GHSA-q26p-9cq4-7fc2
Vulnerability from github
Published
2025-01-30 17:51
Modified
2025-03-17 20:25
Severity ?
6.6 (Medium) - CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U
Summary
Go Ethereum vulnerable to DoS via malicious p2p message
Details

Impact

A vulnerable node can be forced to shutdown/crash using a specially crafted message.

During the peer-to-peer connection handshake, a shared secret key is computed. The implementation did not verify whether the EC public key provided by the remote party is a valid point on the secp256k1 curve. By simply sending an all-zero public key, a crash could be induced due to unexpected results from the handshake.

The issue was fixed by adding a curve point validity check in https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/commit/159fb1a1db551c544978dc16a5568a4730b4abf3

Patches

A fix has been included in geth version 1.14.13 and onwards.

Workarounds

Unfortunately, no workaround is available.

Credits

This issue was originally reported to Polygon Security by David Matosse (@iam-ned).

Show details on source website

To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.14.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.14.13"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-24883"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-20",
      "CWE-248"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2025-01-30T17:51:57Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-01-30T16:15:31Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n\nA vulnerable node can be forced to shutdown/crash using a specially crafted message.\n\nDuring the peer-to-peer connection handshake, a shared secret key is computed. The implementation\ndid not verify whether the EC public key provided by the remote party is a valid point on the secp256k1 curve.\nBy simply sending an all-zero public key, a crash could be induced due to unexpected results from the handshake.\n\nThe issue was fixed by adding a curve point validity check in https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/commit/159fb1a1db551c544978dc16a5568a4730b4abf3\n\n### Patches\n\nA fix has been included in geth version 1.14.13 and onwards.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nUnfortunately, no workaround is available.\n\n### Credits\n\nThis issue was originally reported to Polygon Security by David Matosse (@iam-ned).",
  "id": "GHSA-q26p-9cq4-7fc2",
  "modified": "2025-03-17T20:25:21Z",
  "published": "2025-01-30T17:51:57Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/security/advisories/GHSA-q26p-9cq4-7fc2"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-24883"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/commit/159fb1a1db551c544978dc16a5568a4730b4abf3"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/commit/fa9a2ff8687ec9efe57b4b9833d5590d20f8a83f"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2025-3436"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Go Ethereum vulnerable to DoS via malicious p2p message"
}


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