GHSA-8qff-qr5q-5pr8
Vulnerability from github
Published
2025-05-19 21:54
Modified
2025-05-19 21:54
Severity ?
8.7 (High) - CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Summary
OpenPGP.js's message signature verification can be spoofed
Details

Impact

A maliciously modified message can be passed to either openpgp.verify or openpgp.decrypt, causing these functions to return a valid signature verification result while returning data that was not actually signed.

This flaw allows signature verifications of inline (non-detached) signed messages (using openpgp.verify) and signed-and-encrypted messages (using openpgp.decrypt with verificationKeys) to be spoofed, since both functions return extracted data that may not match the data that was originally signed. Detached signature verifications are not affected, as no signed data is returned in that case.

In order to spoof a message, the attacker needs a single valid message signature (inline or detached) as well as the plaintext data that was legitimately signed, and can then construct an inline-signed message or signed-and-encrypted message with any data of the attacker's choice, which will appear as legitimately signed by affected versions of OpenPGP.js.

In other words. any inline-signed message can be modified to return any other data (while still indicating that the signature was valid), and the same is true for signed+encrypted messages if the attacker can obtain a valid signature and encrypt a new message (of the attacker's choice) together with that signature.

Both OpenPGP.js v6 and v5 are affected. OpenPGP.js v4 is not affected.

Patches

The issue has been patched in versions 5.11.3 and 6.1.1.

Workarounds

  • When verifying inline-signed messages, extract the message and signature(s) from the message returned by openpgp.readMessage, and verify the(/each) signature as a detached signature by passing the signature and a new message containing only the data (created using openpgp.createMessage) to openpgp.verify.
  • When decrypting and verifying signed+encrypted messages, decrypt and verify the message in two steps, by first calling openpgp.decrypt without verificationKeys, and then passing the returned signature(s) and a new message containing the decrypted data (created using openpgp.createMessage) to openpgp.verify.

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank: - Edoardo Geraci and Thomas Rinsma of Codean Labs for finding and reporting this vulnerability - The Sovereign Tech Agency for sponsoring the OpenPGP.js bug bounty program - YesWeHack for hosting the OpenPGP.js bug bounty program

Show details on source website

To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 5.11.2"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "openpgp"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "5.0.1"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.11.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 6.1.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "openpgp"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "6.0.0-alpha.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.1.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-47934"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-347"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2025-05-19T21:54:43Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-05-19T19:15:52Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\nA maliciously modified message can be passed to either `openpgp.verify` or `openpgp.decrypt`, causing these functions to return a valid signature verification result while returning data that was not actually signed.\n\nThis flaw allows signature verifications of inline (non-detached) signed messages (using `openpgp.verify`) and signed-and-encrypted messages (using `openpgp.decrypt` with `verificationKeys`) to be spoofed, since both functions return extracted data that may not match the data that was originally signed. Detached signature verifications are not affected, as no signed data is returned in that case.\n\nIn order to spoof a message, the attacker needs a single valid message signature (inline or detached) as well as the plaintext data that was legitimately signed, and can then construct an inline-signed message or signed-and-encrypted message with any data of the attacker\u0027s choice, which will appear as legitimately signed by affected versions of OpenPGP.js.\n\nIn other words. any inline-signed message can be modified to return any other data (while still indicating that the signature was valid), and the same is true for signed+encrypted messages if the attacker can obtain a valid signature and encrypt a new message (of the attacker\u0027s choice) together with that signature.\n\nBoth OpenPGP.js v6 and v5 are affected. OpenPGP.js v4 is not affected.\n\n### Patches\nThe issue has been patched in versions 5.11.3 and 6.1.1.\n\n### Workarounds\n- When verifying inline-signed messages, extract the message and signature(s) from the message returned by `openpgp.readMessage`, and verify the(/each) signature as a detached signature by passing the signature and a new message containing only the data (created using `openpgp.createMessage`) to `openpgp.verify`.\n- When decrypting and verifying signed+encrypted messages, decrypt and verify the message in two steps, by first calling `openpgp.decrypt` without `verificationKeys`, and then passing the returned signature(s) and a new message containing the decrypted data (created using `openpgp.createMessage`) to `openpgp.verify`.\n\n### Acknowledgements\nWe would like to thank:\n- Edoardo Geraci and Thomas Rinsma of [Codean Labs](https://codeanlabs.com/) for finding and reporting this vulnerability\n- The [Sovereign Tech Agency](https://www.sovereign.tech/) for sponsoring the [OpenPGP.js bug bounty program](https://yeswehack.com/programs/openpgp-js-bug-bounty-program)\n- [YesWeHack](https://www.yeswehack.com/) for hosting the [OpenPGP.js bug bounty program](https://yeswehack.com/programs/openpgp-js-bug-bounty-program)",
  "id": "GHSA-8qff-qr5q-5pr8",
  "modified": "2025-05-19T21:54:43Z",
  "published": "2025-05-19T21:54:43Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openpgpjs/openpgpjs/security/advisories/GHSA-8qff-qr5q-5pr8"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-47934"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openpgpjs/openpgpjs/commit/43f5f4e2bd67d0514d06acc60b6ee571a049c229"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openpgpjs/openpgpjs/commit/843a69d0adbdec0f87af09f9000a9223e6614e5c"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openpgpjs/openpgpjs/commit/bd54e8535ca29b3bef58a8c02296892e408be356"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/openpgpjs/openpgpjs"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openpgpjs/openpgpjs/releases/tag/v5.11.3"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openpgpjs/openpgpjs/releases/tag/v6.1.1"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "OpenPGP.js\u0027s message signature verification can be spoofed"
}


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