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Vulnerability from bitnami_vulndb
Published
2024-03-06 10:55
Modified
2026-09-08 08:34
Summary
X.509 Extended Key Usage and Trust Purposes bypass in Envoy
Details

Envoy is an open source edge and service proxy, designed for cloud-native applications. In affected versions Envoy does not restrict the set of certificates it accepts from the peer, either as a TLS client or a TLS server, to only those certificates that contain the necessary extendedKeyUsage (id-kp-serverAuth and id-kp-clientAuth, respectively). This means that a peer may present an e-mail certificate (e.g. id-kp-emailProtection), either as a leaf certificate or as a CA in the chain, and it will be accepted for TLS. This is particularly bad when combined with the issue described in pull request #630, in that it allows a Web PKI CA that is intended only for use with S/MIME, and thus exempted from audit or supervision, to issue TLS certificates that will be accepted by Envoy. As a result Envoy will trust upstream certificates that should not be trusted. There are no known workarounds to this issue. Users are advised to upgrade.


{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Bitnami",
        "name": "envoy",
        "purl": "pkg:bitnami/envoy"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.18.6"
            },
            {
              "introduced": "1.19.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.19.3"
            },
            {
              "introduced": "1.20.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.20.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "SEMVER"
        }
      ],
      "severity": [
        {
          "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
          "type": "CVSS_V3"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-21657"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cpes": [
      "cpe:2.3:a:envoyproxy:envoy:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
    ],
    "severity": "Medium"
  },
  "details": "Envoy is an open source edge and service proxy, designed for cloud-native applications. In affected versions Envoy does not restrict the set of certificates it accepts from the peer, either as a TLS client or a TLS server, to only those certificates that contain the necessary extendedKeyUsage (id-kp-serverAuth and id-kp-clientAuth, respectively). This means that a peer may present an e-mail certificate (e.g. id-kp-emailProtection), either as a leaf certificate or as a CA in the chain, and it will be accepted for TLS. This is particularly bad when combined with the issue described in pull request #630, in that it allows a Web PKI CA that is intended only for use with S/MIME, and thus exempted from audit or supervision, to issue TLS certificates that will be accepted by Envoy. As a result Envoy will trust upstream certificates that should not be trusted. There are no known workarounds to this issue. Users are advised to upgrade.",
  "id": "BIT-envoy-2022-21657",
  "modified": "2026-09-08T08:34:36.952Z",
  "published": "2024-03-06T10:55:54.594Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/envoyproxy/envoy/pull/630"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/envoyproxy/envoy/security/advisories/GHSA-837m-wjrv-vm5g"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-21657"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.5.0",
  "summary": "X.509 Extended Key Usage and Trust Purposes bypass in Envoy"
}



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