Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-918

Allowed

Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)

Abstraction: Base · Status: Incomplete

API response cwe.mitre.org

The web server receives a URL or similar request from an upstream component and retrieves the contents of this URL, but it does not sufficiently ensure that the request is being sent to the expected destination.

4713 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-PCX4-V3RH-GQ5X

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-24 09:30 – Updated: 2026-06-24 09:30
VLAI
Details

The WP Meta SEO plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery in all versions up to, and including, 4.5.18 via the 'new_link' parameter. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with contributor-level access and above, to make web requests to arbitrary locations originating from the web application and can be used to query and modify information from internal services. The HTTP response status from outbound requests is reflected back in the AJAX JSON response as status_code, providing an enumeration oracle usable for probing internal hosts and cloud metadata services.

Severity
6.4 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-11370"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-24T07:16:26Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The WP Meta SEO plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery in all versions up to, and including, 4.5.18 via the \u0027new_link\u0027 parameter. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with contributor-level access and above, to make web requests to arbitrary locations originating from the web application and can be used to query and modify information from internal services. The HTTP response status from outbound requests is reflected back in the AJAX JSON response as status_code, providing an enumeration oracle usable for probing internal hosts and cloud metadata services.",
  "id": "GHSA-pcx4-v3rh-gq5x",
  "modified": "2026-06-24T09:30:45Z",
  "published": "2026-06-24T09:30:45Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-11370"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/wp-meta-seo/tags/4.5.18/inc/class.metaseo-admin.php#L4783"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/wp-meta-seo/tags/4.5.18/inc/class.metaseo-broken-link-table.php#L1138"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/wp-meta-seo/tags/4.5.18/inc/class.metaseo-broken-link-table.php#L2013"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/2a6e37c1-aaac-4642-bace-234bbc4f6c38?source=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-PF3H-QJGV-VCPR

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-03 21:51 – Updated: 2026-07-17 16:18
VLAI
Summary
vLLM: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) in `download_bytes_from_url `
Details

Summary

A Server Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in download_bytes_from_url allows any actor who can control batch input JSON to make the vLLM batch runner issue arbitrary HTTP/HTTPS requests from the server, without any URL validation or domain restrictions.

This can be used to target internal services (e.g. cloud metadata endpoints or internal HTTP APIs) reachable from the vLLM host.

Details

Vulnerable component

The vulnerable logic is in the batch runner entrypoint vllm/entrypoints/openai/run_batch.py, function download_bytes_from_url:

# run_batch.py Lines 442-482
async def download_bytes_from_url(url: str) -> bytes:
    """
    Download data from a URL or decode from a data URL.

    Args:
        url: Either an HTTP/HTTPS URL or a data URL (data:...;base64,...)

    Returns:
        Data as bytes
    """
    parsed = urlparse(url)

    # Handle data URLs (base64 encoded)
    if parsed.scheme == "data":
        # Format: data:...;base64,<base64_data>
        if "," in url:
            header, data = url.split(",", 1)
            if "base64" in header:
                return base64.b64decode(data)
            else:
                raise ValueError(f"Unsupported data URL encoding: {header}")
        else:
            raise ValueError(f"Invalid data URL format: {url}")

    # Handle HTTP/HTTPS URLs
    elif parsed.scheme in ("http", "https"):
        async with (
            aiohttp.ClientSession() as session,
            session.get(url) as resp,
        ):
            if resp.status != 200:
                raise Exception(
                    f"Failed to download data from URL: {url}. Status: {resp.status}"
                )
            return await resp.read()

    else:
        raise ValueError(
            f"Unsupported URL scheme: {parsed.scheme}. "
            "Supported schemes: http, https, data"
        )

Key properties:

  • The function only parses the URL to dispatch on the scheme (data, http, https).
  • For http / https, it directly calls session.get(url) on the provided string.
  • There is no validation of:
  • hostname or IP address,
  • whether the target is internal or external,
  • port number,
  • path, query, or redirect target.
  • This is in contrast to the multimodal media path (MediaConnector), which implements an explicit domain allowlist. download_bytes_from_url does not reuse that protection.

URL controllability

The url argument is fully controlled by batch input JSON via the file_url field of BatchTranscriptionRequest / BatchTranslationRequest.

  1. Batch request body type:
# run_batch.py Line 67-80
class BatchTranscriptionRequest(TranscriptionRequest):
    """
    Batch transcription request that uses file_url instead of file.

    This class extends TranscriptionRequest but replaces the file field
    with file_url to support batch processing from audio files written in JSON format.
    """

    file_url: str = Field(
        ...,
        description=(
            "Either a URL of the audio or a data URL with base64 encoded audio data. "
        ),
    )

# run_batch.py Line 98-111
class BatchTranslationRequest(TranslationRequest):
    """
    Batch translation request that uses file_url instead of file.

    This class extends TranslationRequest but replaces the file field
    with file_url to support batch processing from audio files written in JSON format.
    """

    file_url: str = Field(
        ...,
        description=(
            "Either a URL of the audio or a data URL with base64 encoded audio data. "
        ),
    )

There is no restriction on the domain, IP, or port of file_url in these models.

  1. Batch input is parsed directly from the batch file:
# run_batch.py Line 139-179
class BatchRequestInput(OpenAIBaseModel):
    ...
    url: str
    body: BatchRequestInputBody
    @field_validator("body", mode="plain")
    @classmethod
    def check_type_for_url(cls, value: Any, info: ValidationInfo):
        url: str = info.data["url"]
        ...
        if url == "/v1/audio/transcriptions":
            return BatchTranscriptionRequest.model_validate(value)
        if url == "/v1/audio/translations":
            return BatchTranslationRequest.model_validate(value)

# run_batch.py Line 770-781
   logger.info("Reading batch from %s...", args.input_file)

    # Submit all requests in the file to the engine "concurrently".
    response_futures: list[Awaitable[BatchRequestOutput]] = []
    for request_json in (await read_file(args.input_file)).strip().split("\n"):
        # Skip empty lines.
        request_json = request_json.strip()
        if not request_json:
            continue

        request = BatchRequestInput.model_validate_json(request_json)

The batch runner reads each line of the input file (args.input_file), parses it as JSON, and constructs a BatchTranscriptionRequest / BatchTranslationRequest. Whatever file_url appears in that JSON line becomes batch_request_body.file_url.

  1. file_url is passed directly into download_bytes_from_url:
# run_batch.py Line 610-623
def wrapper(handler_fn: Callable):
        async def transcription_wrapper(
            batch_request_body: (BatchTranscriptionRequest | BatchTranslationRequest),
        ) -> (
            TranscriptionResponse
            | TranscriptionResponseVerbose
            | TranslationResponse
            | TranslationResponseVerbose
            | ErrorResponse
        ):
            try:
                # Download data from URL
                audio_data = await download_bytes_from_url(batch_request_body.file_url)

So the data flow is:

  1. Attacker supplies JSON line in the batch input file with arbitrary body.file_url.
  2. BatchRequestInput / BatchTranscriptionRequest / BatchTranslationRequest parse that JSON and store file_url verbatim.
  3. make_transcription_wrapper calls download_bytes_from_url(batch_request_body.file_url).
  4. download_bytes_from_url’s HTTP/HTTPS branch issues aiohttp.ClientSession().get(url) to that attacker-controlled URL with no further validation.

This is a classic SSRF pattern: a server-side component makes arbitrary HTTP requests to a URL string taken from untrusted input.

Comparison with safer code

The project already contains a safer URL-handling path for multimodal media in vllm/multimodal/media/connector.py, which demonstrates the intent to mitigate SSRF via domain allowlists and URL normalization:

# connector.py Lines 169-189
 def load_from_url(
        self,
        url: str,
        media_io: MediaIO[_M],
        *,
        fetch_timeout: int | None = None,
    ) -> _M:  # type: ignore[type-var]
        url_spec = parse_url(url)

        if url_spec.scheme and url_spec.scheme.startswith("http"):
            self._assert_url_in_allowed_media_domains(url_spec)

            connection = self.connection
            data = connection.get_bytes(
                url_spec.url,
                timeout=fetch_timeout,
                allow_redirects=envs.VLLM_MEDIA_URL_ALLOW_REDIRECTS,
            )

            return media_io.load_bytes(data)

and:

# connector.py Lines 158-167
  def _assert_url_in_allowed_media_domains(self, url_spec: Url) -> None:
        if (
            self.allowed_media_domains
            and url_spec.hostname not in self.allowed_media_domains
        ):
            raise ValueError(
                f"The URL must be from one of the allowed domains: "
                f"{self.allowed_media_domains}. Input URL domain: "
                f"{url_spec.hostname}"
            )

download_bytes_from_url does not reuse this allowlist or any equivalent validation, even though it also fetches user-provided URLs.

Severity
5.4 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:L
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "vllm"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.16.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.19.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-34753"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-03T21:51:00Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-06T16:16:36Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nA Server Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in `download_bytes_from_url` allows any actor who can control batch input JSON to make the vLLM batch runner issue arbitrary HTTP/HTTPS requests from the server, without any URL validation or domain restrictions.\n\nThis can be used to target internal services (e.g. cloud metadata endpoints or internal HTTP APIs) reachable from the vLLM host.\n\n------\n\n### Details\n\n#### Vulnerable component\n\nThe vulnerable logic is in the batch runner entrypoint `vllm/entrypoints/openai/run_batch.py`, function `download_bytes_from_url`:\n\n```\n# run_batch.py Lines 442-482\nasync def download_bytes_from_url(url: str) -\u003e bytes:\n    \"\"\"\n    Download data from a URL or decode from a data URL.\n\n    Args:\n        url: Either an HTTP/HTTPS URL or a data URL (data:...;base64,...)\n\n    Returns:\n        Data as bytes\n    \"\"\"\n    parsed = urlparse(url)\n\n    # Handle data URLs (base64 encoded)\n    if parsed.scheme == \"data\":\n        # Format: data:...;base64,\u003cbase64_data\u003e\n        if \",\" in url:\n            header, data = url.split(\",\", 1)\n            if \"base64\" in header:\n                return base64.b64decode(data)\n            else:\n                raise ValueError(f\"Unsupported data URL encoding: {header}\")\n        else:\n            raise ValueError(f\"Invalid data URL format: {url}\")\n\n    # Handle HTTP/HTTPS URLs\n    elif parsed.scheme in (\"http\", \"https\"):\n        async with (\n            aiohttp.ClientSession() as session,\n            session.get(url) as resp,\n        ):\n            if resp.status != 200:\n                raise Exception(\n                    f\"Failed to download data from URL: {url}. Status: {resp.status}\"\n                )\n            return await resp.read()\n\n    else:\n        raise ValueError(\n            f\"Unsupported URL scheme: {parsed.scheme}. \"\n            \"Supported schemes: http, https, data\"\n        )\n```\n\nKey properties:\n\n- The function only parses the URL to dispatch on the scheme (`data`, `http`, `https`).\n- For `http` / `https`, it directly calls `session.get(url)` on the provided string.\n- There is no validation of:\n  - hostname or IP address,\n  - whether the target is internal or external,\n  - port number,\n  - path, query, or redirect target.\n- This is in contrast to the multimodal media path (`MediaConnector`), which implements an explicit domain allowlist. `download_bytes_from_url` does not reuse that protection.\n\n#### URL controllability\n\nThe `url` argument is fully controlled by batch input JSON via the `file_url` field of `BatchTranscriptionRequest` / `BatchTranslationRequest`.\n\n1. Batch request body type:\n\n```\n# run_batch.py Line 67-80\nclass BatchTranscriptionRequest(TranscriptionRequest):\n    \"\"\"\n    Batch transcription request that uses file_url instead of file.\n\n    This class extends TranscriptionRequest but replaces the file field\n    with file_url to support batch processing from audio files written in JSON format.\n    \"\"\"\n\n    file_url: str = Field(\n        ...,\n        description=(\n            \"Either a URL of the audio or a data URL with base64 encoded audio data. \"\n        ),\n    )\n```\n\n```\n# run_batch.py Line 98-111\nclass BatchTranslationRequest(TranslationRequest):\n    \"\"\"\n    Batch translation request that uses file_url instead of file.\n\n    This class extends TranslationRequest but replaces the file field\n    with file_url to support batch processing from audio files written in JSON format.\n    \"\"\"\n\n    file_url: str = Field(\n        ...,\n        description=(\n            \"Either a URL of the audio or a data URL with base64 encoded audio data. \"\n        ),\n    )\n```\n\nThere is no restriction on the domain, IP, or port of `file_url` in these models.\n\n1. Batch input is parsed directly from the batch file:\n\n```\n# run_batch.py Line 139-179\nclass BatchRequestInput(OpenAIBaseModel):\n    ...\n    url: str\n    body: BatchRequestInputBody\n    @field_validator(\"body\", mode=\"plain\")\n    @classmethod\n    def check_type_for_url(cls, value: Any, info: ValidationInfo):\n        url: str = info.data[\"url\"]\n        ...\n        if url == \"/v1/audio/transcriptions\":\n            return BatchTranscriptionRequest.model_validate(value)\n        if url == \"/v1/audio/translations\":\n            return BatchTranslationRequest.model_validate(value)\n```\n\n```\n# run_batch.py Line 770-781\n   logger.info(\"Reading batch from %s...\", args.input_file)\n\n    # Submit all requests in the file to the engine \"concurrently\".\n    response_futures: list[Awaitable[BatchRequestOutput]] = []\n    for request_json in (await read_file(args.input_file)).strip().split(\"\\n\"):\n        # Skip empty lines.\n        request_json = request_json.strip()\n        if not request_json:\n            continue\n\n        request = BatchRequestInput.model_validate_json(request_json)\n```\n\nThe batch runner reads each line of the input file (`args.input_file`), parses it as JSON, and constructs a `BatchTranscriptionRequest` / `BatchTranslationRequest`. Whatever `file_url` appears in that JSON line becomes `batch_request_body.file_url`.\n\n1. `file_url` is passed directly into `download_bytes_from_url`:\n\n```\n# run_batch.py Line 610-623\ndef wrapper(handler_fn: Callable):\n        async def transcription_wrapper(\n            batch_request_body: (BatchTranscriptionRequest | BatchTranslationRequest),\n        ) -\u003e (\n            TranscriptionResponse\n            | TranscriptionResponseVerbose\n            | TranslationResponse\n            | TranslationResponseVerbose\n            | ErrorResponse\n        ):\n            try:\n                # Download data from URL\n                audio_data = await download_bytes_from_url(batch_request_body.file_url)\n```\n\nSo the data flow is:\n\n1. Attacker supplies JSON line in the batch input file with arbitrary `body.file_url`.\n2. `BatchRequestInput` / `BatchTranscriptionRequest` / `BatchTranslationRequest` parse that JSON and store `file_url` verbatim.\n3. `make_transcription_wrapper` calls `download_bytes_from_url(batch_request_body.file_url)`.\n4. `download_bytes_from_url`\u2019s HTTP/HTTPS branch issues `aiohttp.ClientSession().get(url)` to that attacker-controlled URL with no further validation.\n\nThis is a classic SSRF pattern: a server-side component makes arbitrary HTTP requests to a URL string taken from untrusted input.\n\n#### Comparison with safer code\n\nThe project already contains a safer URL-handling path for multimodal media in `vllm/multimodal/media/connector.py`, which demonstrates the intent to mitigate SSRF via domain allowlists and URL normalization:\n\n```\n# connector.py Lines 169-189\n def load_from_url(\n        self,\n        url: str,\n        media_io: MediaIO[_M],\n        *,\n        fetch_timeout: int | None = None,\n    ) -\u003e _M:  # type: ignore[type-var]\n        url_spec = parse_url(url)\n\n        if url_spec.scheme and url_spec.scheme.startswith(\"http\"):\n            self._assert_url_in_allowed_media_domains(url_spec)\n\n            connection = self.connection\n            data = connection.get_bytes(\n                url_spec.url,\n                timeout=fetch_timeout,\n                allow_redirects=envs.VLLM_MEDIA_URL_ALLOW_REDIRECTS,\n            )\n\n            return media_io.load_bytes(data)\n```\n\nand:\n\n```\n# connector.py Lines 158-167\n  def _assert_url_in_allowed_media_domains(self, url_spec: Url) -\u003e None:\n        if (\n            self.allowed_media_domains\n            and url_spec.hostname not in self.allowed_media_domains\n        ):\n            raise ValueError(\n                f\"The URL must be from one of the allowed domains: \"\n                f\"{self.allowed_media_domains}. Input URL domain: \"\n                f\"{url_spec.hostname}\"\n            )\n```\n\n`download_bytes_from_url` does not reuse this allowlist or any equivalent validation, even though it also fetches user-provided URLs.",
  "id": "GHSA-pf3h-qjgv-vcpr",
  "modified": "2026-07-17T16:18:19Z",
  "published": "2026-04-03T21:51:00Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/security/advisories/GHSA-pf3h-qjgv-vcpr"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34753"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/pull/38482"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/commit/57861ae48d3493fa48b4d7d830b7ec9f995783e7"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-pf3h-qjgv-vcpr"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/vllm/PYSEC-2026-3410.yaml"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://pypi.org/project/vllm"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "vLLM: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) in `download_bytes_from_url `"
}

GHSA-PF5R-4CPX-XCXM

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 19:03 – Updated: 2022-05-24 19:03
VLAI
Details

IBM Jazz Foundation and IBM Engineering products are vulnerable to server-side request forgery (SSRF). This may allow an authenticated attacker to send unauthorized requests from the system, potentially leading to network enumeration or facilitating other attacks. IBM X-Force ID: 194596.

Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-20347"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2021-06-02T21:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "IBM Jazz Foundation and IBM Engineering products are vulnerable to server-side request forgery (SSRF). This may allow an authenticated attacker to send unauthorized requests from the system, potentially leading to network enumeration or facilitating other attacks. IBM X-Force ID: 194596.",
  "id": "GHSA-pf5r-4cpx-xcxm",
  "modified": "2022-05-24T19:03:50Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T19:03:50Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-20347"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/194596"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/6457739"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}

GHSA-PF6P-25R2-FX45

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-06-29 00:00 – Updated: 2022-08-12 21:03
VLAI
Summary
Server-Side Request Forgery in dompdf/dompdf
Details

Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) in GitHub repository dompdf/dompdf prior to 2.0.0.

Severity
5.3 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "dompdf/dompdf"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.0.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-0085"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2022-07-05T22:12:46Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-06-28T15:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) in GitHub repository dompdf/dompdf prior to 2.0.0.",
  "id": "GHSA-pf6p-25r2-fx45",
  "modified": "2022-08-12T21:03:44Z",
  "published": "2022-06-29T00:00:27Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-0085"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/dompdf/dompdf/commit/bb1ef65011a14730b7cfbe73506b4bb8a03704bd"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/FriendsOfPHP/security-advisories/blob/master/dompdf/dompdf/CVE-2022-0085.yaml"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/dompdf/dompdf"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://huntr.dev/bounties/73dbcc78-5ba9-492f-9133-13bbc9f31236"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Server-Side Request Forgery in dompdf/dompdf"
}

GHSA-PF87-P9PQ-44Q4

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-05-02 15:31 – Updated: 2025-05-02 15:31
VLAI
Details

Sematell ReplyOne 7.4.3.0 allows SSRF via the application server API.

Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-48907"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-05-01T21:15:52Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Sematell ReplyOne 7.4.3.0 allows SSRF via the application server API.",
  "id": "GHSA-pf87-p9pq-44q4",
  "modified": "2025-05-02T15:31:46Z",
  "published": "2025-05-02T15:31:46Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-48907"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.syss.de/fileadmin/dokumente/Publikationen/Advisories/SYSS-2024-083.txt"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-PF9C-CH8R-2958

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-18 15:32 – Updated: 2026-06-09 10:30
VLAI
Summary
Statamic CMS: Server-Side Request Forgery via Glide
Details

Impact

The Glide image proxy's URL validation could be bypassed using an IP representation that wasn't normalized before the public-IP check. An unauthenticated user could cause the server to make HTTP requests to internal addresses — including loopback, private network, and cloud metadata endpoints.

This affects sites that pass user-supplied URLs to Glide. Sites running PHP 8.3 or newer are not affected.

Patches

This has been fixed in 5.73.22 and 6.18.1

Severity
5.4 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "statamic/cms"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.73.22"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "statamic/cms"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "6.0.0-alpha.1"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.18.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-45660"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-18T15:32:43Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-29T18:17:11Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n\nThe Glide image proxy\u0027s URL validation could be bypassed using an IP representation that wasn\u0027t normalized before the public-IP check. An unauthenticated user could cause the server to make HTTP requests to internal addresses \u2014 including loopback, private network, and cloud metadata endpoints.\n\nThis affects sites that pass user-supplied URLs to Glide. Sites running PHP 8.3 or newer are not affected.\n\n### Patches\n\nThis has been fixed in 5.73.22 and 6.18.1",
  "id": "GHSA-pf9c-ch8r-2958",
  "modified": "2026-06-09T10:30:43Z",
  "published": "2026-05-18T15:32:43Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/statamic/cms/security/advisories/GHSA-pf9c-ch8r-2958"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-45660"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/statamic/cms"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Statamic CMS: Server-Side Request Forgery via Glide"
}

GHSA-PFCC-3G6R-8RG8

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-02-23 21:30 – Updated: 2025-03-12 21:53
VLAI
Summary
Undertow client not checking server identity presented by server certificate in https connections
Details

The undertow client is not checking the server identity presented by the server certificate in https connections. This should be performed by default in https and in http/2.

Severity
9.8 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "io.undertow:undertow-core"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.3.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.3.5.Final"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "io.undertow:undertow-core"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.2.24.Final"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-4492"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2023-03-03T23:12:22Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-02-23T20:15:00Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "The undertow client is not checking the server identity presented by the server certificate in https connections. This should be performed by default in https and in http/2.",
  "id": "GHSA-pfcc-3g6r-8rg8",
  "modified": "2025-03-12T21:53:34Z",
  "published": "2023-02-23T21:30:16Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-4492"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/undertow-io/undertow/pull/1447"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/undertow-io/undertow/pull/1447/commits/e5071e52b72529a14d3ec436ae7102cea5d918c4"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/undertow-io/undertow/pull/1457"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/undertow-io/undertow/pull/1457/commits/a4d3b167126a803cc4f7fb740dd9a6ecabf59342"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2022-4492"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2153260"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/undertow-io/undertow/blob/master/core/src/main/java/io/undertow/security/impl/ClientCertAuthenticationMechanism.java"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://issues.redhat.com/browse/MTA-93"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://issues.redhat.com/browse/UNDERTOW-2212"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://security.netapp.com/advisory/ntap-20230324-0002"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Undertow client not checking server identity presented by server certificate in https connections"
}

GHSA-PFJ3-MMXR-4RJH

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-10 21:31 – Updated: 2025-12-11 21:31
VLAI
Details

A Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability was discovered in the webpage-to-markdown conversion feature of markdownify-mcp v0.0.2 and before. This vulnerability allows an attacker to bypass private IP restrictions through hostname-based bypass and HTTP redirect chains, enabling access to internal network services.

Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-65512"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-12-10T21:16:07Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "A Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability was discovered in the webpage-to-markdown conversion feature of markdownify-mcp v0.0.2 and before. This vulnerability allows an attacker to bypass private IP restrictions through hostname-based bypass and HTTP redirect chains, enabling access to internal network services.",
  "id": "GHSA-pfj3-mmxr-4rjh",
  "modified": "2025-12-11T21:31:27Z",
  "published": "2025-12-10T21:31:37Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-65512"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Team-Off-course/MCP-Server-Vuln-Analysis/blob/main/CVE-2025-65512.md"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://thorn-pheasant-6d8.notion.site/markdownify-mcp-Report-2a03daf7b44180908ff4eea0c2915763"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-PFQ8-M2Q4-6WMH

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-09-29 21:30 – Updated: 2025-10-09 21:31
VLAI
Details

Vasion Print (formerly PrinterLogic) Virtual Appliance Host prior to version 25.1.102 and Application prior to version 25.1.1413 (VA/SaaS deployments) contain a server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability. The console_release directory is reachable from the internet without any authentication. Inside that directory are dozens of PHP scripts that build URLs from user‑controlled values and then invoke either 'curl_exec()orfile_get_contents()without proper validation. Although many files attempt to mitigate SSRF by callingfilter_var', the checks are incomplete. Because the endpoint is unauthenticated, any remote attacker can supply a hostname and cause the server to issue requests to internal resources. This enables internal network reconnaissance, potential pivoting, or data exfiltration. This vulnerability has been confirmed to be remediated, but it is unclear as to when the patch was introduced.

Severity
8.6 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N
8.8 (High)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-34225"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306",
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-09-29T21:15:36Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Vasion Print (formerly PrinterLogic) Virtual Appliance Host prior to version 25.1.102\u00a0and Application prior to version 25.1.1413\u00a0(VA/SaaS deployments) contain a server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability. The `console_release` directory is reachable from the internet without any authentication.  Inside that directory are dozens of PHP scripts that build URLs from user\u2011controlled values and then invoke either \u0027curl_exec()` or `file_get_contents()` without proper validation.\u00a0Although many files attempt to mitigate SSRF by calling `filter_var\u0027, the checks are incomplete. Because the endpoint is unauthenticated, any remote attacker can supply a hostname and cause the server to issue requests to internal resources. This enables internal network reconnaissance, potential pivoting, or data exfiltration. This vulnerability has been confirmed to be remediated, but it is unclear as to when the patch was introduced.",
  "id": "GHSA-pfq8-m2q4-6wmh",
  "modified": "2025-10-09T21:31:09Z",
  "published": "2025-09-29T21:30:27Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-34225"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://help.printerlogic.com/saas/Print/Security/Security-Bulletins.htm"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://help.printerlogic.com/va/Print/Security/Security-Bulletins.htm"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://pierrekim.github.io/blog/2025-04-08-vasion-printerlogic-83-vulnerabilities.html#va-ssrf-03"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/vasion-print-printerlogic-ssrf-via-console-release-directory"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-PFXP-H2RX-W8C2

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-04-28 09:31 – Updated: 2025-05-12 21:31
VLAI
Details

A vulnerability was found in playeduxyz PlayEdu 开源培训系统 up to 1.8 and classified as problematic. This issue affects some unknown processing of the file /api/backend/v1/user/create of the component User Avatar Handler. The manipulation of the argument Avatar leads to server-side request forgery. The attack may be initiated remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.

Severity
2.7 (Low)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
5.1 (Medium)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-4012"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-04-28T09:15:21Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "A vulnerability was found in playeduxyz PlayEdu \u5f00\u6e90\u57f9\u8bad\u7cfb\u7edf up to 1.8 and classified as problematic. This issue affects some unknown processing of the file /api/backend/v1/user/create of the component User Avatar Handler. The manipulation of the argument Avatar leads to server-side request forgery. The attack may be initiated remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.",
  "id": "GHSA-pfxp-h2rx-w8c2",
  "modified": "2025-05-12T21:31:02Z",
  "published": "2025-04-28T09:31:55Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-4012"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Bae-ke/cve/issues/3"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.306365"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.306365"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/?submit.558283"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

No mitigation information available for this CWE.

CAPEC-664: Server Side Request Forgery

An adversary exploits improper input validation by submitting maliciously crafted input to a target application running on a server, with the goal of forcing the server to make a request either to itself, to web services running in the server’s internal network, or to external third parties. If successful, the adversary’s request will be made with the server’s privilege level, bypassing its authentication controls. This ultimately allows the adversary to access sensitive data, execute commands on the server’s network, and make external requests with the stolen identity of the server. Server Side Request Forgery attacks differ from Cross Site Request Forgery attacks in that they target the server itself, whereas CSRF attacks exploit an insecure user authentication mechanism to perform unauthorized actions on the user's behalf.

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