CWE-79
AllowedImproper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting')
Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable
The product does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes user-controllable input before it is placed in output that is used as a web page that is served to other users.
68772 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-86H6-4672-7VX7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-10-29 15:32 – Updated: 2026-04-01 18:32Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation (XSS or 'Cross-site Scripting') vulnerability in Ali Azlan Risk Warning Bar allows Reflected XSS.This issue affects Risk Warning Bar: from n/a through 1.0.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-49638"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-10-29T13:15:05Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation (XSS or \u0027Cross-site Scripting\u0027) vulnerability in Ali Azlan Risk Warning Bar allows Reflected XSS.This issue affects Risk Warning Bar: from n/a through 1.0.",
"id": "GHSA-86h6-4672-7vx7",
"modified": "2026-04-01T18:32:13Z",
"published": "2024-10-29T15:32:05Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-49638"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/Wordpress/Plugin/risk-warning-bar/vulnerability/wordpress-risk-warning-bar-plugin-1-0-reflected-cross-site-scripting-xss-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/vulnerability/risk-warning-bar/wordpress-risk-warning-bar-plugin-1-0-reflected-cross-site-scripting-xss-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-86HM-6F3J-6HMV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-06-24 00:00 – Updated: 2022-06-30 00:0074cmsSE v3.5.1 was discovered to contain a reflective cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability via the path /company.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-32126"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-06-23T17:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "74cmsSE v3.5.1 was discovered to contain a reflective cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability via the path /company.",
"id": "GHSA-86hm-6f3j-6hmv",
"modified": "2022-06-30T00:00:41Z",
"published": "2022-06-24T00:00:30Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-32126"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/PAINCLOWN/74cmsSE-Arbitrary-File-Reading/issues/3"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-86HP-CRVX-3QVR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-30 21:30 – Updated: 2026-01-02 15:30An HTML Injection vulnerability in TrueConf server 5.5.2.10813 in the conference description field allows an attacker to inject arbitrary HTML in the Create/Edit conference functionality. The payload will be triggered when the victim opens the Conference Info page ([conference url]/info).
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-66823"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-12-30T20:16:01Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "An HTML Injection vulnerability in TrueConf server 5.5.2.10813 in the conference description field allows an attacker to inject arbitrary HTML in the Create/Edit conference functionality. The payload will be triggered when the victim opens the Conference Info page ([conference url]/info).",
"id": "GHSA-86hp-crvx-3qvr",
"modified": "2026-01-02T15:30:25Z",
"published": "2025-12-30T21:30:33Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-66823"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/x00nullbit/CVE-References/blob/main/CVE-2025-66823/README.md"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://trueconf.com"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-86HP-HF3J-3M8R
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-18 12:40 – Updated: 2026-06-19 14:52Cotonti 1.0.0 (master branch, commit f43f1fc3) is vulnerable to stored Cross-Site Scripting in the Personal File Storage (PFS) module. A folder title (pff_title) is imported with the 'TXT' filter, which does not strip or encode HTML (the tag check in cot_import is disabled), so an authenticated user can store HTML/JavaScript in a folder title. In modules/pfs/inc/pfs.main.php the title is assigned to the template variable PFF_ROW_TITLE without htmlspecialchars(), and modules/pfs/tpl/pfs.tpl outputs {PFF_ROW_TITLE} unescaped. When the folder listing is viewed (including by other users for public folders), the injected script executes in the victim's browser.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "cotonti/cotonti"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "1.0.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-55746"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-19T14:52:31Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-18T08:16:34Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Cotonti 1.0.0 (master branch, commit f43f1fc3) is vulnerable to stored Cross-Site Scripting in the Personal File Storage (PFS) module. A folder title (pff_title) is imported with the \u0027TXT\u0027 filter, which does not strip or encode HTML (the tag check in cot_import is disabled), so an authenticated user can store HTML/JavaScript in a folder title. In modules/pfs/inc/pfs.main.php the title is assigned to the template variable PFF_ROW_TITLE without htmlspecialchars(), and modules/pfs/tpl/pfs.tpl outputs {PFF_ROW_TITLE} unescaped. When the folder listing is viewed (including by other users for public folders), the injected script executes in the victim\u0027s browser.",
"id": "GHSA-86hp-hf3j-3m8r",
"modified": "2026-06-19T14:52:31Z",
"published": "2026-06-18T12:40:26Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-55746"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/Cotonti/Cotonti"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Cotonti/Cotonti/blob/f43f1fc38ba4e02027786dad9dac1435c7c52b30/modules/pfs/inc/pfs.main.php#L396"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:P/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Cotonti: Stored Cross-Site Scripting in the Personal File Storage (PFS) module"
}
GHSA-86HP-QH9J-V6JV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-02 06:18 – Updated: 2022-05-02 06:18Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in HP System Insight Manager before 6.0 allows remote attackers to inject arbitrary web script or HTML via unspecified vectors.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2010-1036"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2010-04-28T22:30:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in HP System Insight Manager before 6.0 allows remote attackers to inject arbitrary web script or HTML via unspecified vectors.",
"id": "GHSA-86hp-qh9j-v6jv",
"modified": "2022-05-02T06:18:19Z",
"published": "2022-05-02T06:18:19Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2010-1036"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://marc.info/?l=bugtraq\u0026m=127239985506823\u0026w=2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/39645"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://securitytracker.com/id?1023927"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/39735"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-86J7-9J95-VPQJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-07 20:55 – Updated: 2026-07-07 20:55Am I affected?
Check each condition. Users are affected when all of the first three hold.
- Their application enables the
oidc-providerplugin or themcpplugin frombetter-auth/plugins. Themcpplugin wraps the same provider and carries the same defect. Both are on the migration path to@better-auth/oauth-provider, which is not affected. - Their application
better-authversion is1.6.12or earlier on the stable line, or any1.7.0-betabuild on the pre-release line. Both release lines carry the same defect. - Their application consent page is a client component that reads
redirectURIfrom theauthClient.oauth2.consent(...)response and assigns it to a browser navigation target such aswindow.location.href,location.assign, orlocation.replace.
Two conditions raise an application's exposure:
- It sets
allowDynamicClientRegistration: true. Client registration is then unauthenticated, so any visitor can plant the malicious client. The default isfalse, which limits planting to authenticated users. - It exposes the consent page to ordinary end users rather than to a restricted operator audience.
A developer's application is not affected when any of these hold:
- Their application copied the project's
consent-buttons.tsxdemo verbatim. That file reads aurifield that this plugin never returns, so its navigation branch never runs and it falls through to an error toast. - Their application completse the consent flow with a server-side redirect, for example a Next.js or Remix server action. Browsers do not follow a
javascript:URL delivered in aLocationresponse header. - Their application uses
@better-auth/oauth-providerinstead of the deprecatedoidc-providerplugin.
Fix:
- Upgrade to
better-auth@1.6.13(stable) or1.7.0-beta.4(pre-release). - If developers cannot upgrade their applications, see the workarounds below.
Summary
The deprecated oidc-provider plugin registers OAuth clients without validating the scheme of their redirect_uris. An attacker stores a javascript: URI as a client redirect target, and the authorization server later returns that URI to the browser in the consent response. A consent page that navigates to the returned value then executes attacker JavaScript in the authorization-server origin, which exposes the victim's session and enables account takeover. The mcp plugin wraps the same provider and carries the same defect, so MCP server deployments are affected as well; like oidc-provider, it is migrating to @better-auth/oauth-provider.
Details
Client registration accepts any string. The registration body schema types redirect_uris as z.array(z.string()) with no scheme check, so POST /oauth2/register stores a value such as javascript:fetch('/api/auth/get-session')//. In the default configuration, allowDynamicClientRegistration is false, so registration requires an authenticated session; any logged-in user qualifies. With dynamic client registration enabled, registration is unauthenticated.
The dangerous value then survives the authorization-code flow unchanged. GET /oauth2/authorize matches the request redirect_uri against the stored list by exact string equality, so the registered javascript: URI matches itself and is written into the consent verification record. When the user approves on the consent screen, the handler runs new URL(value.redirectURI), appends the authorization code through searchParams.set, and returns the result in JSON under the key redirectURI. The javascript: scheme passes through new URL intact, and a trailing // in the payload comments out the appended query string.
The plugin documents the consent call but not the redirect step that follows it, and it gives no warning that redirectURI can carry a dangerous scheme. The natural way an operator completes the flow is to assign res.data.redirectURI to window.location.href. Per the URL specification and browser behavior, navigating window.location to a javascript: URL executes the script body in the current document origin, which here is the authorization server. The injected script can call /api/auth/get-session and any other session-scoped endpoint in that origin.
The sibling @better-auth/oauth-provider package already prevents this. It validates the same field with SafeUrlSchema, which rejects the javascript:, data:, and vbscript: schemes and requires HTTPS or a loopback host. The deprecated plugin never received that control; the field shipped unvalidated when the registration endpoint was first added, well before the sibling package introduced SafeUrlSchema.
Patches
Fixed in better-auth@1.6.13 (stable) and 1.7.0-beta.4 (pre-release). The fix adds scheme validation to the redirect_uris of both the oidc-provider and mcp plugins, matching the control @better-auth/oauth-provider already enforces.
Workarounds
If developers cannot upgrade, apply one of the following.
- Harden the consent page. Before navigating, parse the returned value and navigate only when its scheme is
http:orhttps:. For example, reject the value whennew URL(redirectURI).protocolis neitherhttp:norhttps:, and show an error instead of navigating. This closes the sink regardless of what the server returns. - Migrate to
@better-auth/oauth-provider. It validates redirect URIs at registration and is the supported replacement for the deprecated plugin. - Keep
allowDynamicClientRegistrationat its default offalseand restrict who can register clients. This does not remove the issue, because any authenticated user can still register a malicious client, but it removes the unauthenticated path.
Impact
This is a stored DOM cross-site scripting issue in the authorization server's own origin, which leads to account takeover. An attacker who can register a client plants a javascript: redirect URI. A victim who visits the attacker's authorize URL and approves consent runs attacker JavaScript in the authorization-server origin. From there the script reads /api/auth/get-session, calls any session-scoped endpoint, and takes over the account. The consent screen shows the attacker-controlled client name, which makes the approval click easy to socially engineer.
The realized impact depends on one operator-side precondition: the consent page must assign the returned redirectURI to a navigation target. Better Auth itself never performs that navigation, which is why the assessed Attack Complexity is High and the score sits below a pure server-side execution flaw. The deprecated status of the oidc-provider plugin does not reduce the impact. The plugin remains published, importable, and documented, and users on the affected versions cannot opt out without changing their integration. The mcp plugin wraps the same provider and is affected on the same versions; its docs announce a move to @better-auth/oauth-provider, but until users migrate or upgrade, the affected published versions stay exposed. @better-auth/oauth-provider validates redirect URIs and provides MCP support, so it is the migration target for both plugins.
Credit
Reported by @hillalee
Resources
- CWE-79: Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting'). https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/79.html
- CWE-601: URL Redirection to Untrusted Site ('Open Redirect'). https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/601.html
- RFC 6749 (OAuth 2.0) Section 3.1.2, Redirection Endpoint: the redirection endpoint URI must be an absolute URI. https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6749#section-3.1.2
- MDN, javascript: URLs: navigating
window.locationto ajavascript:URL executes the script body. https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/URI/Reference/Schemes/javascript
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "better-auth"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.6.13"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "better-auth"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.7.0-beta.0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.7.0-beta.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-601",
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-07T20:55:28Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Am I affected?\n\nCheck each condition. Users are affected when all of the first three hold.\n\n- Their application enables the `oidc-provider` plugin or the `mcp` plugin from `better-auth/plugins`. The `mcp` plugin wraps the same provider and carries the same defect. Both are on the migration path to `@better-auth/oauth-provider`, which is not affected.\n- Their application `better-auth` version is `1.6.12` or earlier on the stable line, or any `1.7.0-beta` build on the pre-release line. Both release lines carry the same defect.\n- Their application consent page is a client component that reads `redirectURI` from the `authClient.oauth2.consent(...)` response and assigns it to a browser navigation target such as `window.location.href`, `location.assign`, or `location.replace`.\n\nTwo conditions raise an application\u0027s exposure:\n\n- It sets `allowDynamicClientRegistration: true`. Client registration is then unauthenticated, so any visitor can plant the malicious client. The default is `false`, which limits planting to authenticated users.\n- It exposes the consent page to ordinary end users rather than to a restricted operator audience.\n\nA developer\u0027s application is not affected when any of these hold:\n\n- Their application copied the project\u0027s `consent-buttons.tsx` demo verbatim. That file reads a `uri` field that this plugin never returns, so its navigation branch never runs and it falls through to an error toast.\n- Their application completse the consent flow with a server-side redirect, for example a Next.js or Remix server action. Browsers do not follow a `javascript:` URL delivered in a `Location` response header.\n- Their application uses `@better-auth/oauth-provider` instead of the deprecated `oidc-provider` plugin.\n\nFix:\n\n1. Upgrade to `better-auth@1.6.13` (stable) or `1.7.0-beta.4` (pre-release).\n2. If developers cannot upgrade their applications, see the workarounds below.\n\n### Summary\n\nThe deprecated `oidc-provider` plugin registers OAuth clients without validating the scheme of their `redirect_uris`. An attacker stores a `javascript:` URI as a client redirect target, and the authorization server later returns that URI to the browser in the consent response. A consent page that navigates to the returned value then executes attacker JavaScript in the authorization-server origin, which exposes the victim\u0027s session and enables account takeover. The `mcp` plugin wraps the same provider and carries the same defect, so MCP server deployments are affected as well; like `oidc-provider`, it is migrating to `@better-auth/oauth-provider`.\n\n### Details\n\nClient registration accepts any string. The registration body schema types `redirect_uris` as `z.array(z.string())` with no scheme check, so `POST /oauth2/register` stores a value such as `javascript:fetch(\u0027/api/auth/get-session\u0027)//`. In the default configuration, `allowDynamicClientRegistration` is `false`, so registration requires an authenticated session; any logged-in user qualifies. With dynamic client registration enabled, registration is unauthenticated.\n\nThe dangerous value then survives the authorization-code flow unchanged. `GET /oauth2/authorize` matches the request `redirect_uri` against the stored list by exact string equality, so the registered `javascript:` URI matches itself and is written into the consent verification record. When the user approves on the consent screen, the handler runs `new URL(value.redirectURI)`, appends the authorization code through `searchParams.set`, and returns the result in JSON under the key `redirectURI`. The `javascript:` scheme passes through `new URL` intact, and a trailing `//` in the payload comments out the appended query string.\n\nThe plugin documents the consent call but not the redirect step that follows it, and it gives no warning that `redirectURI` can carry a dangerous scheme. The natural way an operator completes the flow is to assign `res.data.redirectURI` to `window.location.href`. Per the URL specification and browser behavior, navigating `window.location` to a `javascript:` URL executes the script body in the current document origin, which here is the authorization server. The injected script can call `/api/auth/get-session` and any other session-scoped endpoint in that origin.\n\nThe sibling `@better-auth/oauth-provider` package already prevents this. It validates the same field with `SafeUrlSchema`, which rejects the `javascript:`, `data:`, and `vbscript:` schemes and requires HTTPS or a loopback host. The deprecated plugin never received that control; the field shipped unvalidated when the registration endpoint was first added, well before the sibling package introduced `SafeUrlSchema`.\n\n### Patches\n\nFixed in `better-auth@1.6.13` (stable) and `1.7.0-beta.4` (pre-release). The fix adds scheme validation to the `redirect_uris` of both the `oidc-provider` and `mcp` plugins, matching the control `@better-auth/oauth-provider` already enforces.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nIf developers cannot upgrade, apply one of the following.\n\n- Harden the consent page. Before navigating, parse the returned value and navigate only when its scheme is `http:` or `https:`. For example, reject the value when `new URL(redirectURI).protocol` is neither `http:` nor `https:`, and show an error instead of navigating. This closes the sink regardless of what the server returns.\n- Migrate to `@better-auth/oauth-provider`. It validates redirect URIs at registration and is the supported replacement for the deprecated plugin.\n- Keep `allowDynamicClientRegistration` at its default of `false` and restrict who can register clients. This does not remove the issue, because any authenticated user can still register a malicious client, but it removes the unauthenticated path.\n\n### Impact\n\nThis is a stored DOM cross-site scripting issue in the authorization server\u0027s own origin, which leads to account takeover. An attacker who can register a client plants a `javascript:` redirect URI. A victim who visits the attacker\u0027s authorize URL and approves consent runs attacker JavaScript in the authorization-server origin. From there the script reads `/api/auth/get-session`, calls any session-scoped endpoint, and takes over the account. The consent screen shows the attacker-controlled client name, which makes the approval click easy to socially engineer.\n\nThe realized impact depends on one operator-side precondition: the consent page must assign the returned `redirectURI` to a navigation target. Better Auth itself never performs that navigation, which is why the assessed Attack Complexity is High and the score sits below a pure server-side execution flaw. The deprecated status of the `oidc-provider` plugin does not reduce the impact. The plugin remains published, importable, and documented, and users on the affected versions cannot opt out without changing their integration. The `mcp` plugin wraps the same provider and is affected on the same versions; its docs announce a move to `@better-auth/oauth-provider`, but until users migrate or upgrade, the affected published versions stay exposed. `@better-auth/oauth-provider` validates redirect URIs and provides MCP support, so it is the migration target for both plugins.\n\n### Credit\n\nReported by @hillalee \n\n### Resources\n\n- CWE-79: Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation (\u0027Cross-site Scripting\u0027). https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/79.html\n- CWE-601: URL Redirection to Untrusted Site (\u0027Open Redirect\u0027). https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/601.html\n- RFC 6749 (OAuth 2.0) Section 3.1.2, Redirection Endpoint: the redirection endpoint URI must be an absolute URI. https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6749#section-3.1.2\n- MDN, javascript: URLs: navigating `window.location` to a `javascript:` URL executes the script body. https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/URI/Reference/Schemes/javascript",
"id": "GHSA-86j7-9j95-vpqj",
"modified": "2026-07-07T20:55:28Z",
"published": "2026-07-07T20:55:28Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/better-auth/better-auth/security/advisories/GHSA-86j7-9j95-vpqj"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/better-auth/better-auth"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/better-auth/better-auth/releases/tag/v1.6.13"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/better-auth/better-auth/releases/tag/v1.7.0-beta.4"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Better Auth has stored XSS in the auth-server origin via javascript: redirect_uri in oidc-provider and mcp"
}
GHSA-86J9-QMRW-64JX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-01-12 15:30 – Updated: 2023-01-20 21:30A vulnerability, which was classified as problematic, was found in earclink ESPCMS P8.21120101. Affected is an unknown function of the component Content Handler. The manipulation leads to cross site scripting. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. VDB-218154 is the identifier assigned to this vulnerability.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-0246"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-01-12T15:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A vulnerability, which was classified as problematic, was found in earclink ESPCMS P8.21120101. Affected is an unknown function of the component Content Handler. The manipulation leads to cross site scripting. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. VDB-218154 is the identifier assigned to this vulnerability.",
"id": "GHSA-86j9-qmrw-64jx",
"modified": "2023-01-20T21:30:27Z",
"published": "2023-01-12T15:30:24Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-0246"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://gitee.com/earclink/espcms/issues/I6812Q"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.218154"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.218154"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-86JJ-69GR-C7XX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-08-13 00:31 – Updated: 2024-08-13 00:31Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation (XSS or 'Cross-site Scripting') vulnerability in CreativeMindsSolutions CM Tooltip Glossary allows Stored XSS.This issue affects CM Tooltip Glossary: from n/a through 4.3.7.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-43149"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-08-12T23:15:18Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation (XSS or \u0027Cross-site Scripting\u0027) vulnerability in CreativeMindsSolutions CM Tooltip Glossary allows Stored XSS.This issue affects CM Tooltip Glossary: from n/a through 4.3.7.",
"id": "GHSA-86jj-69gr-c7xx",
"modified": "2024-08-13T00:31:43Z",
"published": "2024-08-13T00:31:43Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-43149"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/vulnerability/enhanced-tooltipglossary/wordpress-cm-tooltip-glossary-plugin-4-3-7-cross-site-scripting-xss-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-86JV-VVJM-W37G
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-04 18:30 – Updated: 2025-12-05 21:30A stored cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability was discovered in Seafile Community Edition prior to version 13.0.12. When Seafile is configured with the Golang file server, an attacker can upload a crafted SVG file containing malicious JavaScript and share it using a public link. Opening the link triggers script execution in the victim's browser. This issue has been fixed in Seafile Community Edition 13.0.12.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-65516"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-12-04T16:16:22Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A stored cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability was discovered in Seafile Community Edition prior to version 13.0.12. When Seafile is configured with the Golang file server, an attacker can upload a crafted SVG file containing malicious JavaScript and share it using a public link. Opening the link triggers script execution in the victim\u0027s browser. This issue has been fixed in Seafile Community Edition 13.0.12.",
"id": "GHSA-86jv-vvjm-w37g",
"modified": "2025-12-05T21:30:23Z",
"published": "2025-12-04T18:30:53Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-65516"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://gist.github.com/x0root/e5597622fede55b320d29a248dce01e6"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://manual.seafile.com/latest/changelog/server-changelog"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-86JX-VMQR-M9HG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 16:45 – Updated: 2026-06-22 21:30An issue was discovered in app/webroot/js/misp.js in MISP before 2.4.107. There is persistent XSS via image names in titles, as demonstrated by a screenshot.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2019-11814"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2019-05-08T13:29:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "An issue was discovered in app/webroot/js/misp.js in MISP before 2.4.107. There is persistent XSS via image names in titles, as demonstrated by a screenshot.",
"id": "GHSA-86jx-vmqr-m9hg",
"modified": "2026-06-22T21:30:40Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T16:45:22Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-11814"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/62f15433e42fb92e45bd57dd6fc0c0bf53deb6fc"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation MIT-4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
- Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
- Examples of libraries and frameworks that make it easier to generate properly encoded output include Microsoft's Anti-XSS library, the OWASP ESAPI Encoding module, and Apache Wicket.
Mitigation
- Understand the context in which your data will be used and the encoding that will be expected. This is especially important when transmitting data between different components, or when generating outputs that can contain multiple encodings at the same time, such as web pages or multi-part mail messages. Study all expected communication protocols and data representations to determine the required encoding strategies.
- For any data that will be output to another web page, especially any data that was received from external inputs, use the appropriate encoding on all non-alphanumeric characters.
- Parts of the same output document may require different encodings, which will vary depending on whether the output is in the:
- etc. Note that HTML Entity Encoding is only appropriate for the HTML body.
- Consult the XSS Prevention Cheat Sheet [REF-724] for more details on the types of encoding and escaping that are needed.
- HTML body
- Element attributes (such as src="XYZ")
- URIs
- JavaScript sections
- Cascading Style Sheets and style property
Mitigation MIT-6
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
Understand all the potential areas where untrusted inputs can enter your software: parameters or arguments, cookies, anything read from the network, environment variables, reverse DNS lookups, query results, request headers, URL components, e-mail, files, filenames, databases, and any external systems that provide data to the application. Remember that such inputs may be obtained indirectly through API calls.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-27
Strategy: Parameterization
If available, use structured mechanisms that automatically enforce the separation between data and code. These mechanisms may be able to provide the relevant quoting, encoding, and validation automatically, instead of relying on the developer to provide this capability at every point where output is generated.
Mitigation MIT-30.1
Strategy: Output Encoding
- Use and specify an output encoding that can be handled by the downstream component that is reading the output. Common encodings include ISO-8859-1, UTF-7, and UTF-8. When an encoding is not specified, a downstream component may choose a different encoding, either by assuming a default encoding or automatically inferring which encoding is being used, which can be erroneous. When the encodings are inconsistent, the downstream component might treat some character or byte sequences as special, even if they are not special in the original encoding. Attackers might then be able to exploit this discrepancy and conduct injection attacks; they even might be able to bypass protection mechanisms that assume the original encoding is also being used by the downstream component.
- The problem of inconsistent output encodings often arises in web pages. If an encoding is not specified in an HTTP header, web browsers often guess about which encoding is being used. This can open up the browser to subtle XSS attacks.
Mitigation MIT-43
With Struts, write all data from form beans with the bean's filter attribute set to true.
Mitigation MIT-31
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
To help mitigate XSS attacks against the user's session cookie, set the session cookie to be HttpOnly. In browsers that support the HttpOnly feature (such as more recent versions of Internet Explorer and Firefox), this attribute can prevent the user's session cookie from being accessible to malicious client-side scripts that use document.cookie. This is not a complete solution, since HttpOnly is not supported by all browsers. More importantly, XmlHttpRequest and other powerful browser technologies provide read access to HTTP headers, including the Set-Cookie header in which the HttpOnly flag is set.
Mitigation MIT-5
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When dynamically constructing web pages, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set based on the expected value of the parameter in the request. All input should be validated and cleansed, not just parameters that the user is supposed to specify, but all data in the request, including hidden fields, cookies, headers, the URL itself, and so forth. A common mistake that leads to continuing XSS vulnerabilities is to validate only fields that are expected to be redisplayed by the site. It is common to see data from the request that is reflected by the application server or the application that the development team did not anticipate. Also, a field that is not currently reflected may be used by a future developer. Therefore, validating ALL parts of the HTTP request is recommended.
- Note that proper output encoding, escaping, and quoting is the most effective solution for preventing XSS, although input validation may provide some defense-in-depth. This is because it effectively limits what will appear in output. Input validation will not always prevent XSS, especially if you are required to support free-form text fields that could contain arbitrary characters. For example, in a chat application, the heart emoticon ("<3") would likely pass the validation step, since it is commonly used. However, it cannot be directly inserted into the web page because it contains the "<" character, which would need to be escaped or otherwise handled. In this case, stripping the "<" might reduce the risk of XSS, but it would produce incorrect behavior because the emoticon would not be recorded. This might seem to be a minor inconvenience, but it would be more important in a mathematical forum that wants to represent inequalities.
- Even if you make a mistake in your validation (such as forgetting one out of 100 input fields), appropriate encoding is still likely to protect you from injection-based attacks. As long as it is not done in isolation, input validation is still a useful technique, since it may significantly reduce your attack surface, allow you to detect some attacks, and provide other security benefits that proper encoding does not address.
- Ensure that you perform input validation at well-defined interfaces within the application. This will help protect the application even if a component is reused or moved elsewhere.
Mitigation MIT-21
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
Mitigation MIT-16
Strategy: Environment Hardening
When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
CAPEC-209: XSS Using MIME Type Mismatch
An adversary creates a file with scripting content but where the specified MIME type of the file is such that scripting is not expected. The adversary tricks the victim into accessing a URL that responds with the script file. Some browsers will detect that the specified MIME type of the file does not match the actual type of its content and will automatically switch to using an interpreter for the real content type. If the browser does not invoke script filters before doing this, the adversary's script may run on the target unsanitized, possibly revealing the victim's cookies or executing arbitrary script in their browser.
CAPEC-588: DOM-Based XSS
This type of attack is a form of Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) where a malicious script is inserted into the client-side HTML being parsed by a web browser. Content served by a vulnerable web application includes script code used to manipulate the Document Object Model (DOM). This script code either does not properly validate input, or does not perform proper output encoding, thus creating an opportunity for an adversary to inject a malicious script launch a XSS attack. A key distinction between other XSS attacks and DOM-based attacks is that in other XSS attacks, the malicious script runs when the vulnerable web page is initially loaded, while a DOM-based attack executes sometime after the page loads. Another distinction of DOM-based attacks is that in some cases, the malicious script is never sent to the vulnerable web server at all. An attack like this is guaranteed to bypass any server-side filtering attempts to protect users.
CAPEC-591: Reflected XSS
This type of attack is a form of Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) where a malicious script is "reflected" off a vulnerable web application and then executed by a victim's browser. The process starts with an adversary delivering a malicious script to a victim and convincing the victim to send the script to the vulnerable web application.
CAPEC-592: Stored XSS
An adversary utilizes a form of Cross-site Scripting (XSS) where a malicious script is persistently "stored" within the data storage of a vulnerable web application as valid input.
CAPEC-63: Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
An adversary embeds malicious scripts in content that will be served to web browsers. The goal of the attack is for the target software, the client-side browser, to execute the script with the users' privilege level. An attack of this type exploits a programs' vulnerabilities that are brought on by allowing remote hosts to execute code and scripts. Web browsers, for example, have some simple security controls in place, but if a remote attacker is allowed to execute scripts (through injecting them in to user-generated content like bulletin boards) then these controls may be bypassed. Further, these attacks are very difficult for an end user to detect.
CAPEC-85: AJAX Footprinting
This attack utilizes the frequent client-server roundtrips in Ajax conversation to scan a system. While Ajax does not open up new vulnerabilities per se, it does optimize them from an attacker point of view. A common first step for an attacker is to footprint the target environment to understand what attacks will work. Since footprinting relies on enumeration, the conversational pattern of rapid, multiple requests and responses that are typical in Ajax applications enable an attacker to look for many vulnerabilities, well-known ports, network locations and so on. The knowledge gained through Ajax fingerprinting can be used to support other attacks, such as XSS.