847cf3f7faadd459b62caee9a]\\n    ? exc_invalid_op+0x50/0x70\\n    ? btrfs_get_ordered_extents_for_logging.cold+0x1f/0x42 [btrfs bb26272d49b4cdc847cf3f7faadd459b62caee9a]\\n    ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20\\n    ? btrfs_get_ordered_extents_for_logging.cold+0x1f/0x42 [btrfs bb26272d49b4cdc847cf3f7faadd459b62caee9a]\\n    ? btrfs_get_ordered_extents_for_logging.cold+0x1f/0x42 [btrfs bb26272d49b4cdc847cf3f7faadd459b62caee9a]\\n    btrfs_sync_file+0x21a/0x4d0 [btrfs bb26272d49b4cdc847cf3f7faadd459b62caee9a]\\n    ? __seccomp_filter+0x31d/0x4f0\\n    __x64_sys_fdatasync+0x4f/0x90\\n    do_syscall_64+0x82/0x160\\n    ? do_futex+0xcb/0x190\\n    ? __x64_sys_futex+0x10e/0x1d0\\n    ? switch_fpu_return+0x4f/0xd0\\n    ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x72/0x220\\n    ? do_syscall_64+0x8e/0x160\\n    ? syscall_exit_to_user_mod\\n---truncated---\"},{\"lang\":\"es\",\"value\":\"En el kernel de Linux, se ha resuelto la siguiente vulnerabilidad: btrfs: arregla la ejecuci\u00f3n entre la escritura de E/S directa y fsync cuando se usa el mismo fd Si tenemos 2 subprocesos que usan el mismo descriptor de archivo y uno de ellos est\u00e1 haciendo escrituras de E/S directas mientras que el otro est\u00e1 haciendo fsync, tenemos una ejecuci\u00f3n en la que podemos terminar: 1) Intentar un fsync sin mantener el bloqueo del inodo, lo que desencadena fallas de aserci\u00f3n cuando las aserciones est\u00e1n habilitadas; 2) Hacer un acceso a memoria no v\u00e1lido desde la tarea fsync porque el archivo privado apunta a la memoria asignada en la pila por la tarea de E/S directa y puede ser utilizada por la tarea fsync despu\u00e9s de que la pila se haya destruido. La ejecuci\u00f3n sucede as\u00ed: 1) Un programa de espacio de usuario abre un descriptor de archivo con O_DIRECT; 2) El programa genera 2 subprocesos usando libpthread, por ejemplo; 3) Uno de los subprocesos usa el descriptor de archivo para hacer escrituras de E/S directas, mientras que el otro llama a fsync usando el mismo descriptor de archivo. 4) Llama a la tarea A, el hilo que realiza las escrituras de E/S directas, y a la tarea B, el hilo que realiza las fsyncs; 5) La tarea A realiza una escritura de E/S directa y, en btrfs_direct_write(), establece el privado del archivo en un privado asignado en la pila con el miembro \u0027fsync_skip_inode_lock\u0027 establecido en verdadero; 6) La tarea B ingresa a btrfs_sync_file() y ve que hay una estructura privada asociada al archivo que tiene \u0027fsync_skip_inode_lock\u0027 establecido en verdadero, por lo que omite el bloqueo del bloqueo VFS del inodo; 7) La tarea A completa la escritura de E/S directa y restablece el privado del archivo a NULL, ya que no ten\u00eda ning\u00fan privado anterior y nuestro privado estaba asignado en la pila. Luego, desbloquea el bloqueo VFS del inodo; 8) La tarea B ingresa a btrfs_get_ordered_extents_for_logging(), luego la aserci\u00f3n que verifica que el bloqueo VFS del inodo se mantenga falla, ya que la tarea B nunca lo bloque\u00f3 y la tarea A ya lo desbloque\u00f3. El seguimiento de la pila producido es el siguiente: aserci\u00f3n fallida: inode_is_locked(\u0026amp;inode-\u0026gt;vfs_inode), en fs/btrfs/ordered-data.c:983 ------------[ corte aqu\u00ed ]------------ \u00a1ERROR del kernel en fs/btrfs/ordered-data.c:983! Ups: c\u00f3digo de operaci\u00f3n no v\u00e1lido: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI CPU: 9 PID: 5072 Comm: worker Contaminado: GU OE 6.10.5-1-default #1 openSUSE Tumbleweed 69f48d427608e1c09e60ea24c6c55e2ca1b049e8 Nombre del hardware: Acer Predator PH315-52/Covini_CFS, BIOS V1.12 28/07/2020 RIP: 0010:btrfs_get_ordered_extents_for_logging.cold+0x1f/0x42 [btrfs] C\u00f3digo: 50 d6 86 c0 e8 (...) RSP: 0018:ffff9e4a03dcfc78 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000054 RBX: ffff9078a9868e98 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff907dce4a7800 RDI: ffff907dce4a7800 RBP: ffff907805518800 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff9e4a03dcfb38 R10: ffff9e4a03dcfb30 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: ffff907684ae7800 R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffff90774646b600 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007f04b96006c0(0000) GS:ffff907dce480000(0000) knlGS:000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f32acbfc000 CR3: 00000001fd4fa005 CR4: 00000000003726f0 Seguimiento de llamadas:  ? btrfs_obtener_extensiones_ordenadas_para_registro.cold+0x1f/0x42 [btrfs bb26272d49b4cdc847cf3f7faadd459b62caee9a] ? exc_op_inv\u00e1lida+0x50/0x70 ? btrfs_obtener_extensiones_ordenadas_para_registro.cold+0x1f/0x42 [btrfs bb26272d49b4cdc847cf3f7faadd459b62caee9a] ? btrfs_obtener_extensiones_ordenadas_para_registro.cold+0x1f/0x42 [btrfs bb26272d49b4cdc847cf3f7faadd459b62caee9a] btrfs_archivo_de_sincronizaci\u00f3n+0x21a/0x4d0 [btrfs bb26272d49b4cdc847cf3f7faadd459b62caee9a] ? __seccomp_filter+0x31d/0x4f0 __x64_sys_fdatasync+0x4f/0x90 do_syscall_64+0x82/0x160 ? do_futex+0xcb/0x190 ? __x64_sys_futex+0x10e/0x1d0 ? switch_fpu_return+0x4f/0xd0 ? syscall_salir_al_modo_usuario+0x72/0x220 ? do_syscall_64+0x8e/0x160 ? syscall_salir_al_modo_usuario ---truncado---\"}],\"metrics\":{},\"references\":[{\"url\":\"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/01681aa609b5f110502f56c4e3b2938efcf4a5bc\",\"source\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\"},{\"url\":\"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7b5595f33c3c273613b590892a578d78186bb400\",\"source\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\"},{\"url\":\"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cd3087582e4fa36e89be4e6f859e75a4400292b4\",\"source\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\"},{\"url\":\"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cd9253c23aedd61eb5ff11f37a36247cd46faf86\",\"source\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\"},{\"url\":\"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d116a0b0e02f395cedfb8c725bd67480aa7c428c\",\"source\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\"}]}}"
  }
}


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