CWE-918
AllowedServer-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
Abstraction: Base · Status: Incomplete
The web server receives a URL or similar request from an upstream component and retrieves the contents of this URL, but it does not sufficiently ensure that the request is being sent to the expected destination.
4754 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-8V65-47JX-7MFR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-01-06 17:44 – Updated: 2026-02-02 14:51Summary
A Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability exists in Mailpit's /proxy endpoint that allows attackers to make requests to internal network resources.
Description
The /proxy endpoint allows requests to internal network resources. While it validates http:// and https:// schemes, it does not block internal IP addresses, allowing attackers to access internal services and APIs.
Proof of Concept
Basic SSRF Request
GET /proxy?url=http://127.0.0.1:8025/api/v1/info
This returns internal API data including database path and runtime statistics.
Impact Assessment
1. Internal Network Scanning
Attacker can probe and discover internal services on the network.
2. Information Disclosure
Access to internal API data, database paths, and runtime statistics.
3. Email Content Access
Ability to read all captured emails via internal API endpoints.
4. Cloud Metadata Access
If deployed in cloud environments (AWS/GCP/Azure), potential access to instance metadata services (e.g., http://169.254.169.254/).
Attack Scenarios
Scenario 1: Development Environment Exposure
If Mailpit is accidentally exposed to the internet, attackers can leverage SSRF to access internal development resources and services.
Scenario 2: Container Escape Information
In containerized deployments, SSRF can reveal container metadata and internal service configurations.
Scenario 3: Lateral Movement
In corporate networks, SSRF can be used to discover and interact with internal services, facilitating lateral movement.
Mitigating Factors
This vulnerability is limited to HTTP GET requests with minimal headers. Additionally, Mailpit's web UI & API should be protected by basic authentication when exposed to the internet, which prevents access to the proxy endpoint.
References
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.28.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/axllent/mailpit"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.28.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-21859"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-01-06T17:44:29Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-01-08T00:16:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nA Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability exists in Mailpit\u0027s `/proxy` endpoint that allows attackers to make requests to internal network resources.\n\n\n## Description\n\nThe `/proxy` endpoint allows requests to internal network resources. While it validates `http://` and `https://` schemes, it does not block internal IP addresses, allowing attackers to access internal services and APIs.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n### Basic SSRF Request\n```\nGET /proxy?url=http://127.0.0.1:8025/api/v1/info\n```\n\nThis returns internal API data including database path and runtime statistics.\n \n## Impact Assessment\n\n### 1. Internal Network Scanning\nAttacker can probe and discover internal services on the network.\n\n### 2. Information Disclosure\nAccess to internal API data, database paths, and runtime statistics.\n\n### 3. Email Content Access\nAbility to read all captured emails via internal API endpoints.\n\n### 4. Cloud Metadata Access\nIf deployed in cloud environments (AWS/GCP/Azure), potential access to instance metadata services (e.g., `http://169.254.169.254/`).\n\n## Attack Scenarios\n\n### Scenario 1: Development Environment Exposure\nIf Mailpit is accidentally exposed to the internet, attackers can leverage SSRF to access internal development resources and services.\n\n### Scenario 2: Container Escape Information\nIn containerized deployments, SSRF can reveal container metadata and internal service configurations.\n\n### Scenario 3: Lateral Movement\nIn corporate networks, SSRF can be used to discover and interact with internal services, facilitating lateral movement.\n\n## Mitigating Factors\nThis vulnerability is limited to HTTP GET requests with minimal headers. Additionally, Mailpit\u0027s web UI \u0026 API should be protected by basic authentication when exposed to the internet, which prevents access to the proxy endpoint. \n\n## References\n\n- [MDN Web Security - SSRF Attacks](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/Security/Attacks/SSRF)\n- [CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/918.html)\n- [OWASP SSRF Prevention Cheat Sheet](https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Server_Side_Request_Forgery_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet.html)",
"id": "GHSA-8v65-47jx-7mfr",
"modified": "2026-02-02T14:51:32Z",
"published": "2026-01-06T17:44:29Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/axllent/mailpit/security/advisories/GHSA-8v65-47jx-7mfr"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-21859"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/axllent/mailpit/commit/3b9b470c093b3d20b7d751722c1c24f3eed2e19d"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/axllent/mailpit"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2026-4284"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Mailpit Proxy Endpoint has Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability"
}
GHSA-8V6J-VG6W-6WWJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-03-20 12:32 – Updated: 2025-03-20 12:32langgenius/dify version 0.9.1 contains a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability. The vulnerability exists due to improper handling of the api_endpoint parameter, allowing an attacker to make direct requests to internal network services. This can lead to unauthorized access to internal servers and potentially expose sensitive information, including access to the AWS metadata endpoint.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-11822"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-03-20T10:15:25Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "langgenius/dify version 0.9.1 contains a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability. The vulnerability exists due to improper handling of the api_endpoint parameter, allowing an attacker to make direct requests to internal network services. This can lead to unauthorized access to internal servers and potentially expose sensitive information, including access to the AWS metadata endpoint.",
"id": "GHSA-8v6j-vg6w-6wwj",
"modified": "2025-03-20T12:32:42Z",
"published": "2025-03-20T12:32:42Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-11822"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://huntr.com/bounties/f3042029-5d4e-41c6-850d-bbe02fae6592"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-8VFV-X5MF-26J9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-14 02:01 – Updated: 2022-05-14 02:01An SSRF vulnerability was discovered in idreamsoft iCMS 7.0.11 because the remote function in app/spider/spider_tools.class.php does not block DNS hostnames associated with private and reserved IP addresses, as demonstrated by 127.0.0.1 in an A record. NOTE: this vulnerability exists because of an incomplete fix for CVE-2018-14858.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2018-15895"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2018-08-27T04:29:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "An SSRF vulnerability was discovered in idreamsoft iCMS 7.0.11 because the remote function in app/spider/spider_tools.class.php does not block DNS hostnames associated with private and reserved IP addresses, as demonstrated by 127.0.0.1 in an A record. NOTE: this vulnerability exists because of an incomplete fix for CVE-2018-14858.",
"id": "GHSA-8vfv-x5mf-26j9",
"modified": "2022-05-14T02:01:42Z",
"published": "2022-05-14T02:01:42Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-15895"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/idreamsoft/iCMS/issues/40"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-8W4F-PQVP-553J
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-05 12:30 – Updated: 2026-02-05 12:30The All In One Image Viewer Block plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery in all versions up to, and including, 1.0.2 due to missing authorization and URL validation on the image-proxy REST API endpoint. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to make web requests to arbitrary locations originating from the web application and can be used to query and modify information from internal services.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-1294"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-02-05T10:16:03Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The All In One Image Viewer Block plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery in all versions up to, and including, 1.0.2 due to missing authorization and URL validation on the image-proxy REST API endpoint. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to make web requests to arbitrary locations originating from the web application and can be used to query and modify information from internal services.",
"id": "GHSA-8w4f-pqvp-553j",
"modified": "2026-02-05T12:30:25Z",
"published": "2026-02-05T12:30:25Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-1294"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/image-viewer/tags/1.0.2/image-viewer-block.php#L10"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3449642/image-viewer/tags/1.0.3/image-viewer-block.php?old=3405983\u0026old_path=image-viewer%2Ftags%2F1.0.2%2Fimage-viewer-block.php"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/7c3f7108-eb32-425a-a705-4f032e7da6b0?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-8W5J-Q5MJ-5JPV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-04-23 18:30 – Updated: 2025-04-23 18:30PostHog slack_incoming_webhook Server-Side Request Forgery Information Disclosure Vulnerability. This vulnerability allows remote attackers to disclose sensitive information on affected installations of PostHog. Authentication is required to exploit this vulnerability.
The specific flaw exists within the processing of the slack_incoming_webhook parameter. The issue results from the lack of proper validation of a URI prior to accessing resources. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to execute code in the context of the service account. Was ZDI-CAN-25352.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-1521"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-04-23T17:16:52Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "PostHog slack_incoming_webhook Server-Side Request Forgery Information Disclosure Vulnerability. This vulnerability allows remote attackers to disclose sensitive information on affected installations of PostHog. Authentication is required to exploit this vulnerability.\n\nThe specific flaw exists within the processing of the slack_incoming_webhook parameter. The issue results from the lack of proper validation of a URI prior to accessing resources. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to execute code in the context of the service account. Was ZDI-CAN-25352.",
"id": "GHSA-8w5j-q5mj-5jpv",
"modified": "2025-04-23T18:30:58Z",
"published": "2025-04-23T18:30:58Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-1521"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/PostHog/posthog/commit/6e8f035f9acd339c5ba87ba6ea40fc1ab3053d42"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-25-096"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-8W7Q-Q5JP-JVGX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-14 20:27 – Updated: 2026-05-15 23:55Summary
In the open-webui project, a parsing difference between the urlparse and requests libraries led to an SSRF bypass vulnerability.
Details
In the current project, URL validation is performed using the function validate_url.
The current checking logic uses urlparse to parse the hostname part of the URL for verification.
However, there are actually differences in parsing between urlparse and the library that actually sends the request. For example, in files.py, validate_url is used first for URL validation, and then requests.get is used to send the request.
The core issue: urlparse() and requests disagree on which host a URL like http://127.0.0.1:6666\@1.1.1.1 points to:
urlparse()treats\as a regular character and@as the userinfo-host delimiter, so it extracts hostname as1.1.1.1(public)requeststreats\as a path character, connecting to127.0.0.1(internal)
Below is a test code I wrote following the open-webui code.
from __future__ import annotations
import ipaddress
import logging
import os
import socket
import urllib.parse
import urllib.request
from typing import Optional, Sequence, Union
import requests
log = logging.getLogger(__name__)
# Same text as open_webui.constants.ERROR_MESSAGES.INVALID_URL
INVALID_URL = (
"Oops! The URL you provided is invalid. Please double-check and try again."
)
# Same semantics as open_webui.config (ENABLE_RAG_LOCAL_WEB_FETCH / WEB_FETCH_FILTER_LIST)
ENABLE_RAG_LOCAL_WEB_FETCH = (
os.getenv("ENABLE_RAG_LOCAL_WEB_FETCH", "False").lower() == "true"
)
_DEFAULT_WEB_FETCH_FILTER_LIST = [
"!169.254.169.254",
"!fd00:ec2::254",
"!metadata.google.internal",
"!metadata.azure.com",
"!100.100.100.200",
]
_web_fetch_filter_env = os.getenv("WEB_FETCH_FILTER_LIST", "")
if _web_fetch_filter_env == "":
_web_fetch_filter_env_list: list[str] = []
else:
_web_fetch_filter_env_list = [
item.strip()
for item in _web_fetch_filter_env.split(",")
if item.strip()
]
WEB_FETCH_FILTER_LIST = list(
set(_DEFAULT_WEB_FETCH_FILTER_LIST + _web_fetch_filter_env_list)
)
def get_allow_block_lists(filter_list):
allow_list = []
block_list = []
if filter_list:
for d in filter_list:
if d.startswith("!"):
block_list.append(d[1:].strip())
else:
allow_list.append(d.strip())
return allow_list, block_list
def is_string_allowed(
string: Union[str, Sequence[str]], filter_list: Optional[list[str]] = None
) -> bool:
if not filter_list:
return True
allow_list, block_list = get_allow_block_lists(filter_list)
strings = [string] if isinstance(string, str) else list(string)
if allow_list:
if not any(s.endswith(allowed) for s in strings for allowed in allow_list):
return False
if any(s.endswith(blocked) for s in strings for blocked in block_list):
return False
return True
def resolve_hostname(hostname):
# Get address information
addr_info = socket.getaddrinfo(hostname, None)
# Extract IP addresses from address information
ipv4_addresses = [info[4][0] for info in addr_info if info[0] == socket.AF_INET]
ipv6_addresses = [info[4][0] for info in addr_info if info[0] == socket.AF_INET6]
return ipv4_addresses, ipv6_addresses
def _validators_url_accept(url: str) -> bool:
"""
Stand-in for python-validators url(): True if string looks like http(s) URL with host.
"""
try:
u = url.strip()
if not u:
return False
p = urllib.parse.urlparse(u)
if p.scheme not in ("http", "https"):
return False
if not p.netloc:
return False
return True
except Exception:
return False
def _ipv4_private(ip: str) -> bool:
try:
a = ipaddress.ip_address(ip)
return a.version == 4 and a.is_private
except ValueError:
return False
def _ipv6_private(ip: str) -> bool:
try:
a = ipaddress.ip_address(ip)
return a.version == 6 and a.is_private
except ValueError:
return False
def validate_url(url: Union[str, Sequence[str]]):
if isinstance(url, str):
if not _validators_url_accept(url):
raise ValueError(INVALID_URL)
parsed_url = urllib.parse.urlparse(url)
# Protocol validation - only allow http/https
if parsed_url.scheme not in ["http", "https"]:
log.warning(
f"Blocked non-HTTP(S) protocol: {parsed_url.scheme} in URL: {url}"
)
raise ValueError(INVALID_URL)
# Blocklist check using unified filtering logic
if WEB_FETCH_FILTER_LIST:
if not is_string_allowed(url, WEB_FETCH_FILTER_LIST):
log.warning(f"URL blocked by filter list: {url}")
raise ValueError(INVALID_URL)
if not ENABLE_RAG_LOCAL_WEB_FETCH:
# Local web fetch is disabled, filter out any URLs that resolve to private IP addresses
parsed_url = urllib.parse.urlparse(url)
# Get IPv4 and IPv6 addresses
ipv4_addresses, ipv6_addresses = resolve_hostname(parsed_url.hostname)
# Check if any of the resolved addresses are private
# This is technically still vulnerable to DNS rebinding attacks, as we don't control WebBaseLoader
for ip in ipv4_addresses:
if _ipv4_private(ip):
raise ValueError(INVALID_URL)
for ip in ipv6_addresses:
if _ipv6_private(ip):
raise ValueError(INVALID_URL)
return True
elif isinstance(url, Sequence):
return all(validate_url(u) for u in url)
else:
return False
if __name__ == "__main__":
logging.basicConfig(level=logging.INFO)
# url = "https://127.0.0.1:6666\@1.1.1.1"
url = "https://127.0.0.1:6666"
validate_url(url)
response = requests.get(url)
print(response.text)
As you can see, the current check on 127.0.0.1:6666 successfully identified it as an internal network IP and blocked it.
However, for https://127.0.0.1:6666\@1.1.1.1/, the hostname extracted by validate_url is 1.1.1.1, which is considered a public IP address and therefore passes validation. In reality, this URL is being used to request the internal IP address 127.0.0.1:6666, resulting in an SSRF bypass.
PoC
http://127.0.0.1:6666\@baidu.com
Impact
SSRF
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.9.4"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "open-webui"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.9.5"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-45400"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-14T20:27:00Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-15T21:16:38Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\nIn the open-webui project, a parsing difference between the urlparse and requests libraries led to an SSRF bypass vulnerability.\n\n### Details\nIn the current project, URL validation is performed using the function validate_url.\n\n\u003cimg width=\"1323\" height=\"1145\" alt=\"QQ20260322-202854-22-1\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/896d19f2-c7c3-499a-9052-12aea756ac47\" /\u003e\n\nThe current checking logic uses urlparse to parse the hostname part of the URL for verification.\n\n\u003cimg width=\"1122\" height=\"429\" alt=\"QQ20260322-203014-22-2\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/653520e9-e311-4a5e-8345-a2446e217d88\" /\u003e\n\nHowever, there are actually differences in parsing between urlparse and the library that actually sends the request. For example, in files.py, validate_url is used first for URL validation, and then requests.get is used to send the request.\n\n\u003cimg width=\"1269\" height=\"915\" alt=\"QQ20260322-203122-22-3\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/f200aa06-9190-425e-9659-1ecaf95f806b\" /\u003e\n\nThe core issue: `urlparse()` and `requests` disagree on which host a URL like `http://127.0.0.1:6666\\@1.1.1.1` points to:\n\n- `urlparse()` treats `\\` as a regular character and `@` as the userinfo-host delimiter, so it extracts hostname as `1.1.1.1` (public)\n- `requests` treats `\\` as a path character, connecting to `127.0.0.1` (internal)\n\nBelow is a test code I wrote following the open-webui code.\n```\nfrom __future__ import annotations\n\nimport ipaddress\nimport logging\nimport os\nimport socket\nimport urllib.parse\nimport urllib.request\nfrom typing import Optional, Sequence, Union\nimport requests\n\nlog = logging.getLogger(__name__)\n\n# Same text as open_webui.constants.ERROR_MESSAGES.INVALID_URL\nINVALID_URL = (\n \"Oops! The URL you provided is invalid. Please double-check and try again.\"\n)\n\n# Same semantics as open_webui.config (ENABLE_RAG_LOCAL_WEB_FETCH / WEB_FETCH_FILTER_LIST)\nENABLE_RAG_LOCAL_WEB_FETCH = (\n os.getenv(\"ENABLE_RAG_LOCAL_WEB_FETCH\", \"False\").lower() == \"true\"\n)\n\n_DEFAULT_WEB_FETCH_FILTER_LIST = [\n \"!169.254.169.254\",\n \"!fd00:ec2::254\",\n \"!metadata.google.internal\",\n \"!metadata.azure.com\",\n \"!100.100.100.200\",\n]\n_web_fetch_filter_env = os.getenv(\"WEB_FETCH_FILTER_LIST\", \"\")\nif _web_fetch_filter_env == \"\":\n _web_fetch_filter_env_list: list[str] = []\nelse:\n _web_fetch_filter_env_list = [\n item.strip()\n for item in _web_fetch_filter_env.split(\",\")\n if item.strip()\n ]\nWEB_FETCH_FILTER_LIST = list(\n set(_DEFAULT_WEB_FETCH_FILTER_LIST + _web_fetch_filter_env_list)\n)\n\n\ndef get_allow_block_lists(filter_list):\n allow_list = []\n block_list = []\n\n if filter_list:\n for d in filter_list:\n if d.startswith(\"!\"):\n block_list.append(d[1:].strip())\n else:\n allow_list.append(d.strip())\n\n return allow_list, block_list\n\n\ndef is_string_allowed(\n string: Union[str, Sequence[str]], filter_list: Optional[list[str]] = None\n) -\u003e bool:\n if not filter_list:\n return True\n\n allow_list, block_list = get_allow_block_lists(filter_list)\n strings = [string] if isinstance(string, str) else list(string)\n\n if allow_list:\n if not any(s.endswith(allowed) for s in strings for allowed in allow_list):\n return False\n\n if any(s.endswith(blocked) for s in strings for blocked in block_list):\n return False\n\n return True\n\n\ndef resolve_hostname(hostname):\n # Get address information\n addr_info = socket.getaddrinfo(hostname, None)\n\n # Extract IP addresses from address information\n ipv4_addresses = [info[4][0] for info in addr_info if info[0] == socket.AF_INET]\n ipv6_addresses = [info[4][0] for info in addr_info if info[0] == socket.AF_INET6]\n\n return ipv4_addresses, ipv6_addresses\n\n\ndef _validators_url_accept(url: str) -\u003e bool:\n \"\"\"\n Stand-in for python-validators url(): True if string looks like http(s) URL with host.\n \"\"\"\n try:\n u = url.strip()\n if not u:\n return False\n p = urllib.parse.urlparse(u)\n if p.scheme not in (\"http\", \"https\"):\n return False\n if not p.netloc:\n return False\n return True\n except Exception:\n return False\n\n\ndef _ipv4_private(ip: str) -\u003e bool:\n try:\n a = ipaddress.ip_address(ip)\n return a.version == 4 and a.is_private\n except ValueError:\n return False\n\n\ndef _ipv6_private(ip: str) -\u003e bool:\n try:\n a = ipaddress.ip_address(ip)\n return a.version == 6 and a.is_private\n except ValueError:\n return False\n\n\ndef validate_url(url: Union[str, Sequence[str]]):\n if isinstance(url, str):\n if not _validators_url_accept(url):\n raise ValueError(INVALID_URL)\n\n parsed_url = urllib.parse.urlparse(url)\n\n # Protocol validation - only allow http/https\n if parsed_url.scheme not in [\"http\", \"https\"]:\n log.warning(\n f\"Blocked non-HTTP(S) protocol: {parsed_url.scheme} in URL: {url}\"\n )\n raise ValueError(INVALID_URL)\n\n # Blocklist check using unified filtering logic\n if WEB_FETCH_FILTER_LIST:\n if not is_string_allowed(url, WEB_FETCH_FILTER_LIST):\n log.warning(f\"URL blocked by filter list: {url}\")\n raise ValueError(INVALID_URL)\n\n if not ENABLE_RAG_LOCAL_WEB_FETCH:\n # Local web fetch is disabled, filter out any URLs that resolve to private IP addresses\n parsed_url = urllib.parse.urlparse(url)\n # Get IPv4 and IPv6 addresses\n ipv4_addresses, ipv6_addresses = resolve_hostname(parsed_url.hostname)\n # Check if any of the resolved addresses are private\n # This is technically still vulnerable to DNS rebinding attacks, as we don\u0027t control WebBaseLoader\n for ip in ipv4_addresses:\n if _ipv4_private(ip):\n raise ValueError(INVALID_URL)\n for ip in ipv6_addresses:\n if _ipv6_private(ip):\n raise ValueError(INVALID_URL)\n return True\n elif isinstance(url, Sequence):\n return all(validate_url(u) for u in url)\n else:\n return False\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n logging.basicConfig(level=logging.INFO)\n # url = \"https://127.0.0.1:6666\\@1.1.1.1\"\n url = \"https://127.0.0.1:6666\"\n validate_url(url)\n response = requests.get(url)\n print(response.text)\n\n```\nAs you can see, the current check on 127.0.0.1:6666 successfully identified it as an internal network IP and blocked it.\n\n\u003cimg width=\"1428\" height=\"273\" alt=\"QQ20260322-203503-22-4\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/cf29b639-d4fe-409e-a516-2424d608739f\" /\u003e\n\nHowever, for https://127.0.0.1:6666\\@1.1.1.1/, the hostname extracted by validate_url is 1.1.1.1, which is considered a public IP address and therefore passes validation. In reality, this URL is being used to request the internal IP address 127.0.0.1:6666, resulting in an SSRF bypass.\n\n\u003cimg width=\"2255\" height=\"786\" alt=\"QQ20260322-203750-22-5\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/050bc6a4-760f-4d7a-8b52-056778097cd1\" /\u003e\n\n### PoC\n```\nhttp://127.0.0.1:6666\\@baidu.com\n```\n\n### Impact\nSSRF",
"id": "GHSA-8w7q-q5jp-jvgx",
"modified": "2026-05-15T23:55:29Z",
"published": "2026-05-14T20:27:00Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/security/advisories/GHSA-8w7q-q5jp-jvgx"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-45400"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/releases/tag/v0.9.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Open WebUI has a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) bypass in `validate_url`"
}
GHSA-8W86-M9H8-HVQG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-16 20:05 – Updated: 2026-07-16 20:05Impact
The SQL IMPORT DATABASE statement did not require administrative privileges and passed its source URL to the importer without validation. Any authenticated user with SQL command access (not only root/administrators) could therefore:
- Server-Side Request Forgery (CWE-918): cause the server to issue HTTP(S) requests to arbitrary destinations, including cloud metadata endpoints (e.g.
169.254.169.254) and internal-only services, and ingest the responses as queryable records. - Arbitrary local file read (CWE-22): read local files reachable by the server process (e.g.
/etc/passwd, credential files) by importingfile://paths, exposing their contents as records.
The server administration endpoint (/api/v1/server) was already restricted to the root user and was not affected; the exposure was through the database SQL command/query endpoints (/api/v1/command, /api/v1/query).
A related lower-severity hardening gap (CWE-776): the XML importer did not disable DTD processing, leaving entity-expansion (Billion Laughs) possible.
Affected component
integration/src/main/java/com/arcadedb/integration/importer/SourceDiscovery.java (no host allow-list for http(s); no path validation for file://), reached from engine/.../query/sql/parser/ImportDatabaseStatement.java.
Patches
IMPORT DATABASEnow requires the administrativeupdateSecuritypermission (no-op in embedded mode).- Import sources are validated in
SourceDiscovery: HTTP(S) hosts resolving to loopback / link-local / private (site-local) / wildcard / multicast addresses are blocked by default (arcadedb.server.security.importBlockLocalNetworks, defaulttrue), and an optional local-path allow-list (arcadedb.server.security.importAllowedLocalPaths) restrictsfile://reads. - The XML importer now disables DTD processing and external entities.
Fixed in commit referenced by pull request #4422.
Workarounds
Restrict SQL command/query access to trusted administrative users; do not grant query access to untrusted users on servers that can reach sensitive networks or hold sensitive local files. Upgrading is strongly recommended.
Credit
Reported by Bin Luo (luob87709@gmail.com).
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "com.arcadedb:arcadedb-engine"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "26.6.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-54077"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-776",
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-16T20:05:56Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nThe SQL `IMPORT DATABASE` statement did not require administrative privileges and passed its source URL to the importer without validation. Any authenticated user with SQL command access (not only `root`/administrators) could therefore:\n\n- **Server-Side Request Forgery (CWE-918):** cause the server to issue HTTP(S) requests to arbitrary destinations, including cloud metadata endpoints (e.g. `169.254.169.254`) and internal-only services, and ingest the responses as queryable records.\n- **Arbitrary local file read (CWE-22):** read local files reachable by the server process (e.g. `/etc/passwd`, credential files) by importing `file://` paths, exposing their contents as records.\n\nThe server administration endpoint (`/api/v1/server`) was already restricted to the `root` user and was **not** affected; the exposure was through the database SQL command/query endpoints (`/api/v1/command`, `/api/v1/query`).\n\nA related lower-severity hardening gap (CWE-776): the XML importer did not disable DTD processing, leaving entity-expansion (Billion Laughs) possible.\n\n### Affected component\n\n`integration/src/main/java/com/arcadedb/integration/importer/SourceDiscovery.java` (no host allow-list for http(s); no path validation for `file://`), reached from `engine/.../query/sql/parser/ImportDatabaseStatement.java`.\n\n### Patches\n\n- `IMPORT DATABASE` now requires the administrative `updateSecurity` permission (no-op in embedded mode).\n- Import sources are validated in `SourceDiscovery`: HTTP(S) hosts resolving to loopback / link-local / private (site-local) / wildcard / multicast addresses are blocked by default (`arcadedb.server.security.importBlockLocalNetworks`, default `true`), and an optional local-path allow-list (`arcadedb.server.security.importAllowedLocalPaths`) restricts `file://` reads.\n- The XML importer now disables DTD processing and external entities.\n\nFixed in commit referenced by pull request [#4422](https://github.com/ArcadeData/arcadedb/pull/4422).\n\n### Workarounds\n\nRestrict SQL command/query access to trusted administrative users; do not grant query access to untrusted users on servers that can reach sensitive networks or hold sensitive local files. Upgrading is strongly recommended.\n\n### Credit\n\nReported by Bin Luo (luob87709@gmail.com).",
"id": "GHSA-8w86-m9h8-hvqg",
"modified": "2026-07-16T20:05:56Z",
"published": "2026-07-16T20:05:56Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ArcadeData/arcadedb/security/advisories/GHSA-8w86-m9h8-hvqg"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/ArcadeData/arcadedb"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ArcadeData/arcadedb/releases/tag/26.6.1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "ArcadeDB: IMPORT DATABASE allows SSRF and arbitrary local file read by authenticated users"
}
GHSA-8WG4-H2WP-63R5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-04-04 18:31 – Updated: 2025-04-04 18:31A vulnerability was found in xujiangfei admintwo 1.0. It has been classified as critical. Affected is an unknown function of the file /resource/add. The manipulation of the argument description leads to server-side request forgery. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-3254"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-04-04T16:15:40Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A vulnerability was found in xujiangfei admintwo 1.0. It has been classified as critical. Affected is an unknown function of the file /resource/add. The manipulation of the argument description leads to server-side request forgery. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used.",
"id": "GHSA-8wg4-h2wp-63r5",
"modified": "2025-04-04T18:31:07Z",
"published": "2025-04-04T18:31:07Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-3254"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/caigo8/CVE-md/blob/main/admintwo/SSRF.md"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.303324"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.303324"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?submit.548979"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-8WMW-PRW8-2GGM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-17 15:31 – Updated: 2026-04-24 21:03Craftql v1.3.7 and before is vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) which allows an attacker to execute arbitrary code via the vendor/markhuot/craftql/src/Listeners/GetAssetsFieldSchema.php file.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "markhuot/craftql"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "1.3.7"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-31317"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-18T01:03:36Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-17T14:16:33Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Craftql v1.3.7 and before is vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) which allows an attacker to execute arbitrary code via the vendor/markhuot/craftql/src/Listeners/GetAssetsFieldSchema.php file.",
"id": "GHSA-8wmw-prw8-2ggm",
"modified": "2026-04-24T21:03:56Z",
"published": "2026-04-17T15:31:18Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31317"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/markhuot/craftql"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/stormmmg/craftql_ssrf"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/stormmmg/craftql_ssrf/blob/master/craftql-ssrf-en/README_detail.md"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Craftql vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery"
}
GHSA-8WX4-4FR5-G6R8
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-06-03 18:30 – Updated: 2025-06-03 18:30A vulnerability classified as critical was found in quequnlong shiyi-blog up to 1.2.1. This vulnerability affects unknown code of the file /app/sys/article/optimize. The manipulation of the argument url leads to server-side request forgery. The attack can be initiated remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-5510"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-06-03T17:15:22Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A vulnerability classified as critical was found in quequnlong shiyi-blog up to 1.2.1. This vulnerability affects unknown code of the file /app/sys/article/optimize. The manipulation of the argument url leads to server-side request forgery. The attack can be initiated remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.",
"id": "GHSA-8wx4-4fr5-g6r8",
"modified": "2025-06-03T18:30:41Z",
"published": "2025-06-03T18:30:41Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-5510"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/uglory-gll/javasec/blob/main/shiyi-blog.md"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/uglory-gll/javasec/blob/main/shiyi-blog.md#2ssrf"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.310924"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.310924"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?submit.584489"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
No mitigation information available for this CWE.
CAPEC-664: Server Side Request Forgery
An adversary exploits improper input validation by submitting maliciously crafted input to a target application running on a server, with the goal of forcing the server to make a request either to itself, to web services running in the server’s internal network, or to external third parties. If successful, the adversary’s request will be made with the server’s privilege level, bypassing its authentication controls. This ultimately allows the adversary to access sensitive data, execute commands on the server’s network, and make external requests with the stolen identity of the server. Server Side Request Forgery attacks differ from Cross Site Request Forgery attacks in that they target the server itself, whereas CSRF attacks exploit an insecure user authentication mechanism to perform unauthorized actions on the user's behalf.