cve-2024-44991
Vulnerability from cvelistv5
Published
2024-09-04 19:54
Modified
2024-12-19 09:19
Severity ?
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tcp: prevent concurrent execution of tcp_sk_exit_batch Its possible that two threads call tcp_sk_exit_batch() concurrently, once from the cleanup_net workqueue, once from a task that failed to clone a new netns. In the latter case, error unwinding calls the exit handlers in reverse order for the 'failed' netns. tcp_sk_exit_batch() calls tcp_twsk_purge(). Problem is that since commit b099ce2602d8 ("net: Batch inet_twsk_purge"), this function picks up twsk in any dying netns, not just the one passed in via exit_batch list. This means that the error unwind of setup_net() can "steal" and destroy timewait sockets belonging to the exiting netns. This allows the netns exit worker to proceed to call WARN_ON_ONCE(!refcount_dec_and_test(&net->ipv4.tcp_death_row.tw_refcount)); without the expected 1 -> 0 transition, which then splats. At same time, error unwind path that is also running inet_twsk_purge() will splat as well: WARNING: .. at lib/refcount.c:31 refcount_warn_saturate+0x1ed/0x210 ... refcount_dec include/linux/refcount.h:351 [inline] inet_twsk_kill+0x758/0x9c0 net/ipv4/inet_timewait_sock.c:70 inet_twsk_deschedule_put net/ipv4/inet_timewait_sock.c:221 inet_twsk_purge+0x725/0x890 net/ipv4/inet_timewait_sock.c:304 tcp_sk_exit_batch+0x1c/0x170 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:3522 ops_exit_list+0x128/0x180 net/core/net_namespace.c:178 setup_net+0x714/0xb40 net/core/net_namespace.c:375 copy_net_ns+0x2f0/0x670 net/core/net_namespace.c:508 create_new_namespaces+0x3ea/0xb10 kernel/nsproxy.c:110 ... because refcount_dec() of tw_refcount unexpectedly dropped to 0. This doesn't seem like an actual bug (no tw sockets got lost and I don't see a use-after-free) but as erroneous trigger of debug check. Add a mutex to force strict ordering: the task that calls tcp_twsk_purge() blocks other task from doing final _dec_and_test before mutex-owner has removed all tw sockets of dying netns.
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
Linux Linux Version: 6.1
Show details on NVD website


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              "content": {
                "id": "CVE-2024-44991",
                "options": [
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                    "Exploitation": "none"
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                    "Technical Impact": "partial"
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                "timestamp": "2024-09-04T20:19:40.169819Z",
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          "programFiles": [
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              "version": "6.6.48",
              "versionType": "semver"
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              "version": "6.10.7",
              "versionType": "semver"
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              "versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
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      "descriptions": [
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          "lang": "en",
          "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ntcp: prevent concurrent execution of tcp_sk_exit_batch\n\nIts possible that two threads call tcp_sk_exit_batch() concurrently,\nonce from the cleanup_net workqueue, once from a task that failed to clone\na new netns.  In the latter case, error unwinding calls the exit handlers\nin reverse order for the \u0027failed\u0027 netns.\n\ntcp_sk_exit_batch() calls tcp_twsk_purge().\nProblem is that since commit b099ce2602d8 (\"net: Batch inet_twsk_purge\"),\nthis function picks up twsk in any dying netns, not just the one passed\nin via exit_batch list.\n\nThis means that the error unwind of setup_net() can \"steal\" and destroy\ntimewait sockets belonging to the exiting netns.\n\nThis allows the netns exit worker to proceed to call\n\nWARN_ON_ONCE(!refcount_dec_and_test(\u0026net-\u003eipv4.tcp_death_row.tw_refcount));\n\nwithout the expected 1 -\u003e 0 transition, which then splats.\n\nAt same time, error unwind path that is also running inet_twsk_purge()\nwill splat as well:\n\nWARNING: .. at lib/refcount.c:31 refcount_warn_saturate+0x1ed/0x210\n...\n refcount_dec include/linux/refcount.h:351 [inline]\n inet_twsk_kill+0x758/0x9c0 net/ipv4/inet_timewait_sock.c:70\n inet_twsk_deschedule_put net/ipv4/inet_timewait_sock.c:221\n inet_twsk_purge+0x725/0x890 net/ipv4/inet_timewait_sock.c:304\n tcp_sk_exit_batch+0x1c/0x170 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:3522\n ops_exit_list+0x128/0x180 net/core/net_namespace.c:178\n setup_net+0x714/0xb40 net/core/net_namespace.c:375\n copy_net_ns+0x2f0/0x670 net/core/net_namespace.c:508\n create_new_namespaces+0x3ea/0xb10 kernel/nsproxy.c:110\n\n... because refcount_dec() of tw_refcount unexpectedly dropped to 0.\n\nThis doesn\u0027t seem like an actual bug (no tw sockets got lost and I don\u0027t\nsee a use-after-free) but as erroneous trigger of debug check.\n\nAdd a mutex to force strict ordering: the task that calls tcp_twsk_purge()\nblocks other task from doing final _dec_and_test before mutex-owner has\nremoved all tw sockets of dying netns."
        }
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      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2024-12-19T09:19:47.273Z",
        "orgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
        "shortName": "Linux"
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          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e3d9de3742f4d5c47ae35f888d3023a5b54fcd2f"
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          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/99580ae890ec8bd98b21a2a9c6668f8f1555b62e"
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          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f6fd2dbf584a4047ba88d1369ff91c9851261ec1"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/565d121b69980637f040eb4d84289869cdaabedf"
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      ],
      "title": "tcp: prevent concurrent execution of tcp_sk_exit_batch",
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    "assignerShortName": "Linux",
    "cveId": "CVE-2024-44991",
    "datePublished": "2024-09-04T19:54:38.206Z",
    "dateReserved": "2024-08-21T05:34:56.671Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2024-12-19T09:19:47.273Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
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    "nvd": "{\"cve\":{\"id\":\"CVE-2024-44991\",\"sourceIdentifier\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\",\"published\":\"2024-09-04T20:15:08.150\",\"lastModified\":\"2024-10-09T14:36:15.790\",\"vulnStatus\":\"Analyzed\",\"cveTags\":[],\"descriptions\":[{\"lang\":\"en\",\"value\":\"In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\\n\\ntcp: prevent concurrent execution of tcp_sk_exit_batch\\n\\nIts possible that two threads call tcp_sk_exit_batch() concurrently,\\nonce from the cleanup_net workqueue, once from a task that failed to clone\\na new netns.  In the latter case, error unwinding calls the exit handlers\\nin reverse order for the \u0027failed\u0027 netns.\\n\\ntcp_sk_exit_batch() calls tcp_twsk_purge().\\nProblem is that since commit b099ce2602d8 (\\\"net: Batch inet_twsk_purge\\\"),\\nthis function picks up twsk in any dying netns, not just the one passed\\nin via exit_batch list.\\n\\nThis means that the error unwind of setup_net() can \\\"steal\\\" and destroy\\ntimewait sockets belonging to the exiting netns.\\n\\nThis allows the netns exit worker to proceed to call\\n\\nWARN_ON_ONCE(!refcount_dec_and_test(\u0026net-\u003eipv4.tcp_death_row.tw_refcount));\\n\\nwithout the expected 1 -\u003e 0 transition, which then splats.\\n\\nAt same time, error unwind path that is also running inet_twsk_purge()\\nwill splat as well:\\n\\nWARNING: .. at lib/refcount.c:31 refcount_warn_saturate+0x1ed/0x210\\n...\\n refcount_dec include/linux/refcount.h:351 [inline]\\n inet_twsk_kill+0x758/0x9c0 net/ipv4/inet_timewait_sock.c:70\\n inet_twsk_deschedule_put net/ipv4/inet_timewait_sock.c:221\\n inet_twsk_purge+0x725/0x890 net/ipv4/inet_timewait_sock.c:304\\n tcp_sk_exit_batch+0x1c/0x170 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:3522\\n ops_exit_list+0x128/0x180 net/core/net_namespace.c:178\\n setup_net+0x714/0xb40 net/core/net_namespace.c:375\\n copy_net_ns+0x2f0/0x670 net/core/net_namespace.c:508\\n create_new_namespaces+0x3ea/0xb10 kernel/nsproxy.c:110\\n\\n... because refcount_dec() of tw_refcount unexpectedly dropped to 0.\\n\\nThis doesn\u0027t seem like an actual bug (no tw sockets got lost and I don\u0027t\\nsee a use-after-free) but as erroneous trigger of debug check.\\n\\nAdd a mutex to force strict ordering: the task that calls tcp_twsk_purge()\\nblocks other task from doing final _dec_and_test before mutex-owner has\\nremoved all tw sockets of dying netns.\"},{\"lang\":\"es\",\"value\":\"En el kernel de Linux, se ha resuelto la siguiente vulnerabilidad: tcp: evitar la ejecuci\u00f3n concurrente de tcp_sk_exit_batch Es posible que dos subprocesos llamen a tcp_sk_exit_batch() simult\u00e1neamente, una vez desde la cola de trabajo cleanup_net, otra desde una tarea que no pudo clonar una nueva netns. En el \u00faltimo caso, el desenrollado de errores llama a los controladores de salida en orden inverso para las netns \\\"fallidas\\\". tcp_sk_exit_batch() llama a tcp_twsk_purge(). El problema es que desde el commit b099ce2602d8 (\\\"net: Batch inet_twsk_purge\\\"), esta funci\u00f3n recoge twsk en cualquier netn moribundo, no solo en el que se pasa a trav\u00e9s de la lista exit_batch. Esto significa que el desenrollado de errores de setup_net() puede \\\"robar\\\" y destruir los sockets timewait que pertenecen a las netns que salen. Esto permite que el trabajador de salida netns proceda a llamar a WARN_ON_ONCE(!refcount_dec_and_test(\u0026amp;net-\u0026gt;ipv4.tcp_death_row.tw_refcount)); sin la transici\u00f3n esperada de 1 -\u0026gt; 0, que luego falla. Al mismo tiempo, la ruta de desenrollado de error que tambi\u00e9n est\u00e1 ejecutando inet_twsk_purge() tambi\u00e9n se mostrar\u00e1: ADVERTENCIA: .. en lib/refcount.c:31 refcount_warn_saturate+0x1ed/0x210 ... refcount_dec include/linux/refcount.h:351 [en l\u00ednea] inet_twsk_kill+0x758/0x9c0 net/ipv4/inet_timewait_sock.c:70 inet_twsk_deschedule_put net/ipv4/inet_timewait_sock.c:221 inet_twsk_purge+0x725/0x890 net/ipv4/inet_timewait_sock.c:304 tcp_sk_exit_batch+0x1c/0x170 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:3522 ops_exit_list+0x128/0x180 net/core/net_namespace.c:178 setup_net+0x714/0xb40 net/core/net_namespace.c:375 copy_net_ns+0x2f0/0x670 net/core/net_namespace.c:508 create_new_namespaces+0x3ea/0xb10 kernel/nsproxy.c:110 ... porque refcount_dec() de tw_refcount cay\u00f3 inesperadamente a 0. Esto no parece un error real (no se perdieron sockets tw y no veo un use-after-free) sino un disparador err\u00f3neo de la comprobaci\u00f3n de depuraci\u00f3n. Agregue un mutex para forzar un orden estricto: la tarea que llama a tcp_twsk_purge() impide que otra tarea realice _dec_and_test final antes de que el propietario del mutex haya eliminado todos los sockets tw de los netn moribundos.\"}],\"metrics\":{\"cvssMetricV31\":[{\"source\":\"nvd@nist.gov\",\"type\":\"Primary\",\"cvssData\":{\"version\":\"3.1\",\"vectorString\":\"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H\",\"baseScore\":5.5,\"baseSeverity\":\"MEDIUM\",\"attackVector\":\"LOCAL\",\"attackComplexity\":\"LOW\",\"privilegesRequired\":\"LOW\",\"userInteraction\":\"NONE\",\"scope\":\"UNCHANGED\",\"confidentialityImpact\":\"NONE\",\"integrityImpact\":\"NONE\",\"availabilityImpact\":\"HIGH\"},\"exploitabilityScore\":1.8,\"impactScore\":3.6}]},\"weaknesses\":[{\"source\":\"nvd@nist.gov\",\"type\":\"Primary\",\"description\":[{\"lang\":\"en\",\"value\":\"NVD-CWE-noinfo\"}]}],\"configurations\":[{\"nodes\":[{\"operator\":\"OR\",\"negate\":false,\"cpeMatch\":[{\"vulnerable\":true,\"criteria\":\"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*\",\"versionStartIncluding\":\"6.1\",\"versionEndExcluding\":\"6.1.107\",\"matchCriteriaId\":\"8D4DE0F9-B1B3-4577-84CD-11CF847ABCE6\"},{\"vulnerable\":true,\"criteria\":\"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*\",\"versionStartIncluding\":\"6.2\",\"versionEndExcluding\":\"6.6.48\",\"matchCriteriaId\":\"9DE9201A-CE6B-4726-BABB-8265EA0F8AE4\"},{\"vulnerable\":true,\"criteria\":\"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*\",\"versionStartIncluding\":\"6.7\",\"versionEndExcluding\":\"6.10.7\",\"matchCriteriaId\":\"D2AFDFD1-D95A-4EB7-843B-5E7659518B67\"},{\"vulnerable\":true,\"criteria\":\"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:6.11:rc1:*:*:*:*:*:*\",\"matchCriteriaId\":\"8B3CE743-2126-47A3-8B7C-822B502CF119\"},{\"vulnerable\":true,\"criteria\":\"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:6.11:rc2:*:*:*:*:*:*\",\"matchCriteriaId\":\"4DEB27E7-30AA-45CC-8934-B89263EF3551\"},{\"vulnerable\":true,\"criteria\":\"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:6.11:rc3:*:*:*:*:*:*\",\"matchCriteriaId\":\"E0005AEF-856E-47EB-BFE4-90C46899394D\"},{\"vulnerable\":true,\"criteria\":\"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:6.11:rc4:*:*:*:*:*:*\",\"matchCriteriaId\":\"39889A68-6D34-47A6-82FC-CD0BF23D6754\"}]}]}],\"references\":[{\"url\":\"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/565d121b69980637f040eb4d84289869cdaabedf\",\"source\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\",\"tags\":[\"Patch\"]},{\"url\":\"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/99580ae890ec8bd98b21a2a9c6668f8f1555b62e\",\"source\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\",\"tags\":[\"Patch\"]},{\"url\":\"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e3d9de3742f4d5c47ae35f888d3023a5b54fcd2f\",\"source\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\",\"tags\":[\"Patch\"]},{\"url\":\"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f6fd2dbf584a4047ba88d1369ff91c9851261ec1\",\"source\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\",\"tags\":[\"Patch\"]}]}}"
  }
}


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