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Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-918

Allowed

Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)

Abstraction: Base · Status: Incomplete

API response cwe.mitre.org

The web server receives a URL or similar request from an upstream component and retrieves the contents of this URL, but it does not sufficiently ensure that the request is being sent to the expected destination.

5695 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-X288-3778-4HHX

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-25 22:42 – Updated: 2026-02-25 22:42
VLAI
Summary
Angular SSR is vulnerable to SSRF and Header Injection via request handling pipeline
Details

A Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability has been identified in the Angular SSR request handling pipeline. The vulnerability exists because Angular’s internal URL reconstruction logic directly trusts and consumes user-controlled HTTP headers specifically the Host and X-Forwarded-* family to determine the application's base origin without any validation of the destination domain.

Specifically, the framework didn't have checks for the following: - Host Domain: The Host and X-Forwarded-Host headers were not checked to belong to a trusted origin. This allows an attacker to redefine the "base" of the application to an arbitrary external domain. - Path & Character Sanitization: The X-Forwarded-Host header was not checked for path segments or special characters, allowing manipulation of the base path for all resolved relative URLs. - Port Validation: The X-Forwarded-Port header was not verified as numeric, leading to malformed URI construction or injection attacks.

This vulnerability manifests in two primary ways:

  • Implicit Relative URL Resolution: Angular's HttpClient resolves relative URLs against this unvalidated and potentially malformed base origin. An attacker can "steer" these requests to an external server or internal service.
  • Explicit Manual Construction: Developers injecting the REQUEST object to manually construct URLs (for fetch or third-party SDKs) directly inherit these unsanitized values. By accessing the Host / X-Forwarded-* headers, the application logic may perform requests to attacker-controlled destinations or malformed endpoints.

Impact

When successfully exploited, this vulnerability allows for arbitrary internal request steering. This can lead to: - Credential Exfiltration: Stealing sensitive Authorization headers or session cookies by redirecting them to an attacker's server. - Internal Network Probing: Accessing and transmitting data from internal services, databases, or cloud metadata endpoints (e.g., 169.254.169.254) not exposed to the public internet. - Confidentiality Breach: Accessing sensitive information processed within the application's server-side context.

Attack Preconditions

  • The victim application must use Angular SSR (Server-Side Rendering).
  • The application must perform HttpClient requests using relative URLs OR manually construct URLs using the unvalidated Host / X-Forwarded-* headers using the REQUEST object.
  • Direct Header Access: The application server is reachable by an attacker who can influence these headers without strict validation from a front-facing proxy.
  • Lack of Upstream Validation: The infrastructure (Cloud, CDN, or Load Balancer) does not sanitize or validate incoming headers.

Patches

  • 21.2.0-rc.1
  • 21.1.5
  • 20.3.17
  • 19.2.21

Workarounds

  • Use Absolute URLs: Avoid using req.headers for URL construction. Instead, use trusted variables for your base API paths.
  • Implement Strict Header Validation (Middleware): If you cannot upgrade immediately, implement a middleware in your server.ts to enforce numeric ports and validated hostnames.
const ALLOWED_HOSTS = new Set(['your-domain.com']);

app.use((req, res, next) => {
  const hostHeader = (req.headers['x-forwarded-host'] ?? req.headers['host'])?.toString();
  const portHeader = req.headers['x-forwarded-port']?.toString();

  if (hostHeader) {
    const hostname = hostHeader.split(':')[0];
    // Reject if hostname contains path separators or is not in allowlist
    if (/^[a-z0-9.:-]+$/i.test(hostname) || 
       (!ALLOWED_HOSTS.has(hostname) && hostname !== 'localhost')) {
      return res.status(400).send('Invalid Hostname');
    }
  }

  // Ensure port is strictly numeric if provided
  if (portHeader && !/^\d+$/.test(portHeader)) {
    return res.status(400).send('Invalid Port');
  }

  next();
});

References

Severity
9.2 (Critical)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:H/SI:L/SA:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c 21.2.0-rc.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@angular/ssr"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "21.2.0-next.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "21.2.0-rc.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@angular/ssr"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "21.0.0-next.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "21.1.5"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@angular/ssr"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "20.0.0-next.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "20.3.17"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@angular/ssr"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "19.2.21"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@nguniversal/common"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "16.2.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@nguniversal/express-engine"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "16.2.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-27739"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-25T22:42:36Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-02-25T18:23:40Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "A [Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/Security/Attacks/SSRF) vulnerability has been identified in the Angular SSR request handling pipeline. The vulnerability exists because Angular\u2019s internal URL reconstruction logic directly trusts and consumes user-controlled HTTP headers specifically the Host and `X-Forwarded-*` family to determine the application\u0027s base origin without any validation of the destination domain.\n\nSpecifically, the framework didn\u0027t have checks for the following:\n- **Host Domain**: The `Host` and `X-Forwarded-Host` headers were not checked to belong to a trusted origin. This allows an attacker to redefine the \"base\" of the application to an arbitrary external domain.\n- **Path \u0026 Character Sanitization**: The `X-Forwarded-Host` header was not checked for path segments or special characters, allowing manipulation of the base path for all resolved relative URLs.\n- **Port Validation**: The `X-Forwarded-Port` header was not verified as numeric, leading to malformed URI construction or injection attacks.\n\n\nThis vulnerability manifests in two primary ways:\n\n- **Implicit Relative URL Resolution**: Angular\u0027s `HttpClient` resolves relative URLs against this unvalidated and potentially malformed base origin. An attacker can \"steer\" these requests to an external server or internal service.\n- **Explicit Manual Construction**: Developers injecting the `REQUEST` object to manually construct URLs (for fetch or third-party SDKs) directly inherit these unsanitized values. By accessing the `Host` / `X-Forwarded-*` headers, the application logic may perform requests to attacker-controlled destinations or malformed endpoints.\n\n### Impact\n\nWhen successfully exploited, this vulnerability allows for arbitrary internal request steering. This can lead to:\n- **Credential Exfiltration**: Stealing sensitive `Authorization` headers or session cookies by redirecting them to an attacker\u0027s server.\n- **Internal Network Probing**: Accessing and transmitting data from internal services, databases, or cloud metadata endpoints (e.g., `169.254.169.254`) not exposed to the public internet.\n- Confidentiality Breach: Accessing sensitive information processed within the application\u0027s server-side context.\n\n### Attack Preconditions\n\n- The victim application must use Angular SSR (Server-Side Rendering).\n- The application must perform `HttpClient` requests using relative URLs OR manually construct URLs using the unvalidated `Host` / `X-Forwarded-*` headers using the `REQUEST` object.\n- **Direct Header Access**: The application server is reachable by an attacker who can influence these headers without strict validation from a front-facing proxy.\n- **Lack of Upstream Validation**: The infrastructure (Cloud, CDN, or Load Balancer) does not sanitize or validate incoming headers.\n\n### Patches\n\n- 21.2.0-rc.1\n- 21.1.5\n- 20.3.17\n- 19.2.21\n\n\n### Workarounds\n- **Use Absolute URLs:** Avoid using `req.headers` for URL construction. Instead, use trusted variables for your base API paths.\n- **Implement Strict Header Validation (Middleware)**: If you cannot upgrade immediately, implement a middleware in your `server.ts` to enforce numeric ports and validated hostnames.\n\n```ts\nconst ALLOWED_HOSTS = new Set([\u0027your-domain.com\u0027]);\n\napp.use((req, res, next) =\u003e {\n  const hostHeader = (req.headers[\u0027x-forwarded-host\u0027] ?? req.headers[\u0027host\u0027])?.toString();\n  const portHeader = req.headers[\u0027x-forwarded-port\u0027]?.toString();\n\n  if (hostHeader) {\n    const hostname = hostHeader.split(\u0027:\u0027)[0];\n    // Reject if hostname contains path separators or is not in allowlist\n    if (/^[a-z0-9.:-]+$/i.test(hostname) || \n       (!ALLOWED_HOSTS.has(hostname) \u0026\u0026 hostname !== \u0027localhost\u0027)) {\n      return res.status(400).send(\u0027Invalid Hostname\u0027);\n    }\n  }\n\n  // Ensure port is strictly numeric if provided\n  if (portHeader \u0026\u0026 !/^\\d+$/.test(portHeader)) {\n    return res.status(400).send(\u0027Invalid Port\u0027);\n  }\n\n  next();\n});\n```\n\n### References\n\n- [Fix](https://github.com/angular/angular-cli/pull/32516)\n- [Docs](https://angular.dev/best-practices/security#preventing-server-side-request-forgery-ssrf)",
  "id": "GHSA-x288-3778-4hhx",
  "modified": "2026-02-25T22:42:36Z",
  "published": "2026-02-25T22:42:36Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/angular/angular-cli/security/advisories/GHSA-x288-3778-4hhx"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-27739"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/angular/angular-cli/pull/32516"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://angular.dev/best-practices/security#preventing-server-side-request-forgery-ssrf"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/Security/Attacks/SSRF"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/angular/angular-cli"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:H/SI:L/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Angular SSR is vulnerable to SSRF and Header Injection via request handling pipeline"
}

GHSA-X2F5-332J-9XWQ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-30 17:08 – Updated: 2026-04-06 16:44
VLAI
Summary
Docker Model Runner OCI Registry Client Vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
Details

Summary

Docker Model Runner contains an SSRF vulnerability in its OCI registry token exchange flow. When pulling a model, Model Runner follows the realm URL from the registry's WWW-Authenticate header without validating the scheme, hostname, or IP range. A malicious OCI registry can set the realm to an internal URL (e.g., http://127.0.0.1:3000/), causing Model Runner running on the host to make arbitrary GET requests to internal services and reflect the full response body back to the caller. Additionally, the token exchange mechanism can relay data from internal services back to the attacker-controlled registry via the Authorization: Bearer header.

Patches

Fixed in Docker Model Runner v1.1.25 Docker Desktop users should update to 4.67.0 or later, which includes the fixed Model Runner.

Workarounds

For Docker Desktop users, enabling Enhanced Container Isolation (ECI) blocks container access to Model Runner, preventing exploitation. However, if the Docker Model Runner is exposed to localhost over TCP in specific configurations, the vulnerability is still exploitable.

Impact

An unprivileged container or a malicious OCI registry that the user performed a pull from might issue GET requests to host-local services (localhost, internal network)

Severity
6.8 (Medium)
CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:N/SA:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/docker/model-runner"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.1.25"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-33990"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-30T17:08:25Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-01T17:28:39Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\nDocker Model Runner contains an SSRF vulnerability in its OCI registry token exchange flow. When pulling a model, Model Runner follows the realm URL from the registry\u0027s `WWW-Authenticate` header without validating the scheme, hostname, or IP range. A malicious OCI registry can set the realm to an internal URL (e.g., `http://127.0.0.1:3000/`), causing Model Runner running on the host to make arbitrary GET requests to internal services and reflect the full response body back to the caller. Additionally, the token exchange mechanism can relay data from internal services back to the attacker-controlled registry via the `Authorization: Bearer` header.\n\n## Patches\nFixed in Docker Model Runner v1.1.25\nDocker Desktop users should update to 4.67.0 or later, which includes the fixed Model Runner.\n\n## Workarounds\nFor Docker Desktop users, enabling Enhanced Container Isolation (ECI) blocks container access to Model Runner, preventing exploitation. However, if the Docker Model Runner is exposed to localhost over TCP in specific configurations, the vulnerability is still exploitable.\n\n## Impact\nAn unprivileged container or a malicious OCI registry that the user performed a pull from might issue GET requests to host-local services (localhost, internal network)",
  "id": "GHSA-x2f5-332j-9xwq",
  "modified": "2026-04-06T16:44:36Z",
  "published": "2026-03-30T17:08:25Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/docker/model-runner/security/advisories/GHSA-x2f5-332j-9xwq"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33990"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/docker/model-runner"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Docker Model Runner OCI Registry Client Vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)"
}

GHSA-X2MH-8FMC-RQGH

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-08-23 18:30 – Updated: 2025-02-13 19:11
VLAI
Summary
Apache Airflow denial of service vulnerability
Details

Apache Airflow, in versions prior to 2.7.0, contains a security vulnerability that can be exploited by an authenticated user possessing Connection edit privileges. This vulnerability allows the user to access connection information and exploit the test connection feature by sending many requests, leading to a denial of service (DoS) condition on the server. Furthermore, malicious actors can leverage this vulnerability to establish harmful connections with the server.

Users of Apache Airflow are strongly advised to upgrade to version 2.7.0 or newer to mitigate the risk associated with this vulnerability. Additionally, administrators are encouraged to review and adjust user permissions to restrict access to sensitive functionalities, reducing the attack surface.

Severity
8.1 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H
7.2 (High)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "apache-airflow"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.7.0b1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-37379"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-200",
      "CWE-400",
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2023-08-24T12:52:17Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-08-23T16:15:09Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Apache Airflow, in versions prior to 2.7.0, contains a security vulnerability that can be exploited by an authenticated user possessing Connection edit privileges. This vulnerability allows the user to access connection information and exploit the test connection feature by sending many requests, leading to a denial of service (DoS) condition on the server. Furthermore, malicious actors can leverage this vulnerability to establish harmful connections with the server.\n\nUsers of Apache Airflow are strongly advised to upgrade to version 2.7.0 or newer to mitigate the risk associated with this vulnerability. Additionally, administrators are encouraged to review and adjust user permissions to restrict access to sensitive functionalities, reducing the attack surface.",
  "id": "GHSA-x2mh-8fmc-rqgh",
  "modified": "2025-02-13T19:11:02Z",
  "published": "2023-08-23T18:30:34Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-37379"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/apache/airflow/pull/32052"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/apache/airflow/commit/e4c3ecf8ceaefa17525b495e4bcb5b2f41309603"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/apache/airflow"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/apache-airflow/PYSEC-2023-152.yaml"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread/g5c9vcn27lr14go48thrjpo6f4vw571r"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2023/08/23/4"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Apache Airflow denial of service vulnerability"
}

GHSA-X2QR-JHH4-F3VX

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-01-23 15:31 – Updated: 2026-01-26 21:30
VLAI
Details

Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in Prince Radio Player radio-player allows Server Side Request Forgery.This issue affects Radio Player: from n/a through <= 2.0.91.

Severity
5.3 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-24548"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-01-23T15:16:10Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in Prince Radio Player radio-player allows Server Side Request Forgery.This issue affects Radio Player: from n/a through \u003c= 2.0.91.",
  "id": "GHSA-x2qr-jhh4-f3vx",
  "modified": "2026-01-26T21:30:35Z",
  "published": "2026-01-23T15:31:36Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-24548"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://patchstack.com/database/Wordpress/Plugin/radio-player/vulnerability/wordpress-radio-player-plugin-2-0-91-server-side-request-forgery-ssrf-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-X2VJ-49JW-8JMG

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-02-02 00:30 – Updated: 2023-02-09 21:30
VLAI
Details

In dotCMS 5.x-22.06, TempFileAPI allows a user to create a temporary file based on a passed in URL, while attempting to block any SSRF access to local IP addresses or private subnets. In resolving this URL, the TempFileAPI follows any 302 redirects that the remote URL returns. Because there is no re-validation of the redirect URL, the TempFileAPI can be used to return data from those local/private hosts that should not be accessible remotely.

Severity
6.5 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-37033"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-02-01T22:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "In dotCMS 5.x-22.06, TempFileAPI allows a user to create a temporary file based on a passed in URL, while attempting to block any SSRF access to local IP addresses or private subnets. In resolving this URL, the TempFileAPI follows any 302 redirects that the remote URL returns. Because there is no re-validation of the redirect URL, the TempFileAPI can be used to return data from those local/private hosts that should not be accessible remotely.",
  "id": "GHSA-x2vj-49jw-8jmg",
  "modified": "2023-02-09T21:30:28Z",
  "published": "2023-02-02T00:30:16Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-37033"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.dotcms.com/security/SI-64"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-X2WV-W39C-7C55

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-20 15:31 – Updated: 2026-04-20 15:31
VLAI
Details

A vulnerability was determined in Qibo CMS 1.0. Affected by this issue is some unknown functionality of the file /index/image/headers. Executing a manipulation of the argument starts can lead to server-side request forgery. The attack can be launched remotely. The exploit has been publicly disclosed and may be utilized. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.

Severity
6.3 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L
2.1 (Low)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-6649"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-20T14:16:23Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "A vulnerability was determined in Qibo CMS 1.0. Affected by this issue is some unknown functionality of the file /index/image/headers. Executing a manipulation of the argument starts can lead to server-side request forgery. The attack can be launched remotely. The exploit has been publicly disclosed and may be utilized. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.",
  "id": "GHSA-x2wv-w39c-7c55",
  "modified": "2026-04-20T15:31:52Z",
  "published": "2026-04-20T15:31:52Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-6649"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://tcn60zf28jhk.feishu.cn/wiki/VYIcwwH4uiWZMgkX0SecopTgnQd?from=from_copylink"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/submit/793510"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/vuln/358283"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/vuln/358283/cti"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-X34H-5QGF-76HX

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-06-27 21:32 – Updated: 2024-06-27 21:32
VLAI
Details

stangirard/quivr version 0.0.236 contains a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability. The application does not provide sufficient controls when crawling a website, allowing an attacker to access applications on the local network. This vulnerability could allow a malicious user to gain access to internal servers, the AWS metadata endpoint, and capture Supabase data.

Severity
8.6 (High)
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-5885"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-06-27T19:15:17Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "stangirard/quivr version 0.0.236 contains a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability. The application does not provide sufficient controls when crawling a website, allowing an attacker to access applications on the local network. This vulnerability could allow a malicious user to gain access to internal servers, the AWS metadata endpoint, and capture Supabase data.",
  "id": "GHSA-x34h-5qgf-76hx",
  "modified": "2024-06-27T21:32:08Z",
  "published": "2024-06-27T21:32:08Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-5885"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://huntr.com/bounties/c178bf48-1d4a-4743-87ca-4cc8e475d274"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-X34J-WXQ8-7VCM

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 02:56 – Updated: 2023-08-03 22:13
VLAI
Summary
Umbraco CMS vulnerable to CSRF
Details

The Page_Load function in Umbraco.Web/umbraco.presentation/umbraco/dashboard/FeedProxy.aspx.cs in Umbraco before 7.4.0 allows remote attackers to conduct server-side request forgery (SSRF) attacks via the url parameter.

Severity
8.2 (High)
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:H/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "NuGet",
        "name": "Umbraco.CMS"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "7.4.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2015-8813"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2023-08-03T22:13:29Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2017-03-03T16:59:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "The `Page_Load` function in [Umbraco.Web/umbraco.presentation/umbraco/dashboard/FeedProxy.aspx.cs](https://github.com/umbraco/Umbraco-CMS/commit/924a016ffe7ae7ea6d516c07a7852f0095eddbce#diff-2899f01df84571577834f97a81637c65e20178ec6129b76c02f99789b23cf72e) in Umbraco before 7.4.0 allows remote attackers to conduct server-side request forgery (SSRF) attacks via the url parameter.",
  "id": "GHSA-x34j-wxq8-7vcm",
  "modified": "2023-08-03T22:13:29Z",
  "published": "2022-05-17T02:56:23Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-8813"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/umbraco/Umbraco-CMS/commit/924a016ffe7ae7ea6d516c07a7852f0095eddbce"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20230608160721/https://issues.umbraco.org/issue/U4-7457"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2016/02/16/10"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2016/02/17/1"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2016/02/17/5"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2016/02/18/8"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Umbraco CMS vulnerable to CSRF"
}

GHSA-X36R-4347-PM5X

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-29 14:28 – Updated: 2026-07-29 14:28
VLAI
Summary
swagger-typescript-api vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery via spec `$ref`
Details

Summary

swagger-typescript-api walks every $ref value in the input OpenAPI spec and, for any $ref whose target is an http(s):// URL, issues an HTTP GET to that URL during generation (warmUpRemoteSchemasCache). The only URL filter is a regex that matches ^https?:// — there is no private-IP allowlist, no DNS-rebinding protection, no redirect cap, and no same-origin check against the spec source. A malicious OpenAPI spec can therefore force the generator process to issue HTTP requests to arbitrary hosts and paths reachable from the generator's network, including 127.0.0.1, RFC-1918 ranges, internal hostnames, and the cloud instance-metadata endpoint at 169.254.169.254.

The attacker model is identical to the previously reported code-injection findings: a developer or CI pipeline that runs swagger-typescript-api generate against an attacker-controlled spec (remote URL, third-party / public OpenAPI registry, multi-tenant tenant input, or a spec file modified via PR).

Details

SwaggerSchemaResolver.fetchSwaggerSchemaFile (src/swagger-schema-resolver.ts:122) loads the entry-point spec. After it parses, ResolvedSwaggerSchema (src/resolved-swagger-schema.ts) calls warmUpRemoteSchemasCache which does a BFS over every external $ref:

// src/resolved-swagger-schema.ts:399-445
private async warmUpRemoteSchemasCache() {
  if (typeof this.config.url !== "string" || !this.isHttpUrl(this.config.url)) {
    return;
  }
  const visited = new Set<string>();
  const queue = [this.stripHash(this.config.url)];

  while (queue.length > 0) {
    const currentUrl = queue.shift();
    if (!currentUrl || visited.has(currentUrl)) continue;
    visited.add(currentUrl);

    if (this.externalSchemaCache.has(currentUrl)) continue;
    const schema = await this.fetchRemoteSchemaDocument(currentUrl);   // <-- HTTP GET
    if (!schema) continue;
    this.externalSchemaCache.set(currentUrl, schema);

    for (const ref of this.extractRefsFromSchema(schema)) {
      const normalizedRef = this.normalizeRef(ref);
      if (normalizedRef.startsWith("#")) continue;

      const [externalPath = ""] = normalizedRef.split("#");
      if (!externalPath) continue;

      const absoluteUrl = this.resolveAbsoluteUrl(externalPath, currentUrl);
      if (absoluteUrl && !visited.has(absoluteUrl)) {
        queue.push(absoluteUrl);                                       // <-- recurse
      }
    }
  }
}

The fetch itself:

// src/resolved-swagger-schema.ts:374
const response = await fetch(url, {
  headers: this.getRemoteRequestHeaders(),
});

…and the only URL-shape filter:

// src/resolved-swagger-schema.ts:75-78
private isHttpUrl(value: string): boolean {
  return /^https?:\/\//i.test(value);
}

There is no IP allowlist (no rejection of 127.x, 10.x, 172.16-31.x, 192.168.x, 169.254.x, IPv6 ::1 / fc00::/7, etc.), no DNS-rebinding mitigation (the URL is passed straight to Node's built-in fetch, which itself follows up to 20 redirects by default), and no check that the new URL shares an origin with the spec source. Any $ref value that survives isHttpUrl is fetched.

Because fetch is Node's undici-backed implementation, an external 302 redirect from an attacker's spec server to an internal URL ALSO succeeds — even if the maintainer later adds a private-IP filter to the spec string itself, redirect-based SSRF would still work without additional mitigation in the fetch options (redirect: "manual" or a custom dispatcher with a same-host check).

PoC

Self-contained reproducer in comments (install swagger-typescript-api@13.12.1 into a local node_modules, spin up two loopback HTTP servers — one serving the spec, one pretending to be an "internal" service — run the generator against each, observe the internal server's hit count). Tested on swagger-typescript-api@13.12.1 and Node v24.11.1.

Payload spec (served from http://127.0.0.1:<spec-port>/spec.json):

{
  "openapi": "3.0.0",
  "info": { "title": "SSRF-payload", "version": "1.0.0" },
  "paths": {
    "/p": {
      "get": {
        "operationId": "p",
        "responses": {
          "200": {
            "description": "OK",
            "content": {
              "application/json": {
                "schema": {
                  "$ref": "http://127.0.0.1:<internal-port>/INTERNAL_ONLY_PATH/secret.json"
                }
              }
            }
          }
        }
      }
    }
  }
}

Steps:

# 1. Start a loopback "internal" HTTP server that should not be reachable from a public spec.
# 2. Start a loopback "spec" HTTP server that serves the payload spec above.
# 3. Point the generator at the spec server.
npm install swagger-typescript-api@13.12.1
node -e "import('swagger-typescript-api').then(m => m.generateApi({
  output: '/tmp/out',
  url: 'http://127.0.0.1:<spec-port>/spec.json',
  httpClientType: 'fetch'
}))"

Observed (control vs payload):

[control] (no external $ref in spec) → internal-server hits: 0
[payload] ($ref → http://127.0.0.1:<internal-port>/...) → internal-server hits: 1
  hit: /INTERNAL_ONLY_PATH/secret.json  host=127.0.0.1:<internal-port>

The internal server received a GET /INTERNAL_ONLY_PATH/secret.json issued by the generator's warmUpRemoteSchemasCache while the developer was running swagger-typescript-api generate. The loopback target in the PoC stands in for any host reachable from the generator process — typical real-world targets include 169.254.169.254 (cloud IMDS), internal admin panels, intranet web apps, and corporate-VPN-only services.

Impact

Type: Server-Side Request Forgery (CWE-918) via unrestricted external-reference resolution in a code-generation tool.

Affected use cases:

  • A developer running sta generate --url https://attacker.example/openapi.json against an attacker-hosted spec.
  • A developer running the generator against any third-party or public OpenAPI spec they did not author (cached APIs on public schema registries, vendor / partner specs).
  • A CI/CD pipeline regenerating clients from a spec on every build.
  • A multi-tenant SaaS that generates per-tenant clients from tenant-supplied specs.
  • Any project where a contributor can modify the pinned spec via a pull request.

What an attacker can do with this:

  • Probe the generator's network reachability — enumerate which RFC-1918 hosts and internal services are alive based on timing and error states.
  • Hit cloud-provider instance metadata endpoints (http://169.254.169.254/...) on cloud-hosted CI runners. Even though the response body is not directly returned to the attacker, side effects (rate-limit, timing, error code reflected in logs) leak information.
  • Trigger side effects in internal services that have GET-mutating endpoints (rare but real).
  • Combine with the companion finding (Authorization-token forwarding to $ref URLs — filed separately) to escalate this from blind SSRF into direct credential exfiltration.

Lifecycle: generation-time. The fetch happens when the developer or CI pipeline runs swagger-typescript-api generate, not when the generated client is later imported.

Suggested fix:

Defense in depth at three layers, in priority order:

  1. Reject private / link-local / loopback addresses at the URL-validation layer. Resolve the URL's hostname, check the resulting IP against IPv4 ranges 127.0.0.0/8, 10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16, 169.254.0.0/16, 0.0.0.0/8, and IPv6 equivalents (::1, fc00::/7, fe80::/10, ::ffff:0:0/96). Re-resolve on every redirect to defeat DNS rebinding.
  2. Use a custom undici dispatcher with connect hook that re-checks the resolved IP at TCP-connect time — the only reliable way to defeat DNS rebinding in Node's built-in fetch.
  3. Set redirect: "manual" in the fetch options and validate each redirect URL through the same allowlist before following it.

If full SSRF mitigation is too invasive for a code-generation tool, at minimum surface the threat: log every external URL the generator is about to fetch (so a developer can grep for unexpected hosts in the output) and add an opt-out flag like --no-external-refs that disables warmUpRemoteSchemasCache entirely.

Submitted by: Hamza Haroon (thegr1ffyn)

Severity
6.1 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 13.12.1"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "swagger-typescript-api"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "13.12.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-54663"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-20",
      "CWE-441",
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-29T14:28:58Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\n`swagger-typescript-api` walks every `$ref` value in the input OpenAPI spec and, for any `$ref` whose target is an `http(s)://` URL, issues an HTTP GET to that URL during generation (`warmUpRemoteSchemasCache`). The only URL filter is a regex that matches `^https?://` \u2014 there is **no private-IP allowlist, no DNS-rebinding protection, no redirect cap, and no same-origin check against the spec source**. A malicious OpenAPI spec can therefore force the generator process to issue HTTP requests to arbitrary hosts and paths reachable from the generator\u0027s network, including `127.0.0.1`, RFC-1918 ranges, internal hostnames, and the cloud instance-metadata endpoint at `169.254.169.254`.\n\nThe attacker model is identical to the previously reported code-injection findings: a developer or CI pipeline that runs `swagger-typescript-api generate` against an attacker-controlled spec (remote URL, third-party / public OpenAPI registry, multi-tenant tenant input, or a spec file modified via PR).\n\n### Details\n\n`SwaggerSchemaResolver.fetchSwaggerSchemaFile` (`src/swagger-schema-resolver.ts:122`) loads the entry-point spec. After it parses, `ResolvedSwaggerSchema` (`src/resolved-swagger-schema.ts`) calls `warmUpRemoteSchemasCache` which does a BFS over every external `$ref`:\n\n```ts\n// src/resolved-swagger-schema.ts:399-445\nprivate async warmUpRemoteSchemasCache() {\n  if (typeof this.config.url !== \"string\" || !this.isHttpUrl(this.config.url)) {\n    return;\n  }\n  const visited = new Set\u003cstring\u003e();\n  const queue = [this.stripHash(this.config.url)];\n\n  while (queue.length \u003e 0) {\n    const currentUrl = queue.shift();\n    if (!currentUrl || visited.has(currentUrl)) continue;\n    visited.add(currentUrl);\n\n    if (this.externalSchemaCache.has(currentUrl)) continue;\n    const schema = await this.fetchRemoteSchemaDocument(currentUrl);   // \u003c-- HTTP GET\n    if (!schema) continue;\n    this.externalSchemaCache.set(currentUrl, schema);\n\n    for (const ref of this.extractRefsFromSchema(schema)) {\n      const normalizedRef = this.normalizeRef(ref);\n      if (normalizedRef.startsWith(\"#\")) continue;\n\n      const [externalPath = \"\"] = normalizedRef.split(\"#\");\n      if (!externalPath) continue;\n\n      const absoluteUrl = this.resolveAbsoluteUrl(externalPath, currentUrl);\n      if (absoluteUrl \u0026\u0026 !visited.has(absoluteUrl)) {\n        queue.push(absoluteUrl);                                       // \u003c-- recurse\n      }\n    }\n  }\n}\n```\n\nThe fetch itself:\n\n```ts\n// src/resolved-swagger-schema.ts:374\nconst response = await fetch(url, {\n  headers: this.getRemoteRequestHeaders(),\n});\n```\n\n\u2026and the only URL-shape filter:\n\n```ts\n// src/resolved-swagger-schema.ts:75-78\nprivate isHttpUrl(value: string): boolean {\n  return /^https?:\\/\\//i.test(value);\n}\n```\n\nThere is no IP allowlist (no rejection of `127.x`, `10.x`, `172.16-31.x`, `192.168.x`, `169.254.x`, IPv6 `::1` / fc00::/7, etc.), no DNS-rebinding mitigation (the URL is passed straight to Node\u0027s built-in `fetch`, which itself follows up to 20 redirects by default), and no check that the new URL shares an origin with the spec source. Any `$ref` value that survives `isHttpUrl` is fetched.\n\nBecause `fetch` is Node\u0027s undici-backed implementation, an external 302 redirect from an attacker\u0027s spec server to an internal URL ALSO succeeds \u2014 even if the maintainer later adds a private-IP filter to the spec string itself, redirect-based SSRF would still work without additional mitigation in the fetch options (`redirect: \"manual\"` or a custom dispatcher with a same-host check).\n\n### PoC\n\nSelf-contained reproducer in comments (install `swagger-typescript-api@13.12.1` into a local `node_modules`, spin up two loopback HTTP servers \u2014 one serving the spec, one pretending to be an \"internal\" service \u2014 run the generator against each, observe the internal server\u0027s hit count). Tested on `swagger-typescript-api@13.12.1` and Node `v24.11.1`.\n\n**Payload spec** (served from `http://127.0.0.1:\u003cspec-port\u003e/spec.json`):\n\n```json\n{\n  \"openapi\": \"3.0.0\",\n  \"info\": { \"title\": \"SSRF-payload\", \"version\": \"1.0.0\" },\n  \"paths\": {\n    \"/p\": {\n      \"get\": {\n        \"operationId\": \"p\",\n        \"responses\": {\n          \"200\": {\n            \"description\": \"OK\",\n            \"content\": {\n              \"application/json\": {\n                \"schema\": {\n                  \"$ref\": \"http://127.0.0.1:\u003cinternal-port\u003e/INTERNAL_ONLY_PATH/secret.json\"\n                }\n              }\n            }\n          }\n        }\n      }\n    }\n  }\n}\n```\n\n**Steps:**\n\n```bash\n# 1. Start a loopback \"internal\" HTTP server that should not be reachable from a public spec.\n# 2. Start a loopback \"spec\" HTTP server that serves the payload spec above.\n# 3. Point the generator at the spec server.\nnpm install swagger-typescript-api@13.12.1\nnode -e \"import(\u0027swagger-typescript-api\u0027).then(m =\u003e m.generateApi({\n  output: \u0027/tmp/out\u0027,\n  url: \u0027http://127.0.0.1:\u003cspec-port\u003e/spec.json\u0027,\n  httpClientType: \u0027fetch\u0027\n}))\"\n```\n\n**Observed (control vs payload):**\n\n```\n[control] (no external $ref in spec) \u2192 internal-server hits: 0\n[payload] ($ref \u2192 http://127.0.0.1:\u003cinternal-port\u003e/...) \u2192 internal-server hits: 1\n  hit: /INTERNAL_ONLY_PATH/secret.json  host=127.0.0.1:\u003cinternal-port\u003e\n```\n\nThe internal server received a `GET /INTERNAL_ONLY_PATH/secret.json` issued by the generator\u0027s `warmUpRemoteSchemasCache` while the developer was running `swagger-typescript-api generate`. The loopback target in the PoC stands in for any host reachable from the generator process \u2014 typical real-world targets include `169.254.169.254` (cloud IMDS), internal admin panels, intranet web apps, and corporate-VPN-only services.\n\n### Impact\n\n**Type:** Server-Side Request Forgery (CWE-918) via unrestricted external-reference resolution in a code-generation tool.\n\n**Affected use cases:**\n\n- A developer running `sta generate --url https://attacker.example/openapi.json` against an attacker-hosted spec.\n- A developer running the generator against any third-party or public OpenAPI spec they did not author (cached APIs on public schema registries, vendor / partner specs).\n- A CI/CD pipeline regenerating clients from a spec on every build.\n- A multi-tenant SaaS that generates per-tenant clients from tenant-supplied specs.\n- Any project where a contributor can modify the pinned spec via a pull request.\n\n**What an attacker can do with this:**\n\n- Probe the generator\u0027s network reachability \u2014 enumerate which RFC-1918 hosts and internal services are alive based on timing and error states.\n- Hit cloud-provider instance metadata endpoints (`http://169.254.169.254/...`) on cloud-hosted CI runners. Even though the response body is not directly returned to the attacker, side effects (rate-limit, timing, error code reflected in logs) leak information.\n- Trigger side effects in internal services that have GET-mutating endpoints (rare but real).\n- Combine with the companion finding (Authorization-token forwarding to `$ref` URLs \u2014 filed separately) to escalate this from blind SSRF into direct credential exfiltration.\n\n**Lifecycle:** generation-time. The fetch happens when the developer or CI pipeline runs `swagger-typescript-api generate`, not when the generated client is later imported.\n\n**Suggested fix:**\n\nDefense in depth at three layers, in priority order:\n\n1. **Reject private / link-local / loopback addresses at the URL-validation layer.** Resolve the URL\u0027s hostname, check the resulting IP against IPv4 ranges `127.0.0.0/8`, `10.0.0.0/8`, `172.16.0.0/12`, `192.168.0.0/16`, `169.254.0.0/16`, `0.0.0.0/8`, and IPv6 equivalents (`::1`, `fc00::/7`, `fe80::/10`, `::ffff:0:0/96`). Re-resolve on every redirect to defeat DNS rebinding.\n2. **Use a custom undici dispatcher with `connect` hook that re-checks the resolved IP at TCP-connect time** \u2014 the only reliable way to defeat DNS rebinding in Node\u0027s built-in `fetch`.\n3. **Set `redirect: \"manual\"` in the `fetch` options** and validate each redirect URL through the same allowlist before following it.\n\nIf full SSRF mitigation is too invasive for a code-generation tool, at minimum surface the threat: log every external URL the generator is about to fetch (so a developer can `grep` for unexpected hosts in the output) and add an opt-out flag like `--no-external-refs` that disables `warmUpRemoteSchemasCache` entirely.\n\nSubmitted by: Hamza Haroon (thegr1ffyn)",
  "id": "GHSA-x36r-4347-pm5x",
  "modified": "2026-07-29T14:28:58Z",
  "published": "2026-07-29T14:28:58Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/acacode/swagger-typescript-api/security/advisories/GHSA-x36r-4347-pm5x"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/acacode/swagger-typescript-api/pull/1779"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/acacode/swagger-typescript-api/commit/306d59acb8ffbb00f953f807b97234b21f51d9de"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/acacode/swagger-typescript-api"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/acacode/swagger-typescript-api/releases/tag/v13.12.2"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "swagger-typescript-api vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery via spec `$ref`"
}

GHSA-X373-32XC-7GQV

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-11 09:32 – Updated: 2026-08-11 09:32
VLAI
Details

Affected versions of cti-transmute contain an SSRF vulnerability in the /fetch_misp_event and /misp_search_events endpoints.

The URL validation routine checked whether a supplied hostname was itself an IP literal and rejected private, loopback, link-local, or reserved IPs. However, ordinary domain names were accepted without resolving them first. An attacker could therefore use a hostname whose DNS record pointed to an internal address and cause the cti-transmute server to issue requests into its internal network. The commit explicitly states that anonymous callers could make the server request the internal target and read the response.

The fix resolves hostnames using socket.getaddrinfo(), checks that every resolved address is globally routable, and additionally places @login_required on both affected MISP fetch/search routes.

Severity
8.7 (High)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:N/SA:N
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-73160"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-11T09:17:15Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Affected versions of cti-transmute contain an SSRF vulnerability in the /fetch_misp_event and /misp_search_events endpoints.\n\n\nThe URL validation routine checked whether a supplied hostname was itself an IP literal and rejected private, loopback, link-local, or reserved IPs. However, ordinary domain names were accepted without resolving them first. An attacker could therefore use a hostname whose DNS record pointed to an internal address and cause the cti-transmute server to issue requests into its internal network. The commit explicitly states that anonymous callers could make the server request the internal target and read the response.\n\n\nThe fix resolves hostnames using socket.getaddrinfo(), checks that every resolved address is globally routable, and additionally places @login_required on both affected MISP fetch/search routes.",
  "id": "GHSA-x373-32xc-7gqv",
  "modified": "2026-08-11T09:32:35Z",
  "published": "2026-08-11T09:32:35Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-73160"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MISP/cti-transmute/commit/4d29109a6f185d5e7c7f3b906f822ab34403f512"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

No mitigation information available for this CWE.

CAPEC-664: Server Side Request Forgery

An adversary exploits improper input validation by submitting maliciously crafted input to a target application running on a server, with the goal of forcing the server to make a request either to itself, to web services running in the server’s internal network, or to external third parties. If successful, the adversary’s request will be made with the server’s privilege level, bypassing its authentication controls. This ultimately allows the adversary to access sensitive data, execute commands on the server’s network, and make external requests with the stolen identity of the server. Server Side Request Forgery attacks differ from Cross Site Request Forgery attacks in that they target the server itself, whereas CSRF attacks exploit an insecure user authentication mechanism to perform unauthorized actions on the user's behalf.

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