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    Related vulnerabilities

    GHSA-PV2J-RGHR-V5R9

    Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-18 13:55 – Updated: 2026-07-20 21:24
    VLAI
    Summary
    PraisonAI: execute_code sandbox bypass: str.format C-level attribute access reads every blocklisted dunder
    Details

    Summary

    The execute_code tool's subprocess sandbox advertises a three-layer defense (AST validation, text-pattern blocklist, restricted __builtins__). In sandbox mode (the default) only two layers are active — the text-pattern blocklist is skipped — and both remaining layers are bypassed by combining two CPython semantics:

    1. Runtime string assembly. The AST validator (src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/tools/python_tools.py:75) enumerates blocked dunder names against ast.Attribute.attr, ast.Call.func.id, and ast.Constant string-substring. Names assembled at runtime (e.g. "_"*2 + "class" + "_"*2) appear in the AST as multiple short ast.Constant nodes, none containing a blocked substring, so the static check passes.
    2. C-level attribute access via format-spec. str.format / str.format_map resolve dotted field references through CPython's internal PyObject_GetAttr (do_string_format → get_field). This C path never consults the Python-level getattr binding. The sandbox's _safe_getattr wrapper (python_tools.py:221) is installed only as the getattr name in safe_builtins, so any C-level attribute access — including format-spec field resolution — sidesteps it. format/format_map are also absent from _SANDBOX_BLOCKED_CALLS (python_tools.py:56).

    Combined, this yields an arbitrary read primitive over every blocklisted attribute (__class__, __qualname__, __bases__, __base__, function __globals__, __dict__, …).

    Affected code

    File Lines Symbol Role
    src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/tools/python_tools.py 39–54 _SANDBOX_BLOCKED_ATTRS The blocklist the bypass renders unreachable
    src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/tools/python_tools.py 56–60 _SANDBOX_BLOCKED_CALLS Missing entries: format, format_map
    src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/tools/python_tools.py 75–102 _validate_code_ast Static check, blind to runtime string assembly
    src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/tools/python_tools.py 221–226 _safe_getattr Wraps Python-level getattr only; C-level access bypasses
    src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/tools/python_tools.py 352 execute_code Entry point; gated by @require_approval(risk_level="critical")

    Reproducer

    import os
os.environ["PRAISONAI_AUTO_APPROVE"] = "true"
from praisonaiagents.tools.python_tools import execute_code

payload = '''
und = "_" * 2                         # "__" assembled at runtime
key1 = und + "class" + und            # "__class__"
key2 = und + "qualname" + und         # "__qualname__"
fmt_class = "{0." + key1 + "}"
fmt_qual2 = "{0." + key1 + "." + key2 + "}"
print("LEAK_CLASS=" + fmt_class.format(()))
print("LEAK_QUAL2=" + fmt_qual2.format(()))
'''
print(execute_code(payload, sandbox_mode="sandbox", timeout=15))

    Observed: stdout = LEAK_CLASS=<class 'tuple'> / LEAK_QUAL2=tuple, success: true, no security error. Both __class__ (one hop) and __class__.__qualname__ (two hops) — all blocklisted — are read.

    Trust boundary

    The @require_approval(risk_level="critical") gate is bypassed when PRAISONAI_AUTO_APPROVE is set (verified: require_approval short-circuits on is_env_auto_approve()). That variable is set by the project's FULL_AUTO autonomy mode, the bots-CLI launchers, and the project's own issue-triage CI workflow — postures where the agent reaches execute_code with no human approval. The payload then arrives via any LLM-visible surface (user message, retrieved document, tool/web/MCP output) and the tool-call machinery passes it as the code argument.

    Relationship to GHSA-4mr5-g6f9-cfrh

    The code's own comment at python_tools.py:46 cites GHSA-4mr5-g6f9-cfrh, which added __self__ to the blocklist to stop C-builtins leaking builtins via func.__self__. This finding does not bypass that single entry — it bypasses the entire blocklist, because format-spec attribute resolution never consults the blocklist or _safe_getattr. "{0.__self__}".format(print) would leak __self__ regardless of the blocklist. Same defense surface, different mechanism; the GHSA-4mr5 fix does not mitigate this.

    Scope (read primitive only)

    This reports the read primitive. Turning the read into in-process execution requires a callable bridge; the obvious one (string.Formatter().get_field() returning the live object) is not directly reachable because import string is blocked at the AST layer (no ast.Import). Other bridges may exist; a full execution chain is not claimed here. If one is found, severity rises to ~8.8 (the subprocess has no seccomp/setrlimit/syscall filtering).

    Suggested fix

    1. Add format, format_map to _SANDBOX_BLOCKED_CALLS (blocks the calls at the AST layer; cost: also blocks benign str.format).
    2. Or replace str in safe_builtins with a subclass whose format/format_map reject dotted fields resolving to leading-underscore attributes (preserves benign formatting).
    3. Or drop sandbox-mode's in-process security claim and document that real isolation requires external sandboxing (gVisor/firejail/container/microVM) — which matches what the subprocess provides today.

    The text-pattern blocklist present in the direct path (python_tools.py:487-502) is absent from the sandbox path; even if added, the runtime-assembly trick defeats it, so (1) or (2) is required.

    Reporter: Kai Aizen / SnailSploit — kai@snailsploit.com — PGP on request. Coordinated disclosure; no public posting.

    Severity
    6.5 (Medium)
    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
    Show details on source website
    To clipboard 

    {
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "praisonaiagents"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.6.59"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-57120"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-693"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-18T13:55:29Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThe `execute_code` tool\u0027s subprocess sandbox advertises a three-layer defense (AST validation, text-pattern blocklist, restricted `__builtins__`). In **sandbox mode** (the default) only two layers are active \u2014 the text-pattern blocklist is skipped \u2014 and both remaining layers are bypassed by combining two CPython semantics:\n\n1. **Runtime string assembly.** The AST validator (`src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/tools/python_tools.py:75`) enumerates blocked dunder names against `ast.Attribute.attr`, `ast.Call.func.id`, and `ast.Constant` string-substring. Names assembled at runtime (e.g. `\"_\"*2 + \"class\" + \"_\"*2`) appear in the AST as multiple short `ast.Constant` nodes, none containing a blocked substring, so the static check passes.\n2. **C-level attribute access via format-spec.** `str.format` / `str.format_map` resolve dotted field references through CPython\u0027s internal `PyObject_GetAttr` (`do_string_format` \u2192 `get_field`). This C path never consults the Python-level `getattr` binding. The sandbox\u0027s `_safe_getattr` wrapper (`python_tools.py:221`) is installed only as the `getattr` name in `safe_builtins`, so any C-level attribute access \u2014 including format-spec field resolution \u2014 sidesteps it. `format`/`format_map` are also absent from `_SANDBOX_BLOCKED_CALLS` (`python_tools.py:56`).\n\nCombined, this yields an arbitrary read primitive over every blocklisted attribute (`__class__`, `__qualname__`, `__bases__`, `__base__`, function `__globals__`, `__dict__`, \u2026).\n\n## Affected code\n\n| File | Lines | Symbol | Role |\n|---|---|---|---|\n| `src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/tools/python_tools.py` | 39\u201354 | `_SANDBOX_BLOCKED_ATTRS` | The blocklist the bypass renders unreachable |\n| `src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/tools/python_tools.py` | 56\u201360 | `_SANDBOX_BLOCKED_CALLS` | Missing entries: `format`, `format_map` |\n| `src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/tools/python_tools.py` | 75\u2013102 | `_validate_code_ast` | Static check, blind to runtime string assembly |\n| `src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/tools/python_tools.py` | 221\u2013226 | `_safe_getattr` | Wraps Python-level `getattr` only; C-level access bypasses |\n| `src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/tools/python_tools.py` | 352 | `execute_code` | Entry point; gated by `@require_approval(risk_level=\"critical\")` |\n\n## Reproducer\n\n```python\nimport os\nos.environ[\"PRAISONAI_AUTO_APPROVE\"] = \"true\"\nfrom praisonaiagents.tools.python_tools import execute_code\n\npayload = \u0027\u0027\u0027\nund = \"_\" * 2                         # \"__\" assembled at runtime\nkey1 = und + \"class\" + und            # \"__class__\"\nkey2 = und + \"qualname\" + und         # \"__qualname__\"\nfmt_class = \"{0.\" + key1 + \"}\"\nfmt_qual2 = \"{0.\" + key1 + \".\" + key2 + \"}\"\nprint(\"LEAK_CLASS=\" + fmt_class.format(()))\nprint(\"LEAK_QUAL2=\" + fmt_qual2.format(()))\n\u0027\u0027\u0027\nprint(execute_code(payload, sandbox_mode=\"sandbox\", timeout=15))\n```\n\nObserved: `stdout` = `LEAK_CLASS=\u003cclass \u0027tuple\u0027\u003e` / `LEAK_QUAL2=tuple`, `success: true`, no security error. Both `__class__` (one hop) and `__class__.__qualname__` (two hops) \u2014 all blocklisted \u2014 are read.\n\n## Trust boundary\n\nThe `@require_approval(risk_level=\"critical\")` gate is bypassed when `PRAISONAI_AUTO_APPROVE` is set (verified: `require_approval` short-circuits on `is_env_auto_approve()`). That variable is set by the project\u0027s FULL_AUTO autonomy mode, the bots-CLI launchers, and the project\u0027s own issue-triage CI workflow \u2014 postures where the agent reaches `execute_code` with no human approval. The payload then arrives via any LLM-visible surface (user message, retrieved document, tool/web/MCP output) and the tool-call machinery passes it as the `code` argument.\n\n## Relationship to GHSA-4mr5-g6f9-cfrh\n\nThe code\u0027s own comment at `python_tools.py:46` cites GHSA-4mr5-g6f9-cfrh, which added `__self__` to the blocklist to stop C-builtins leaking `builtins` via `func.__self__`. This finding does not bypass that single entry \u2014 it bypasses the **entire** blocklist, because format-spec attribute resolution never consults the blocklist or `_safe_getattr`. `\"{0.__self__}\".format(print)` would leak `__self__` regardless of the blocklist. Same defense surface, different mechanism; the GHSA-4mr5 fix does not mitigate this.\n\n## Scope (read primitive only)\n\nThis reports the **read primitive**. Turning the read into in-process execution requires a callable bridge; the obvious one (`string.Formatter().get_field()` returning the live object) is not directly reachable because `import string` is blocked at the AST layer (no `ast.Import`). Other bridges may exist; a full execution chain is **not** claimed here. If one is found, severity rises to ~8.8 (the subprocess has no seccomp/`setrlimit`/syscall filtering).\n\n## Suggested fix\n\n1. Add `format`, `format_map` to `_SANDBOX_BLOCKED_CALLS` (blocks the calls at the AST layer; cost: also blocks benign `str.format`).\n2. Or replace `str` in `safe_builtins` with a subclass whose `format`/`format_map` reject dotted fields resolving to leading-underscore attributes (preserves benign formatting).\n3. Or drop sandbox-mode\u0027s in-process security claim and document that real isolation requires external sandboxing (gVisor/firejail/container/microVM) \u2014 which matches what the subprocess provides today.\n\nThe text-pattern blocklist present in the `direct` path (`python_tools.py:487-502`) is absent from the sandbox path; even if added, the runtime-assembly trick defeats it, so (1) or (2) is required.\n\nReporter: Kai Aizen / SnailSploit \u2014 kai@snailsploit.com \u2014 PGP on request. Coordinated disclosure; no public posting.",
  "id": "GHSA-pv2j-rghr-v5r9",
  "modified": "2026-07-20T21:24:25Z",
  "published": "2026-06-18T13:55:29Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-pv2j-rghr-v5r9"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "PraisonAI: execute_code sandbox bypass: str.format C-level attribute access reads every blocklisted dunder"
}

    PYSEC-2026-3533

    Vulnerability from pysec - Published: 2026-07-23 11:41 - Updated: 2026-07-23 14:32
    VLAI
    Details

    Summary

    The execute_code tool's subprocess sandbox advertises a three-layer defense (AST validation, text-pattern blocklist, restricted __builtins__). In sandbox mode (the default) only two layers are active — the text-pattern blocklist is skipped — and both remaining layers are bypassed by combining two CPython semantics:

    1. Runtime string assembly. The AST validator (src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/tools/python_tools.py:75) enumerates blocked dunder names against ast.Attribute.attr, ast.Call.func.id, and ast.Constant string-substring. Names assembled at runtime (e.g. "_"*2 + "class" + "_"*2) appear in the AST as multiple short ast.Constant nodes, none containing a blocked substring, so the static check passes.
    2. C-level attribute access via format-spec. str.format / str.format_map resolve dotted field references through CPython's internal PyObject_GetAttr (do_string_format → get_field). This C path never consults the Python-level getattr binding. The sandbox's _safe_getattr wrapper (python_tools.py:221) is installed only as the getattr name in safe_builtins, so any C-level attribute access — including format-spec field resolution — sidesteps it. format/format_map are also absent from _SANDBOX_BLOCKED_CALLS (python_tools.py:56).

    Combined, this yields an arbitrary read primitive over every blocklisted attribute (__class__, __qualname__, __bases__, __base__, function __globals__, __dict__, …).

    Affected code

    File Lines Symbol Role
    src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/tools/python_tools.py 39–54 _SANDBOX_BLOCKED_ATTRS The blocklist the bypass renders unreachable
    src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/tools/python_tools.py 56–60 _SANDBOX_BLOCKED_CALLS Missing entries: format, format_map
    src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/tools/python_tools.py 75–102 _validate_code_ast Static check, blind to runtime string assembly
    src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/tools/python_tools.py 221–226 _safe_getattr Wraps Python-level getattr only; C-level access bypasses
    src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/tools/python_tools.py 352 execute_code Entry point; gated by @require_approval(risk_level="critical")

    Reproducer

    import os
os.environ["PRAISONAI_AUTO_APPROVE"] = "true"
from praisonaiagents.tools.python_tools import execute_code

payload = '''
und = "_" * 2                         # "__" assembled at runtime
key1 = und + "class" + und            # "__class__"
key2 = und + "qualname" + und         # "__qualname__"
fmt_class = "{0." + key1 + "}"
fmt_qual2 = "{0." + key1 + "." + key2 + "}"
print("LEAK_CLASS=" + fmt_class.format(()))
print("LEAK_QUAL2=" + fmt_qual2.format(()))
'''
print(execute_code(payload, sandbox_mode="sandbox", timeout=15))

    Observed: stdout = LEAK_CLASS=<class 'tuple'> / LEAK_QUAL2=tuple, success: true, no security error. Both __class__ (one hop) and __class__.__qualname__ (two hops) — all blocklisted — are read.

    Trust boundary

    The @require_approval(risk_level="critical") gate is bypassed when PRAISONAI_AUTO_APPROVE is set (verified: require_approval short-circuits on is_env_auto_approve()). That variable is set by the project's FULL_AUTO autonomy mode, the bots-CLI launchers, and the project's own issue-triage CI workflow — postures where the agent reaches execute_code with no human approval. The payload then arrives via any LLM-visible surface (user message, retrieved document, tool/web/MCP output) and the tool-call machinery passes it as the code argument.

    Relationship to GHSA-4mr5-g6f9-cfrh

    The code's own comment at python_tools.py:46 cites GHSA-4mr5-g6f9-cfrh, which added __self__ to the blocklist to stop C-builtins leaking builtins via func.__self__. This finding does not bypass that single entry — it bypasses the entire blocklist, because format-spec attribute resolution never consults the blocklist or _safe_getattr. "{0.__self__}".format(print) would leak __self__ regardless of the blocklist. Same defense surface, different mechanism; the GHSA-4mr5 fix does not mitigate this.

    Scope (read primitive only)

    This reports the read primitive. Turning the read into in-process execution requires a callable bridge; the obvious one (string.Formatter().get_field() returning the live object) is not directly reachable because import string is blocked at the AST layer (no ast.Import). Other bridges may exist; a full execution chain is not claimed here. If one is found, severity rises to ~8.8 (the subprocess has no seccomp/setrlimit/syscall filtering).

    Suggested fix

    1. Add format, format_map to _SANDBOX_BLOCKED_CALLS (blocks the calls at the AST layer; cost: also blocks benign str.format).
    2. Or replace str in safe_builtins with a subclass whose format/format_map reject dotted fields resolving to leading-underscore attributes (preserves benign formatting).
    3. Or drop sandbox-mode's in-process security claim and document that real isolation requires external sandboxing (gVisor/firejail/container/microVM) — which matches what the subprocess provides today.

    The text-pattern blocklist present in the direct path (python_tools.py:487-502) is absent from the sandbox path; even if added, the runtime-assembly trick defeats it, so (1) or (2) is required.

    Reporter: Kai Aizen / SnailSploit — kai@snailsploit.com — PGP on request. Coordinated disclosure; no public posting.

    Severity
    6.5 (Medium)
    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
    Impacted products
    Name purl
    praisonaiagents pkg:pypi/praisonaiagents
    Aliases
    To clipboard 

    {
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "praisonaiagents",
        "purl": "pkg:pypi/praisonaiagents"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.6.59"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ],
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    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-57120",
    "GHSA-pv2j-rghr-v5r9"
  ],
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThe `execute_code` tool\u0027s subprocess sandbox advertises a three-layer defense (AST validation, text-pattern blocklist, restricted `__builtins__`). In **sandbox mode** (the default) only two layers are active \u2014 the text-pattern blocklist is skipped \u2014 and both remaining layers are bypassed by combining two CPython semantics:\n\n1. **Runtime string assembly.** The AST validator (`src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/tools/python_tools.py:75`) enumerates blocked dunder names against `ast.Attribute.attr`, `ast.Call.func.id`, and `ast.Constant` string-substring. Names assembled at runtime (e.g. `\"_\"*2 + \"class\" + \"_\"*2`) appear in the AST as multiple short `ast.Constant` nodes, none containing a blocked substring, so the static check passes.\n2. **C-level attribute access via format-spec.** `str.format` / `str.format_map` resolve dotted field references through CPython\u0027s internal `PyObject_GetAttr` (`do_string_format` \u2192 `get_field`). This C path never consults the Python-level `getattr` binding. The sandbox\u0027s `_safe_getattr` wrapper (`python_tools.py:221`) is installed only as the `getattr` name in `safe_builtins`, so any C-level attribute access \u2014 including format-spec field resolution \u2014 sidesteps it. `format`/`format_map` are also absent from `_SANDBOX_BLOCKED_CALLS` (`python_tools.py:56`).\n\nCombined, this yields an arbitrary read primitive over every blocklisted attribute (`__class__`, `__qualname__`, `__bases__`, `__base__`, function `__globals__`, `__dict__`, \u2026).\n\n## Affected code\n\n| File | Lines | Symbol | Role |\n|---|---|---|---|\n| `src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/tools/python_tools.py` | 39\u201354 | `_SANDBOX_BLOCKED_ATTRS` | The blocklist the bypass renders unreachable |\n| `src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/tools/python_tools.py` | 56\u201360 | `_SANDBOX_BLOCKED_CALLS` | Missing entries: `format`, `format_map` |\n| `src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/tools/python_tools.py` | 75\u2013102 | `_validate_code_ast` | Static check, blind to runtime string assembly |\n| `src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/tools/python_tools.py` | 221\u2013226 | `_safe_getattr` | Wraps Python-level `getattr` only; C-level access bypasses |\n| `src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/tools/python_tools.py` | 352 | `execute_code` | Entry point; gated by `@require_approval(risk_level=\"critical\")` |\n\n## Reproducer\n\n```python\nimport os\nos.environ[\"PRAISONAI_AUTO_APPROVE\"] = \"true\"\nfrom praisonaiagents.tools.python_tools import execute_code\n\npayload = \u0027\u0027\u0027\nund = \"_\" * 2                         # \"__\" assembled at runtime\nkey1 = und + \"class\" + und            # \"__class__\"\nkey2 = und + \"qualname\" + und         # \"__qualname__\"\nfmt_class = \"{0.\" + key1 + \"}\"\nfmt_qual2 = \"{0.\" + key1 + \".\" + key2 + \"}\"\nprint(\"LEAK_CLASS=\" + fmt_class.format(()))\nprint(\"LEAK_QUAL2=\" + fmt_qual2.format(()))\n\u0027\u0027\u0027\nprint(execute_code(payload, sandbox_mode=\"sandbox\", timeout=15))\n```\n\nObserved: `stdout` = `LEAK_CLASS=\u003cclass \u0027tuple\u0027\u003e` / `LEAK_QUAL2=tuple`, `success: true`, no security error. Both `__class__` (one hop) and `__class__.__qualname__` (two hops) \u2014 all blocklisted \u2014 are read.\n\n## Trust boundary\n\nThe `@require_approval(risk_level=\"critical\")` gate is bypassed when `PRAISONAI_AUTO_APPROVE` is set (verified: `require_approval` short-circuits on `is_env_auto_approve()`). That variable is set by the project\u0027s FULL_AUTO autonomy mode, the bots-CLI launchers, and the project\u0027s own issue-triage CI workflow \u2014 postures where the agent reaches `execute_code` with no human approval. The payload then arrives via any LLM-visible surface (user message, retrieved document, tool/web/MCP output) and the tool-call machinery passes it as the `code` argument.\n\n## Relationship to GHSA-4mr5-g6f9-cfrh\n\nThe code\u0027s own comment at `python_tools.py:46` cites GHSA-4mr5-g6f9-cfrh, which added `__self__` to the blocklist to stop C-builtins leaking `builtins` via `func.__self__`. This finding does not bypass that single entry \u2014 it bypasses the **entire** blocklist, because format-spec attribute resolution never consults the blocklist or `_safe_getattr`. `\"{0.__self__}\".format(print)` would leak `__self__` regardless of the blocklist. Same defense surface, different mechanism; the GHSA-4mr5 fix does not mitigate this.\n\n## Scope (read primitive only)\n\nThis reports the **read primitive**. Turning the read into in-process execution requires a callable bridge; the obvious one (`string.Formatter().get_field()` returning the live object) is not directly reachable because `import string` is blocked at the AST layer (no `ast.Import`). Other bridges may exist; a full execution chain is **not** claimed here. If one is found, severity rises to ~8.8 (the subprocess has no seccomp/`setrlimit`/syscall filtering).\n\n## Suggested fix\n\n1. Add `format`, `format_map` to `_SANDBOX_BLOCKED_CALLS` (blocks the calls at the AST layer; cost: also blocks benign `str.format`).\n2. Or replace `str` in `safe_builtins` with a subclass whose `format`/`format_map` reject dotted fields resolving to leading-underscore attributes (preserves benign formatting).\n3. Or drop sandbox-mode\u0027s in-process security claim and document that real isolation requires external sandboxing (gVisor/firejail/container/microVM) \u2014 which matches what the subprocess provides today.\n\nThe text-pattern blocklist present in the `direct` path (`python_tools.py:487-502`) is absent from the sandbox path; even if added, the runtime-assembly trick defeats it, so (1) or (2) is required.\n\nReporter: Kai Aizen / SnailSploit \u2014 kai@snailsploit.com \u2014 PGP on request. Coordinated disclosure; no public posting.",
  "id": "PYSEC-2026-3533",
  "modified": "2026-07-23T14:32:41.822909Z",
  "published": "2026-07-23T11:41:41.087045Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-pv2j-rghr-v5r9"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://pypi.org/project/praisonaiagents"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-pv2j-rghr-v5r9"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-57120"
    }
  ],
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "PraisonAI: execute_code sandbox bypass: str.format C-level attribute access reads every blocklisted dunder"
}