Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-918

Allowed

Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)

Abstraction: Base · Status: Incomplete

API response cwe.mitre.org

The web server receives a URL or similar request from an upstream component and retrieves the contents of this URL, but it does not sufficiently ensure that the request is being sent to the expected destination.

4641 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-R245-6W67-CJXX

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-11-09 09:30 – Updated: 2026-04-01 18:32
VLAI
Details

Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in I Thirteen Web Solution Responsive Filterable Portfolio allows Server Side Request Forgery.This issue affects Responsive Filterable Portfolio: from n/a through 1.0.22.

Severity
4.4 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-51785"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-11-09T09:15:06Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in I Thirteen Web Solution Responsive Filterable Portfolio allows Server Side Request Forgery.This issue affects Responsive Filterable Portfolio: from n/a through 1.0.22.",
  "id": "GHSA-r245-6w67-cjxx",
  "modified": "2026-04-01T18:32:18Z",
  "published": "2024-11-09T09:30:30Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-51785"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://patchstack.com/database/Wordpress/Plugin/responsive-filterable-portfolio/vulnerability/wordpress-responsive-filterable-portfolio-plugin-1-0-22-server-side-request-forgery-ssrf-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://patchstack.com/database/vulnerability/responsive-filterable-portfolio/wordpress-responsive-filterable-portfolio-plugin-1-0-22-server-side-request-forgery-ssrf-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-R29W-R9PH-VM76

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-10-25 19:00 – Updated: 2022-10-31 15:41
VLAI
Summary
Apache XML Graphics Batik vulnerable to code execution via SVG.
Details

A vulnerability in Batik of Apache XML Graphics allows an attacker to run untrusted Java code from an SVG. This issue affects Apache XML Graphics prior to 1.16. It is recommended to update to version 1.16.

Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.apache.xmlgraphics:batik"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.16"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-41704"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2022-10-25T23:10:27Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-10-25T17:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "A vulnerability in Batik of Apache XML Graphics allows an attacker to run untrusted Java code from an SVG. This issue affects Apache XML Graphics prior to 1.16. It is recommended to update to version 1.16.",
  "id": "GHSA-r29w-r9ph-vm76",
  "modified": "2022-10-31T15:41:18Z",
  "published": "2022-10-25T19:00:29Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-41704"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/apache/xmlgraphics-batik/commit/905f368b50c2567cf2c4869a0ab596a7b1b5125c"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/BATIK-1338"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread/hplhx0o74jb7blj39fm4kw3otcnjd6xf"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2022/10/msg00038.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/202401-11"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.debian.org/security/2022/dsa-5264"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://xmlgraphics.apache.org/security.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/xmlgraphics/batik/trunk"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2022/10/25/2"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Apache XML Graphics Batik vulnerable to code execution via SVG."
}

GHSA-R2CC-Q3JW-4VHV

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 19:17 – Updated: 2022-05-24 19:17
VLAI
Details

Releases prior to VMware vRealize Operations 8.6 contain a Server Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability.

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-22033"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2021-10-13T16:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Releases prior to VMware vRealize Operations 8.6 contain a Server Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability.",
  "id": "GHSA-r2cc-q3jw-4vhv",
  "modified": "2022-05-24T19:17:24Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T19:17:24Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-22033"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vmware.com/security/advisories/VMSA-2021-0021.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}

GHSA-R2CX-CPFX-9H63

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-02 21:32 – Updated: 2026-07-02 21:32
VLAI
Details

LobeChat before 2.2.10-canary.18 contains a server-side request forgery vulnerability that allows authenticated attackers to direct internal HTTP requests to arbitrary URLs by supplying user-controlled input to the skill import service (importFromUrl) and topic cover update (fetchImageFromUrl) endpoints, which use the global fetch without the project's ssrf-safe-fetch wrapper. Attackers can target internal addresses such as cloud instance metadata endpoints through these unprotected code paths to disclose internal service responses and cloud credentials.

Severity
7.7 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N
8.3 (High)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-59095"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-02T20:17:07Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "LobeChat before 2.2.10-canary.18 contains a server-side request forgery vulnerability that allows authenticated attackers to direct internal HTTP requests to arbitrary URLs by supplying user-controlled input to the skill import service (importFromUrl) and topic cover update (fetchImageFromUrl) endpoints, which use the global fetch without the project\u0027s ssrf-safe-fetch wrapper. Attackers can target internal addresses such as cloud instance metadata endpoints through these unprotected code paths to disclose internal service responses and cloud credentials.",
  "id": "GHSA-r2cx-cpfx-9h63",
  "modified": "2026-07-02T21:32:14Z",
  "published": "2026-07-02T21:32:14Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-59095"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/lobehub/lobehub/issues/16536"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/lobehub/lobehub/pull/16601"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/lobechat-canary-18-ssrf-via-importfromurl-and-fetchimagefromurl"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-R2HM-J6R3-88Q2

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-11-25 18:32 – Updated: 2025-11-25 18:32
VLAI
Details

NVIDIA NeMo Agent Toolkit UI for Web contains a vulnerability in the chat API endpoint where an attacker may cause a Server-Side Request Forgery. A successful exploit of this vulnerability may lead to information disclosure and denial of service.

Severity
7.6 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:L
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-33203"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-11-25T18:15:52Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "NVIDIA NeMo Agent Toolkit UI for Web contains a vulnerability in the chat API endpoint where an attacker may cause a Server-Side Request Forgery. A successful exploit of this vulnerability may lead to information disclosure and denial of service.",
  "id": "GHSA-r2hm-j6r3-88q2",
  "modified": "2025-11-25T18:32:23Z",
  "published": "2025-11-25T18:32:23Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-33203"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://nvidia.custhelp.com/app/answers/detail/a_id/5726"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2025-33203"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-R2JQ-4H3X-RFJ6

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-28 06:30 – Updated: 2026-05-06 19:44
VLAI
Summary
BigSweetPotatoStudio HyperChat has a Server-Side Request Forgery issue
Details

A vulnerability was identified in BigSweetPotatoStudio HyperChat up to 2.0.0-alpha.63. Affected by this issue is the function fetch of the file packages/core/src/http/aiProxyMiddleware.mts of the component AI Proxy Middleware. Such manipulation of the argument baseurl leads to server-side request forgery. The attack can be launched remotely. The exploit is publicly available and might be used. The project was informed of the problem early through an issue report but has not responded yet.

Severity
7.3 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L
5.5 (Medium)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@dadigua/hyperchat"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "2.0.0-alpha.63"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-7223"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-06T19:44:30Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-28T04:16:29Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "A vulnerability was identified in BigSweetPotatoStudio HyperChat up to 2.0.0-alpha.63. Affected by this issue is the function fetch of the file packages/core/src/http/aiProxyMiddleware.mts of the component AI Proxy Middleware. Such manipulation of the argument baseurl leads to server-side request forgery. The attack can be launched remotely. The exploit is publicly available and might be used. The project was informed of the problem early through an issue report but has not responded yet.",
  "id": "GHSA-r2jq-4h3x-rfj6",
  "modified": "2026-05-06T19:44:30Z",
  "published": "2026-04-28T06:30:29Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-7223"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/BigSweetPotatoStudio/HyperChat/issues/142"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/BigSweetPotatoStudio/HyperChat"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/submit/802265"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/vuln/359823"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/vuln/359823/cti"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "BigSweetPotatoStudio HyperChat has a Server-Side Request Forgery issue"
}

GHSA-R2VM-3VM4-94JG

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 16:54 – Updated: 2024-04-04 01:45
VLAI
Details

The nelio-ab-testing plugin before 4.5.9 for WordPress has SSRF in ajax/iesupport.php.

Severity
10.0 (Critical)
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2016-10926"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2019-08-22T14:15:00Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "The nelio-ab-testing plugin before 4.5.9 for WordPress has SSRF in ajax/iesupport.php.",
  "id": "GHSA-r2vm-3vm4-94jg",
  "modified": "2024-04-04T01:45:37Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T16:54:30Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-10926"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://wordpress.org/plugins/nelio-ab-testing/#developers"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-R2WG-2MCR-66RV

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-17 17:55 – Updated: 2026-07-15 21:51
VLAI
Summary
Open WebUI: Path traversal / SSRF in terminal server proxy via encoded path traversal
Details

Summary

The terminal-server reverse proxy in backend/open_webui/routers/terminals.py does not fully confine the user-controlled path segment before forwarding it to an admin-configured terminal server. An authenticated user who has been granted access to a terminal server can craft path values containing encoded ../ traversal sequences that escape the intended path (or policy) scope on that server, reaching unintended endpoints and files on the terminal-server host. Where the terminal server fans requests out to internal services, this also gives SSRF-style reach into those services.

This is a separate code path from the /api/v1/retrieval/process/web SSRF (GHSA-c6xv-rcvw-v685), with its own input. Two distinct vectors are consolidated here:

  1. Raw path forwarding / single-encoded traversal (original report).
  2. A bypass of the subsequently-added _sanitize_proxy_path mitigation using double-encoded dots (%252e%252e).

The attacker-controlled input is the request path, supplied by the non-admin user, not anything an administrator configures, so this is not an admin-trust / Rule-9 situation.

Affected code

The proxy route forwards an arbitrary trailing path to the configured terminal server:

# routers/terminals.py
@router.api_route('/{server_id}/{path:path}', methods=PROXY_METHODS)
async def proxy_terminal(server_id, path, request, user=Depends(get_verified_user)):
    ...
    safe_path = _sanitize_proxy_path(path)
    if safe_path is None:
        return JSONResponse({'error': 'Invalid path'}, status_code=400)
    target_url = f'{base_url}/{safe_path}'
    policy_id = connection.get('policy_id')
    if policy_id:
        target_url = f'{base_url}/p/{policy_id}/{safe_path}'

Access requires has_connection_access(user, connection, ...), i.e. a non-admin user the administrator has granted to that terminal server.

Vector 1 — single-encoded traversal (original)

The path was originally concatenated to the base URL with no sanitization (target_url = f"{base_url}/{path}"), so single-encoded traversal escaped the intended scope:

GET /api/v1/terminals/server1/..%2F..%2F..%2Finternal-api/secrets
# proxied to: {base_url}/../../../internal-api/secrets

This vector is closed at HEAD: _sanitize_proxy_path now URL-decodes once, runs posixpath.normpath, strips leading slashes, and rejects results beginning with .. (unquote('..%2F..%2F') -> '../../' -> normpath -> '../..' -> rejected).

Vector 2 — double-encoded bypass of _sanitize_proxy_path

_sanitize_proxy_path decodes the path only once before the .. check, so a double-encoded payload survives:

def _sanitize_proxy_path(path: str) -> str | None:
    decoded = unquote(path)                 # single decode pass only
    normalized = posixpath.normpath(decoded)
    cleaned = normalized.lstrip('/')
    if cleaned.startswith('..') or cleaned == '.':
        return None
    ...

unquote('%252e%252e/secret') yields %2e%2e/secret (not ..), which normpath leaves unchanged and which does not start with .., so it passes the check. The proxy then forwards {base_url}/%2e%2e/secret, and the upstream terminal server decodes %2e%2e into .. and resolves the traversal the check was meant to prevent.

GET /api/v1/terminals/server1/%252e%252e/%252e%252e/sensitive-file
# passes _sanitize_proxy_path as %2e%2e/%2e%2e/sensitive-file
# upstream decodes -> ../../sensitive-file

The policy_id form ({base_url}/p/{policy_id}/{safe_path}) is the higher-impact target: traversal escapes the policy namespace and reaches other policies or the terminal-server root.

Impact

An authenticated user with access to a terminal server can escape the intended path/policy scope on that server, reaching unintended endpoints and files, and, where the terminal server routes onward to internal services, reach those services. CWE-22 (Path Traversal) and CWE-918 (SSRF).

Fix

Decode the proxy path until it is stable before normalising and checking, so no depth of encoding can smuggle a traversal sequence past the check to be re-decoded upstream:

decoded = path
for _ in range(8):
    once = unquote(decoded)
    if once == decoded:
        break
    decoded = once
normalized = posixpath.normpath(decoded)
cleaned = normalized.lstrip('/')
if cleaned.startswith('..') or cleaned == '.':
    return None

This rejects %2e%2e, %252e%252e, %25252e%25252e, ..%2f..%2f, etc., while leaving legitimate paths (including singly-encoded characters such as %20) intact.

Credits

  • Tulgaaaaaaaa — original report (terminal-proxy path SSRF / single-encoded traversal).
  • sermikr0 — double-encoded (%252e%252e) bypass of the _sanitize_proxy_path mitigation.
Severity
7.7 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.9.5"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "open-webui"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.9.6"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-54017"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22",
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-17T17:55:28Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-18T22:16:32Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nThe terminal-server reverse proxy in `backend/open_webui/routers/terminals.py` does not fully confine the user-controlled `path` segment before forwarding it to an admin-configured terminal server. An authenticated user who has been granted access to a terminal server can craft `path` values containing encoded `../` traversal sequences that escape the intended path (or policy) scope on that server, reaching unintended endpoints and files on the terminal-server host. Where the terminal server fans requests out to internal services, this also gives SSRF-style reach into those services.\n\nThis is a separate code path from the `/api/v1/retrieval/process/web` SSRF (GHSA-c6xv-rcvw-v685), with its own input. Two distinct vectors are consolidated here:\n\n1. Raw path forwarding / single-encoded traversal (original report).\n2. A bypass of the subsequently-added `_sanitize_proxy_path` mitigation using double-encoded dots (`%252e%252e`).\n\nThe attacker-controlled input is the request `path`, supplied by the non-admin user, not anything an administrator configures, so this is not an admin-trust / Rule-9 situation.\n\n### Affected code\n\nThe proxy route forwards an arbitrary trailing path to the configured terminal server:\n\n```python\n# routers/terminals.py\n@router.api_route(\u0027/{server_id}/{path:path}\u0027, methods=PROXY_METHODS)\nasync def proxy_terminal(server_id, path, request, user=Depends(get_verified_user)):\n    ...\n    safe_path = _sanitize_proxy_path(path)\n    if safe_path is None:\n        return JSONResponse({\u0027error\u0027: \u0027Invalid path\u0027}, status_code=400)\n    target_url = f\u0027{base_url}/{safe_path}\u0027\n    policy_id = connection.get(\u0027policy_id\u0027)\n    if policy_id:\n        target_url = f\u0027{base_url}/p/{policy_id}/{safe_path}\u0027\n```\n\nAccess requires `has_connection_access(user, connection, ...)`, i.e. a non-admin user the administrator has granted to that terminal server.\n\n### Vector 1 \u2014 single-encoded traversal (original)\n\nThe path was originally concatenated to the base URL with no sanitization (`target_url = f\"{base_url}/{path}\"`), so single-encoded traversal escaped the intended scope:\n\n```\nGET /api/v1/terminals/server1/..%2F..%2F..%2Finternal-api/secrets\n# proxied to: {base_url}/../../../internal-api/secrets\n```\n\nThis vector is closed at HEAD: `_sanitize_proxy_path` now URL-decodes once, runs `posixpath.normpath`, strips leading slashes, and rejects results beginning with `..` (`unquote(\u0027..%2F..%2F\u0027) -\u003e \u0027../../\u0027 -\u003e normpath -\u003e \u0027../..\u0027` -\u003e rejected).\n\n### Vector 2 \u2014 double-encoded bypass of `_sanitize_proxy_path`\n\n`_sanitize_proxy_path` decodes the path only once before the `..` check, so a double-encoded payload survives:\n\n```python\ndef _sanitize_proxy_path(path: str) -\u003e str | None:\n    decoded = unquote(path)                 # single decode pass only\n    normalized = posixpath.normpath(decoded)\n    cleaned = normalized.lstrip(\u0027/\u0027)\n    if cleaned.startswith(\u0027..\u0027) or cleaned == \u0027.\u0027:\n        return None\n    ...\n```\n\n`unquote(\u0027%252e%252e/secret\u0027)` yields `%2e%2e/secret` (not `..`), which `normpath` leaves unchanged and which does not start with `..`, so it passes the check. The proxy then forwards `{base_url}/%2e%2e/secret`, and the upstream terminal server decodes `%2e%2e` into `..` and resolves the traversal the check was meant to prevent.\n\n```\nGET /api/v1/terminals/server1/%252e%252e/%252e%252e/sensitive-file\n# passes _sanitize_proxy_path as %2e%2e/%2e%2e/sensitive-file\n# upstream decodes -\u003e ../../sensitive-file\n```\n\nThe `policy_id` form (`{base_url}/p/{policy_id}/{safe_path}`) is the higher-impact target: traversal escapes the policy namespace and reaches other policies or the terminal-server root.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn authenticated user with access to a terminal server can escape the intended path/policy scope on that server, reaching unintended endpoints and files, and, where the terminal server routes onward to internal services, reach those services. CWE-22 (Path Traversal) and CWE-918 (SSRF).\n\n### Fix\n\nDecode the proxy path until it is stable before normalising and checking, so no depth of encoding can smuggle a traversal sequence past the check to be re-decoded upstream:\n\n```python\ndecoded = path\nfor _ in range(8):\n    once = unquote(decoded)\n    if once == decoded:\n        break\n    decoded = once\nnormalized = posixpath.normpath(decoded)\ncleaned = normalized.lstrip(\u0027/\u0027)\nif cleaned.startswith(\u0027..\u0027) or cleaned == \u0027.\u0027:\n    return None\n```\n\nThis rejects `%2e%2e`, `%252e%252e`, `%25252e%25252e`, `..%2f..%2f`, etc., while leaving legitimate paths (including singly-encoded characters such as `%20`) intact.\n\n### Credits\n\n- **Tulgaaaaaaaa** \u2014 original report (terminal-proxy path SSRF / single-encoded traversal).\n- **sermikr0** \u2014 double-encoded (`%252e%252e`) bypass of the `_sanitize_proxy_path` mitigation.",
  "id": "GHSA-r2wg-2mcr-66rv",
  "modified": "2026-07-15T21:51:33Z",
  "published": "2026-06-17T17:55:28Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/security/advisories/GHSA-r2wg-2mcr-66rv"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-54017"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/open-webui/PYSEC-2026-2751.yaml"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://pypi.org/project/open-webui"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Open WebUI: Path traversal / SSRF in terminal server proxy via encoded path traversal"
}

GHSA-R2X7-427F-RQ69

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-10 19:49 – Updated: 2026-04-10 19:49
VLAI
Summary
Ech0 has SSRF via DNS Resolution Bypass in Webhook URL Validation
Details

Summary

The validateWebhookURL function in webhook_setting_service.go attempts to block webhooks targeting private/internal IP addresses, but only checks literal IP strings via net.ParseIP(). Hostnames that DNS-resolve to private IPs (e.g., 169.254.169.254.nip.io, 10.0.0.1.nip.io) bypass all checks, allowing an admin to create webhooks that make server-side requests to internal network services and cloud metadata endpoints.

Details

The vulnerability is in validateWebhookURL (internal/service/setting/webhook_setting_service.go:180-199):

func validateWebhookURL(rawURL string) error {
    parsed, err := url.Parse(rawURL)
    // ...
    host := strings.ToLower(parsed.Hostname())
    if host == "" || host == "localhost" || strings.HasSuffix(host, ".local") {
        return errors.New(commonModel.INVALID_WEBHOOK_URL)
    }
    if ip := net.ParseIP(host); ip != nil {  // <-- returns nil for hostnames
        if ip.IsLoopback() || ip.IsPrivate() || ip.IsLinkLocalMulticast() ||
            ip.IsLinkLocalUnicast() || ip.IsUnspecified() {
            return errors.New(commonModel.INVALID_WEBHOOK_URL)
        }
    }
    return nil  // hostname passes all checks unchecked
}

net.ParseIP("169.254.169.254.nip.io") returns nil because it is not a literal IP address. The entire private IP check block is skipped, and the function returns nil (valid).

Both HTTP clients that execute webhook requests use standard http.Client / http.Transport with no custom DialContext to verify resolved IPs:

  • TestWebhook (webhook_setting_service.go:169): &http.Client{Timeout: 5 * time.Second}
  • Dispatcher (dispatcher.go:51-58): &http.Client{...Transport: &http.Transport{...}} — no custom dialer

The Dispatcher.HandleObservation (dispatcher.go:67-81) iterates all active webhooks and dispatches without re-validating URLs, so a stored malicious webhook triggers SSRF on every application event.

Execution flow: 1. Admin calls POST /api/webhook with URL http://169.254.169.254.nip.io/latest/meta-data/ 2. CreateWebhook → validateWebhookURL → net.ParseIP returns nil → passes validation 3. Webhook stored in database with is_active: true 4. On any echo event → Dispatcher.HandleObservation → Dispatch → SendWithRetry → DNS resolves 169.254.169.254.nip.io to 169.254.169.254 → POST to cloud metadata endpoint

PoC

# Step 1: Create a webhook targeting cloud metadata via DNS rebinding
curl -X POST http://localhost:8080/api/webhook \
  -H 'Authorization: Bearer <admin-jwt>' \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{"name":"ssrf-probe","url":"http://169.254.169.254.nip.io/latest/meta-data/","secret":"","is_active":true}'

# Step 2: Trigger SSRF via test endpoint
curl -X POST http://localhost:8080/api/webhook/<webhook-id>/test \
  -H 'Authorization: Bearer <admin-jwt>'

# The server makes an HTTP POST to 169.254.169.254 (AWS metadata).
# net.ParseIP("169.254.169.254.nip.io") returns nil, skipping all IP checks.
# Delivery status and error messages reveal connectivity information.

# For internal network scanning:
# http://10.0.0.1.nip.io:8080/
# http://127.0.0.1.nip.io:6379/

# With is_active:true, every application event automatically dispatches
# to the SSRF target via Dispatcher.HandleObservation (no re-validation).

Impact

  • Cloud metadata access: An admin can reach cloud instance metadata endpoints (AWS 169.254.169.254, GCP, Azure) to steal IAM credentials, instance identity tokens, and configuration data.
  • Internal network probing: Webhooks can scan internal services by observing delivery status (success/failed) and error messages, mapping internal network topology.
  • Persistent SSRF: Active webhooks fire on every application event via the Dispatcher, creating ongoing SSRF without further admin interaction.
  • Scope escalation: Impact escapes the application's security boundary to affect internal infrastructure, despite the application explicitly attempting to prevent this.

Recommended Fix

Replace the hostname-only check with a custom net.Dialer that resolves DNS and validates the resolved IP before connecting. Apply this to both HTTP clients:

import "net"

func safeDialContext(ctx context.Context, network, addr string) (net.Conn, error) {
    host, port, err := net.SplitHostPort(addr)
    if err != nil {
        return nil, err
    }
    ips, err := net.DefaultResolver.LookupIPAddr(ctx, host)
    if err != nil {
        return nil, err
    }
    for _, ip := range ips {
        if ip.IP.IsLoopback() || ip.IP.IsPrivate() || ip.IP.IsLinkLocalUnicast() ||
            ip.IP.IsLinkLocalMulticast() || ip.IP.IsUnspecified() {
            return nil, fmt.Errorf("resolved IP %s is not allowed", ip.IP)
        }
    }
    dialer := &net.Dialer{Timeout: 5 * time.Second}
    return dialer.DialContext(ctx, network, addr)
}

// Use in both TestWebhook and Dispatcher:
client := &http.Client{
    Timeout: 5 * time.Second,
    Transport: &http.Transport{
        DialContext: safeDialContext,
    },
}

This ensures resolved IPs are checked against the private range blocklist regardless of hostname used.

Severity
5.5 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/lin-snow/ech0"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.4.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-10T19:49:48Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThe `validateWebhookURL` function in `webhook_setting_service.go` attempts to block webhooks targeting private/internal IP addresses, but only checks literal IP strings via `net.ParseIP()`. Hostnames that DNS-resolve to private IPs (e.g., `169.254.169.254.nip.io`, `10.0.0.1.nip.io`) bypass all checks, allowing an admin to create webhooks that make server-side requests to internal network services and cloud metadata endpoints.\n\n## Details\n\nThe vulnerability is in `validateWebhookURL` (`internal/service/setting/webhook_setting_service.go:180-199`):\n\n```go\nfunc validateWebhookURL(rawURL string) error {\n    parsed, err := url.Parse(rawURL)\n    // ...\n    host := strings.ToLower(parsed.Hostname())\n    if host == \"\" || host == \"localhost\" || strings.HasSuffix(host, \".local\") {\n        return errors.New(commonModel.INVALID_WEBHOOK_URL)\n    }\n    if ip := net.ParseIP(host); ip != nil {  // \u003c-- returns nil for hostnames\n        if ip.IsLoopback() || ip.IsPrivate() || ip.IsLinkLocalMulticast() ||\n            ip.IsLinkLocalUnicast() || ip.IsUnspecified() {\n            return errors.New(commonModel.INVALID_WEBHOOK_URL)\n        }\n    }\n    return nil  // hostname passes all checks unchecked\n}\n```\n\n`net.ParseIP(\"169.254.169.254.nip.io\")` returns `nil` because it is not a literal IP address. The entire private IP check block is skipped, and the function returns `nil` (valid).\n\nBoth HTTP clients that execute webhook requests use standard `http.Client` / `http.Transport` with no custom `DialContext` to verify resolved IPs:\n\n- **TestWebhook** (`webhook_setting_service.go:169`): `\u0026http.Client{Timeout: 5 * time.Second}`\n- **Dispatcher** (`dispatcher.go:51-58`): `\u0026http.Client{...Transport: \u0026http.Transport{...}}` \u2014 no custom dialer\n\nThe `Dispatcher.HandleObservation` (`dispatcher.go:67-81`) iterates all active webhooks and dispatches without re-validating URLs, so a stored malicious webhook triggers SSRF on every application event.\n\n**Execution flow:**\n1. Admin calls POST `/api/webhook` with URL `http://169.254.169.254.nip.io/latest/meta-data/`\n2. `CreateWebhook` \u2192 `validateWebhookURL` \u2192 `net.ParseIP` returns nil \u2192 passes validation\n3. Webhook stored in database with `is_active: true`\n4. On any echo event \u2192 `Dispatcher.HandleObservation` \u2192 `Dispatch` \u2192 `SendWithRetry` \u2192 DNS resolves `169.254.169.254.nip.io` to `169.254.169.254` \u2192 POST to cloud metadata endpoint\n\n## PoC\n\n```bash\n# Step 1: Create a webhook targeting cloud metadata via DNS rebinding\ncurl -X POST http://localhost:8080/api/webhook \\\n  -H \u0027Authorization: Bearer \u003cadmin-jwt\u003e\u0027 \\\n  -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n  -d \u0027{\"name\":\"ssrf-probe\",\"url\":\"http://169.254.169.254.nip.io/latest/meta-data/\",\"secret\":\"\",\"is_active\":true}\u0027\n\n# Step 2: Trigger SSRF via test endpoint\ncurl -X POST http://localhost:8080/api/webhook/\u003cwebhook-id\u003e/test \\\n  -H \u0027Authorization: Bearer \u003cadmin-jwt\u003e\u0027\n\n# The server makes an HTTP POST to 169.254.169.254 (AWS metadata).\n# net.ParseIP(\"169.254.169.254.nip.io\") returns nil, skipping all IP checks.\n# Delivery status and error messages reveal connectivity information.\n\n# For internal network scanning:\n# http://10.0.0.1.nip.io:8080/\n# http://127.0.0.1.nip.io:6379/\n\n# With is_active:true, every application event automatically dispatches\n# to the SSRF target via Dispatcher.HandleObservation (no re-validation).\n```\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Cloud metadata access:** An admin can reach cloud instance metadata endpoints (AWS `169.254.169.254`, GCP, Azure) to steal IAM credentials, instance identity tokens, and configuration data.\n- **Internal network probing:** Webhooks can scan internal services by observing delivery status (`success`/`failed`) and error messages, mapping internal network topology.\n- **Persistent SSRF:** Active webhooks fire on every application event via the Dispatcher, creating ongoing SSRF without further admin interaction.\n- **Scope escalation:** Impact escapes the application\u0027s security boundary to affect internal infrastructure, despite the application explicitly attempting to prevent this.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nReplace the hostname-only check with a custom `net.Dialer` that resolves DNS and validates the resolved IP before connecting. Apply this to both HTTP clients:\n\n```go\nimport \"net\"\n\nfunc safeDialContext(ctx context.Context, network, addr string) (net.Conn, error) {\n    host, port, err := net.SplitHostPort(addr)\n    if err != nil {\n        return nil, err\n    }\n    ips, err := net.DefaultResolver.LookupIPAddr(ctx, host)\n    if err != nil {\n        return nil, err\n    }\n    for _, ip := range ips {\n        if ip.IP.IsLoopback() || ip.IP.IsPrivate() || ip.IP.IsLinkLocalUnicast() ||\n            ip.IP.IsLinkLocalMulticast() || ip.IP.IsUnspecified() {\n            return nil, fmt.Errorf(\"resolved IP %s is not allowed\", ip.IP)\n        }\n    }\n    dialer := \u0026net.Dialer{Timeout: 5 * time.Second}\n    return dialer.DialContext(ctx, network, addr)\n}\n\n// Use in both TestWebhook and Dispatcher:\nclient := \u0026http.Client{\n    Timeout: 5 * time.Second,\n    Transport: \u0026http.Transport{\n        DialContext: safeDialContext,\n    },\n}\n```\n\nThis ensures resolved IPs are checked against the private range blocklist regardless of hostname used.",
  "id": "GHSA-r2x7-427f-rq69",
  "modified": "2026-04-10T19:49:49Z",
  "published": "2026-04-10T19:49:48Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/lin-snow/Ech0/security/advisories/GHSA-r2x7-427f-rq69"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/lin-snow/Ech0"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/lin-snow/Ech0/releases/tag/v4.4.3"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Ech0 has SSRF via DNS Resolution Bypass in Webhook URL Validation"
}

GHSA-R348-32HQ-M483

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-06-17 21:32 – Updated: 2025-06-17 21:32
VLAI
Details

A Server-side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in Trend Micro Apex Central (on-premise) modOSCE component could allow an attacker to manipulate certain parameters leading to information disclosure on affected installations.

Severity
6.5 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-30679"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-06-17T20:15:31Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "A Server-side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in Trend Micro Apex Central (on-premise) modOSCE component could allow an attacker to manipulate certain parameters leading to information disclosure on affected installations.",
  "id": "GHSA-r348-32hq-m483",
  "modified": "2025-06-17T21:32:30Z",
  "published": "2025-06-17T21:32:30Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-30679"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://success.trendmicro.com/en-US/solution/KA-0019355"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-25-237"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

No mitigation information available for this CWE.

CAPEC-664: Server Side Request Forgery

An adversary exploits improper input validation by submitting maliciously crafted input to a target application running on a server, with the goal of forcing the server to make a request either to itself, to web services running in the server’s internal network, or to external third parties. If successful, the adversary’s request will be made with the server’s privilege level, bypassing its authentication controls. This ultimately allows the adversary to access sensitive data, execute commands on the server’s network, and make external requests with the stolen identity of the server. Server Side Request Forgery attacks differ from Cross Site Request Forgery attacks in that they target the server itself, whereas CSRF attacks exploit an insecure user authentication mechanism to perform unauthorized actions on the user's behalf.

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