Vulnerability from bitnami_vulndb
Published
2026-05-06 14:45
Modified
2026-09-10 15:46
Summary
GHSL-2024-166: GStreamer Integer overflows in MP4/MOV demuxer and memory allocator that can lead to out-of-bounds writes
Details

GStreamer is a library for constructing graphs of media-handling components. An integer underflow has been detected in the function qtdemux_parse_theora_extension within qtdemux.c. The vulnerability occurs due to an underflow of the gint size variable, which causes size to hold a large unintended value when cast to an unsigned integer. This 32-bit negative value is then cast to a 64-bit unsigned integer (0xfffffffffffffffa) in a subsequent call to gst_buffer_new_and_alloc. The function gst_buffer_new_allocate then attempts to allocate memory, eventually calling _sysmem_new_block. The function _sysmem_new_block adds alignment and header size to the (unsigned) size, causing the overflow of the 'slice_size' variable. As a result, only 0x89 bytes are allocated, despite the large input size. When the following memcpy call occurs in gst_buffer_fill, the data from the input file will overwrite the content of the GstMapInfo info structure. Finally, during the call to gst_memory_unmap, the overwritten memory may cause a function pointer hijack, as the mem->allocator->mem_unmap_full function is called with a corrupted pointer. This function pointer overwrite could allow an attacker to alter the execution flow of the program, leading to arbitrary code execution. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.24.10.


{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Bitnami",
        "name": "java",
        "purl": "pkg:bitnami/java"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.8.0"
            },
            {
              "introduced": "1.9.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "8.0.451"
            }
          ],
          "type": "SEMVER"
        }
      ],
      "severity": [
        {
          "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
          "type": "CVSS_V3"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-47606"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cpes": [
      "cpe:2.3:a:bellsoft:libericajdk:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
    ],
    "severity": "Critical"
  },
  "details": "GStreamer is a library for constructing graphs of media-handling components. An integer underflow has been detected in the function qtdemux_parse_theora_extension within qtdemux.c. The vulnerability occurs due to an underflow of the gint size variable, which causes size to hold a large unintended value when cast to an unsigned integer. This 32-bit negative value is then cast to a 64-bit unsigned integer (0xfffffffffffffffa) in a subsequent call to gst_buffer_new_and_alloc. The function gst_buffer_new_allocate then attempts to allocate memory, eventually calling _sysmem_new_block. The function _sysmem_new_block adds alignment and header size to the (unsigned) size, causing the overflow of the \u0027slice_size\u0027 variable. As a result, only 0x89 bytes are allocated, despite the large input size. When the following memcpy call occurs in gst_buffer_fill, the data from the input file will overwrite the content of the GstMapInfo info structure. Finally, during the call to gst_memory_unmap, the overwritten memory may cause a function pointer hijack, as the mem-\u003eallocator-\u003emem_unmap_full function is called with a corrupted pointer. This function pointer overwrite could allow an attacker to alter the execution flow of the program, leading to arbitrary code execution. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.24.10.",
  "id": "BIT-java-2024-47606",
  "modified": "2026-09-10T15:46:03.895Z",
  "published": "2026-05-06T14:45:01.107Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/gstreamer/gstreamer/-/merge_requests/8032.patch"
    },
    {
      "type": "ARTICLE",
      "url": "https://gstreamer.freedesktop.org/security/sa-2024-0014.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "DISCUSSION",
      "url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2024/12/msg00016.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2025/02/msg00035.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-47606"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://security.netapp.com/advisory/ntap-20250418-0003/"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://securitylab.github.com/advisories/GHSL-2024-166_Gstreamer/"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.6.2",
  "summary": "GHSL-2024-166: GStreamer Integer overflows in MP4/MOV demuxer and memory allocator that can lead to out-of-bounds writes"
}



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