CVE-2026-23012 (GCVE-0-2026-23012)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-01-25 14:36 – Updated: 2026-01-25 14:36
VLAI?
Title
mm/damon/core: remove call_control in inactive contexts
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/damon/core: remove call_control in inactive contexts
If damon_call() is executed against a DAMON context that is not running,
the function returns error while keeping the damon_call_control object
linked to the context's call_controls list. Let's suppose the object is
deallocated after the damon_call(), and yet another damon_call() is
executed against the same context. The function tries to add the new
damon_call_control object to the call_controls list, which still has the
pointer to the previous damon_call_control object, which is deallocated.
As a result, use-after-free happens.
This can actually be triggered using the DAMON sysfs interface. It is not
easily exploitable since it requires the sysfs write permission and making
a definitely weird file writes, though. Please refer to the report for
more details about the issue reproduction steps.
Fix the issue by making two changes. Firstly, move the final
kdamond_call() for cancelling all existing damon_call() requests from
terminating DAMON context to be done before the ctx->kdamond reset. This
makes any code that sees NULL ctx->kdamond can safely assume the context
may not access damon_call() requests anymore. Secondly, let damon_call()
to cleanup the damon_call_control objects that were added to the
already-terminated DAMON context, before returning the error.
Severity ?
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
Impacted products
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"datePublished": "2026-01-25T14:36:25.187Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-01-13T15:37:45.940Z",
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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